1
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Wang X, Perc M. Replicator dynamics of public goods games with global exclusion. CHAOS (WOODBURY, N.Y.) 2022; 32:073132. [PMID: 35907743 DOI: 10.1063/5.0099697] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/18/2022] [Accepted: 06/27/2022] [Indexed: 06/15/2023]
Abstract
Studies to date on the role of social exclusion in public cooperation have mainly focused on the peer or pool sanctioning types of excluding free-riders from the share of common goods. However, the exclusive behaviors are not necessarily performed by individuals or local organizations but may rather be implemented by a centralized enforcement institution at a global scale. Besides, previous modeling methods of either peer or pool exclusion often presuppose some particular forms of feedback between the individual or collective efforts and the efficiency of social exclusion and, therefore, cannot comprehensively evaluate their effects on the evolution of cooperation in the social dilemma situations. Here, we construct a general model of global exclusion by considering the successful construction of the centralized exclusive institution as an arbitrary non-decreasing and smooth function of the collective efforts made by the global excluders and then theoretically analyze its potential impacts in the replicator dynamics of the public goods game. Interestingly, we have shown that, despite the presence of both the first- and second-order free-riding problems, global exclusion can indeed lead to the emergence or even stabilization of public cooperation without the support of any other evolutionary mechanism. In addition, we have also observed rich dynamical behaviors, such as the occurrence of a global or local family of neutrally stable closed orbits revolving around a nonlinear center or the existence of stable heteroclinic cycles between defectors, cooperators as well as global excluders, which give rise to a classification of up to 21 different phases.
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Affiliation(s)
- Xiaofeng Wang
- Department of Automation, School of Information Science & Technology, Donghua University, Shanghai 201620, China
| | - Matjaž Perc
- Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics, University of Maribor, Koroška cesta 160, 2000 Maribor, Slovenia
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2
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Xu C, Hui PM. Enhanced cooperation in multiplayer snowdrift games with random and dynamic groupings. Phys Rev E 2022; 105:054309. [PMID: 35706247 DOI: 10.1103/physreve.105.054309] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/03/2021] [Accepted: 05/03/2022] [Indexed: 06/15/2023]
Abstract
An analytically tractable generalization of the N-person snowdrift (NSG) game that illustrates how cooperation can be enhanced is proposed and studied. The number of players competing within a NSG varies from one time step to another. Exact equations governing the frequency of cooperation f_{c}(r) as a function of the cost-to-benefit ratio r within an imitation strategy updating scheme are presented. For group sizes g uniformly distributed within the range g∈[1,g_{m}], an analytic formula for the critical value r_{c}(g_{m}), below which the system evolves into a totally cooperative (AllC) state, is derived. In contrast, a fixed group size NSG does not support an AllC state. The result r_{c}(g_{m}) requires the presence of sole-player groups and involves the inverse of the harmonic numbers and, more generally, the inverse first moment of the group size distribution. For r>r_{c}(g_{m}), the equation that determines the dynamical mixed states f_{c}(r) is given, with exact solutions existing for g_{m}≤5. The exact treatment allows the study of the phase boundary between the AllC state and the mixed states. The analytic results are checked against simulation results and exact agreements are demonstrated. The analytic form of the critical r_{c}(g_{m}) illustrates the necessity of having groups of a sole player in the evolutionary process. This result is supported by simulations with group sizes excluding the sole groups for which no AllC state emerges. A physically transparent picture of the importance of the sole players in inducing an AllC state is further presented based on the last surviving pattern before the AllC state is attained. The exact expression r_{c}(g_{m}) turns out to remain valid for nonuniform group-size distributions. Our analytical tractable generalization, therefore, sheds light on how a competing environment with variable group sizes could enhance cooperation and induce an AllC state.
