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Cusack R, Ranzato M, Charvet CJ. Helpless infants are learning a foundation model. Trends Cogn Sci 2024:S1364-6613(24)00114-1. [PMID: 38839537 DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2024.05.001] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/12/2023] [Revised: 04/24/2024] [Accepted: 05/03/2024] [Indexed: 06/07/2024]
Abstract
Humans have a protracted postnatal helplessness period, typically attributed to human-specific maternal constraints causing an early birth when the brain is highly immature. By aligning neurodevelopmental events across species, however, it has been found that humans are not born with especially immature brains compared with animal species with a shorter helpless period. Consistent with this, the rapidly growing field of infant neuroimaging has found that brain connectivity and functional activation at birth share many similarities with the mature brain. Inspired by machine learning, where deep neural networks also benefit from a 'helpless period' of pre-training, we propose that human infants are learning a foundation model: a set of fundamental representations that underpin later cognition with high performance and rapid generalisation.
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Quilty-Dunn J, Porot N, Mandelbaum E. The language-of-thought hypothesis as a working hypothesis in cognitive science. Behav Brain Sci 2023; 46:e292. [PMID: 37766639 DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x23002431] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 09/29/2023]
Abstract
The target article attempted to draw connections between broad swaths of evidence by noticing a common thread: Abstract, symbolic, compositional codes, that is, language-of-thoughts (LoTs). Commentators raised concerns about the evidence and offered fascinating extensions to areas we overlooked. Here we respond and highlight the many specific empirical questions to be answered in the next decade and beyond.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jake Quilty-Dunn
- Department of Philosophy and Philosophy-Neuroscience-Psychology Program, Washington University in St. Louis, St. Louis, MO, USA ; sites.google.com/site/jakequiltydunn/
| | - Nicolas Porot
- Africa Institute for Research in Economics and Social Sciences, Mohammed VI Polytechnic University, Ben Guerir, Morocco ; nicolasporot.com
| | - Eric Mandelbaum
- Department of Philosophy and Department of Psychology, The Graduate Center & Baruch College, CUNY, New York, NY, USA ; ericmandelbaum.com
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Kibbe MM, Stahl AE. An object's categorizability impacts whether infants encode surface features into their object representations. INFANCY 2023; 28:958-972. [PMID: 37394971 DOI: 10.1111/infa.12555] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/16/2022] [Revised: 04/11/2023] [Accepted: 06/16/2023] [Indexed: 07/04/2023]
Abstract
Infants encode the surface features of simple, unfamiliar objects (e.g., red triangle) and the categorical identities of familiar, categorizable objects (e.g., car) into their representations of these objects. We asked whether 16-18-month-olds ignore non-diagnostic surface features (e.g., color) in favor of encoding an object's categorical identity (e.g., car) when objects are from familiar categories. In Experiment 1 (n = 18), we hid a categorizable object inside an opaque box. In No Switch trials, infants retrieved the object that was hidden. In Switch trials, infants retrieved a different object: an object from a different category (Between-Category-Switch trials) or a different object from the same category (Within-Category-Switch trials). We measured infants' subsequent searching in the box. Infants' pattern of searching suggested that only infants who completed a Within-Category-Switch trial as their first Switch trial encoded objects' surface features, and an exploratory analysis suggested that infants who completed a Between-Category-Switch trial as their first Switch trial only encoded objects' categories. In Experiment 2 (n = 18), we confirmed that these results were due to objects' categorizability. These results suggest infants may tailor the way they encode categorizable objects depending on which object dimensions are perceived to be task relevant.
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Affiliation(s)
- Melissa M Kibbe
- Department of Psychological & Brain Sciences, Boston University, Boston, Massachusetts, USA
| | - Aimee E Stahl
- Department of Psychology, The College of New Jersey, Ewing, New Jersey, USA
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LaTourrette A, Chan DM, Waxman SR. A principled link between object naming and representation is available to infants by seven months of age. Sci Rep 2023; 13:14328. [PMID: 37653111 PMCID: PMC10471589 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-023-41538-y] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/22/2023] [Accepted: 08/28/2023] [Indexed: 09/02/2023] Open
Abstract
By their first birthdays, infants represent objects flexibly as a function of not only whether but how the objects are named. Applying the same name to a set of different objects from the same category supports object categorization, with infants encoding commonalities among objects at the expense of individuating details. In contrast, applying a distinct name to each object supports individuation, with infants encoding distinct features at the expense of categorical information. Here, we consider the development of this nuanced link between naming and representation in infants' first year. Infants at 12 months (Study 1; N = 55) and 7 months (Study 2; N = 96) participated in an online recognition memory task. All infants saw the same objects, but their recognition of these objects at test varied as a function of how they had been named. At both ages, infants successfully recognized objects that had been named with distinct labels but failed to recognize these objects when they had all been named with the same, consistent label. This new evidence demonstrates that a principled link between object naming and representation is available by 7 months, early enough to support infants as they begin mapping words to meaning.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Dana Michelle Chan
- Department of Psychology, Northwestern University, 2029 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL, 60208, USA
| | - Sandra R Waxman
- Department of Psychology, Northwestern University, 2029 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL, 60208, USA.
