Evolution of cooperation in an epithelium

The role of evolutionary game theory in spatial and non-spatial models of the survival of cooperation in cancer: a review

Evolutionary game theory (EGT) is a branch of mathematics which considers populations of individuals interacting with each other to receive pay-offs. An individual’s pay-off is dependent on the strategy of its opponent(s) as well as on its own, and the higher its pay-off, the higher its reproductive fitness. Its offspring generally inherit its interaction strategy, subject to random mutation. Over time, the composition of the population shifts as different strategies spread or are driven extinct. In the last 25 years there has been a flood of interest in applying EGT to cancer modelling, with the aim of explaining how cancerous mutations spread through healthy tissue and how intercellular cooperation persists in tumour-cell populations. This review traces this body of work from theoretical analyses of well-mixed infinite populations through to more realistic spatial models of the development of cooperation between epithelial cells. We also consider work in which EGT has been used to make experimental predictions about the evolution of cancer, and discuss work that remains to be done before EGT can make large-scale contributions to clinical treatment and patient outcomes.

Cooperative success in epithelial public goods games

Cancer cells obtain mutations which rely on the production of diffusible growth factors to confer a fitness benefit. These mutations can be considered cooperative, and studied as public goods games within the framework of evolutionary game theory. The population structure, benefit function and update rule all influence the evolutionary success of cooperators. We model the evolution of cooperation in epithelial cells using the Voronoi tessellation model. Unlike traditional evolutionary graph theory, this allows us to implement global updating, for which birth and death events are spatially decoupled. We compare, for a sigmoid benefit function, the conditions for cooperation to be favoured and/or beneficial for well-mixed and structured populations. We find that when population structure is combined with global updating, cooperation is more successful than if there were local updating or the population were well-mixed. Interestingly, the qualitative behaviour for the well-mixed population and the Voronoi tessellation model is remarkably similar, but the latter case requires significantly lower incentives to ensure cooperation.

Normal tissue architecture determines the evolutionary course of cancer

Cancer growth can be described as a caricature of the renewal process of the tissue of origin, where the tissue architecture has a strong influence on the evolutionary dynamics within the tumor. Using a classic, well-studied model of tumor evolution (a passenger-driver mutation model) we systematically alter spatial constraints and cell mixing rates to show how tissue structure influences functional (driver) mutations and genetic heterogeneity over time. This approach explores a key mechanism behind both inter-patient and intratumoral tumor heterogeneity: competition for space. Time-varying competition leads to an emergent transition from Darwinian premalignant growth to subsequent invasive neutral tumor growth. Initial spatial constraints determine the emergent mode of evolution (Darwinian to neutral) without a change in cell-specific mutation rate or fitness effects. Driver acquisition during the Darwinian precancerous stage may be modulated en route to neutral evolution by the combination of two factors: spatial constraints and limited cellular mixing. These two factors occur naturally in ductal carcinomas, where the branching topology of the ductal network dictates spatial constraints and mixing rates.

Evolutionary bet-hedging in structured populations

As ecosystems evolve, species can become extinct due to fluctuations in the environment. This leads to the evolutionary adaption known as bet-hedging, where species hedge against these fluctuations to reduce their likelihood of extinction. Environmental variation can be either within or between generations. Previous work has shown that selection for bet-hedging against within-generational variation should not occur in large populations. However, this work has been limited by assumptions of well-mixed populations, whereas real populations usually have some degree of structure. Using the framework of evolutionary graph theory, we show that through adding competition structure to the population, within-generational variation can have a significant impact on the evolutionary process for any population size. This complements research using subdivided populations, which suggests that within-generational variation is important when local population sizes are small. Together, these conclusions provide evidence to support observations by some ecologists that are contrary to the widely held view that only between-generational environmental variation has an impact on natural selection. This provides theoretical justification for further empirical study into this largely unexplored area.

Evolution of cooperation under punishment

Punishment has been considered as an effective mechanism for promoting and sustaining cooperation. In most existing models, punishment always comes as a third strategy alongside cooperation and defection, and it is commonly assumed to be executed based on individual decision rules rather than collective decision rules. Differently from previous works, we employ a democratic procedure by which cooperators cast votes independently and simultaneously for whether to impose punishment on defectors, and we establish a relationship between the cooperators' willingness to punish defectors (WTPD) and whether the punishment is inflicted on defectors. The results illustrate that the population can evolve to full cooperation under consensual punishment. It is noteworthy that, compared with autonomous punishment, whether consensual punishment is more in favor of cooperation crucially depends on the minimum number of votes required for punishment execution as well as the cooperators' WTPD. Our findings highlight the importance of collective decision making in the evolution of cooperation and may provide a mathematical framework for explaining the prevalence of democracy in modern societies.