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Alajmi M, Roy S. An evolutionary differential game for regulating the role of monoclonal antibodies in treating signalling pathways in oesophageal cancer. ROYAL SOCIETY OPEN SCIENCE 2024; 11:240347. [PMID: 39086820 PMCID: PMC11289643 DOI: 10.1098/rsos.240347] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/12/2024] [Revised: 05/21/2024] [Accepted: 06/11/2024] [Indexed: 08/02/2024]
Abstract
This work presents a new framework for a competitive evolutionary game between monoclonal antibodies and signalling pathways in oesophageal cancer. The framework is based on a novel dynamical model that takes into account the dynamic progression of signalling pathways, resistance mechanisms and monoclonal antibody therapies. This game involves a scenario in which signalling pathways and monoclonal antibodies are the players competing against each other, where monoclonal antibodies use Brentuximab and Pembrolizumab dosages as strategies to counter the evolutionary resistance strategy implemented by the signalling pathways. Their interactions are described by the dynamical model, which serves as the game's playground. The analysis and computation of two game-theoretic strategies, Stackelberg and Nash equilibria, are conducted within this framework to ascertain the most favourable outcome for the patient. By comparing Stackelberg equilibria with Nash equilibria, numerical experiments show that the Stackelberg equilibria are superior for treating signalling pathways and are critical for the success of monoclonal antibodies in improving oesophageal cancer patient outcomes.
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Affiliation(s)
- Mesfer Alajmi
- Department of Mathematics, The University of Texas at Arlington, Arlington, TX76019-0407, USA
| | - Souvik Roy
- Department of Mathematics, The University of Texas at Arlington, Arlington, TX76019-0407, USA
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2
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Allen B. Symmetry in models of natural selection. J R Soc Interface 2023; 20:20230306. [PMID: 37963562 PMCID: PMC10645516 DOI: 10.1098/rsif.2023.0306] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/27/2023] [Accepted: 10/20/2023] [Indexed: 11/16/2023] Open
Abstract
Symmetry arguments are frequently used-often implicitly-in mathematical modelling of natural selection. Symmetry simplifies the analysis of models and reduces the number of distinct population states to be considered. Here, I introduce a formal definition of symmetry in mathematical models of natural selection. This definition applies to a broad class of models that satisfy a minimal set of assumptions, using a framework developed in previous works. In this framework, population structure is represented by a set of sites at which alleles can live, and transitions occur via replacement of some alleles by copies of others. A symmetry is defined as a permutation of sites that preserves probabilities of replacement and mutation. The symmetries of a given selection process form a group, which acts on population states in a way that preserves the Markov chain representing selection. Applying classical results on group actions, I formally characterize the use of symmetry to reduce the states of this Markov chain, and obtain bounds on the number of states in the reduced chain.
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Affiliation(s)
- Benjamin Allen
- Department of Mathematics, Emmanuel College, Boston, MA, USA
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3
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Schimit PH, Pereira FH, Broom M. Good predictors for the fixation probability on complex networks of multi-player games using territorial interactions. ECOLOGICAL COMPLEXITY 2022. [DOI: 10.1016/j.ecocom.2022.101017] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/17/2022]
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4
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Monk T, van Schaik A. Wald’s martingale and the conditional distributions of absorption time in the Moran process. Proc Math Phys Eng Sci 2020. [DOI: 10.1098/rspa.2020.0135] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/12/2022] Open
Abstract
Many models of evolution are stochastic processes, where some quantity of interest fluctuates randomly in time. One classic example is the Moranbirth–death process, where that quantity is the number of mutants in a population. In such processes, we are often interested in their absorption (i.e. fixation) probabilities and the conditional distributions of absorption time. Those conditional time distributions can be very difficult to calculate, even for relatively simple processes like the Moran birth–death model. Instead of considering the time to absorption, we consider a closely related quantity: the number of mutant population size changes before absorption. We use Wald’s martingale to obtain the conditional characteristic functions of that quantity in the Moran process. Our expressions are novel, analytical and exact, and their parameter dependence is explicit. We use our results to approximate the conditional characteristic functions of absorption time. We state the conditions under which that approximation is particularly accurate. Martingales are an elegant framework to solve principal problems of evolutionary stochastic processes. They do not require us to evaluate recursion relations, so when they are applicable, we can quickly and tractably obtain absorption probabilities and times of evolutionary models.
