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Aguilar-Janita M, Khalil N, Leyva I, Sendiña-Nadal I. Cooperation transitions in social games induced by aspiration-driven players. Phys Rev E 2024; 109:024107. [PMID: 38491644 DOI: 10.1103/physreve.109.024107] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/03/2023] [Accepted: 01/16/2024] [Indexed: 03/18/2024]
Abstract
Cooperation and defection are social traits whose evolutionary origin is still unresolved. Recent behavioral experiments with humans suggested that strategy changes are driven mainly by the individuals' expectations and not by imitation. This work theoretically analyzes and numerically explores an aspiration-driven strategy updating in a well-mixed population playing games. The payoffs of the game matrix and the aspiration are condensed into just two parameters that allow a comprehensive description of the dynamics. We find continuous and abrupt transitions in the cooperation density with excellent agreement between theory and the Gillespie simulations. Under strong selection, the system can display several levels of steady cooperation or get trapped into absorbing states. These states are still relevant for experiments even when irrational choices are made due to their prolonged relaxation times. Finally, we show that for the particular case of the prisoner dilemma, where defection is the dominant strategy under imitation mechanisms, the self-evaluation update instead favors cooperation nonlinearly with the level of aspiration. Thus, our work provides insights into the distinct role between imitation and self-evaluation with no learning dynamics.
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Affiliation(s)
- M Aguilar-Janita
- Complex Systems Group & GISC, Universidad Rey Juan Carlos, 28933 Móstoles, Spain
| | - N Khalil
- Complex Systems Group & GISC, Universidad Rey Juan Carlos, 28933 Móstoles, Spain
| | - I Leyva
- Complex Systems Group & GISC, Universidad Rey Juan Carlos, 28933 Móstoles, Spain
- Center for Biomedical Technology, Universidad Politécnica de Madrid, Pozuelo de Alarcón, 28223 Madrid, Spain
| | - I Sendiña-Nadal
- Complex Systems Group & GISC, Universidad Rey Juan Carlos, 28933 Móstoles, Spain
- Center for Biomedical Technology, Universidad Politécnica de Madrid, Pozuelo de Alarcón, 28223 Madrid, Spain
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2
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Wang SY, Yao X, Yang YM, Chen D, Wang RW, Xie FJ. Super-rational aspiration promotes cooperation in the asymmetric game with peer exit punishment and reward. Heliyon 2023; 9:e16729. [PMID: 37346327 PMCID: PMC10279827 DOI: 10.1016/j.heliyon.2023.e16729] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/31/2022] [Revised: 05/19/2023] [Accepted: 05/25/2023] [Indexed: 06/23/2023] Open
Abstract
Super-rational aspiration induced strategy updating with exit rights has been considered in some previous studies, in which the players adjust strategies in line with their payoffs and aspirations, and they have access to exit the game. However, exit payoffs for exiting players are automatically allocated, which is clearly contrary to reality. In this study, evolutionary cooperation dynamics with super-rational aspiration and asymmetry in the Prisoner's Dilemma game is investigated, where exit payoffs are implemented by local peers. The results show that for different population structures, the asymmetry of the system is always contributive to the participation of the players. Furthermore, we show that under different exit payoffs, super-rationality and asymmetry are conductive to the evolution of cooperation.
