Cuttlefish exert self-control in a delay of gratification task

Beyond the Tricks: The Science and Comparative Cognition of Magic

Magic is an art form that has fascinated humans for centuries. Recently, the techniques used by magicians to make their audience experience the impossible have attracted the attention of psychologists, who, in just a couple of decades, have produced a large amount of research regarding how these effects operate, focusing on the blind spots in perception and roadblocks in cognition that magic techniques exploit. Most recently, this investigation has given a pathway to a new line of research that uses magic effects to explore the cognitive abilities of nonhuman animals. This new branch of the scientific study of magic has already yielded new evidence illustrating the power of magic effects as a psychological tool for nonhuman animals. This review aims to give a thorough overview of the research on both the human and nonhuman perception of magic effects by critically illustrating the most prominent works of both fields of inquiry.

The Inner Lives of Cephalopods

The minds of cephalopods have captivated scientists for millennia, yet the extent that we can understand their subjective experiences remains contested. In this article, we consider the sum of our scientific progress towards understanding the inner lives of cephalopods. Here, we outline the behavioral responses to specific experimental paradigms that are helping us to reveal their subjective experiences. We consider evidence from three broad research categories, which help to illuminate whether soft-bodied cephalopods (octopus, cuttlefish, and squid) have an awareness of self, awareness of others, and an awareness of time. Where there are current gaps in the literature, we outline cephalopod behaviors that warrant experimental investigation. We argue that investigations, especially framed through the lens of comparative psychology, have the potential to extend our understanding of the inner lives of this extraordinary class of animals.

Octopus toss-up: Is debris throwing driven by intent?

In a noteworthy observation, Godfrey-Smith and colleagues report the first evidence of debris throwing in wild octopuses, including instances where they target conspecifics. Proposing parallels with behaviours observed in select social mammals, this discovery prompts inquiries into the extent of their similarity and the potential role of cognition.

'Arm brains' (axial nerves) of Jurassic coleoids and the evolution of coleoid neuroanatomy

Although patchy, the fossil record of coleoids bears a wealth of information on their soft part anatomy. Here, we describe remains of the axial nerve cord from both decabrachian (Acanthoteuthis, Belemnotheutis, Chondroteuthis) and octobrachian (Plesioteuthis, Proteroctopus, Vampyronassa) coleoids from the Jurassic. We discuss some hypotheses reflecting on possible evolutionary drivers behind the neuroanatomical differentiation of the coleoid arm crown. We also propose some hypotheses on potential links between habitat depth, mode of life and the evolution of the Coleoidea.

Supplementary Information

The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1186/s13358-023-00285-3.

Humans, fish, spiders and bees inherited working memory and attention from their last common ancestor

All brain processes that generate behaviour, apart from reflexes, operate with information that is in an "activated" state. This activated information, which is known as working memory (WM), is generated by the effect of attentional processes on incoming information or information previously stored in short-term or long-term memory (STM or LTM). Information in WM tends to remain the focus of attention; and WM, attention and STM together enable information to be available to mental processes and the behaviours that follow on from them. WM and attention underpin all flexible mental processes, such as solving problems, making choices, preparing for opportunities or threats that could be nearby, or simply finding the way home. Neither WM nor attention are necessarily conscious, and both may have evolved long before consciousness. WM and attention, with similar properties, are possessed by humans, archerfish, and other vertebrates; jumping spiders, honey bees, and other arthropods; and members of other clades, whose last common ancestor (LCA) is believed to have lived more than 600 million years ago. It has been reported that very similar genes control the development of vertebrate and arthropod brains, and were likely inherited from their LCA. Genes that control brain development are conserved because brains generate adaptive behaviour. However, the neural processes that generate behaviour operate with the activated information in WM, so WM and attention must have existed prior to the evolution of brains. It is proposed that WM and attention are widespread amongst animal species because they are phylogenetically conserved mechanisms that are essential to all mental processing, and were inherited from the LCA of vertebrates, arthropods, and some other animal clades.