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Quilty-Dunn J, Porot N, Mandelbaum E. The best game in town: The reemergence of the language-of-thought hypothesis across the cognitive sciences. Behav Brain Sci 2022; 46:e261. [PMID: 36471543 DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x22002849] [Citation(s) in RCA: 12] [Impact Index Per Article: 6.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/12/2022]
Abstract
Mental representations remain the central posits of psychology after many decades of scrutiny. However, there is no consensus about the representational format(s) of biological cognition. This paper provides a survey of evidence from computational cognitive psychology, perceptual psychology, developmental psychology, comparative psychology, and social psychology, and concludes that one type of format that routinely crops up is the language-of-thought (LoT). We outline six core properties of LoTs: (i) discrete constituents; (ii) role-filler independence; (iii) predicate-argument structure; (iv) logical operators; (v) inferential promiscuity; and (vi) abstract content. These properties cluster together throughout cognitive science. Bayesian computational modeling, compositional features of object perception, complex infant and animal reasoning, and automatic, intuitive cognition in adults all implicate LoT-like structures. Instead of regarding LoT as a relic of the previous century, researchers in cognitive science and philosophy-of-mind must take seriously the explanatory breadth of LoT-based architectures. We grant that the mind may harbor many formats and architectures, including iconic and associative structures as well as deep-neural-network-like architectures. However, as computational/representational approaches to the mind continue to advance, classical compositional symbolic structures - that is, LoTs - only prove more flexible and well-supported over time.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jake Quilty-Dunn
- Department of Philosophy and Philosophy-Neuroscience-Psychology Program, Washington University in St. Louis, St. Louis, MO, USA. , sites.google.com/site/jakequiltydunn/
| | - Nicolas Porot
- Africa Institute for Research in Economics and Social Sciences, Mohammed VI Polytechnic University, Rabat, Morocco. , nicolasporot.com
| | - Eric Mandelbaum
- Departments of Philosophy and Psychology, The Graduate Center & Baruch College, CUNY, New York, NY, USA. , ericmandelbaum.com
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Pomiechowska B, Csibra G. Nonverbal Action Interpretation Guides Novel Word Disambiguation in 12-Month-Olds. Open Mind (Camb) 2022; 6:51-76. [DOI: 10.1162/opmi_a_00055] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/16/2020] [Accepted: 04/08/2022] [Indexed: 11/04/2022] Open
Abstract
Abstract
Whether young infants can exploit sociopragmatic information to interpret new words is a matter of debate. Based on findings and theories from the action interpretation literature, we hypothesized that 12-month-olds should distinguish communicative object-directed actions expressing reference from instrumental object-directed actions indicative of one’s goals, and selectively use the former to identify referents of novel linguistic expressions. This hypothesis was tested across four eye-tracking experiments. Infants watched pairs of unfamiliar objects, one of which was first targeted by either a communicative action (e.g., pointing) or an instrumental action (e.g., grasping) and then labeled with a novel word. As predicted, infants fast-mapped the novel words onto the targeted objects after pointing (Experiments 1 and 4) but not after grasping (Experiment 2) unless the grasping action was preceded by an ostensive signal (Experiment 3). Moreover, whenever infants mapped a novel word onto the object indicated by a communicative action, they tended to map a different novel word onto the distractor object, displaying a mutual exclusivity effect. This reliance on nonverbal action interpretation in the disambiguation of novel words indicates that sociopragmatic inferences about reference likely supplement associative and statistical learning mechanisms from the outset of word learning.
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Affiliation(s)
- Barbara Pomiechowska
- Cognitive Development Center, Department of Cognitive Science, Central European University
| | - Gergely Csibra
- Cognitive Development Center, Department of Cognitive Science, Central European University
- Birkbeck College, University of London
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Pomiechowska B, Gliga T. Nonverbal category knowledge limits the amount of information encoded in object representations: EEG evidence from 12-month-old infants. ROYAL SOCIETY OPEN SCIENCE 2021; 8:200782. [PMID: 34035932 PMCID: PMC8101279 DOI: 10.1098/rsos.200782] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/26/2020] [Accepted: 03/03/2021] [Indexed: 06/12/2023]
Abstract
To what extent does language shape how we think about the world? Studies suggest that linguistic symbols expressing conceptual categories ('apple', 'squirrel') make us focus on categorical information (e.g. that you saw a squirrel) and disregard individual information (e.g. whether that squirrel had a long or short tail). Across two experiments with preverbal infants, we demonstrated that it is not language but nonverbal category knowledge that determines what information is packed into object representations. Twelve-month-olds (N = 48) participated in an electroencephalography (EEG) change-detection task involving objects undergoing a brief occlusion. When viewing objects from unfamiliar categories, infants detected both across- and within-category changes, as evidenced by their negative central wave (Nc) event-related potential. Conversely, when viewing objects from familiar categories, they did not respond to within-category changes, which indicates that nonverbal category knowledge interfered with the representation of individual surface features necessary to detect such changes. Furthermore, distinct patterns of γ and α oscillations between familiar and unfamiliar categories were evident before and during occlusion, suggesting that categorization had an influence on the format of recruited object representations. Thus, we show that nonverbal category knowledge has rapid and enduring effects on object representation and discuss their functional significance for generic knowledge acquisition in the absence of language.
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Affiliation(s)
- Barbara Pomiechowska
- Cognitive Development Center, Department of Cognitive Science, Central European University, Nador utca 9, Budapest 1051, Hungary
| | - Teodora Gliga
- School of Psychology, University of East Anglia, Norwich Research Park, Norwich NR4 7TJ, UK
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