The coordination of attention and action in great apes and humans

Children Sustain Cooperation in a Threshold Public-Goods Game Even When Seeing Others' Outcomes

Many societal challenges are threshold dilemmas requiring people to cooperate to reach a threshold before group benefits can be reaped. Yet receiving feedback about others' outcomes relative to one's own (relative feedback) can undermine cooperation by focusing group members' attention on outperforming each other. We investigated the impact of relative feedback compared to individual feedback (only seeing one's own outcome) on cooperation in children from Germany and India (6- to 10-year-olds, N = 240). Using a threshold public-goods game with real water as a resource, we show that, although feedback had an effect, most groups sustained cooperation at high levels in both feedback conditions until the end of the game. Analyses of children's communication (14,374 codable utterances) revealed more references to social comparisons and more verbal efforts to coordinate in the relative-feedback condition. Thresholds can mitigate the most adverse effects of social comparisons by focusing attention on a common goal.

Object exploration is facilitated by the physical and social environment in center-based child care

Object exploration is considered a driver of motor, cognitive, and social development. However, little is known about how early childhood education and care settings facilitate object exploration. This study examined if children's exploration of objects during free play was facilitated by the use of particular spatial components (floor, tables, and activity centers) and types of play (solitary, social, and parallel). Participants were 61 children (aged 11 to 48 months and 50.8% boys, socioeconomic levels representative of the Dutch population). Intraindividual variability in children's object exploration was predicted by the use of particular spatial components and the social setting, with small-to-medium effect sizes. Solitary and parallel play were positively associated with complex object exploration, especially when sitting or standing at child-height tables. During social play, object exploration was mostly absent.

Interactive repair and the foundations of language

The robustness and flexibility of human language is underpinned by a machinery of interactive repair. Repair is deeply intertwined with two core properties of human language: reflexivity (it can communicate about itself) and accountability (it is used to publicly enforce social norms). We review empirical and theoretical advances from across the cognitive sciences that mark interactive repair as a domain of pragmatic universals, a key place to study metacognition in interaction, and a system that enables collective computation. This provides novel insights into the role of repair in comparative cognition, language development, and human-computer interaction. As an always-available fallback option and an infrastructure for negotiating social commitments, interactive repair is foundational to the resilience, complexity, and flexibility of human language.

Differences in the Social Motivations and Emotions of Humans and Other Great Apes

Humans share with other mammals and primates many social motivations and emotions, but they are also much more cooperative than even their closest primate relatives. Here I review recent comparative experiments and analyses that illustrate humans' species-typical social motivations and emotions for cooperation in comparison with those of other great apes. These may be classified most generally as (i) 'you > me' (e.g., prosocial sympathy, informative and pedagogical motives in communication); (ii) 'you = me' (e.g., feelings of mutual respect, fairness, resentment); (iii) 'we > me' (e.g., feelings of obligation and guilt); and (iv) 'WE (in the group) > me' (e.g., in-group loyalty and conformity to norms, shame, and many in-group biases). The existence of these species-typical and species-universal motivations and emotions provides compelling evidence for the importance of cooperative activities in the human species.

Life history impacts on infancy and the evolution of human social cognition

Greater longevity, slower maturation and shorter birth intervals are life history features that distinguish humans from the other living members of our hominid family, the great apes. Theory and evidence synthesized here suggest the evolution of those features can explain both our bigger brains and our cooperative sociality. I rely on Sarah Hrdy's hypothesis that survival challenges for ancestral infants propelled the evolution of distinctly human socioemotional appetites and Barbara Finlay and colleagues' findings that mammalian brain size is determined by developmental duration. Similar responsiveness to varying developmental contexts in chimpanzee and human one-year-olds suggests similar infant responsiveness in our nearest common ancestor. Those ancestral infants likely began to acquire solid food while still nursing and fed themselves at weaning as chimpanzees and other great apes do now. When human ancestors colonized habitats lacking foods that infants could handle, dependents' survival became contingent on subsidies. Competition to engage subsidizers selected for capacities and tendencies to enlist and maintain social connections during the early wiring of expanding infant brains with lifelong consequences that Hrdy labeled "emotionally modern" social cognition.

Great ape interaction: Ladyginian but not Gricean

Nonhuman great apes inform one another in ways that can seem very humanlike. Especially in the gestural domain, their behavior exhibits many similarities with human communication, meeting widely used empirical criteria for intentionality. At the same time, there remain some manifest differences, most obviously the enormous range and scope of human expression. How to account for these similarities and differences in a unified way remains a major challenge. Here, we make a key distinction between the expression of intentions (Ladyginian) and the expression of specifically informative intentions (Gricean), and we situate this distinction within a "special case of" framework for classifying different modes of attention manipulation. We hence describe how the attested tendencies of great ape interaction-for instance, to be dyadic rather than triadic, to be about the here-and-now rather than "displaced," and to have a high degree of perceptual resemblance between form and meaning-are products of its Ladyginian but not Gricean character. We also reinterpret video footage of great ape gesture as Ladyginian but not Gricean, and we distinguish several varieties of meaning that are continuous with one another. We conclude that the evolutionary origins of linguistic meaning lie not in gradual changes in communication systems, but rather in gradual changes in social cognition, and specifically in what modes of attention manipulation are enabled by a species' cognitive phenotype: first Ladyginian and in turn Gricean. The second of these shifts rendered humans, and only humans, "language ready."