Thinking about possibilities: mechanisms, ontogeny, functions and phylogeny

Humans possess the remarkable capacity to imagine possible worlds and to demarcate possibilities and impossibilities in reasoning. We can think about what might happen in the future and consider what the present would look like had the past turned out differently. We reason about cause and effect, weigh up alternative courses of action and regret our mistakes. In this theme issue, leading experts from across the life sciences provide ground-breaking insights into the proximate questions of how thinking about possibilities works and develops, and the ultimate questions of its adaptive functions and evolutionary history. Together, the contributions delineate neurophysiological, cognitive and social mechanisms involved in mentally simulating possible states of reality; and point to conceptual changes in the understanding of singular and multiple possibilities during human development. The contributions also demonstrate how thinking about possibilities can augment learning, decision-making and judgement, and highlight aspects of the capacity that appear to be shared with non-human animals and aspects that may be uniquely human. Throughout the issue, it becomes clear that many developmental milestones achieved during childhood, and many of the most significant evolutionary and cultural triumphs of the human species, can only be understood with reference to increasingly complex reasoning about possibilities. This article is part of the theme issue 'Thinking about possibilities: mechanisms, ontogeny, functions and phylogeny'.

Waiting for a better possibility: delay of gratification in corvids and its relationship to other cognitive capacities

Self-control, the ability to resist temptation and wait for better but delayed possibilities, is an important cognitive skill that underpins decision-making and planning. The capacity to exert self-control has been linked to intelligence in humans, chimpanzees and most recently cuttlefish. Here, we presented 10 Eurasian jays, Garrulus glandarius, with a delayed maintenance task, which measured the ability to choose a preferred outcome as well as the ability to sustain the delay prior to that outcome. Jays were able to wait for better possibilities, but maximum wait times varied across the subjects. We also presented them with five cognitive tasks that assessed spatial memory, spatial relationships and learning capacity. These tasks are commonly used as measures of general intelligence within an ecological context. Individual performance was correlated across the cognitive tasks, which suggests that there was a general intelligence factor underlying their performance. Performance in these tasks was correlated significantly with the jays' capacity to wait for better possibilities. This study demonstrates that self-control and intelligence are correlated in jays. The fact that this correlation exists in diverse species suggests that self-control is a fundamental feature of cognition. Our results are discussed in the context of convergent evolution.

This article is part of the theme issue ‘Thinking about possibilities: mechanisms, ontogeny, functions and phylogeny’.

Horses wait for more and better rewards in a delay of gratification paradigm

Self-control, defined as the ability to forgo immediate satisfaction in favor of better pay-offs in the future, has been extensively studied, revealing enormous variation between and within species. Horses are interesting in this regard because as a grazing species they are expected to show low self-control whereas its social complexity might be linked to high self-control abilities. Additionally, self-control may be a key factor in training and/or coping with potentially stressful husbandry conditions. We assessed horses’ self-control abilities in a simplified delay of gratification test that can be easily implemented in a farm setting. In Experiment 1, we gave horses (N = 52) the choice between an immediately available low-quality reward and a delayed high-quality reward that could only be obtained if the horse refrained from consuming the immediate reward. Different experimenters (N = 30) that underwent prior training in the procedures, tested horses in two test phases either with their eyes visible or invisible (sunglasses). Twenty horses waited up to the maximum delay stage of 60 s while all horses performed worse in the second test phase. In Experiment 2, we improved the test procedure (i.e., one experimenter, refined criterion for success), and tested 30 additional horses in a quality and quantity condition (one reward vs. delayed bigger reward). Two horses successfully waited for 60 s (quality: N = 1, quantity: N = 1). Horses tolerated higher delays, if they were first tested in the quantity condition. Furthermore, horses that were fed hay ad libitum, instead of in a restricted manner, reached higher delays. Coping behaviors (e.g., looking away, head movements, pawing, and increasing distance to reward) facilitated waiting success and horses were able to anticipate the upcoming delay duration as indicated by non-random distributions of giving-up times. We found no correlations between owner-assessed traits (e.g., trainability and patience) and individual performance in the test. These results suggest that horses are able to exert self-control in a delay of gratification paradigm similar to other domesticated species. Our simplified paradigm could be used to gather large scale data, e.g., to investigate the role of self-control in trainability or success in equestrian sports.