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Affiliation(s)
- Si-Yi Wang
- School of Modern Posts, Xi’an University of Posts & Telecommunications, Xi’an, Shaanxi, 710061, China
| | - Xin Yao
- School of Modern Posts, Xi’an University of Posts & Telecommunications, Xi’an, Shaanxi, 710061, China
| | - Yi-Mei Yang
- Department of Applied Mathematics, Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xi'an, 710129, China
| | - Daniel Chen
- The High School Affiliated to Renmin University of China, Beijing, 100097, China
| | - Rui-Wu Wang
- School of Ecology and Environment, Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xi'an, 710129, China
| | - Feng-Jie Xie
- School of Modern Posts, Xi’an University of Posts & Telecommunications, Xi’an, Shaanxi, 710061, China
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3
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Xia K. The characteristics of average abundance function with mutation of multi-player threshold public goods evolutionary game model under redistribution mechanism. BMC Ecol Evol 2021; 21:152. [PMID: 34348658 PMCID: PMC8336419 DOI: 10.1186/s12862-021-01847-0] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/17/2020] [Accepted: 06/03/2021] [Indexed: 11/16/2022] Open
Abstract
BACKGROUND In recent years, the average abundance function has attracted much attention as it reflects the degree of cooperation in the population. Then it is significant to analyse how average abundance functions can be increased to promote the proliferation of cooperative behaviour. However, further theoretical analysis for average abundance function with mutation under redistribution mechanism is still lacking. Furthermore, the theoretical basis for the corresponding numerical simulation is not sufficiently understood. RESULTS We have deduced the approximate expressions of average abundance function with mutation under redistribution mechanism on the basis of different levels of selection intensity [Formula: see text] (sufficiently small and large enough). In addition, we have analysed the influence of the size of group d, multiplication factor r, cost c, aspiration level [Formula: see text] on average abundance function from both quantitative and qualitative aspects. CONCLUSIONS (1) The approximate expression will become the linear equation related to selection intensity when [Formula: see text] is sufficiently small. (2) On one hand, approximation expression when [Formula: see text] is large enough is not available when r is small and m is large. On the other hand, this approximation expression will become more reliable when [Formula: see text] is larger. (3) On the basis of the expected payoff function [Formula: see text] and function [Formula: see text], the corresponding results for the effects of parameters (d,r,c,[Formula: see text]) on average abundance function [Formula: see text] have been explained.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ke Xia
- School of Economics, Zhengzhou University of Aeronautics, Zhengzhou, China.
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4
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Arefin MR, Tanimoto J. Imitation and aspiration dynamics bring different evolutionary outcomes in feedback-evolving games. Proc Math Phys Eng Sci 2021. [DOI: 10.1098/rspa.2021.0240] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/12/2022] Open
Abstract
Feedback-evolving games characterize the interplay between the evolution of strategies and environments. Rich dynamics have been derived for such games under the premise of the replicator equation, which unveils persistent oscillations between cooperation and defection. Besides replicator dynamics, here we have employed aspiration dynamics, in which individuals, instead of comparing payoffs with opposite strategies, assess their payoffs by self-evaluation to update strategies. We start with a brief review of feedback-evolving games with replicator dynamics and then comprehensively discuss such games with aspiration dynamics. Interestingly, the tenacious cycles, as perceived in replicator dynamics, cannot be observed in aspiration dynamics. Our analysis reveals that a parameter
θ
—which depicts the strength of cooperation in enhancing the environment—plays a pivotal role in comprehending the dynamics. In particular, with the symmetric aspiration level, if replete and depleted states, respectively, experience Prisoner's Dilemma and Trivial games, the rich environment is achievable only when
θ
> 1. The case
θ
< 1 never allows us to reach the replete state, even with a higher cooperation level. Furthermore, if cooperators aspire less than defectors, then the enhanced state can be achieved with a relatively lower
θ
value compared with the opposite scenario because too much expectation from cooperation can be less beneficial.
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Affiliation(s)
- Md. Rajib Arefin
- Interdisciplinary Graduate School of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University, Kasuga-koen, Kasuga-shi, Fukuoka 816-8580, Japan
- Department of Mathematics, University of Dhaka, Dhaka 1000, Bangladesh
| | - Jun Tanimoto
- Interdisciplinary Graduate School of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University, Kasuga-koen, Kasuga-shi, Fukuoka 816-8580, Japan
- Faculty of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University, Kasuga-koen, Kasuga-shi, Fukuoka 816-8580, Japan
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5
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Strategically positioning cooperators can facilitate the contagion of cooperation. Sci Rep 2021; 11:1127. [PMID: 33441930 PMCID: PMC7806618 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-020-80770-8] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/25/2020] [Accepted: 12/22/2020] [Indexed: 11/30/2022] Open
Abstract
The spreading of cooperation in structured population is a challenging problem which can be observed at different scales of social and biological organization. Generally, the problem is studied by evaluating the chances that few initial invading cooperators, randomly appearing in a network, can lead to the spreading of cooperation. In this paper we demonstrate that in many scenarios some cooperators are more influential than others and their initial positions can facilitate the spreading of cooperation. We investigate six different ways to add initial cooperators in a network of cheaters, based on different network-based measurements. Our research reveals that strategically positioning the initial cooperators in a population of cheaters allows to decrease the number of initial cooperators necessary to successfully seed cooperation. The strategic positioning of initial cooperators can also help to shorten the time necessary for the restoration of cooperation. The optimal ways in which the initial cooperators should be placed is, however, non-trivial in that it depends on the degree of competition, the underlying game, and the network structure. Overall, our results show that, in structured populations, few cooperators, well positioned in strategically chosen places, can spread cooperation faster and easier than a large number of cooperators that are placed badly.
