An assessment of the immune costs associated with meiotic drive elements in Drosophila

Adequacy and sufficiency evaluation of existing EFSA guidelines for the molecular characterisation, environmental risk assessment and post-market environmental monitoring of genetically modified insects containing engineered gene drives

Advances in molecular and synthetic biology are enabling the engineering of gene drives in insects for disease vector/pest control. Engineered gene drives (that bias their own inheritance) can be designed either to suppress interbreeding target populations or modify them with a new genotype. Depending on the engineered gene drive system, theoretically, a genetic modification of interest could spread through target populations and persist indefinitely, or be restricted in its spread or persistence. While research on engineered gene drives and their applications in insects is advancing at a fast pace, it will take several years for technological developments to move to practical applications for deliberate release into the environment. Some gene drive modified insects (GDMIs) have been tested experimentally in the laboratory, but none has been assessed in small-scale confined field trials or in open release trials as yet. There is concern that the deliberate release of GDMIs in the environment may have possible irreversible and unintended consequences. As a proactive measure, the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) has been requested by the European Commission to review whether its previously published guidelines for the risk assessment of genetically modified animals (EFSA, 2012 and 2013), including insects (GMIs), are adequate and sufficient for GDMIs, primarily disease vectors, agricultural pests and invasive species, for deliberate release into the environment. Under this mandate, EFSA was not requested to develop risk assessment guidelines for GDMIs. In this Scientific Opinion, the Panel on Genetically Modified Organisms (GMO) concludes that EFSA's guidelines are adequate, but insufficient for the molecular characterisation (MC), environmental risk assessment (ERA) and post-market environmental monitoring (PMEM) of GDMIs. While the MC,ERA and PMEM of GDMIs can build on the existing risk assessment framework for GMIs that do not contain engineered gene drives, there are specific areas where further guidance is needed for GDMIs.

Gene drive: progress and prospects

Gene drive is a naturally occurring phenomenon in which selfish genetic elements manipulate gametogenesis and reproduction to increase their own transmission to the next generation. Currently, there is great excitement about the potential of harnessing such systems to control major pest and vector populations. If synthetic gene drive systems can be constructed and applied to key species, they may be able to rapidly spread either modifying or eliminating the targeted populations. This approach has been lauded as a revolutionary and efficient mechanism to control insect-borne diseases and crop pests. Driving endosymbionts have already been deployed to combat the transmission of dengue and Zika virus in mosquitoes. However, there are a variety of barriers to successfully implementing gene drive techniques in wild populations. There is a risk that targeted organisms will rapidly evolve an ability to suppress the synthetic drive system, rendering it ineffective. There are also potential risks of synthetic gene drivers invading non-target species or populations. This Special Feature covers the current state of affairs regarding both natural and synthetic gene drive systems with the aim to identify knowledge gaps. By understanding how natural drive systems spread through populations, we may be able to better predict the outcomes of synthetic drive release.

An assessment of the immune costs associated with meiotic drive elements in Drosophila

Most organisms are constantly adapting to pathogens and parasites that exploit their host for their own benefit. Less studied, but perhaps more ubiquitous, are intragenomic parasites or selfish genetic elements. These include transposable elements, selfish B chromosomes and meiotic drivers that promote their own replication without regard to fitness effects on hosts. Therefore, intragenomic parasites are also a constant evolutionary pressure on hosts. Gamete-killing meiotic drive elements are often associated with large chromosomal inversions that reduce recombination between the drive and wild-type chromosomes. This reduced recombination is thought to reduce the efficacy of selection on the drive chromosome and allow for the accumulation of deleterious mutations. We tested whether gamete-killing meiotic drive chromosomes were associated with reduced immune defence against two bacterial pathogens in three species of Drosophila. We found little evidence of reduced immune defence in lines with meiotic drive. One line carrying the Drosophila melanogaster autosomal Segregation Distorter did show reduced defence, but we were unable to attribute that reduced defence to either genotype or immune gene expression differences. Our results suggest that though gamete-killing meiotic drive chromosomes probably accumulate deleterious mutations, those mutations do not result in reduced capacity for immune defence.