Kick-starting concept formation with intrinsically motivated learning: the grounding by competence acquisition hypothesis

Neural representation in active inference: Using generative models to interact with-and understand-the lived world

This paper considers neural representation through the lens of active inference, a normative framework for understanding brain function. It delves into how living organisms employ generative models to minimize the discrepancy between predictions and observations (as scored with variational free energy). The ensuing analysis suggests that the brain learns generative models to navigate the world adaptively, not (or not solely) to understand it. Different living organisms may possess an array of generative models, spanning from those that support action-perception cycles to those that underwrite planning and imagination; namely, from explicit models that entail variables for predicting concurrent sensations, like objects, faces, or people-to action-oriented models that predict action outcomes. It then elucidates how generative models and belief dynamics might link to neural representation and the implications of different types of generative models for understanding an agent's cognitive capabilities in relation to its ecological niche. The paper concludes with open questions regarding the evolution of generative models and the development of advanced cognitive abilities-and the gradual transition from pragmatic to detached neural representations. The analysis on offer foregrounds the diverse roles that generative models play in cognitive processes and the evolution of neural representation.

The curious origins of ownership

What are the origins of ownership as a conceptual domain? By combining experimental evidence from cognitive science, a theoretical proposal from developmental psychology, and the computational framework of reinforcement learning, I argue that ownership concepts can develop as a by-product of our curiosity-based exploration and become grounded via our experience of control in physical and social environments.

Editorial concepts in interaction: social engagement and inner experiences

This theme issue aims to view the literature on concepts through a novel lens, that of social interaction and its influence on inner experiences. It discusses unsolved problems in literature on concepts, emphasizing the distinction between concrete versus abstract concepts and external versus internal grounding. This introductory article reflects the two research streams that the theme aims to bridge-in this area, the dimension of embodied interaction with others and how this influences the interaction with ourselves is still underexplored. In the first part, we discuss recent trends in social cognition, showing how interacting with others influences our concepts. In the second part, we address how social interactions become part of our inner world in a Vygotskian fashion. First, we illustrate how interoception, emotion and metacognition are connected with concepts and knowledge. Second, we deal with how language, in both its outer and inner form, can empower cognition and concepts. We also briefly describe how novel experimental and computational methods contribute to investigating the online use of concepts. Overall, this introductory article outlines the potentialities of an integrated and interactive approach that can give new, fresh life to a topic, that of concepts, which lies at the root of human cognition. This article is part of the theme issue 'Concepts in interaction: social engagement and inner experiences'.