Valuing what happens: a biogenic approach to valence and (potentially) affect

Stress sharing as cognitive glue for collective intelligences: A computational model of stress as a coordinator for morphogenesis

Individual cells have numerous competencies in physiological and metabolic spaces. However, multicellular collectives can reliably navigate anatomical morphospace towards much larger, reliable endpoints. Understanding the robustness and control properties of this process is critical for evolutionary developmental biology, bioengineering, and regenerative medicine. One mechanism that has been proposed for enabling individual cells to coordinate toward specific morphological outcomes is the sharing of stress (where stress is a physiological parameter that reflects the current amount of error in the context of a homeostatic loop). Here, we construct and analyze a multiscale agent-based model of morphogenesis in which we quantitatively examine the impact of stress sharing on the ability to reach target morphology. We found that stress sharing improves the morphogenetic efficiency of multicellular collectives; populations with stress sharing reached anatomical targets faster. Moreover, stress sharing influenced the future fate of distant cells in the multi-cellular collective, enhancing cells' movement and their radius of influence, consistent with the hypothesis that stress sharing works to increase cohesiveness of collectives. During development, anatomical goal states could not be inferred from observation of stress states, revealing the limitations of knowledge of goals by an extern observer outside the system itself. Taken together, our analyses support an important role for stress sharing in natural and engineered systems that seek robust large-scale behaviors to emerge from the activity of their competent components.

The impact of emotional valence on generalization gradients

Generalization enables individuals to respond to novel stimuli based on previous experiences. The degree to which organisms respond is determined by their physical resemblance to the original conditioned stimulus (CS+), with a stronger response elicited by more similar stimuli, resulting in similarity-based generalization gradients. Recent research showed that cognitive or conceptual dimensions also result in gradients similar to those observed with manipulations of physical dimensions. Such findings suggest that attributes beyond physical similarity play a role in shaping generalization gradients. However, despite its adaptive relevance for survival, there is no study exploring the effectiveness of affective dimensions in shaping generalization gradients. In two experiments (135 Spanish and 150 English participants, respectively), we used an online predictive learning task, in which different stimuli (words and Gabor patches) were paired with the presence - or absence - of a fictitious shock. After training, we assessed whether valence (i.e., hedonic experience) conveyed by words shape generalization gradients. In Experiment 1, the outcome expectancy decreased monotonically with variations in valence of Spanish words, mirroring the gradient obtained with the physical dimension (line orientation). In Experiment 2, conducted with English words, a similar gradient was observed when non-trained (i.e., generalization) words varied along the valence dimension, but not when words were of neutral valence. The consistency of these findings across two different languages strengthens the reliability and validity of the affective dimension as a determinant of generalization gradients. Furthermore, our data highlight the importance of considering the role of affective features in generalization responses, advancing the interplay between emotion, language, and learning.

Of ugly gains and happy losses: An event-related potential study of interactions of the intrinsic and acquired valence of emotional pictures

During the last decades, event-related potential research on the processing of intrinsic and acquired valence has made great progress, but the two dimensions rarely varied simultaneously. Only that way, however, can we investigate whether the acquisition of extrinsic valence varies with intrinsic valence and whether intrinsic and acquired valence share the same brain mechanisms. Forty-five participants performed associative learning of gains and losses, using pictures varying on intrinsic valence (positive, negative) and outcome (90 % gain, 50 %/50 %, 90 % loss). 64-channel EEG was recorded. During acquisition, one picture from each valence/outcome combination was repeatedly presented, followed by abstract outcome information (+10 ct, -10 ct) at the predefined probability. In the test phase, participants pressed buttons to earn the real gains and avoid the real losses associated with the pictures. Here, effects of outcome and/or its congruence with intrinsic valence were observed for RT, error rate, frontal theta power, posterior P2, P300, and LPP. Moreover, outcome systematically affected post-test valence and arousal ratings. During acquisition, a contingency effect (90 % > 50 %) on amplitude of a frontal negative slow wave accompanied the progress of learning, independently of outcome, valence, and congruence. The relative absence of outcome effects during acquisition suggests "cold" semantic rather than genuinely affective processing of gains and losses. However, with real gains and losses in the test phase, "hot" affective processing took place, and outcome and its congruence with intrinsic valence influenced behavior and neural processing. Finally, the data suggest both shared and distinct brain mechanisms of intrinsic and acquired valence.

