Experts in action: why we need an embodied social brain hypothesis

A revitalized biopsychosocial model: core theory, research paradigms, and clinical implications

The biopsychosocial model (BPSM) was proposed by George Engel in 1977 as an improvement to the biomedical model (BMM), to take account of psychological and social as well as biological factors relevant to health and disease. Since then the BPSM has had a mixed reputation, as the overarching framework for psychiatry, perhaps for medicine generally, while also being criticized for being theoretically and empirically vacuous. Over the past few decades, substantial evidence has accumulated supporting the BPSM but its theory remains less clear. The first part of this paper reviews recent well-known, general theories in the relevant sciences that can provide a theoretical framework of the model, constituting a revitalized BPSM capable of theorizing causal interactions within and between biological, psychological, and social domains. Fundamental concepts in this new framework include causation as regulation and dysfunction as dysregulation. Associated research paradigms are outlined in Part 2. Research in psychological therapies and social epidemiology are major examples of programs that have produced results anomalous for the BMM and consistent with the BPSM. Theorized models of causal mechanisms enrich empirical data and two biopsychosocial examples are models of chronic stress and pain perception. Clinical implications are reviewed in Part 3. The BPSM accommodates psychological and social as well as biological treatment effects evident in the clinical trials literature. Personal, interpersonal, and institutional aspects of clinical care are out of the scope of the BMM, assigned to the art of healthcare rather than the science, but can be accommodated and theorized in the BPSM.

Coevolution of social and communicative complexity in lemurs

The endemic lemurs of Madagascar (Lemuriformes: Primates) exhibit great social and communicative diversity. Given their independent evolutionary history, lemurs provide an excellent opportunity to identify fundamental principles in the coevolution of social and communicative traits. We conducted comparative phylogenetic analyses to examine patterns of interspecific variation among measures of social complexity and repertoire sizes in the vocal, olfactory and visual modality, while controlling for environmental factors such as habitat and number of sympatric species. We also examined potential trade-offs in signal evolution as well as coevolution between body mass or brain size and communicative complexity. Repertoire sizes in the vocal, olfactory and visual modality correlated positively with group size, but not with environmental factors. Evolutionary changes in social complexity presumably antedated corresponding changes in communicative complexity. There was no trade-off in the evolution of signals in different modalities and neither body mass nor brain size correlated with any repertoire size. Hence, communicative complexity coevolved with social complexity across different modalities, possibly to service social relationships flexibly and effectively in pair- and group-living species. Our analyses shed light on the requirements and adaptive possibilities in the coevolution of core elements of social organization and social structure in a basal primate lineage. This article is part of the theme issue 'Cognition, communication and social bonds in primates'.

Equivocating on unconsciousness

In the language used by those who take an empirical approach to the study of consciousness, the subliminal–supraliminal binary and the unconscious–conscious process binary are treated as one and the same, despite the unconscious–conscious process distinction having a historical association to a different meaning. The historical meaning of the unconscious–conscious process distinction may then become implicitly associated with the interpretations of related studies, resulting in a misinterpretation of evidence. This is to say, where the ability to differentially respond to subliminal and supraliminal stimuli may be indicative of a variety of “unconscious” and “conscious” processes, as these terms relate to a qualitative conception of consciousness, subliminal threshold testing does not tell us anything about consciousness and the associated binary of “unconscious” and “conscious” processes as these terms relate to their historical, metacognitive conceptions.

Neuroscience needs evolution

The nervous system is a product of evolution. That is, it was constructed through a long series of modifications, within the strong constraints of heredity, and continuously subjected to intense selection pressures. As a result, the organization and functions of the brain are shaped by its history. We believe that this fact, underappreciated in contemporary systems neuroscience, offers an invaluable aid for helping us resolve the brain's mysteries. Indeed, we think that the consideration of evolutionary history ought to take its place alongside other intellectual tools used to understand the brain, such as behavioural experiments, studies of anatomical structure and functional characterization based on recordings of neural activity. In this introduction, we argue for the importance of evolution by highlighting specific examples of ways that evolutionary theory can enhance neuroscience. The rest of the theme issue elaborates this point, emphasizing the conservative nature of neural evolution, the important consequences of specific transitions that occurred in our history, and the ways in which considerations of evolution can shed light on issues ranging from specific mechanisms to fundamental principles of brain organization.

This article is part of the theme issue ‘Systems neuroscience through the lens of evolutionary theory’.