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Arefin MR, Tanimoto J. Evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas under the coexistence of aspiration and imitation mechanisms. Phys Rev E 2020; 102:032120. [PMID: 33075988 DOI: 10.1103/physreve.102.032120] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/10/2020] [Accepted: 08/24/2020] [Indexed: 05/09/2023]
Abstract
Imitation and aspiration update rules are frequently observed in human and animal populations. While the imitation process entails payoff comparisons with surroundings, the aspiration process refers to self-evaluation. This work explores the evolution of cooperation in dyadic games under the coexistence of these two dynamics in an infinitely large well-mixed population. Two situations have been explored: (i) individuals adopt either an imitation or aspiration update rule with a certain probability, and (ii) the entire population is divided into two groups where one group only uses imitative rules and the other obeys aspiration updating alone. Both premises have been modeled by taking an infinite approximation of the finite population. In particular, the second mixing principle follows an additive property: the outcome of the whole population is the weighted average of outcomes from imitators and aspiration-driven individuals. Our work progressively investigates several variants of aspiration dynamics under strong selection, encompassing symmetric, asymmetric, and adaptive aspirations, which then coalesce with imitative dynamics. We also demonstrate which of the update rules performs better, under different social dilemmas, by allowing the evolution of the preference of update rules besides strategies. Aspiration dynamics always outperform imitation dynamics in the prisoner's dilemma, however, in the chicken and stag-hunt games the predominance of either update rule depends on the level of aspirations as well as on the extent of greed and fear present in the system. Finally, we examine the coevolution of strategies, aspirations, and update rules which leads to a binary state of obeying either imitation or aspiration dynamics. In such a circumstance, when aspiration dynamics prevail over imitation dynamics, cooperators and defectors coexist to an equal extent.
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Affiliation(s)
- Md Rajib Arefin
- Interdisciplinary Graduate School of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University, Kasuga-koen, Kasuga-shi, Fukuoka 816-8580, Japan
- Department of Mathematics, University of Dhaka, Dhaka 1000, Bangladesh
| | - Jun Tanimoto
- Interdisciplinary Graduate School of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University, Kasuga-koen, Kasuga-shi, Fukuoka 816-8580, Japan
- Faculty of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University, Kasuga-koen, Kasuga-shi, Fukuoka 816-8580, Japan
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7
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Arefin MR, Masaki T, Tanimoto J. Vaccinating behaviour guided by imitation and aspiration. Proc Math Phys Eng Sci 2020. [DOI: 10.1098/rspa.2020.0327] [Citation(s) in RCA: 8] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/19/2022] Open
Abstract
Vaccinating decisions can be influenced by imitation as well as self-evaluation or aspiration. This work analyses vaccinating behaviours by coupling both imitation and aspiration update rules, adopting an existing set-up of the mean-field vaccination game. We incorporate the imitation mechanism with several variants of the aspiration protocol, encompassing constant and adaptive aspirations. Equations of the combined dynamics have been derived by grouping the population according to (i) vaccinating strategies and (ii) healthy and infected status within each strategy. If aspiration levels are fixed but differentiated by vaccinating strategies, then vaccinators aspiring less than non-vaccinators are found to ameliorate the vaccination coverage, thereby yielding a less infectious state. The adaptive aspirations maintain a positive correlation with the vaccine efficacy while keeping the opposite relation with vaccination cost. When vaccinating strategies, aspirations and update rules are allowed to evolve synchronously, then either the imitation or aspiration process takes over the entire population. If aspiration rules prevail, then vaccinees and non-vaccinees coexist equally (according to (i)) or vaccine uptake follows a non-monotonic trend with the efficacy (according to (ii)). The imitative rule performs better when vaccination is less expensive or cheap, while aspiration updating safeguards the tenacity of vaccinees despite vaccination being expensive.