Recurrent networks endowed with structural priors explain suboptimal animal behavior

The strategies found by animals facing a new task are determined both by individual experience and by structural priors evolved to leverage the statistics of natural environments. Rats quickly learn to capitalize on the trial sequence correlations of two-alternative forced choice (2AFC) tasks after correct trials but consistently deviate from optimal behavior after error trials. To understand this outcome-dependent gating, we first show that recurrent neural networks (RNNs) trained in the same 2AFC task outperform rats as they can readily learn to use across-trial information both after correct and error trials. We hypothesize that, although RNNs can optimize their behavior in the 2AFC task without any a priori restrictions, rats' strategy is constrained by a structural prior adapted to a natural environment in which rewarded and non-rewarded actions provide largely asymmetric information. When pre-training RNNs in a more ecological task with more than two possible choices, networks develop a strategy by which they gate off the across-trial evidence after errors, mimicking rats' behavior. Population analyses show that the pre-trained networks form an accurate representation of the sequence statistics independently of the outcome in the previous trial. After error trials, gating is implemented by a change in the network dynamics that temporarily decouple the categorization of the stimulus from the across-trial accumulated evidence. Our results suggest that the rats' suboptimal behavior reflects the influence of a structural prior that reacts to errors by isolating the network decision dynamics from the context, ultimately constraining the performance in a 2AFC laboratory task.

Mind the matter: Active matter, soft robotics, and the making of bio-inspired artificial intelligence

Philosophical and theoretical debates on the multiple realisability of the cognitive have historically influenced discussions of the possible systems capable of instantiating complex functions like memory, learning, goal-directedness, and decision-making. These debates have had the corollary of undermining, if not altogether neglecting, the materiality and corporeality of cognition-treating material, living processes as "hardware" problems that can be abstracted out and, in principle, implemented in a variety of materials-in particular on digital computers and in the form of state-of-the-art neural networks. In sum, the matter in se has been taken not to matter for cognition. However, in this paper, we argue that the materiality of cognition-and the living, self-organizing processes that it enables-requires a more detailed assessment when understanding the nature of cognition and recreating it in the field of embodied robotics. Or, in slogan form, that the matter matters for cognitive form and function. We pull from the fields of Active Matter Physics, Soft Robotics, and Basal Cognition literature to suggest that the imbrication between material and cognitive processes is closer than standard accounts of multiple realisability suggest. In light of this, we propose upgrading the notion of multiple realisability from the standard version-what we call 1.0-to a more nuanced conception 2.0 to better reflect the recent empirical advancements, while at the same time averting many of the problems that have been raised for it. These fields are actively reshaping the terrain in which we understand materiality and how it enables, mediates, and constrains cognition. We propose that taking the materiality of our embodied, precarious nature seriously furnishes an important research avenue for the development of embodied robots that autonomously value, engage, and interact with the environment in a goal-directed manner, in response to existential needs of survival, persistence, and, ultimately, reproduction. Thus, we argue that by placing further emphasis on the soft, active, and plastic nature of the materials that constitute cognitive embodiment, we can move further in the direction of autonomous embodied robots and Artificial Intelligence.

Metacognition as a Consequence of Competing Evolutionary Time Scales

Evolution is full of coevolving systems characterized by complex spatio-temporal interactions that lead to intertwined processes of adaptation. Yet, how adaptation across multiple levels of temporal scales and biological complexity is achieved remains unclear. Here, we formalize how evolutionary multi-scale processing underlying adaptation constitutes a form of metacognition flowing from definitions of metaprocessing in machine learning. We show (1) how the evolution of metacognitive systems can be expected when fitness landscapes vary on multiple time scales, and (2) how multiple time scales emerge during coevolutionary processes of sufficiently complex interactions. After defining a metaprocessor as a regulator with local memory, we prove that metacognition is more energetically efficient than purely object-level cognition when selection operates at multiple timescales in evolution. Furthermore, we show that existing modeling approaches to coadaptation and coevolution—here active inference networks, predator–prey interactions, coupled genetic algorithms, and generative adversarial networks—lead to multiple emergent timescales underlying forms of metacognition. Lastly, we show how coarse-grained structures emerge naturally in any resource-limited system, providing sufficient evidence for metacognitive systems to be a prevalent and vital component of (co-)evolution. Therefore, multi-scale processing is a necessary requirement for many evolutionary scenarios, leading to de facto metacognitive evolutionary outcomes.