Relationships Organize Information in Mind and Nature: Empirical Findings of Action–Reaction Relationships (R) in Cognitive and Material Complexity

Diverse phenomena such as feedback, interconnectedness, causality, network dynamics, and complexity are all born from Relationships. They are fundamentally important, as they are transdisciplinary and synonymous with connections, links, edges, and interconnections. The foundation of systems thinking and systems themselves consists of four universals, one of which is action–reaction Relationships. They are also foundational to the consilience of knowledge. This publication gives a formal description of and predictions of action–reaction Relationships (R) or “R-rule”. There are seven original empirical studies presented in this paper. For these seven studies, experiments for the subjects were created on software (unless otherwise noted). The experiments had the subjects complete a task and/or answer a question. The samples are generalizable to a normal distribution of the US population and they vary for each study (ranging from N = 407 to N = 34,398). With high statistical significance the studies support the predictions made by DSRP Theory regarding action–reaction Relationships including its universality as an observable phenomenon in both nature (ontological complexity) and mind (cognitive complexity); mutual dependencies on other universals (i.e., Distinctions, Systems, and Perspectives); role in structural predictions; internal structures and dynamics; efficacy as a metacognitive skill. In conclusion, these data suggest the observable and empirical existence, parallelism (between cognitive and ontological complexity), universality, and efficacy of action–reaction Relationships (R).

The Case for Octopus Consciousness: Temporality

Temporality is one of the criteria that Birch has advanced for areas of cognitive ability that may underlie animal sentience. An ability to integrate and use information across time must be more than simply learning pieces of information and retrieving them. This paper looks at such wider use of information by octopuses across time. It evaluates accumulation of information about one’s place in space, as used across immediate egocentric localization by cuttlefish and medium distance navigation in octopuses. Information about useful items in the environment can be incorporated for future use by octopuses, including for shelter in antipredator situations. Finding prey is not random but can be predicted by environmental cues, especially by cuttlefish about future contingencies. Finally, the paper examines unlimited associative learning and constraints on learning, and the ability of cephalopods to explore and seek out information, even by play, for future use.

Perspectives Organize Information in Mind and Nature: Empirical Findings of Point-View Perspective (P) in Cognitive and Material Complexity

The importance of perspective-taking crosses disciplines and is foundational to diverse phenomena such as point-of-view, scale, mindset, theory of mind, opinion, belief, empathy, compassion, analysis, and problem solving, etc. This publication gives predictions for and a formal description of point-view Perspectives (P) or the “P-rule”. This makes the P-rule foundational to systems, systems thinking and the consilience of knowledge. It is one of four universals of the organization of information as a whole. This paper presents nine empirical studies in which subjects were asked to complete a task and/or answer a question. The samples vary for each study (ranging from N = 407 to N = 34,398) and are generalizable to a normal distribution of the US population. As was evident in Cabrera, “These studies support—with high statistical significance—the predictions made by DSRP Theory (Distinctions, Systems Relationships, Perspectives) point-view Perspectives including its: universality as an observable phenomenon in both mind (cognitive complexity) and nature (material complexity) (i.e., parallelism); internal structures and dynamics; mutual dependencies on other universals (i.e., Distinctions, Systems, and Relationships); role in structural predictions; and, efficacy as a metacognitive skill”. These data suggest that point-view Perspectives (P) observably and empirically exist, and that universality, efficacy, and parallelism (between cognitive and material complexity) exist as well. The impact of this paper is that it provides empirical evidence for the phenomena of point-view perspective taking (“P-rule”) as a universal pattern/structure of systems thinking, a field in which scholarly debate is often based on invalidated opinioned frameworks; this sets the stage for theory building in the field.

Cephalopod Behavior: From Neural Plasticity to Consciousness

It is only in recent decades that subjective experience - or consciousness - has become a legitimate object of scientific inquiry. As such, it represents perhaps the greatest challenge facing neuroscience today. Subsumed within this challenge is the study of subjective experience in non-human animals: a particularly difficult endeavor that becomes even more so, as one crosses the great evolutionary divide between vertebrate and invertebrate phyla. Here, we explore the possibility of consciousness in one group of invertebrates: cephalopod molluscs. We believe such a review is timely, particularly considering cephalopods' impressive learning and memory abilities, rich behavioral repertoire, and the relative complexity of their nervous systems and sensory capabilities. Indeed, in some cephalopods, these abilities are so sophisticated that they are comparable to those of some higher vertebrates. Following the criteria and framework outlined for the identification of hallmarks of consciousness in non-mammalian species, here we propose that cephalopods - particularly the octopus - provide a unique test case among invertebrates for examining the properties and conditions that, at the very least, afford a basal faculty of consciousness. These include, among others: (i) discriminatory and anticipatory behaviors indicating a strong link between perception and memory recall; (ii) the presence of neural substrates representing functional analogs of thalamus and cortex; (iii) the neurophysiological dynamics resembling the functional signatures of conscious states in mammals. We highlight the current lack of evidence as well as potentially informative areas that warrant further investigation to support the view expressed here. Finally, we identify future research directions for the study of consciousness in these tantalizing animals.

