Payoff components and their effects in a spatial three-strategy evolutionary social dilemma

Changes in political party systems arising from conflict and transfer among political parties

Conflict that arises between two groups of different paradigms is an inevitable phenomenon, and a representative example of the conflict among different groups is a conflict phenomenon caused by competition among political parties. In this paper, we study the dynamical behavior of a political party system. Considering three major political parties, we investigate how political party systems can be changed by employing a mathematical model. By considering the transfer mechanism of recruitment as well as conflict of competition between political parties, we found that all parties are likely to coexist when both the competition and transfer between the parties are weak, or if either mechanism can occur at a relatively low level. Otherwise, a political party system is changed to a single-party system. In addition, we found that when a party system was changed into a single-party system, it appeared to be either bistable or multistable, and has been elucidate by linear stability analysis. Our results may provide insights to understand mechanisms how political party systems can be changed by conflict and transfer.

The Effectiveness of Reward and Punishment in Spatial Social Games

Punishment and reward are usually regarded as two potential mechanisms to explain the evolution of cooperation especially among multiple participators. However, the performance of these two scenarios in spatial environment needs to be discussed. To figure out this issue, we resort to the [Formula: see text]-player Iterated Snowdrift Dilemma (ISD) game and Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) game. More importantly, the evolution of punishment and reward in social network-structured populations has not been formally addressed. The numerical results show the equilibrium cooperation frequency can be influenced by cost-to-benefit ratio [Formula: see text], the punishment-to-benefit ratio [Formula: see text] and the reward-to-benefit ratio [Formula: see text]. And one intriguing observation is that under the same situation, the punishment is more effective than reward to the population. Then we further probe the effectiveness of neighborhood relationship to the cooperation, which is reflected by the random rewired probability [Formula: see text]. From the distribution of the four roles of the participator we can find that individuals can cooperate easily when they have close relationship. The results of this paper may be helpful to understand the cooperation in complex project or among industry–university–research cooperation project.

Extension of a spatial evolutionary coordination game with neutral options

The multiagent evolutionary games on a lattice are equivalent to a kinetic Ising model if the uniform pair interactions are defined by a two-strategy coordination game and the logit rule controls the strategy updates. Now we extend this model by allowing the players to use additional neutral strategies that provide zero payoffs for both players if one of them selects one of the neutral strategies. In the resulting n-strategy evolutionary games the analytical methods and numerical simulations indicate continuous order-disorder phase transitions when increasing the noise level if n does not exceed a threshold value. For larger n the system exhibits a first order phase transition at a critical noise level decreasing asymptotically as 2/ln(n).