"Fantastic thinking" in pathologically proven Pick disease

Psychosis in Neurodegenerative Dementias: A Systematic Comparative Review

Background

Psychosis, characterized by delusions and/or hallucinations, is frequently observed during the progression of Alzheimer's disease (AD) and other neurodegenerative dementias (ND) (i.e., dementia with Lewy bodies (DLB), and frontotemporal dementia (FTD)) and cause diagnostic and management difficulties.

Objective

This review aims at presenting a concise and up-to-date overview of psychotic symptoms that occur in patients with ND with a comparative approach.

Methods

A systematic review was conducted following the PRISMA guidelines. 98 original studies investigating psychosis phenotypes in neurodegenerative dementias were identified (40 cohort studies, 57 case reports).

Results

Psychosis is a frequently observed phenomenon during the course of ND, with reported prevalence ranging from 22.5% to 54.1% in AD, 55.9% to 73.9% in DLB, and 18% to 42% in FTD. Throughout all stages of these diseases, noticeable patterns emerge depending on their underlying causes. Misidentification delusions (16.6-78.3%) and visual hallucinations (50-69.6%) are frequently observed in DLB, while paranoid ideas and somatic preoccupations seem to be particularly common in AD and FTD, (respectively 9.1-60.3% and 3.10-41.5%). Limited data were found regarding psychosis in the early stages of these disorders.

Conclusions

Literature data suggest that different ND are associated with noticeable variations in psychotic phenotypes, reflecting disease-specific tendencies. Further studies focusing on the early stages of these disorders are necessary to enhance our understanding of early psychotic manifestations associated with ND and help in differential diagnosis issues.

Frontolimbic affective bias and false narratives from brain disease

Since the nineteenth century, clinicians and investigators have systematically evaluated the origin of delusions and psychotic thinking. One major clue to understanding the neurobiological underpinnings of delusions is the emergence of false narratives from brain disease. In addition to delusions themselves, there are a range of other false narratives not due to deliberate lying and resulting from neurological disorders, including provoked confabulations, fantastic confabulations, false memories, magical thinking, dream delusions, and "fantastic thinking". A comparison of their characteristics, similarities, and differences suggest a hypothesis: despite different sources for their false narrative experiences, such as unusual thoughts or perceptions, all false narratives from brain disease involve erroneous or mismatched "affective biases" applied to the experiences. Affective labels usually signal the sense of rightness, sense of familiarity, and the external vs. internal origin of an experience, and they can be altered by limbic neuropathology. The location and involvement of neuropathology that facilitates false narratives involves frontolimbic regions and their connections, particularly on the right. Future investigations can focus on frontolimbic mechanisms involved in the provision of the intrinsically-linked affective biases, which indicate the nature and external/internal origin of experiences.

A neurophenomenological model for the role of the hippocampus in temporal consciousness. Evidence from confabulation

Confabulation, the production of statements or actions that are unintentionally incongruous to the subject's history, background, present and future situation, is a rather infrequent disorder with different aetiologies and anatomical lesions. Although they may differ in many ways, confabulations show major similarities. Their content, with some minor exceptions, is plausible and therefore indistinguishable from true memories, unless one is familiar with the patient's history, background, present and future situation. They extend through the whole individuals' temporality, including their past, present and future. Accordingly, we have proposed that rather than a mere memory disorder; confabulation reflects a distortion of Temporal Consciousness (TC), i.e., a specific form of consciousness that allows individuals to locate objects and events according to their subjective temporality. Another feature that confabulators share is that, regardless of their lesion's location, they all have a relatively preserved hippocampus (Hip), at least unilaterally. In this article, we review data showing differences and similarities among forms of confabulation. We then describe a model showing that the hippocampus is crucial both for the normal functioning of TC and as the generator of confabulations, and that different types of confabulation can be traced back to a distortion of TC resulting from damage or disconnection of brain areas directly or indirectly connected to the hippocampus. We conclude by comparing our model with other models of memory and confabulation.

The false memory syndrome: experimental studies and comparison to confabulations

False memories, or recollections that are factually incorrect but strongly believed, remain a source of confusion for both psychiatrists and neurologists. We propose model for false memories based on recent experimental investigations, particularly when analyzed in comparison to confabulations, which are the equivalent of false memories from neurological disease. Studies using the Deese/Roedinger-McDermott experimental paradigm indicate that false memories are associated with the need for complete and integrated memories, self-relevancy, imagination and wish fulfillment, familiarity, emotional facilitation, suggestibility, and sexual content. In comparison, confabulations are associated with the same factors except for emotional facilitation, suggestibility, and sexual content. Both false memories and confabulations have an abnormal sense of certainty for their recollections, and neuroanatomical findings implicate decreased activity in the ventromedial frontal lobe in this certainty. In summary, recent studies of false memories in comparison to confabulations support a model of false memories as internally-generated but suggestible and emotionally-facilitated fantasies or impulses, rather than repressed memories of real events. Furthermore, like confabulations, in order for false memories to occur there must be an attenuation of the normal, nonconscious, right frontal "doubt tag" regarding their certainty.