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Affiliation(s)
- Travis Monk
- International Centre for Neuromorphic Engineering, MARCS Institute, Western Sydney University, Werrington, NSW 2747, Australia
| | - André van Schaik
- International Centre for Neuromorphic Engineering, MARCS Institute, Western Sydney University, Werrington, NSW 2747, Australia
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5
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Stanková K, Brown JS, Dalton WS, Gatenby RA. Optimizing Cancer Treatment Using Game Theory: A Review. JAMA Oncol 2019; 5:96-103. [PMID: 30098166 DOI: 10.1001/jamaoncol.2018.3395] [Citation(s) in RCA: 81] [Impact Index Per Article: 16.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/27/2022]
Abstract
Importance While systemic therapy for disseminated cancer is often initially successful, malignant cells, using diverse adaptive strategies encoded in the human genome, almost invariably evolve resistance, leading to treatment failure. Thus, the Darwinian dynamics of resistance are formidable barriers to all forms of systemic cancer treatment but rarely integrated into clinical trial design or included within precision oncology initiatives. Observations We investigate cancer treatment as a game theoretic contest between the physician's therapy and the cancer cells' resistance strategies. This game has 2 critical asymmetries: (1) Only the physician can play rationally. Cancer cells, like all evolving organisms, can only adapt to current conditions; they can neither anticipate nor evolve adaptations for treatments that the physician has not yet applied. (2) It has a distinctive leader-follower (or "Stackelberg") dynamics; the "leader" oncologist plays first and the "follower" cancer cells then respond and adapt to therapy. Current treatment protocols for metastatic cancer typically exploit neither asymmetry. By repeatedly administering the same drug(s) until disease progression, the physician "plays" a fixed strategy even as the opposing cancer cells continuously evolve successful adaptive responses. Furthermore, by changing treatment only when the tumor progresses, the physician cedes leadership to the cancer cells and treatment failure becomes nearly inevitable. Without fundamental changes in strategy, standard-of-care cancer therapy typically results in "Nash solutions" in which no unilateral change in treatment can favorably alter the outcome. Conclusions and Relevance Physicians can exploit the advantages inherent in the asymmetries of the cancer treatment game, and likely improve outcomes, by adopting more dynamic treatment protocols that integrate eco-evolutionary dynamics and modulate therapy accordingly. Implementing this approach will require new metrics of tumor response that incorporate both ecological (ie, size) and evolutionary (ie, molecular mechanisms of resistance and relative size of resistant population) changes.
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Affiliation(s)
- Katerina Stanková
- Department of Data Science and Knowledge Engineering, Maastricht University, Maastricht, the Netherlands.,Delft Institute of Applied Mathematics, Delft University of Technology, Delft, the Netherlands
| | - Joel S Brown
- Cancer Biology and Evolution Program, Moffitt Cancer Center, Tampa, Florida
| | - William S Dalton
- Cancer Biology and Evolution Program, Moffitt Cancer Center, Tampa, Florida.,M2Gen Health Informatics Solutions, Tampa, Florida
| | - Robert A Gatenby
- Cancer Biology and Evolution Program, Moffitt Cancer Center, Tampa, Florida
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6
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Jiao Y, Chen T, Chen Q. Probabilistic punishment and reward under rule of trust-based decision-making in continuous public goods game. J Theor Biol 2019; 486:110103. [PMID: 31809719 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2019.110103] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/31/2019] [Revised: 11/01/2019] [Accepted: 12/02/2019] [Indexed: 11/30/2022]
Abstract
Altruistic punishment and reward have been proved to promote the evolution of cooperation in the public goods game(PGG), but the punishers and the rewarders have to pay a price for these behaviors and that results in overall loss of interest. In present work, probabilistic punishment and reward are introduced to PGG. Probabilistic punishment and reward mean that punishment and reward are executed with a certain probability. Although that will reduce unnecessary costs, occasional absence of execution can lead to distrust. Thus we focus on how to implement punishment and reward efficiently within the structured populations. Numerical simulations are performed and prove that probabilistic punishment and reward can promote the evolution of cooperation more effectively. Further researches indicate that there is an optimal executing probability to promote cooperation and maximize reduction of cost. In addition, when the unit cost is high, the PGG with probabilistic punishment and reward still helps the evolution of altruistic punishers and rewarders, thereby avoiding collapse of cooperation.
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Affiliation(s)
- Yuhang Jiao
- College of Management and Economics, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, PR China
| | - Tong Chen
- College of Management and Economics, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, PR China
| | - Qiao Chen
- College of Management and Economics, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, PR China.
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7
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Richter H. Fixation properties of multiple cooperator configurations on regular graphs. Theory Biosci 2019; 138:261-275. [PMID: 30900107 DOI: 10.1007/s12064-019-00293-3] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/20/2018] [Accepted: 03/11/2019] [Indexed: 10/27/2022]
Abstract
Whether or not cooperation is favored in evolutionary games on graphs depends on the population structure and spatial properties of the interaction network. The population structure can be expressed as configurations. Such configurations extend scenarios with a single cooperator among defectors to any number of cooperators and any arrangement of cooperators and defectors on the network. For interaction networks modeled as regular graphs and for weak selection, the emergence of cooperation can be assessed by structure coefficients, which can be specified for each configuration and each regular graph. Thus, as a single cooperator can be interpreted as a lone mutant, the configuration-based structure coefficients also describe fixation properties of multiple mutants. We analyze the structure coefficients and particularly show that under certain conditions, the coefficients strongly correlate to the average shortest path length between cooperators on the evolutionary graph. Thus, for multiple cooperators fixation properties on regular evolutionary graphs can be linked to cooperator path lengths.