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Affiliation(s)
- Chen Xu
- School of Physical Science and Technology, Soochow University, Suzhou, 215006, China
| | - Pak Ming Hui
- Department of Physics and Institute of Theoretical Physics, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shatin, Hong Kong, China
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3
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Podder S, Righi S, Pancotto F. Reputation and punishment sustain cooperation in the optional public goods game. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 2021; 376:20200293. [PMID: 34601913 DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2020.0293] [Citation(s) in RCA: 11] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/12/2022] Open
Abstract
Cooperative behaviour has been extensively studied as a choice between cooperation and defection. However, the possibility to not participate is also frequently available. This type of problem can be studied through the optional public goods game. The introduction of the 'Loner' strategy' allows players to withdraw from the game, which leads to a cooperator-defector-loner cycle. While pro-social punishment can help increase cooperation, anti-social punishment-where defectors punish cooperators-causes its downfall in both experimental and theoretical studies. In this paper, we introduce social norms that allow agents to condition their behaviour to the reputation of their peers. We benchmark this with respect both to the standard optional public goods game and to the variant where all types of punishment are allowed. We find that a social norm imposing a more moderate reputational penalty for opting out than for defecting increases cooperation. When, besides reputation, punishment is also possible, the two mechanisms work synergically under all social norms that do not assign to loners a strictly worse reputation than to defectors. Under this latter set-up, the high levels of cooperation are sustained by conditional strategies, which largely reduce the use of pro-social punishment and almost completely eliminate anti-social punishment. This article is part of the theme issue 'The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling'.
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Affiliation(s)
- Shirsendu Podder
- Department of Computer Science, University College London, London, UK
| | - Simone Righi
- Department of Economics, Ca'Foscari University of Venice, Venezia, Italy
| | - Francesca Pancotto
- Department of Communication and Economics, Università degli Studi di Modena e Reggio Emilia, Reggio Emilia, Italy
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4
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Wu Z, Huang H, Liao Q. The study on the role of dedicators on promoting cooperation in public goods game. PLoS One 2021; 16:e0257475. [PMID: 34543308 PMCID: PMC8452022 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0257475] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/08/2021] [Accepted: 09/01/2021] [Indexed: 12/04/2022] Open
Abstract
In daily life, some people are always seen dedicating available resources to support collective activities. In this paper, we call these people who care group goals more than individual goals dedicators. Inspired by this phenomenon, we studied the role of dedicators on the evolution of cooperation in public goods game (PGG) based on a Chinese Folk Spring Festival Gala. Three types of agents were introduced into our PGG model including cooperators, defectors and dedicators. Dedicators tried to donate when the Gala was short of funds. Cooperators and defectors imitated the strategy of the highest-payoff neighbor based on the rational mechanism. And their imitating probability was modified on account of the emotional mechanism for positive effect of the dedicator's donating behavior and negative effect of continuous poor performance. Through numerical simulations, we found that the existence of dedicators can indeed promote cooperation in PGG. It should be noted that dedicators' willingness to donate was more important than their donation quantity in facilitating cooperation. And the stronger the emotional effect intensity of dedicators' donating behavior was, the better. So, the selfless dedication of participants should be praised to promote cooperation by improving their emotional effect intensity. Last but not least, a reasonable activity budget was needed to sustain the highest level of cooperation.
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Affiliation(s)
- Zhenghong Wu
- College of Economics and Management, Civil Aviation University of China, Tianjin, China
| | - Huan Huang
- College of Economics and Management, Civil Aviation University of China, Tianjin, China
| | - Qinghu Liao
- School of Public Management, Tianjin University of Commerce, Tianjin, China
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5
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Fang Y, Perc M, Xu H. The Singaporean model in public goods dilemmas with benevolent leaders and bribery. J Theor Biol 2020; 501:110345. [PMID: 32450076 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2020.110345] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/18/2020] [Revised: 05/12/2020] [Accepted: 05/19/2020] [Indexed: 11/26/2022]
Abstract
Public goods dilemmas are at the heart of some of the greatest challenges of our time, including climate inaction, growing inequality, and the overuse of natural resources. The public goods game in which cooperators contribute to a common pool that is then shared equally with defectors who contribute nothing captures the gist of the problem. Cooperators therefore cannot prevail, which ultimately leads to the tragedy of the commons. Actions such as punishment, rewards, and exclusion have been shown to help, but they are costly, therefore rendering cooperators second-order free-riders due to their lack of participation in these actions. In the search for a remedy, we study the public goods game with benevolent leaders who, at a personal cost, have the ability to exclude defectors from using common pool resources. We also consider bribers who can pay the leaders to relax their exclusion efforts. In a traditional setting, this setup yields the standard second-order free-rider problem, where, ironically, the leaders are overcome by cooperators, who then themselves succumb to defectors. We show, however, that the Singaporean model - where a leader's payoff is determined not only by the regular sharing income from the firm production but also by the success of gross firm production as an incentive - can resolve the second-order free-rider problem. We also show that the detrimental effect of bribery can always be, no matter how high the bribe, held in check as long as the number of individuals engaged in this activity is low compared to the number of benevolent leaders. Otherwise, an abrupt transition to a cooperator-less state becomes unavoidable. We discuss the implications of our research for designing successful cooperation and anti-corruption strategies in public goods dilemmas.
