Linking single-cell decisions to collective behaviours in social bacteria

Leveraging Cancer Phenotypic Plasticity for Novel Treatment Strategies

Cancer cells, like all other organisms, are adept at switching their phenotype to adjust to the changes in their environment. Thus, phenotypic plasticity is a quantitative trait that confers a fitness advantage to the cancer cell by altering its phenotype to suit environmental circumstances. Until recently, new traits, especially in cancer, were thought to arise due to genetic factors; however, it is now amply evident that such traits could also emerge non-genetically due to phenotypic plasticity. Furthermore, phenotypic plasticity of cancer cells contributes to phenotypic heterogeneity in the population, which is a major impediment in treating the disease. Finally, plasticity also impacts the group behavior of cancer cells, since competition and cooperation among multiple clonal groups within the population and the interactions they have with the tumor microenvironment also contribute to the evolution of drug resistance. Thus, understanding the mechanisms that cancer cells exploit to tailor their phenotypes at a systems level can aid the development of novel cancer therapeutics and treatment strategies. Here, we present our perspective on a team medicine-based approach to gain a deeper understanding of the phenomenon to develop new therapeutic strategies.

An evidence-based critical review of the mind-brain identity theory

In the philosophy of mind, neuroscience, and psychology, the causal relationship between phenomenal consciousness, mentation, and brain states has always been a matter of debate. On the one hand, material monism posits consciousness and mind as pure brain epiphenomena. One of its most stringent lines of reasoning relies on a 'loss-of-function lesion premise,' according to which, since brain lesions and neurochemical modifications lead to cognitive impairment and/or altered states of consciousness, there is no reason to doubt the mind-brain identity. On the other hand, dualism or idealism (in one form or another) regard consciousness and mind as something other than the sole product of cerebral activity pointing at the ineffable, undefinable, and seemingly unphysical nature of our subjective qualitative experiences and its related mental dimension. Here, several neuroscientific findings are reviewed that question the idea that posits phenomenal experience as an emergent property of brain activity, and argue that the premise of material monism is based on a logical correlation-causation fallacy. While these (mostly ignored) findings, if considered separately from each other, could, in principle, be recast into a physicalist paradigm, once viewed from an integral perspective, they substantiate equally well an ontology that posits mind and consciousness as a primal phenomenon.

Mind the matter: Active matter, soft robotics, and the making of bio-inspired artificial intelligence

Philosophical and theoretical debates on the multiple realisability of the cognitive have historically influenced discussions of the possible systems capable of instantiating complex functions like memory, learning, goal-directedness, and decision-making. These debates have had the corollary of undermining, if not altogether neglecting, the materiality and corporeality of cognition-treating material, living processes as "hardware" problems that can be abstracted out and, in principle, implemented in a variety of materials-in particular on digital computers and in the form of state-of-the-art neural networks. In sum, the matter in se has been taken not to matter for cognition. However, in this paper, we argue that the materiality of cognition-and the living, self-organizing processes that it enables-requires a more detailed assessment when understanding the nature of cognition and recreating it in the field of embodied robotics. Or, in slogan form, that the matter matters for cognitive form and function. We pull from the fields of Active Matter Physics, Soft Robotics, and Basal Cognition literature to suggest that the imbrication between material and cognitive processes is closer than standard accounts of multiple realisability suggest. In light of this, we propose upgrading the notion of multiple realisability from the standard version-what we call 1.0-to a more nuanced conception 2.0 to better reflect the recent empirical advancements, while at the same time averting many of the problems that have been raised for it. These fields are actively reshaping the terrain in which we understand materiality and how it enables, mediates, and constrains cognition. We propose that taking the materiality of our embodied, precarious nature seriously furnishes an important research avenue for the development of embodied robots that autonomously value, engage, and interact with the environment in a goal-directed manner, in response to existential needs of survival, persistence, and, ultimately, reproduction. Thus, we argue that by placing further emphasis on the soft, active, and plastic nature of the materials that constitute cognitive embodiment, we can move further in the direction of autonomous embodied robots and Artificial Intelligence.

Alternative model systems for cognitive variation: eusocial-insect colonies

Understanding the origins and maintenance of cognitive variation in animal populations is central to the study of the evolution of cognition. However, the brain is itself a complex, hierarchical network of heterogeneous components, from diverse cell types to diverse neuropils, each of which may be of limited use to study in isolation or prohibitively challenging to manipulate in situ. Consequently, highly tractable alternative model systems may be valuable tools. Eusocial-insect colonies display emergent cognitive-like properties from relatively simple social interactions between diverse subunits that can be observed and manipulated while operating collectively. Here, we review the individual-scale mechanisms that cause group-level variation in how colonies solve problems analogous to cognitive challenges faced by brains, like decision-making, attention, and search.

Oscillators and servomechanisms in orientation and navigation, and sometimes in cognition

Navigational mechanisms have been characterized as servomechanisms. A navigational servomechanism specifies a goal state to strive for. Discrepancies between the perceived current state and the goal state specify error. Servomechanisms adjust the course of travel to reduce the error. I now add that navigational servomechanisms work with oscillators, periodic movements of effectors that drive locomotion. I illustrate this concept selectively over a vast range of scales of travel from micrometres in bacteria to thousands of kilometres in sea turtles. The servomechanisms differ in sophistication, with some interrupting forward motion occasionally or changing travel speed in kineses and others adjusting the direction of travel in taxes. I suggest that in other realms of life as well, especially in cognition, servomechanisms work with oscillators.

Complete Genome Sequence of Myxococcus Phage Mx4

Myxococcus xanthus is a bacterial model in microbial developmental biology and social evolution. Here, I present the 57.0-kb circular genomic sequence of the wild-type Myxococcus phage Mx4, with a GC content of 70.1%. Annotation predicted 97 protein-coding genes. Head-neck-tail protein classification assigns Mx4 to the tailed, Mu-like members of the family Myoviridae of group type 1 (cluster 8).

Reframing cognition: getting down to biological basics

The premise of this two-part theme issue is simple: the cognitive sciences should join the rest of the life sciences in how they approach the quarry within their research domain. Specifically, understanding how organisms on the lower branches of the phylogenetic tree become familiar with, value and exploit elements of an ecological niche while avoiding harm can be expected to aid understanding of how organisms that evolved later (including Homo sapiens) do the same or similar things. We call this approach basal cognition. In this introductory essay, we explain what the approach involves. Because no definition of cognition exists that reflects its biological basis, we advance a working definition that can be operationalized; introduce a behaviour-generating toolkit of capacities that comprise the function (e.g. sensing/perception, memory, valence, learning, decision making, communication), each element of which can be studied relatively independently; and identify a (necessarily incomplete) suite of common biophysical mechanisms found throughout the domains of life involved in implementing the toolkit. The articles in this collection illuminate different aspects of basal cognition across different forms of biological organization, from prokaryotes and single-celled eukaryotes-the focus of Part 1-to plants and finally to animals, without and with nervous systems, the focus of Part 2. By showcasing work in diverse, currently disconnected fields, we hope to sketch the outline of a new multidisciplinary approach for comprehending cognition, arguably the most fascinating and hard-to-fathom evolved function on this planet. Doing so has the potential to shed light on problems in a wide variety of research domains, including microbiology, immunology, zoology, biophysics, botany, developmental biology, neurobiology/science, regenerative medicine, computational biology, artificial life and synthetic bioengineering. This article is part of the theme issue 'Basal cognition: conceptual tools and the view from the single cell'.