Coordinating unspecified living kidney donation and transplantation across the blood-type barrier in kidney exchange

Downregulation of Swine Leukocyte Antigen Expression Decreases the Strength of Xenogeneic Immune Responses towards Renal Proximal Tubular Epithelial Cells

Xenotransplantation reemerged as a promising alternative to conventional transplantation enlarging the available organ pool. However, success of xenotransplantation depends on the design and selection of specific genetic modifications and on the development of robust assays allowing for a precise assessment of tissue-specific immune responses. Nevertheless, cell-based assays are often compromised by low proliferative capacity of primary cells. Proximal tubular epithelial cells (PTECs) play a crucial role in kidney function. Here, we generated immortalized PTECs (imPTECs) by overexpression of simian virus 40 T large antigen. ImPTECs not only showed typical morphology and phenotype, but, in contrast to primary PTECs, they maintained steady cell cycling rates and functionality. Furthermore, swine leukocyte antigen (SLA) class I and class II transcript levels were reduced by up to 85% after transduction with lentiviral vectors encoding for short hairpin RNAs targeting β2-microglobulin and the class II transactivator. This contributed to reducing xenogeneic T-cell cytotoxicity (p < 0.01) and decreasing secretion of pro-inflammatory cytokines such as IL-6 and IFN-γ. This study showed the feasibility of generating highly proliferative PTECs and the development of tissue-specific immunomonitoring assays. Silencing SLA expression on PTECs was demonstrated to be an effective strategy to prevent xenogeneic cellular immune responses and may strongly support graft survival after xenotransplantation.

Increasing Kidney-Exchange Options Within the Existing Living Donor Pool With CIAT: A Pilot Implementation Study

Computerized integration of alternative transplantation programs (CIAT) is a kidney-exchange program that allows AB0- and/or HLA-incompatible allocation to difficult-to-match patients, thereby increasing their chances. Altruistic donors make this available for waiting list patients as well. Strict criteria were defined for selected highly-immunized (sHI) and long waiting (LW) candidates. For LW patients AB0i allocation was allowed. sHI patients were given priority and AB0i and/or CDC cross-match negative HLAi allocations were allowed. A local pilot was established between 2017 and 2022. CIAT results were assessed against all other transplant programs available. In the period studied there were 131 incompatible couples; CIAT transplanted the highest number of couples (35%), compared to the other programs. There were 55 sHI patients; CIAT transplanted as many sHI patients as the Acceptable Mismatch program (18%); Other programs contributed less. There were 69 LW patients; 53% received deceased donor transplantations, 20% were transplanted via CIAT. In total, 72 CIAT transplants were performed: 66 compatible, 5 AB0i and 1 both AB0i and HLAi. CIAT increased opportunities for difficult-to-match patients, not by increasing pool size, but through prioritization and allowing AB0i and "low risk" HLAi allocation. CIAT is a powerful addition to the limited number of programs available for difficult-to-match patients.

The Health Value of Kidney Exchange and Altruistic Donation

OBJECTIVES

Living donor kidney transplantation (LTx) is the preferred treatment for patients with end-stage renal disease. Kidney exchange programs (KEPs) promote LTx by facilitating exchange of donors among patients who are not compatible with their donors. We analyze and maximize the efficacy and effectiveness of KEPS from a health value perspective and the health value of altruistic donation in KEPs.

METHODS

We developed a Markov model for the health outcomes of patients, which was embedded in a discrete event simulation model to assess the effectiveness of allocation policies in KEPs. A new allocation policy to maximize health value was developed on the basis of integer programing techniques. The evidence-based transition probabilities in the Markov model were based on data from the Dutch KEP using a variety of econometric models. Scenarios analysis was presented to improve robustness.

RESULTS

The efficacy of the Dutch KEP without altruistic donation is reflected by the increase in expected discounted quality-adjusted life-years (QALYs) by 3.23 from 6.42 to 9.65. The present Dutch policy and the policy to maximize the number of transplants achieve 63% of the potential efficacy gain (2.11 discounted QALYs). The new policy achieves 69% of this gain (2.33 discounted QALYs). When systematically enrolling altruistic donors in the KEP, the new policy increased expected discounted QALYs by 4.05 to 10.27 and reduced inequities for patients with blood type O.

CONCLUSIONS

The Dutch KEP can increase health value for patients by more than half. An allocation policy that maximizes health outcomes and maximally allows altruistic donation can yield significant further improvements.

Kidney Exchange Program Reporting Standards: Evidence-Based Consensus From Europe

Background: Kidney Exchange Programs can play an important role to increase access to the life saving and most cost-effective treatment for End Stage Renal Disease. The rise of national KEPs in Europe brings a need for standardized performance reporting to facilitate the development of an international evidence base on program practices.

Methods: We systematically searched and reviewed the literature to extract kidney exchange program performance measures. Reported measures were initially categorized as structure, process, and outcome measures. Expert feedback was used to redefine categories and extend the set of measures to be considered. Using the Delphi method and a panel of 10 experts, the resulting measures were subsequently classified as mandatory (Base set), optional (Extended set), or deleted.