Systems Organize Information in Mind and Nature: Empirical Findings of Part-Whole Systems (S) in Cognitive and Material Complexity

Part-whole Systems (S) structure is foundational to a diverse array of phenomena such as belonging and containment, networks, statistics, reductionism, holism, etc. and is extremely similar if not synonymous with sets, sorts, groups, combinations and combinatorics, clusters, etc. In Cabrera (1998), part-whole Systems (S) or “S-rule” is established as one of four universals for the organization of information and thus is foundational to systems and systems thinking as well as the consilience of knowledge. In this paper, seven empirical studies are presented in which (unless otherwise noted) subjects completed a task. Ranging from n = 407 to n = 34,398, the sample sizes vary for each study but are generalizeable to a normal distribution of the US population. With high statistical significance, the results of these studies support the predictions made by DSRP Theory regarding part-whole Systems (a.k.a., “S-rule”) including: the universality of S-rule as an observable phenomenon in both mind (cognitive complexity) and nature (ontological complexity) (i.e., parallelism); the internal structures and dynamics of S-rule; S-rule’s mutual dependencies on other universals of DSRP (Distinctions, Systems, Relationships, and Perspectives (i.e., Distinctions, Relationships, and Perspectives); the role S-rule plays in making structural predictions; and, S-rule’s efficacy as a metacognitive skill. In conclusion, these data suggest the observable and empirical existence, universality, efficacy, and parallelism (between cognitive and ontological complexity) of part-whole Systems (S).

Distinctions Organize Information in Mind and Nature: Empirical Findings of Identity–Other Distinctions (D) in Cognitive and Material Complexity

The transdisciplinary importance of distinctions is well-established as foundational to such diverse phenomena as recognition, identification, individual and social identity, marginalization, externalities, boundaries, concept formation, etc., and synonymous general ideas, such as thingness, concepts, nodes, objects, etc. Cabrera provides a formal description of and predictions for identity–other distinctions (D) or “D-rule” as one of four universals for the organization of information that is foundational to systems and systems thinking, as well as the consilience of knowledge. This paper presents seven empirical studies in which (unless otherwise noted) software was used to create an experiment for subjects to complete a task and/or answer a question. The samples varied for each study (ranging from N = 407 to N = 34,398) and were generalizable to a normal distribution of the US population. These studies support—with high statistical significance—the predictions made by DSRP theory regarding identity–other distinctions including its: universality as an observable phenomenon in both mind (cognitive complexity) and nature (ontological complexity) (i.e., parallelism); internal structures and dynamics; mutual dependencies on other universals (i.e., relationships, systems, and perspectives); role in structural predictions; and efficacy as a metacognitive skill. In conclusion, these data suggest the observable and empirical existence, universality, efficacy, and parallelism (between cognitive and ontological complexity) of identity–other distinctions (D).

The “Fish Tank” Experiments: Metacognitive Awareness of Distinctions, Systems, Relationships, and Perspectives (DSRP) Significantly Increases Cognitive Complexity

In the field of systems thinking, there are far too many opinioned frameworks and far too few empirical studies. This could be described as a “gap” in the research but it is more like a dearth in the research. More theory and empirical validation of theory are needed if the field and the phenomenon of systems thinking holds promise and not just popularity. This validation comes in the form of both basic (existential) and applied (efficacy) research studies. This article presents efficacy data for a set of empirical studies of DSRP Theory. According to Cabrera, Cabrera, and Midgley, DSRP Theory has equal or more empirical evidence supporting it than any existing systems theories (including frameworks, which are not theories). Four separate studies show highly statistically relevant findings for the effect of a short (less than one minute) treatment of D, S, R, and P. Subjects’ cognitive complexity and the systemic nature of their thinking increased in all four studies. These findings indicate that even a short treatment in DSRP is effective in increasing systems thinking skills. Based on these results, a longer, more in-depth treatment—such as a one hour or semester long training, such is the norm—would therefore likely garner transformative results and efficacy.