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Affiliation(s)
- Hendrik Richter
- Faculty of Electrical Engineering and Information Technology, HTWK Leipzig University of Applied Sciences, Postfach 301166, 04251, Leipzig, Germany.
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Schimit PHT, Pattni K, Broom M. Dynamics of multiplayer games on complex networks using territorial interactions. Phys Rev E 2019; 99:032306. [PMID: 30999523 DOI: 10.1103/physreve.99.032306] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/03/2018] [Indexed: 06/09/2023]
Abstract
The modeling of evolution in structured populations has been significantly advanced by evolutionary graph theory, which incorporates pairwise relationships between individuals on a network. More recently, a new framework has been developed to allow for multiplayer interactions of variable size in more flexible and potentially changing population structures. While the theory within this framework has been developed and simple structures considered, there has been no systematic consideration of a large range of different population structures, which is the subject of this paper. We consider a large range of underlying graphical structures for the territorial raider model, the most commonly used model in the new structure, and consider a variety of important properties of our structures with the aim of finding factors that determine the fixation probability of mutants. We find that the graphical temperature and the average group size, as previously defined, are strong predictors of fixation probability, while all other properties considered are poor predictors, although the clustering coefficient is a useful secondary predictor when combined with either temperature or group size. The relationship between temperature or average group size and fixation probability is sometimes, however, nonmonotonic, with a directional reverse occurring around the temperature associated with what we term "completely mixed" populations in the case of the hawk-dove game, but not the public goods game.
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Affiliation(s)
- Pedro H T Schimit
- Informatics and Knowledge Management Graduate Program, Universidade Nove de Julho, Rua Vergueiro, 235/249, CEP 01504-000, São Paulo, São Paulo, Brazil
| | - Karan Pattni
- Department of Mathematical Sciences, University of Liverpool, Mathematical Sciences Building, Liverpool L69 7ZL, United Kingdom
| | - Mark Broom
- Department of Mathematics, City, University of London, Northampton Square, London EC1V 0HB, United Kingdom
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Kaveh K, McAvoy A, Nowak MA. Environmental fitness heterogeneity in the Moran process. ROYAL SOCIETY OPEN SCIENCE 2019; 6:181661. [PMID: 30800394 PMCID: PMC6366185 DOI: 10.1098/rsos.181661] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/02/2018] [Accepted: 11/30/2018] [Indexed: 06/09/2023]
Abstract
Many mathematical models of evolution assume that all individuals experience the same environment. Here, we study the Moran process in heterogeneous environments. The population is of finite size with two competing types, which are exposed to a fixed number of environmental conditions. Reproductive rate is determined by both the type and the environment. We first calculate the condition for selection to favour the mutant relative to the resident wild-type. In large populations, the mutant is favoured if and only if the mutant's spatial average reproductive rate exceeds that of the resident. But environmental heterogeneity elucidates an interesting asymmetry between the mutant and the resident. Specifically, mutant heterogeneity suppresses its fixation probability; if this heterogeneity is strong enough, it can even completely offset the effects of selection (including in large populations). By contrast, resident heterogeneity has no effect on a mutant's fixation probability in large populations and can amplify it in small populations.
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10
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Débarre F. Fidelity of parent-offspring transmission and the evolution of social behavior in structured populations. J Theor Biol 2017; 420:26-35. [PMID: 28254478 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2017.02.027] [Citation(s) in RCA: 10] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/21/2016] [Revised: 02/13/2017] [Accepted: 02/20/2017] [Indexed: 11/30/2022]
Abstract
The theoretical investigation of how spatial structure affects the evolution of social behavior has mostly been done under the assumption that parent-offspring strategy transmission is perfect, i.e., for genetically transmitted traits, that mutation is very weak or absent. Here, we investigate the evolution of social behavior in structured populations under arbitrary mutation probabilities. We consider populations of fixed size N, structured such that in the absence of selection, all individuals have the same probability of reproducing or dying (neutral reproductive values are the all same). Two types of individuals, A and B, corresponding to two types of social behavior, are competing; the fidelity of strategy transmission from parent to offspring is tuned by a parameter μ. Social interactions have a direct effect on individual fecundities. Under the assumption of small phenotypic differences (implying weak selection), we provide a formula for the expected frequency of type A individuals in the population, and deduce conditions for the long-term success of one strategy against another. We then illustrate our results with three common life-cycles (Wright-Fisher, Moran Birth-Death and Moran Death-Birth), and specific population structures (graph-structured populations). Qualitatively, we find that some life-cycles (Moran Birth-Death, Wright-Fisher) prevent the evolution of altruistic behavior, confirming previous results obtained with perfect strategy transmission. We also show that computing the expected frequency of altruists on a regular graph may require knowing more than just the graph's size and degree.
