Spatial pattern dynamics due to the fitness gradient flux in evolutionary games

How local antipredator response unbalances the rock-paper-scissors model

Antipredator behavior is a self-preservation strategy present in many biological systems, where individuals join the effort in a collective reaction to avoid being caught by an approaching predator. We study a nonhierarchical tritrophic system, whose predator-prey interactions are described by the rock-paper-scissors game rules. We perform a set of spatial stochastic simulations where organisms of one out of the species can resist predation in a collective strategy. The drop in predation capacity is local, which means that each predator faces a particular opposition depending on the prey group size surrounding it. Considering that the interference in a predator action depends on the prey's physical and cognitive ability, we explore the role of a conditioning factor that indicates the fraction of the species apt to perform the antipredator strategy. Because of the local unbalancing of the cyclic predator-prey interactions, departed spatial domains mainly occupied by a single species emerge. Unlike the rock-paper-scissors model with a weak species because of a nonlocal reason, our findings show that if the predation probability of one species is reduced because individuals face local antipredator response, the species does not predominate. Instead, the local unbalancing of the rock-paper-scissors model results in the prevalence of the weak species' prey. Finally, the outcomes show that local unevenness may jeopardize biodiversity, with the coexistence being more threatened for high mobility.

Community formation in wealth-mediated thermodynamic strategy evolution

We study a dynamical system defined by a repeated game on a 1D lattice, in which the players keep track of their gross payoffs over time in a bank. Strategy updates are governed by a Boltzmann distribution, which depends on the neighborhood bank values associated with each strategy, relative to a temperature scale, which defines the random fluctuations. Players with higher bank values are, thus, less likely to change strategy than players with a lower bank value. For a parameterized rock-paper-scissors game, we derive a condition under which communities of a given strategy form with either fixed or drifting boundaries. We show the effect of a temperature increase on the underlying system and identify surprising properties of this model through numerical simulations.

Persistent homology and the shape of evolutionary games

For nearly three decades, spatial games have produced a wealth of insights to the study of behavior and its relation to population structure. However, as different rules and factors are added or altered, the dynamics of spatial models often become increasingly complicated to interpret. To tackle this problem, we introduce persistent homology as a rigorous framework that can be used to both define and compute higher-order features of data in a manner which is invariant to parameter choices, robust to noise, and independent of human observation. Our work demonstrates its relevance for spatial games by showing how topological features of simulation data that persist over different spatial scales reflect the stability of strategies in 2D lattice games. To do so, we analyze the persistent homology of scenarios from two games: a Prisoner's Dilemma and a SIRS epidemic model. The experimental results show how the method accurately detects features that correspond to real aspects of the game dynamics. Unlike other tools that study dynamics of spatial systems, persistent homology can tell us something meaningful about population structure while remaining neutral about the underlying structure itself. Regardless of game complexity, since strategies either succeed or fail to conform to shapes of a certain topology there is much potential for the method to provide novel insights for a wide variety of spatially extended systems in biology, social science, and physics.

Fast cheater migration stabilizes coexistence in a public goods dilemma on networks

Through the lens of game theory, cooperation is frequently considered an unsustainable strategy: if an entire population is cooperating, each individual can increase its overall fitness by choosing not to cooperate, thereby still receiving all the benefit of its cooperating neighbors while no longer expending its own energy. Observable cooperation in naturally-occurring public goods games is consequently of great interest, as such systems offer insight into both the emergence and sustainability of cooperation. Here we consider a population that obeys a public goods game on a network of discrete regions (that we call colonies), between any two of which individuals are free to migrate. We construct a system of piecewise-smooth ordinary differential equations that couple the within-colony population dynamics and the between-colony migratory dynamics. Through a combination of analytical and numerical methods, we show that if the workers within the population migrate sufficiently fast relative to the cheaters, the network loses stability first through a Hopf bifurcation, then a torus bifurcation, after which one or more colonies collapse. Our results indicate that fast moving cheaters can act to stabilize worker-cheatercoexistence within network that would otherwise collapse. We end with a comparison of our results with the dynamics observed in colonies of the ant species Pristomyrmex punctatus, and argue that they qualitatively agree.

The role of opportunistic migration in cyclic games

We study cyclic evolutionary games in a spatial diluted grid environment in which agents strategically interact locally but can also opportunistically move to other positions within a given migration radius. We find that opportunistic migration can inverse the cyclic prevalence between the strategies when the frequency of random imitation is large enough compared to the payoff-driven imitation. At the transition the average size of the patterns diverges and this threatens diversity of strategies.