Constructive anthropomorphism: a functional evolutionary approach to the study of human-like cognitive mechanisms in animals

Using the conditioned place preference paradigm to assess hunger in dairy calves: Preliminary results and methodological issues

Dairy calves are typically fed restricted amounts of milk. Although feed restrictions are predicted to result in negative affective states, the relative aversiveness of 'hunger' remains largely unexplored in this species. Here, we investigated whether the conditioned place preference paradigm can be used to explore how calves feel when experiencing different levels of satiation. This paradigm provides insight into what animals remember from past experiences, the assumption being that individuals will prefer places associated with more pleasant or less unpleasant experiences. Sixteen Holstein calves were either fed a restricted (3 L per meal totalling 6 L per day) or 'enhanced' milk allowance (ad libitum up to 6 L per meal totalling up to 12 L per day) in their home-pen. Calves were then placed in a conditioning pen for 4 h immediately after being fed their morning meal to allow them to develop an association between the pen and their state of post-prandial satiation. Calves were conditioned across four days with their satiation state alternating between days to allow them to develop an association between pen and satiation levels. On the 5th day, calves were individually allowed to roam freely between the two pens for 30 min. We expected that calves would prefer the pen where they previously experienced higher levels of satiation, but our results show no to limited effects of treatment. However, some methodological issues (colour and side bias) prevent us from drawing strong conclusions. We discuss reasons for these issues and potential solutions to avoid these in future studies.

Hoarding titmice predominantly use Familiarity, and not Recollection, when remembering cache locations

Scatter-hoarding birds find their caches using spatial memory and have an enlarged hippocampus. Finding a cache site could be achieved using either Recollection (a discrete recalling of previously experienced information) or Familiarity (a feeling of "having encountered something before"). In humans, these two processes can be distinguished using receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves. ROC curves for olfactory memory in rats have shown the hippocampus is involved in Recollection, but not Familiarity. We test the hypothesis that food-hoarding birds, having a larger hippocampus, primarily use Recollection to find their caches. We validate a novel method of constructing ROC curves in humans and apply this method to cache retrieval by coal tits (Periparus ater). Both humans and birds mainly use Familiarity in finding their caches, with lower contribution of Recollection. This contribution is not significantly different from chance in birds, but a small contribution cannot be ruled out. Memory performance decreases with increasing retention interval in birds. The ecology of food-hoarding Parids makes it plausible that they mainly use Familiarity in the memory for caches. The larger hippocampus could be related to associating cache contents and temporal context with cache locations, rather than Recollection of the spatial information itself.

Hunger affects cognitive performance of dairy calves

Hunger remains a significant animal welfare concern as restricted feeding practices are common on farms. Studies to date have focused on negative effects on health and productivity but little research has addressed the feeling of hunger, mostly due to methodological difficulties in assessing animals' subjective experiences. Here, we explored the use of a cognitive approach to disentangle motivational hunger (a normal state that is of limited welfare concern) from distressful hunger (a state associated with intense negative emotions). Cognitive performance in a foraging task is expected to follow an inverted U relationship with hunger levels, providing an opportunity to make inferences about different hunger states. We assessed the effect of milk restriction on calf cognition in two experiments using a modified hole-board test. Experiment 1 showed that reducing milk allowance from 12 to 6 l d^-1 impaired all measures of cognitive performance. Experiment 2 showed that the same type of feed restriction also disrupted calves' capacity to re-learn. We conclude that hunger associated with reduced milk allowance can disrupt cognitive performance of dairy calves, a result consistent with the experience of distressful hunger.

A possible evolutionary function of phenomenal conscious experience of pain

Evolutionary accounts of feelings, and in particular of negative affect and of pain, assume that creatures that feel and care about the outcomes of their behavior outperform those that do not in terms of their evolutionary fitness. Such accounts, however, can only work if feelings can be shown to contribute to fitness-influencing outcomes. Simply assuming that a learner that feels and cares about outcomes is more strongly motivated than one that does is not enough, if only because motivation can be tied directly to outcomes by incorporating an appropriate reward function, without leaving any apparent role to feelings (as it is done in state-of-the-art engineered systems based on reinforcement learning). Here, we propose a possible mechanism whereby pain contributes to fitness: an actor-critic functional architecture for reinforcement learning, in which pain reflects the costs imposed on actors in their bidding for control, so as to promote honest signaling and ultimately help the system optimize learning and future behavior.