Results: Out of the initial 1,668 articles identified by systematic literature search, 21 European publications on kidney exchange programs were included to collect performance measures, accompanied by three national program reports. The final measurement categories were Context, Population, Enrollment, Matching, Transplantation, and Outcomes. The set of performance measures resulting from the literature review was modified and classified as mandatory or optional. The resulting Base set and Extended set form the kidney exchange program reporting standard.

Conclusions: The evidence-based and consensus-based kidney exchange program reporting standard can harmonize practical and scientific reporting on kidney exchange programs, thus facilitating the advancement of national programs. In addition, the kidney exchange program reporting standard can promote and align cross-national programs.

Creating Options for Difficult-to-match Kidney Transplant Candidates

BACKGROUND

Most transplantation centers recognize a small patient population that unsuccessfully participates in all available, both living and deceased donor, transplantation programs for many years: the difficult-to-match patients. This population consists of highly immunized and/or ABO blood group O or B patients.

METHODS

To improve their chances, Computerized Integration of Alternative Transplantation programs (CIAT) were developed to integrate kidney paired donation, altruistic/unspecified donation, and ABO and HLA desensitization. To compare CIAT with reality, a simulation was performed, including all patients, donors, and pairs who participated in our programs in 2015-2016. Criteria for inclusion as difficult-to-match, selected-highly immunized (sHI) patient were as follows: virtual panel reactive antibody >85% and participating for 2 years in Eurotransplant Acceptable Mismatch program. sHI patients were given priority, and ABO blood group incompatible (ABOi) and/or HLA incompatible (HLAi) matching with donor-specific antigen-mean fluorescence intensity (MFI) <8000 were allowed. For long-waiting blood group O or B patients, ABOi matches were allowed.

RESULTS

In reality, 90 alternative program transplantations were carried out: 73 compatible, 16 ABOi, and 1 both ABOi and HLAi combination. Simulation with CIAT resulted in 95 hypothetical transplantations: 83 compatible (including 1 sHI) and 5 ABOi combinations. Eight sHI patients were matched: 1 compatible, 6 HLAi with donor-specific antigen-MFI <8000 (1 also ABOi), and 1 ABOi match. Six/eight combinations for sHI patients were complement-dependent cytotoxicity cross-match negative.

CONCLUSIONS

CIAT led to 8 times more matches for difficult-to-match sHI patients. This offers them better chances because of a more favorable MFI profile against the new donor. Besides, more ABO compatible matches were found for ABOi couples, while total number of transplantations was not hampered. Prioritizing difficult-to-match patients improves their chances without affecting the chances of regular patients.

Swaps and Chains and Vouchers, Oh My!: Evaluating How Saving More Lives Impacts the Equitable Allocation of Live Donor Kidneys

Live kidney donation involves a delicate balance between saving the most lives possible and maintaining a transplant system that is fair to the many thousands of patients on the transplant waiting list. Federal law and regulations require that kidney allocation be equitable, but the pressure to save patients subject to ever-lengthening waiting times for a transplant has been swinging the balance toward optimizing utility at the expense of justice. This article traces the progression of innovations created to make optimum use of a patient's own live donors. It starts with the simplest - direct donation by family members - and ends with voucher donations, a very recent and unique innovation because the donor can donate 20 or more years before the intended recipient is expected to need a kidney. In return for the donation, the intended recipient receives a voucher that can be redeemed for a live kidney when it is needed. Other innovations that are discussed include kidney exchanges and list paired donation, which are used to facilitate donor swaps when donor/recipient pairs have incompatible blood types. The discussion of each new innovation shows how the equity issues build on each other and how, with each new innovation, it becomes progressively harder to find an acceptable balance between utility and justice. The article culminates with an analysis of two recent allocation methods that have the potential to save many additional lives, but also affirmatively harm some patients on the deceased donor waiting list by increasing their waiting time for a life-saving kidney. The article concludes that saving additional lives does not justify harming patients on the waiting list unless that harm can be minimized. It also proposes solutions to minimize the harm so these new innovations can equitably perform their intended function of stimulating additional transplants and extending the lives of many transplant patients.

BARTERING FOR A COMPATIBLE KIDNEY USING YOUR INCOMPATIBLE, LIVE KIDNEY DONOR: LEGAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES RELATED TO KIDNEY CHAINS

Kidney chains are a recent and novel method of increasing the number of available kidneys for transplantation and have the potential to save thousands of lives. However, because they are novel, kidney chains do not fit neatly within existing legal and ethicalframeworks, raising potential barriers to their full implementation. Kidney chains are an extension of paired kidney donation, which began in the United States in 2000. Paired kidney donations allow kidney patients with willing, but incompatible, donors to swap donors to increase the number of donor/recipient pairs and consequently, the number of transplants. More recently, transplant centers have been using non-simultaneous, extended, altruistic donor ("NEAD") kidney chains--which consist of a sequence of donations by incompatible donors--to further expand the number of donations. This Article fully explains paired kidney donation and kidney chains and focuses on whether NEAD chains are more coercive than traditional kidney donation to a family member or close friend and whether NEAD chains violate the National Organ Transplant Act's prohibition on the transfer of organs for valuable consideration.