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Affiliation(s)
- Md. Rajib Arefin
- Interdisciplinary Graduate School of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University, Kasuga-koen, Kasuga-shi, Fukuoka 816-8580, Japan
- Department of Mathematics, University of Dhaka, Dhaka 1000, Bangladesh
| | - Tanaka Masaki
- Interdisciplinary Graduate School of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University, Kasuga-koen, Kasuga-shi, Fukuoka 816-8580, Japan
| | - Jun Tanimoto
- Interdisciplinary Graduate School of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University, Kasuga-koen, Kasuga-shi, Fukuoka 816-8580, Japan
- Faculty of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University, Kasuga-koen, Kasuga-shi, Fukuoka 816-8580, Japan
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9
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Kurokawa S. Three-player repeated games with an opt-out option. J Theor Biol 2019; 480:13-22. [DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2019.07.012] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/12/2019] [Revised: 07/19/2019] [Accepted: 07/22/2019] [Indexed: 12/31/2022]
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10
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Wang X, Gu C, Zhao J, Quan J. Evolutionary game dynamics of combining the imitation and aspiration-driven update rules. Phys Rev E 2019; 100:022411. [PMID: 31574646 DOI: 10.1103/physreve.100.022411] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/14/2019] [Indexed: 06/10/2023]
Abstract
So far, most studies on evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations have concentrated on a single update rule. However, given the impacts of the environment and individual cognition, individuals may use different update rules to change their current strategies. In light of this, the current paper reports on a study that constructed a mixed stochastic evolutionary game dynamic by combining the imitation and aspiration-driven update processes. The target was to clarify the influences of the aspiration-driven process on the evolution of the level of cooperation by considering the behavior of a population in which individuals have two strategies available: cooperation and defection. Through a numerical analysis of unstructured populations and simulation analyses of structured populations and of the random-matching model, the following results were found. First, the mean fraction of cooperators varied alongside the probability with which the individual adopted the aspiration-driven update rule. In the Prisoner's Dilemma and coexistence games, the aspiration-driven update process promoted cooperation in the well-mixed population but inhibited it in structured ones and the random-matching model; however, in the coordination game, the aspiration-driven update process was seen to exert the opposite effect on cooperation by inhibiting the latter in a homogeneously mixed population but promoting it in structured ones and in the random-matching model. Second, the mean fraction of cooperators changed with the aspiration level in the differently structured populations and random-matching model, and there appeared a phase transition point. Third, the evolutionary characteristics of the mean fraction of cooperators maintained robustness in the differently structured populations and random-matching model. These results extend evolutionary game theory.
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Affiliation(s)
- Xianjia Wang
- Economics and Management School, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China
- Institute of Systems Engineering, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China
| | - Cuiling Gu
- Institute of Systems Engineering, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China
| | - Jinhua Zhao
- Economics and Management School, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China
| | - Ji Quan
- School of Management, Wuhan University of Technology, Wuhan 430070, China
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11
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Takesue H. Roles of mutation rate and co-existence of multiple strategy updating rules in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games. ACTA ACUST UNITED AC 2019. [DOI: 10.1209/0295-5075/126/58001] [Citation(s) in RCA: 15] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/20/2022]
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12
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Ren G, Liu L, Feng M, He Y. Coevolution of public goods game and networks based on survival of the fittest. PLoS One 2018; 13:e0204616. [PMID: 30252900 PMCID: PMC6155537 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0204616] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/08/2018] [Accepted: 09/11/2018] [Indexed: 11/19/2022] Open
Abstract
We introduce a random strategy update rule for the evolutionary public goods game on networks based on survival of the fittest. A survival cost parameter is introduced to public goods game. Players whose payoffs are below the survival cost will be deleted from the network. The same number of new nodes are randomly connected to the network and randomly designated cooperation or defection. Numerical results show that cooperation can flourish if the multiplication factor of the public goods game is greater than the network degree. We present a simple analytical method to explain this result. The fraction of cooperators reaches the maximum for a suitable survival cost. Furthermore, the initial random network has evolved into a heterogeneous network which facilitates the emergence of the cooperation. Our work could be helpful to understand how natural selection favors cooperation. It suggests a new method to investigate the impact of the survival cost on the evolution of cooperation.