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Affiliation(s)
- Yinhai Fang
- College of Economics and Management, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing 211100, China
| | - Matjaž Perc
- Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics, University of Maribor, Koroška cesta 160, 2000 Maribor, Slovenia; Department of Medical Research, China Medical University Hospital, China Medical University, Taichung, Taiwan; Complexity Science Hub Vienna, Josefstädterstraße 39, 1080 Vienna, Austria.
| | - Haiyan Xu
- College of Economics and Management, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing 211100, China.
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6
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Abstract
Sustaining cooperation among unrelated individuals is a fundamental challenge in biology and the social sciences. In human society, this problem can be solved by establishing incentive institutions that reward cooperators and punish free-riders. Most of the previous studies have focused on which incentives promote cooperation best. However, a higher cooperation level does not always imply higher group fitness, and only incentives that lead to higher fitness can survive in social evolution. In this paper, we compare the efficiencies of three types of institutional incentives, namely, reward, punishment, and a mixture of reward and punishment, by analysing the group fitness at the stable equilibria of evolutionary dynamics. We find that the optimal institutional incentive is sensitive to decision errors. When there is no error, a mixture of reward and punishment can lead to high levels of cooperation and fitness. However, for intermediate and large errors, reward performs best, and one should avoid punishment. The failure of punishment is caused by two reasons. First, punishment cannot maintain a high cooperation level. Second, punishing defectors almost always reduces the group fitness. Our findings highlight the role of reward in human cooperation. In an uncertain world, the institutional reward is not only effective but also efficient.
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Affiliation(s)
- Yali Dong
- 1 School of Systems Science, Beijing Normal University , Beijing 100875 , People's Republic of China
| | - Tatsuya Sasaki
- 2 F-power Inc. , Roppongi 1-8-7-2F, Minato, Tokyo 106-0032 , Japan
| | - Boyu Zhang
- 3 Laboratory of Mathematics and Complex Systems, Ministry of Education, School of Mathematical Sciences, Beijing Normal University , Beijing 100875 , People's Republic of China
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Jiao Y, Chen T, Chen Q. Probabilistic punishment and reward under rule of trust-based decision-making in continuous public goods game. J Theor Biol 2019; 486:110103. [PMID: 31809719 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2019.110103] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/31/2019] [Revised: 11/01/2019] [Accepted: 12/02/2019] [Indexed: 11/30/2022]
Abstract
Altruistic punishment and reward have been proved to promote the evolution of cooperation in the public goods game(PGG), but the punishers and the rewarders have to pay a price for these behaviors and that results in overall loss of interest. In present work, probabilistic punishment and reward are introduced to PGG. Probabilistic punishment and reward mean that punishment and reward are executed with a certain probability. Although that will reduce unnecessary costs, occasional absence of execution can lead to distrust. Thus we focus on how to implement punishment and reward efficiently within the structured populations. Numerical simulations are performed and prove that probabilistic punishment and reward can promote the evolution of cooperation more effectively. Further researches indicate that there is an optimal executing probability to promote cooperation and maximize reduction of cost. In addition, when the unit cost is high, the PGG with probabilistic punishment and reward still helps the evolution of altruistic punishers and rewarders, thereby avoiding collapse of cooperation.
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Affiliation(s)
- Yuhang Jiao
- College of Management and Economics, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, PR China
| | - Tong Chen
- College of Management and Economics, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, PR China
| | - Qiao Chen
- College of Management and Economics, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, PR China.