DSRP Theory: A Primer

DSRP Theory is now over 25 years old with more empirical evidence supporting it than any other systems thinking framework. Yet, it is often misunderstood and described in ways that are inaccurate. DSRP Theory describes four patterns and their underlying elements—identity (i) and other (o) for Distinctions (D), part (p) and whole (w) for Systems (S), action (a) and reaction (r) for Relationships (R), and point (ρ) and view (v) for Perspectives (P)—that are universal in both cognitive complexity (mind) and material complexity (nature). DSRP Theory provides a basis for systems thinking or cognitive complexity as well as material complexity (systems science). This paper, as a relatively short primer on the theory, provides clarity to those wanting to understand DSRP and its implications.

The psychological foundations of reputation-based cooperation

Humans care about having a positive reputation, which may prompt them to help in scenarios where the return benefits are not obvious. Various game-theoretical models support the hypothesis that concern for reputation may stabilize cooperation beyond kin, pairs or small groups. However, such models are not explicit about the underlying psychological mechanisms that support reputation-based cooperation. These models therefore cannot account for the apparent rarity of reputation-based cooperation in other species. Here, we identify the cognitive mechanisms that may support reputation-based cooperation in the absence of language. We argue that a large working memory enhances the ability to delay gratification, to understand others' mental states (which allows for perspective-taking and attribution of intentions) and to create and follow norms, which are key building blocks for increasingly complex reputation-based cooperation. We review the existing evidence for the appearance of these processes during human ontogeny as well as their presence in non-human apes and other vertebrates. Based on this review, we predict that most non-human species are cognitively constrained to show only simple forms of reputation-based cooperation. This article is part of the theme issue 'The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling'.

The Ape That Lived to Tell the Tale. The Evolution of the Art of Storytelling and Its Relationship to Mental Time Travel and Theory of Mind

Engaging in the art of creating and telling stories is a defining behaviour of humankind. Humans have been sharing stories with each other, with and without words, since the dawn of recorded history, but the cognitive foundations of the behaviour can be traced deeper into our past. The emergence of stories can be strongly linked to Mental Time Travel (the ability to recall the past and imagine the future) and plays a key role in our ability to communicate past, present and future scenarios with other individuals, within and beyond our lifetimes. Stories are products engraved within the concept of time, constructed to elucidate the past experiences of the self, but designed with the future in mind, thus imparting lessons of such experiences to the receiver. By being privy to the experiences of others, humans can imagine themselves in a similar position to the protagonist of the story, thus mentally learning from an experience they might have never encountered other than in the mind's eye. Evolutionary Psychology investigates how the engagement in artistic endeavours by our ancestors in the Pleistocene granted them an advantage when confronted with obstacles that challenged their survival or reproductive fitness and questions whether art is an adaptation of the human mind or a spandrel of other cognitive adaptations. However, little attention has been placed on the cognitive abilities that might have been imperative for the development of art. Here, we examine the relationship between art, storytelling, Mental Time Travel and Theory of Mind (i.e., the ability to attribute mental states to others). We suggest that Mental Time Travel played a key role in the development of storytelling because through stories, humans can fundamentally transcend their present condition, by being able to imagine different times, separate realities, and place themselves and others anywhere within the time space continuum. We argue that the development of a Theory of Mind also sparked storytelling practises in humans as a method of diffusing the past experiences of the self to others whilst enabling the receiver to dissociate between the past experiences of others and their own, and to understand them as lessons for a possible future. We propose that when artistic products rely on storytelling in form and function, they ought to be considered separate from other forms of art whose appreciation capitalise on our aesthetic preferences.

Information and Self-Organization II: Steady State and Phase Transition

This paper starts from Schrödinger’s famous question “what is life” and elucidates answers that invoke, in particular, Friston’s free energy principle and its relation to the method of Bayesian inference and to Synergetics 2nd foundation that utilizes Jaynes’ maximum entropy principle. Our presentation reflects the shift from the emphasis on physical principles to principles of information theory and Synergetics. In view of the expected general audience of this issue, we have chosen a somewhat tutorial style that does not require special knowledge on physics but familiarizes the reader with concepts rooted in information theory and Synergetics.