Technological Approach to Mind Everywhere: An Experimentally-Grounded Framework for Understanding Diverse Bodies and Minds

Synthetic biology and bioengineering provide the opportunity to create novel embodied cognitive systems (otherwise known as minds) in a very wide variety of chimeric architectures combining evolved and designed material and software. These advances are disrupting familiar concepts in the philosophy of mind, and require new ways of thinking about and comparing truly diverse intelligences, whose composition and origin are not like any of the available natural model species. In this Perspective, I introduce TAME-Technological Approach to Mind Everywhere-a framework for understanding and manipulating cognition in unconventional substrates. TAME formalizes a non-binary (continuous), empirically-based approach to strongly embodied agency. TAME provides a natural way to think about animal sentience as an instance of collective intelligence of cell groups, arising from dynamics that manifest in similar ways in numerous other substrates. When applied to regenerating/developmental systems, TAME suggests a perspective on morphogenesis as an example of basal cognition. The deep symmetry between problem-solving in anatomical, physiological, transcriptional, and 3D (traditional behavioral) spaces drives specific hypotheses by which cognitive capacities can increase during evolution. An important medium exploited by evolution for joining active subunits into greater agents is developmental bioelectricity, implemented by pre-neural use of ion channels and gap junctions to scale up cell-level feedback loops into anatomical homeostasis. This architecture of multi-scale competency of biological systems has important implications for plasticity of bodies and minds, greatly potentiating evolvability. Considering classical and recent data from the perspectives of computational science, evolutionary biology, and basal cognition, reveals a rich research program with many implications for cognitive science, evolutionary biology, regenerative medicine, and artificial intelligence.

Behaviorist approaches to investigating memory and learning: A primer for synthetic biology and bioengineering

The fields of developmental biology, biomedicine, and artificial life are being revolutionized by advances in synthetic morphology. The next phase of synthetic biology and bioengineering is resulting in the construction of novel organisms (biobots), which exhibit not only morphogenesis and physiology but functional behavior. It is now essential to begin to characterize the behavioral capacity of novel living constructs in terms of their ability to make decisions, form memories, learn from experience, and anticipate future stimuli. These synthetic organisms are highly diverse, and often do not resemble familiar model systems used in behavioral science. Thus, they represent an important context in which to begin to unify and standardize vocabulary and techniques across developmental biology, behavioral ecology, and neuroscience. To facilitate the study of behavior in novel living systems, we present a primer on techniques from the behaviorist tradition that can be used to probe the functions of any organism – natural, chimeric, or synthetic – regardless of the details of their construction or origin. These techniques provide a rich toolkit for advancing the fields of synthetic bioengineering, evolutionary developmental biology, basal cognition, exobiology, and robotics.

Reframing cognition: getting down to biological basics

The premise of this two-part theme issue is simple: the cognitive sciences should join the rest of the life sciences in how they approach the quarry within their research domain. Specifically, understanding how organisms on the lower branches of the phylogenetic tree become familiar with, value and exploit elements of an ecological niche while avoiding harm can be expected to aid understanding of how organisms that evolved later (including Homo sapiens) do the same or similar things. We call this approach basal cognition. In this introductory essay, we explain what the approach involves. Because no definition of cognition exists that reflects its biological basis, we advance a working definition that can be operationalized; introduce a behaviour-generating toolkit of capacities that comprise the function (e.g. sensing/perception, memory, valence, learning, decision making, communication), each element of which can be studied relatively independently; and identify a (necessarily incomplete) suite of common biophysical mechanisms found throughout the domains of life involved in implementing the toolkit. The articles in this collection illuminate different aspects of basal cognition across different forms of biological organization, from prokaryotes and single-celled eukaryotes-the focus of Part 1-to plants and finally to animals, without and with nervous systems, the focus of Part 2. By showcasing work in diverse, currently disconnected fields, we hope to sketch the outline of a new multidisciplinary approach for comprehending cognition, arguably the most fascinating and hard-to-fathom evolved function on this planet. Doing so has the potential to shed light on problems in a wide variety of research domains, including microbiology, immunology, zoology, biophysics, botany, developmental biology, neurobiology/science, regenerative medicine, computational biology, artificial life and synthetic bioengineering. This article is part of the theme issue 'Basal cognition: conceptual tools and the view from the single cell'.