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García J, Traulsen A. Evolution of coordinated punishment to enforce cooperation from an unbiased strategy space. J R Soc Interface 2019; 16:20190127. [PMID: 31337305 PMCID: PMC6685031 DOI: 10.1098/rsif.2019.0127] [Citation(s) in RCA: 14] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/12/2022] Open
Abstract
The emergence and maintenance of punishment to protect the commons remains an open puzzle in social and biological sciences. Even in societies where pro-social punishing is common, some individuals seek to cheat the system if they see a chance to do so—and public goods are often maintained in spite of cheaters who do not contribute. We present a model accounting for all possible strategies in a public goods game with punishment. While most models of punishment restrict the set of possible behaviours, excluding seemingly paradoxical anti-social strategies from the start, we show that these strategies can play an important role in explaining large-scale cooperation as observed in human societies. We find that coordinated punishment can emerge from individual interactions, but the stability of the associated institutions is limited owing to anti-social and opportunistic behaviour. In particular, coordinated anti-social punishment can undermine cooperation if individuals cannot condition their behaviour on the existence of institutions that punish. Only when we allow for observability and conditional behaviours do anti-social strategies no longer threaten cooperation. This is due to a stable coexistence of a minority supporting pro-social institutions and those who only cooperate if such institutions are in place. This minority of supporters is enough to guarantee substantial cooperation under a wide range of conditions. Our findings resonate with the empirical observation that public goods are resilient to opportunistic cheaters in large groups of unrelated individuals. They also highlight the importance of letting evolution, and not modellers, decide which strategies matter.
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Affiliation(s)
- Julián García
- Faculty of Information Technology, Monash University, Melbourne, Australia
| | - Arne Traulsen
- Department of Evolutionary Theory, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, 24306 Plön, Germany
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9
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Fang Y, Benko TP, Perc M, Xu H, Tan Q. Synergistic third-party rewarding and punishment in the public goods game. Proc Math Phys Eng Sci 2019; 475:20190349. [PMID: 31423104 PMCID: PMC6694311 DOI: 10.1098/rspa.2019.0349] [Citation(s) in RCA: 31] [Impact Index Per Article: 6.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/04/2019] [Accepted: 06/18/2019] [Indexed: 11/12/2022] Open
Abstract
We study the evolution of cooperation in the spatial public goods game in the presence of third-party rewarding and punishment. The third party executes public intervention, punishing groups where cooperation is weak and rewarding groups where cooperation is strong. We consider four different scenarios to determine what works best for cooperation, in particular, neither rewarding nor punishment, only rewarding, only punishment or both rewarding and punishment. We observe strong synergistic effects when rewarding and punishment are simultaneously applied, which are absent if neither of the two incentives or just each individual incentive is applied by the third party. We find that public cooperation can be sustained at comparatively low third-party costs under adverse conditions, which is impossible if just positive or negative incentives are applied. We also examine the impact of defection tolerance and application frequency, showing that the higher the tolerance and the frequency of rewarding and punishment, the more cooperation thrives. Phase diagrams and characteristic spatial distributions of strategies are presented to corroborate these results, which will hopefully prove useful for more efficient public policies in support of cooperation in social dilemmas.