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Affiliation(s)
- Guangming Ren
- School of Optoelectronic Engineering, Guangdong Polytechnic Normal University, Guangzhou, China
- * E-mail:
| | - Lan Liu
- School of Electronic & Information, Guangdong Polytechnic Normal University, Guangzhou, China
| | - Mingku Feng
- School of Optoelectronic Engineering, Guangdong Polytechnic Normal University, Guangzhou, China
| | - Yingji He
- School of Optoelectronic Engineering, Guangdong Polytechnic Normal University, Guangzhou, China
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13
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The extended reciprocity: Strong belief outperforms persistence. J Theor Biol 2017; 421:16-27. [DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2017.03.021] [Citation(s) in RCA: 10] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/25/2016] [Revised: 03/15/2017] [Accepted: 03/20/2017] [Indexed: 11/22/2022]
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14
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Kurokawa S. Which facilitates the evolution of cooperation more, retaliation or persistence? Math Biosci 2017; 289:20-28. [PMID: 28431890 DOI: 10.1016/j.mbs.2017.04.002] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/07/2016] [Revised: 02/14/2017] [Accepted: 04/17/2017] [Indexed: 11/25/2022]
Abstract
The existence of cooperation in this world is a mysterious phenomenon. One of the mechanisms that explain the evolution of cooperation is repeated interaction. If interactions between the same individuals repeat and individuals cooperate conditionally, cooperation can evolve. A previous study pointed out that if individuals have persistence (i.e., imitate its "own" behavior in the last move), cooperation can evolve. However, retaliation and persistence are not mutually exclusive decisions, but rather a trade-off in the decision making process of individuals. Players can refer to the opponent's behavior and if the actor and the opponent opted for the different alternative in the last move, conditional cooperators have to give up either retaliation or persistence. The previous study also investigated this, and has revealed that the individual should give more importance to retaliation than to persistence. However, this study has assumed that the errors in perception are absent. In this world, errors in perception are present, and trying to imitate the opponent player can sometimes end in failure. And, it might be that imitating the focal player, which definitely ends in success, is more beneficial than trying to imitate the opponent player, which can end in failure especially when the error rate in recognition is large. Here, this paper uses evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) analysis and analyzes the stability for reactive strategies against the invasion by unconditional defectors in the iterated prisoner's dilemma game. And our analysis reveals that even if we take errors in perception into consideration, retaliation facilitates the evolution of cooperation more than persistence unexpectedly. In addition, we analyze the stability for reactive cooperators against the invasion by a strategy other than unconditional defectors. Moreover, we also analyze the deterministic model in which unconditional cooperators, unconditional defectors, and the reactive strategy at the same time.
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Affiliation(s)
- Shun Kurokawa
- Graduate School of Agriculture, Kyoto University, Oiwake-cho, Kitashirakawa, Sakyo-ku, Kyoto 606-8502, Japan; Institute of Zoology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Datun Road, Chaoyang, Beijing 100101, PR China.
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15
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Kurokawa S. Persistence extends reciprocity. Math Biosci 2017; 286:94-103. [DOI: 10.1016/j.mbs.2017.02.006] [Citation(s) in RCA: 9] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/26/2016] [Revised: 12/25/2016] [Accepted: 02/13/2017] [Indexed: 11/29/2022]
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16
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Li D, Ma J, Han D, Sun M, Tian L, Stanley HE. The co-evolution of networks and prisoner's dilemma game by considering sensitivity and visibility. Sci Rep 2017; 7:45237. [PMID: 28338070 PMCID: PMC5364401 DOI: 10.1038/srep45237] [Citation(s) in RCA: 17] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/14/2016] [Accepted: 02/20/2017] [Indexed: 11/08/2022] Open
Abstract
Strategies adopted by individuals in a social network significantly impact the network, and they strongly affect relationships between individuals in the network. Links between individuals also heavily influence their levels of cooperation. Taking into account the evolution of each individual's connection, we explore how sensitivity and visibility affect the prisoner's dilemma game. The so-called 'sensitivity' and 'visibility' respectively present one's self-protection consciousness and the ability of gaining information. We find that at moderate levels of player sensitivity cooperative behavior increases, but that at high levels it is inhibited. We also find that the heterogeneity of the weight of individuals at the end of the game is higher when sensitivity and visibility are increased, but that the successful-defection-payoff has less impact on the weight of individuals and on the relationship between the heterogeneity of the weight of individuals and the density of cooperators. This framework can be used to clarify the interaction mechanism between the micro-level of individual behavior and the macro-level of individual co-evolutionary processes.
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Affiliation(s)
- Dandan Li
- College of Economics and Management, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing, Jiangsu 211106, China
- Center for Polymer Studies and Department of Physics, Boston University, Boston, MA 02215, USA
| | - Jing Ma
- College of Economics and Management, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing, Jiangsu 211106, China
| | - Dun Han
- Nonlinear Scientific Research Center, Jiangsu University, Zhenjiang, Jiangsu, 212013, China
| | - Mei Sun
- Nonlinear Scientific Research Center, Jiangsu University, Zhenjiang, Jiangsu, 212013, China
| | - Lixin Tian
- School of Mathematical Science, Nanjing Normal University, Nanjing, Jiangsu, 210042, China
| | - H. Eugene Stanley
- Center for Polymer Studies and Department of Physics, Boston University, Boston, MA 02215, USA
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