Empirical challenges from the comparative and developmental literature to the Shared Intentionality Theory - a review of alternative data on recursive mind reading, prosociality, imitation and cumulative culture

Humans have an irresistible inclination to coordinate actions with others, leading to species-unique forms of cooperation. According to the highly influential Shared Intentionality Theory (SITh), human cooperation is made possible by shared intentionality (SI), typically defined as a suite of socio-cognitive and motivational traits for sharing psychological states with others, thereby enabling individuals to engage in joint action in the mutually aware pursuit of shared goals. SITh theorises that SI evolved as late as 400,000 years ago, when our ancestors (in particular, Homo heidelbergensis) turned to a kind of food procurement that obligatorily required joint coordinated action. SI is, thus, hypothesized to be absent in other extant species, including our closest genetic relatives, the nonhuman great apes ("apes"). According to SITh, ape psychology is exclusively driven by individualistic motivations, as opposed to human psychology which is uniquely driven by altruistic motivations. The evolutionary scenario proposed by SITh builds on a series of findings from socio-cognitive research with apes and human children, and on the assumption that abilities expressed early in human development are human universals, unlikely to have been shaped by socio-cultural influences. Drawing on the primatological and developmental literature, we provide a systematic - albeit selective - review of SITh-inconsistent findings concerning psychological and behavioural traits theorised to be constitutive of SI. The findings we review pertain to all three thematic clusters typically addressed in SITh: (i) recursive mind reading; (ii) prosociality; (iii) imitation and cumulative culture. We conclude that such alternative data undermine two core SITh claims: the late evolutionary emergence of SI and the radical divide between ape and human psychology. We also discuss several conceptual and methodological limitations that currently hamper reliable comparative research on SI, in particular those engendered by Western-centric biases in the social sciences, where an overreliance on Western samples has promoted the formulation of Western-centric conceptualisations, operationalisations and methodologies.

An adiposity force induces obesity in humans independently of a normal energy balance system-a thought experiment

Obesity in humans represents a cumulative retention of a tiny fraction of total energy intake as fat, which is accompanied by growth of the metabolically active, energy-demanding, lean body mass. Since the energy balance regulation operates irrespective of the excess fat storage, availability of the required energy supplies is a permissive condition for obesity development. It occurs predominantly among people genetically predisposed and/or living with social or mental challenges. I propose a theory in which the body responds to social disruptions as threats of a future lack of food by an adiposity force building a reserve of energy independent of the regulation of the energy balance. It is based on the assumption that our evolutionary development required collaboration in gathering and sharing of food, combined with precautionary measures against anticipated failing food supplies. Social challenges are perceived as such threats, which activate the adiposity force through the brain to instigate the growth of fat and lean mass by neuro-hormonal signalling. If both perceived social threats and food abundance continue, the adiposity force pushes the fat accretion process to continue without inhibition by feedback signals from the fat mass, eventually leading to more obesity, and more so among the genetically predisposed. This article is part of a discussion meeting issue 'Causes of obesity: theories, conjectures and evidence (Part I)'.

Revisiting the human 'interaction engine': comparative approaches to social action coordination

The evolution of language was likely facilitated by a special predisposition for social interaction, involving a set of communicative and cognitive skills summarized as the 'interaction engine'. This assemblage seems to emerge early in development, to be found universally across cultures, and to enable participation in sophisticated joint action through the addition of spoken language. Yet, new evidence on social action coordination and communication in nonhuman primates warrants an update of the interaction engine hypothesis, particularly with respect to the evolutionary origins of its specific ingredients. However, one enduring problem for comparative research results from a conceptual gulf between disciplines, rendering it difficult to test concepts derived from human interaction research in nonhuman animals. The goal of this theme issue is to make such concepts accessible for comparative research, to promote a fruitful interdisciplinary debate on social action coordination as a new arena of research, and to enable mutual fertilization between human and nonhuman interaction research. In consequence, we here consider relevant theoretical and empirical research within and beyond this theme issue to revisit the interaction engine's shared, convergently derived and uniquely derived ingredients preceding (or perhaps in the last case, succeeding) human language. This article is part of the theme issue 'Revisiting the human 'interaction engine': comparative approaches to social action coordination'.