Memory for stimulus sequences: a divide between humans and other animals?

The problem with two-event sequence learning by pigeons

Bonobos appear to show little evidence of learning to make one response (R1) to an AB sequence and a different response (R2) to sequences BB, AA, and BA (Lind et al. PLoS ONE 18(9):e0290546, 2023), yet under different conditions, pigeons can learn this (Weisman et al. Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process 6(4):312, 1980). Aspects of the bonobo procedure may have contributed to this failure. Most important, no response was required in the presence of the stimuli to encourage attention to them. Furthermore, learning to make one response to the target sequence and another to the other sequences involves a bias that allows for better than chance responding. With the two-alternative forced-choice procedure used with the bonobos, the R1 response is correct for one sequence, whereas the R2 response is correct for three sequences. To correct for this, there are three times as many AB trials as each of the other sequences. However, this correction allows a bias to develop in which reinforcement often can be obtained by using only the last stimulus seen as the basis of choice (e.g., when the last stimulus is B respond R1 when the last stimulus is A respond R2). This solution yields reinforcement on five out of six, or 83%, of the trials. In the present experiment with pigeons, using this two-alternative forced choice procedure, most subjects tended to base their choice on the last-seen stimulus. This design allowed subjects to use a suboptimal but relatively effective choice strategy.

A test of memory for stimulus sequences in great apes

Identifying cognitive capacities underlying the human evolutionary transition is challenging, and many hypotheses exist for what makes humans capable of, for example, producing and understanding language, preparing meals, and having culture on a grand scale. Instead of describing processes whereby information is processed, recent studies have suggested that there are key differences between humans and other animals in how information is recognized and remembered. Such constraints may act as a bottleneck for subsequent information processing and behavior, proving important for understanding differences between humans and other animals. We briefly discuss different sequential aspects of cognition and behavior and the importance of distinguishing between simultaneous and sequential input, and conclude that explicit tests on non-human great apes have been lacking. Here, we test the memory for stimulus sequences-hypothesis by carrying out three tests on bonobos and one test on humans. Our results show that bonobos' general working memory decays rapidly and that they fail to learn the difference between the order of two stimuli even after more than 2,000 trials, corroborating earlier findings in other animals. However, as expected, humans solve the same sequence discrimination almost immediately. The explicit test on whether bonobos represent stimulus sequences as an unstructured collection of memory traces was not informative as no differences were found between responses to the different probe tests. However, overall, this first empirical study of sequence discrimination on non-human great apes supports the idea that non-human animals, including the closest relatives to humans, lack a memory for stimulus sequences. This may be an ability that sets humans apart from other animals and could be one reason behind the origin of human culture.

Experts in action: why we need an embodied social brain hypothesis

The anthropoid primates are known for their intense sociality and large brain size. The idea that these might be causally related has given rise to a large body of work testing the 'social brain hypothesis'. Here, the emphasis has been placed on the political demands of social life, and the cognitive skills that would enable animals to track the machinations of other minds in metarepresentational ways. It seems to us that this position risks losing touch with the fact that brains primarily evolved to enable the control of action, which in turn leads us to downplay or neglect the importance of the physical body in a material world full of bodies and other objects. As an alternative, we offer a view of primate brain and social evolution that is grounded in the body and action, rather than minds and metarepresentation. This article is part of the theme issue 'Systems neuroscience through the lens of evolutionary theory'.

Disjunctive inference in preverbal infants

Can preverbal infants utilize logical reasoning such as disjunctive inference? This logical operation requires keeping two alternatives open (A or B), until one of them is eliminated (if not A), allowing the inference: B is true. We presented to 10-month-old infants an ambiguous situation in which a female voice was paired with two faces. Subsequently, one of the two faces was presented with the voice of a male. We measured infants' preference for the correct face when both faces and the initial voice were presented again. Infant pupillary response was measured and utilized as an indicator of cognitive load at the critical moment of disjunctive inference. We controlled for other possible explanations in three additional experiments. Our results show that 10-month-olds can correctly deploy disjunction and negation to disambiguate scenes, suggesting that disjunctive inference does not rely on linguistic constructs.

'Dunbar's number' deconstructed

A widespread and popular belief posits that humans possess a cognitive capacity that is limited to keeping track of and maintaining stable relationships with approximately 150 people. This influential number, 'Dunbar's number', originates from an extrapolation of a regression line describing the relationship between relative neocortex size and group size in primates. Here, we test if there is statistical support for this idea. Our analyses on complementary datasets using different methods yield wildly different numbers. Bayesian and generalized least-squares phylogenetic methods generate approximations of average group sizes between 69-109 and 16-42, respectively. However, enormous 95% confidence intervals (4-520 and 2-336, respectively) imply that specifying any one number is futile. A cognitive limit on human group size cannot be derived in this manner.