Pair-bonding influences affective state in a monogamous fish species

In humans, affective states are a key component in pair-bonding, particularly in the early stage of a relationship. Pairing with a high-quality partner elicits positive affective states which, in turn, validate and reinforce the mate choice. Affective states thus strongly affect pair stability and future reproductive success. We propose generalizing the link between affective states and pair-bonding to encompass other monogamous species exhibiting biparental care, chiefly where the reproductive success of the pair critically depends on the coordination between partners. The convict cichlid Amatitlania siquia is a monogamous fish species that forms long-lasting pairs with strong cooperation between parents for parental care. In this species, we showed that females paired with their non-preferred male had lower reproductive success than those paired with their preferred male. We then transposed the judgement bias paradigm, previously used in other animal species, to assess objectively affective states in fishes. Females that were assigned their non-preferred partner exhibited pessimistic bias, which indicates a negative affective state. By contrast, females that were assigned their preferred partner did not exhibit changes in their affective state. Our results highlight that the influence of pair-bonding on affective states is not human-specific and can also be observed in non-human species.

Anti-anthropomorphism and Its Limits

There is a diffuse sentiment that to anthropomorphize is a mild vice that people tend to do easily and pleasingly, but that an adult well educated person should avoid. In this paper it will be provided an elucidation of “anthropomorphism” in the field of common sense knowledge, the issue of animal rights, and about the use of humans as a model in the scientific explanation. It will be argued for a “constructive anthropomorphism,” i.e., the idea that anthropomorphism is a natural attitude to attribute human psychological features to other individuals, no matter they are actually rational agents, or not. If we know the “grammar” of this attitude, we can avoid the risks in overestimatinasg the environmental inputs toward anthropomor-phism and, at the same time, take the heuristic advantages of anthropomor-phism in the use of human mind as a model for both everyday circumstances and scientific enterprise.

Humans as a model for understanding biological fundamentals

How special are humans? This question drives scholarly output across both the sciences and the humanities. Whereas some disciplines, and the humanities in particular, aim at gaining a better understanding of humans per se, most biologists ultimately aim to understand life in general. This raises the question of whether and when humans are acceptable, or even desirable, models of biological fundamentals. Especially for basic biological processes, non-human species are generally accepted as a relevant model to study topics for which studying humans is impractical, impossible, or ethically inadvisable, but the reverse is controversial: are humans 'too unique' to be informative with respect to biological fundamentals relevant to other species? Or are there areas where we share key components, or for which our very uniqueness serves to allow novel explorations? In this special feature, authors from disciplines including biology, psychology, anthropology, neuroscience and philosophy tackle this question. Their overall conclusion is a qualified yes: humans do tell us about biological fundamentals, in some contexts. We hope this special feature will spur a discussion that will lead to a more careful delineation of the similarities and the differences between humans and other species, and how these impact the study of biological fundamentals.

Humans as model organisms

Like every other species, our species is the result of descent with modification under the influence of natural selection; a tip in an increasingly large and deep series of nested clades, as we trace its ancestry back to increasingly remote antecedents. As a consequence of shared history, our species has much in common with many others; as a consequence of its production by the general mechanisms of evolution, our species carries information about the mechanisms that shaped other species as well. For reasons unconnected to biological theory, we have far more information about humans than we do about other species. So in principle and in practice, humans should be usable as model organisms, and no one denies the truth of this for mundane physical traits, though harnessing human data for more general questions proves to be quite challenging. However, it is also true that human cognitive and behavioural characteristics, and human social groups, are apparently radically unlike those of other animals. Humans are exceptional products of evolution and perhaps that makes them an unsuitable model system for those interested in the evolution of cooperation, complex cognition, group formation, family structure, communication, cultural learning and the like. In all these respects, we are complex and extreme cases, perhaps shaped by mechanisms (like cultural evolution or group selection) that play little role in other lineages. Most of the papers in this special issue respond by rejecting or downplaying exceptionalism. I argue that it can be an advantage: understanding the human exception reveals constraints that have restricted evolutionary options in many lineages.