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Affiliation(s)
- Yinhai Fang
- College of Economics and Management, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing 211100, People's Republic of China
| | - Tina P. Benko
- Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics, University of Maribor, Koroška cesta 160, 2000 Maribor, Slovenia
| | - Matjaž Perc
- Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics, University of Maribor, Koroška cesta 160, 2000 Maribor, Slovenia
- Complexity Science Hub Vienna, Josefstädterstraße 39, 1080 Vienna, Austria
| | - Haiyan Xu
- College of Economics and Management, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing 211100, People's Republic of China
| | - Qingmei Tan
- College of Economics and Management, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing 211100, People's Republic of China
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10
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Benefits of asynchronous exclusion for the evolution of cooperation in stochastic evolutionary optional public goods games. Sci Rep 2019; 9:8208. [PMID: 31160674 PMCID: PMC6547755 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-019-44725-y] [Citation(s) in RCA: 14] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/18/2019] [Accepted: 05/22/2019] [Indexed: 11/08/2022] Open
Abstract
Mechanisms and conditions for the spontaneous emergence of cooperation in multi-player social dilemma games remain an open question. This paper focuses on stochastic evolutionary optional public goods games with different exclusion strategies. We introduce four strategy types in the population, namely, cooperation, defection, loner and exclusion. Synchronous and asynchronous exclusion forms have been compared in finite-sized, well-mixed and structured populations. In addition, we verify that the asynchronous exclusion mechanism is indeed better than the synchronous exclusion mechanism in all cases. The benefits of the asynchronous exclusion are measured by comparing the probability that the system chooses the cooperative states in the two situations. In the well-mixed population cases, only when the investment amplification factor is small and the probability of exclusion success is high will the asynchronous exclusion mechanism have a relatively large advantage in promoting cooperation. However, in the structured population cases, the range of the investment amplification factor, in which the asynchronous exclusion mechanism has relatively large advantages in promoting cooperation, is somewhat different and is mainly in the middle of the interval under our parameters. Our study further corroborated that when non-participation and exclusion strategies exist, a structured population does not necessarily promote cooperation compared with a well-mixed population for some parameter combinations. Thus, we acquire a good understanding of the emergence of cooperation under different exclusion mechanisms.
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dos Santos M, Ghoul M, West SA. Pleiotropy, cooperation, and the social evolution of genetic architecture. PLoS Biol 2018; 16:e2006671. [PMID: 30359363 PMCID: PMC6219813 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pbio.2006671] [Citation(s) in RCA: 31] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/15/2018] [Revised: 11/06/2018] [Accepted: 10/11/2018] [Indexed: 02/06/2023] Open
Abstract
Pleiotropy has been suggested as a novel mechanism for stabilising cooperation in bacteria and other microbes. The hypothesis is that linking cooperation with a trait that provides a personal (private) benefit can outweigh the cost of cooperation in situations when cooperation would not be favoured by mechanisms such as kin selection. We analysed the theoretical plausibility of this hypothesis, with analytical models and individual-based simulations. We found that (1) pleiotropy does not stabilise cooperation, unless the cooperative and private traits are linked via a genetic architecture that cannot evolve (mutational constraint); (2) if the genetic architecture is constrained in this way, then pleiotropy favours any type of trait and not especially cooperation; (3) if the genetic architecture can evolve, then pleiotropy does not favour cooperation; and (4) there are several alternative explanations for why traits may be linked, and causality can even be predicted in the opposite direction, with cooperation favouring pleiotropy. Our results suggest that pleiotropy could only explain cooperation under restrictive conditions and instead show how social evolution can shape the genetic architecture.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Melanie Ghoul
- Department of Zoology, University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom
| | - Stuart A. West
- Department of Zoology, University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom
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Chen T, Wu Z, Wang L. Disseminators or silencers: The effect of information diffusion intensity on cooperation in public goods game. J Theor Biol 2018; 452:47-55. [PMID: 29678693 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2018.04.024] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/24/2018] [Revised: 04/03/2018] [Accepted: 04/16/2018] [Indexed: 10/17/2022]
Abstract
In the Network Era, with the emergence of various instant communication tools, the public are easier to be disseminators than ever. But we have often heard that silence is golden. Inspired by this fact, we investigate that whether the existence of disseminators is beneficial to promote cooperation in the provision of public culture services. To answer this interesting question, we classify disseminators as neutral disseminators, positive disseminators and negative disseminators. And four models are set up, namely, neutral disseminator model (MBD), positive disseminator model (MPD), negative disseminator model (MND) and silencer model (MS). By numerical simulations, it is observed that MND, MBD, MPD and MS perform best in 70%, 25%, 5% and 0% of cases, respectively. And the advantage of the best model is different in various situations. Our work highlights that criticizing instead of tolerating defection is always the best choice to promote cooperation, except the population is relatively large or the agent's reference range fluctuates violently. Besides, under the mechanisms of reputation and conformity, the organizer can not play a significant role on promoting cooperation by intervening information transfer in some conditions, especially when the link-neighbor degree is very low.