A Connectomic Hypothesis for the Hominization of the Brain

Cognitive abilities of the human brain, including language, have expanded dramatically in the course of our recent evolution from nonhuman primates, despite only minor apparent changes at the gene level. The hypothesis we propose for this paradox relies upon fundamental features of human brain connectivity, which contribute to a characteristic anatomical, functional, and computational neural phenotype, offering a parsimonious framework for connectomic changes taking place upon the human-specific evolution of the genome. Many human connectomic features might be accounted for by substantially increased brain size within the global neural architecture of the primate brain, resulting in a larger number of neurons and areas and the sparsification, increased modularity, and laminar differentiation of cortical connections. The combination of these features with the developmental expansion of upper cortical layers, prolonged postnatal brain development, and multiplied nongenetic interactions with the physical, social, and cultural environment gives rise to categorically human-specific cognitive abilities including the recursivity of language. Thus, a small set of genetic regulatory events affecting quantitative gene expression may plausibly account for the origins of human brain connectivity and cognition.

Analogy as a Catalyst for Cumulative Cultural Evolution

Analogies, broadly defined, map novel concepts onto familiar concepts, making them essential for perception, reasoning, and communication. We argue that analogy-building served a critical role in the evolution of cumulative culture by allowing humans to learn and transmit complex behavioural sequences that would otherwise be too cognitively demanding or opaque to acquire. The emergence of a protolanguage consisting of simple labels would have provided early humans with the cognitive tools to build explicit analogies and to communicate them to others. This focus on analogy-building can shed new light on the coevolution of cognition and culture and addresses recent calls for better integration of the field of cultural evolution with cognitive science.

Building Thinking Machines by Solving Animal Cognition Tasks

In ‘Computing Machinery and Intelligence’, Turing, sceptical of the question ‘Can machines think?’, quickly replaces it with an experimentally verifiable test: the imitation game. I suggest that for such a move to be successful the test needs to be relevant, expansive, solvable by exemplars, unpredictable, and lead to actionable research. The Imitation Game is only partially successful in this regard and its reliance on language, whilst insightful for partially solving the problem, has put AI progress on the wrong foot, prescribing a top-down approach for building thinking machines. I argue that to fix shortcomings with modern AI systems a nonverbal operationalisation is required. This is provided by the recent Animal-AI Testbed, which translates animal cognition tests for AI and provides a bottom-up research pathway for building thinking machines that create predictive models of their environment from sensory input.

Exploring Variation Between Artificial Grammar Learning Experiments: Outlining a Meta-Analysis Approach

Artificial grammar learning (AGL) has become an important tool used to understand aspects of human language learning and whether the abilities underlying learning may be unique to humans or found in other species. Successful learning is typically assumed when human or animal participants are able to distinguish stimuli generated by the grammar from those that are not at a level better than chance. However, the question remains as to what subjects actually learn in these experiments. Previous studies of AGL have frequently introduced multiple potential contributors to performance in the training and testing stimuli, but meta-analysis techniques now enable us to consider these multiple information sources for their contribution to learning-enabling intended and unintended structures to be assessed simultaneously. We present a blueprint for meta-analysis approaches to appraise the effect of learning in human and other animal studies for a series of artificial grammar learning experiments, focusing on studies that examine auditory and visual modalities. We identify a series of variables that differ across these studies, focusing on both structural and surface properties of the grammar, and characteristics of training and test regimes, and provide a first step in assessing the relative contribution of these design features of artificial grammars as well as species-specific effects for learning.

Positional encoding in cotton-top tamarins (Saguinus oedipus)

Strategies used in artificial grammar learning can shed light into the abilities of different species to extract regularities from the environment. In the A(X)ⁿB rule, A and B items are linked, but assigned to different positional categories and separated by distractor items. Open questions are how widespread is the ability to extract positional regularities from A(X)ⁿB patterns, which strategies are used to encode positional regularities and whether individuals exhibit preferences for absolute or relative position encoding. We used visual arrays to investigate whether cotton-top tamarins (Saguinusoedipus) can learn this rule and which strategies they use. After training on a subset of exemplars, two of the tested monkeys successfully generalized to novel combinations. These tamarins discriminated between categories of tokens with different properties (A, B, X) and detected a positional relationship between non-adjacent items even in the presence of novel distractors. The pattern of errors revealed that successful subjects used visual similarity with training stimuli to solve the task and that successful tamarins extracted the relative position of As and Bs rather than their absolute position, similarly to what has been observed in other species. Relative position encoding appears to be favoured in different tasks and taxa. Generalization, though, was incomplete, since we observed a failure with items that during training had always been presented in reinforced arrays, showing the limitations in grasping the underlying positional rule. These results suggest the use of local strategies in the extraction of positional rules in cotton-top tamarins.