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Affiliation(s)
- F Débarre
- Centre Interdisciplinaire de Recherche en Biologie (CIRB), Collège de France, CNRS UMR 7241 - Inserm U1050, 11, Place Marcelin Berthelot, 75231 Paris Cedex 05, France.
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11
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Chen YT, McAvoy A, Nowak MA. Fixation Probabilities for Any Configuration of Two Strategies on Regular Graphs. Sci Rep 2016; 6:39181. [PMID: 28004806 PMCID: PMC5177945 DOI: 10.1038/srep39181] [Citation(s) in RCA: 13] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/16/2016] [Accepted: 11/18/2016] [Indexed: 11/08/2022] Open
Abstract
Population structure and spatial heterogeneity are integral components of evolutionary dynamics, in general, and of evolution of cooperation, in particular. Structure can promote the emergence of cooperation in some populations and suppress it in others. Here, we provide results for weak selection to favor cooperation on regular graphs for any configuration, meaning any arrangement of cooperators and defectors. Our results extend previous work on fixation probabilities of rare mutants. We find that for any configuration cooperation is never favored for birth-death (BD) updating. In contrast, for death-birth (DB) updating, we derive a simple, computationally tractable formula for weak selection to favor cooperation when starting from any configuration containing any number of cooperators. This formula elucidates two important features: (i) the takeover of cooperation can be enhanced by the strategic placement of cooperators and (ii) adding more cooperators to a configuration can sometimes suppress the evolution of cooperation. These findings give a formal account for how selection acts on all transient states that appear in evolutionary trajectories. They also inform the strategic design of initial states in social networks to maximally promote cooperation. We also derive general results that characterize the interaction of any two strategies, not only cooperation and defection.
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Affiliation(s)
- Yu-Ting Chen
- Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
- Center of Mathematical Sciences and Applications, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
- Department of Mathematics, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN 37996, USA
| | - Alex McAvoy
- Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
- Department of Mathematics, University of British Columbia, 1984 Mathematics Road, Vancouver, BC, Canada V6T 1Z2
| | - Martin A. Nowak
- Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
- Department of Mathematics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
- Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
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12
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Evolutionary Games of Multiplayer Cooperation on Graphs. PLoS Comput Biol 2016; 12:e1005059. [PMID: 27513946 PMCID: PMC4981334 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1005059] [Citation(s) in RCA: 35] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/21/2016] [Accepted: 07/12/2016] [Indexed: 11/24/2022] Open
Abstract
There has been much interest in studying evolutionary games in structured populations, often modeled as graphs. However, most analytical results so far have only been obtained for two-player or linear games, while the study of more complex multiplayer games has been usually tackled by computer simulations. Here we investigate evolutionary multiplayer games on graphs updated with a Moran death-Birth process. For cycles, we obtain an exact analytical condition for cooperation to be favored by natural selection, given in terms of the payoffs of the game and a set of structure coefficients. For regular graphs of degree three and larger, we estimate this condition using a combination of pair approximation and diffusion approximation. For a large class of cooperation games, our approximations suggest that graph-structured populations are stronger promoters of cooperation than populations lacking spatial structure. Computer simulations validate our analytical approximations for random regular graphs and cycles, but show systematic differences for graphs with many loops such as lattices. In particular, our simulation results show that these kinds of graphs can even lead to more stringent conditions for the evolution of cooperation than well-mixed populations. Overall, we provide evidence suggesting that the complexity arising from many-player interactions and spatial structure can be captured by pair approximation in the case of random graphs, but that it need to be handled with care for graphs with high clustering. Cooperation can be defined as the act of providing fitness benefits to other individuals, often at a personal cost. When interactions occur mainly with neighbors, assortment of strategies can favor cooperation but local competition can undermine it. Previous research has shown that a single coefficient can capture this trade-off when cooperative interactions take place between two players. More complicated, but also more realistic, models of cooperative interactions involving multiple players instead require several such coefficients, making it difficult to assess the effects of population structure. Here, we obtain analytical approximations for the coefficients of multiplayer games in graph-structured populations. Computer simulations show that, for particular instances of multiplayer games, these approximate coefficients predict the condition for cooperation to be promoted in random graphs well, but fail to do so in graphs with more structure, such as lattices. Our work extends and generalizes established results on the evolution of cooperation on graphs, but also highlights the importance of explicitly taking into account higher-order statistical associations in order to assess the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in spatially structured populations.
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