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Affiliation(s)
- Tong Chen
- College of Management and Economics, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, PR China
| | - Zhenghong Wu
- College of Management and Economics, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, PR China.
| | - Le Wang
- College of Management and Economics, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, PR China
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13
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Abstract
Cooperation in collective action dilemmas usually breaks down in the absence of additional incentive mechanisms. This tragedy can be escaped if cooperators have the possibility to invest in reward funds that are shared exclusively among cooperators (prosocial rewarding). Yet, the presence of defectors who do not contribute to the public good but do reward themselves (antisocial rewarding) deters cooperation in the absence of additional countermeasures. A recent simulation study suggests that spatial structure is sufficient to prevent antisocial rewarding from deterring cooperation. Here we reinvestigate this issue assuming mixed strategies and weak selection on a game-theoretic model of social interactions, which we also validate using individual-based simulations. We show that increasing reward funds facilitates the maintenance of prosocial rewarding but prevents its invasion, and that spatial structure can sometimes select against the evolution of prosocial rewarding. Our results suggest that, even in spatially structured populations, additional mechanisms are required to prevent antisocial rewarding from deterring cooperation in public goods dilemmas.
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Affiliation(s)
- Miguel Dos Santos
- Department of Zoology, University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom.
| | - Jorge Peña
- Department of Evolutionary Theory, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Plön, Germany
- GEOMAR Helmholtz Centre for Ocean Research Kiel, Kiel, Germany
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14
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Competitions between prosocial exclusions and punishments in finite populations. Sci Rep 2017; 7:46634. [PMID: 28422168 PMCID: PMC5395949 DOI: 10.1038/srep46634] [Citation(s) in RCA: 51] [Impact Index Per Article: 7.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/30/2016] [Accepted: 03/21/2017] [Indexed: 11/12/2022] Open
Abstract
Prosocial punishment has been proved to be a powerful mean to promote cooperation. Recent studies have found that social exclusion, which indeed can be regarded as a kind of punishment, can also support cooperation. However, if prosocial punishment and exclusion are both present, it is still unclear which strategy is more advantageous to curb free-riders. Here we first study the direct competition between different types of punishment and exclusion. We find that pool (peer) exclusion can always outperform pool (peer) punishment both in the optional and in the compulsory public goods game, no matter whether second-order sanctioning is considered or not. Furthermore, peer exclusion does better than pool exclusion both in the optional and in the compulsory game, but the situation is reversed in the presence of second-order exclusion. Finally, we extend the competition among all possible sanctioning strategies and find that peer exclusion can outperform all other strategies in the absence of second-order exclusion and punishment, while pool exclusion prevails when second-order sanctioning is possible. Our results demonstrate that exclusion is a more powerful strategy than punishment for the resolution of social dilemmas.
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15
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Abstract
Rewarding cooperation is in many ways expected behaviour from social players. However, strategies that promote antisocial behaviour are also surprisingly common, not just in human societies, but also among eusocial insects and bacteria. Examples include sanctioning of individuals who behave prosocially, or rewarding of free-riders who do not contribute to collective enterprises. We therefore study the public goods game with antisocial and prosocial pool rewarding in order to determine the potential negative consequences on the effectiveness of positive incentives to promote cooperation. Contrary to a naive expectation, we show that the ability of defectors to distribute rewards to their like does not deter public cooperation as long as cooperators are able to do the same. Even in the presence of antisocial rewarding, the spatial selection for cooperation in evolutionary social dilemmas is enhanced. Since the administration of rewards to either strategy requires a considerable degree of aggregation, cooperators can enjoy the benefits of their prosocial contributions as well as the corresponding rewards. Defectors when aggregated, on the other hand, can enjoy antisocial rewards, but due to their lack of contributions to the public good they ultimately succumb to their inherent inability to secure a sustainable future. Strategies that facilitate the aggregation of akin players, even if they seek to promote antisocial behaviour, thus always enhance the long-term benefits of cooperation.
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Affiliation(s)
- Attila Szolnoki
- Institute of Technical Physics and Materials Science, Centre for Energy Research, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, PO Box 49, Budapest 1525, Hungary
| | - Matjaž Perc
- Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics, University of Maribor, Koroška cesta 160, Maribor 2000, Slovenia Department of Physics, Faculty of Sciences, King Abdulaziz University, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia CAMTP-Center for Applied Mathematics and Theoretical Physics, University of Maribor, Krekova 2, Maribor 2000, Slovenia
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