Neuronal Encoding in a High-Level Auditory Area: From Sequential Order of Elements to Grammatical Structure

Sensitivity to the sequential structure of communication sounds is fundamental not only for language comprehension in humans but also for song recognition in songbirds. By quantifying single-unit responses, we first assessed whether the sequential order of song elements, called syllables, in conspecific songs is encoded in a secondary auditory cortex-like region of the zebra finch brain. Based on a habituation/dishabituation paradigm, we show that, after multiple repetitions of the same conspecific song, rearranging syllable order reinstated strong responses. A large proportion of neurons showed sensitivity to song context in which syllables occurred providing support for the nonlinear processing of syllable sequences. Sensitivity to the temporal order of items within a sequence should enable learning its underlying structure, an ability considered a core mechanism of the human language faculty. We show that repetitions of songs that were ordered according to a specific grammatical structure (i.e., ABAB or AABB structures; A and B denoting song syllables) led to different responses in both anesthetized and awake birds. Once responses were decreased due to song repetitions, the transition from one structure to the other could affect the firing rates and/or the spike patterns. Our results suggest that detection was based on local differences rather than encoding of the global song structure as a whole. Our study demonstrates that a high-level auditory region provides neuronal mechanisms to help discriminate stimuli that differ in their sequential structure.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Sequence processing has been proposed as a potential precursor of language syntax. As a sequencing operation, the encoding of the temporal order of items within a sequence may help in recognition of relationships between adjacent items and in learning the underlying structure. Taking advantage of the stimulus-specific adaptation phenomenon observed in a high-level auditory region of the zebra finch brain, we addressed this question at the neuronal level. Reordering elements within conspecific songs reinstated robust responses. Neurons also detected changes in the structure of artificial songs, and this detection depended on local transitions between adjacent or nonadjacent syllables. These findings establish the songbird as a model system for deciphering the mechanisms underlying sequence processing at the single-cell level.

Social learning through associative processes: a computational theory

Social transmission of information is a key phenomenon in the evolution of behaviour and in the establishment of traditions and culture. The diversity of social learning phenomena has engendered a diverse terminology and numerous ideas about underlying learning mechanisms, at the same time that some researchers have called for a unitary analysis of social learning in terms of associative processes. Leveraging previous attempts and a recent computational formulation of associative learning, we analyse the following learning scenarios in some generality: learning responses to social stimuli, including learning to imitate; learning responses to non-social stimuli; learning sequences of actions; learning to avoid danger. We conceptualize social learning as situations in which stimuli that arise from other individuals have an important role in learning. This role is supported by genetic predispositions that either cause responses to social stimuli or enable social stimuli to reinforce specific responses. Simulations were performed using a new learning simulator program. The simulator is publicly available and can be used for further theoretical investigations and to guide empirical research of learning and behaviour. Our explorations show that, when guided by genetic predispositions, associative processes can give rise to a wide variety of social learning phenomena, such as stimulus and local enhancement, contextual imitation and simple production imitation, observational conditioning, and social and response facilitation. In addition, we clarify how associative mechanisms can result in transfer of information and behaviour from experienced to naive individuals.

Culture and art: Importance of art practice, not aesthetics, to early human culture

Art is expressed in multiple formats in today's human cultures. Physical traces of stone tools and other archaeological landmarks suggest early nonart cultural behavior and symbolic cognition in the early Homo sapiens (HS) who emerged ~300,000-200,000 years ago in Africa. Fundamental to art expression is the neural underpinning for symbolic cognition, and material art is considered its prime example. However, prior to producing material art, HS could have exploited symbolically through art-rooted biological neural pathways for social purpose, namely, those controlling interpersonal motoric coordination and sound codependence. Aesthetics would not have been the primary purpose; arguments for group dance and rhythmical musical sounds are offered here. In addition, triggers for symbolic body painting are discussed. These cultural art formats could well have preceded material art and would have enhanced unity, inclusiveness, and cooperative behavior, contributing significantly to already existing nonart cultural practices.