1
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Flores LS, Vainstein MH, Fernandes HCM, Amaral MA. Heterogeneous contributions can jeopardize cooperation in the public goods game. Phys Rev E 2023; 108:024111. [PMID: 37723706 DOI: 10.1103/physreve.108.024111] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/18/2023] [Accepted: 07/12/2023] [Indexed: 09/20/2023]
Abstract
When studying social dilemma games, a crucial question arises regarding the impact of general heterogeneity on cooperation, which has been shown to have positive effects in numerous studies. Here, we demonstrate that heterogeneity in the contribution value for the focal public goods game can jeopardize cooperation. We show that there is an optimal contribution value in the homogeneous case that most benefits cooperation depending on the lattice. In a heterogeneous scenario, where strategy and contribution coevolve, cooperators making contributions higher than the optimal value end up harming those who contribute less. This effect is notably detrimental to cooperation in the square lattice with von Neumann neighborhood, while it can have no impact in other lattices. Furthermore, in parameter regions where a higher-contributing cooperator cannot normally survive alone, the exploitation of lower-value contribution cooperators allows their survival, resembling a parasitic behavior. To obtain these results, we examined the effect of various distributions for the contribution values in the initial condition and we conducted Monte Carlo simulations.
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Affiliation(s)
- Lucas S Flores
- Instituto de Física, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, Caixa Postal 15051, CEP 91501-970, Porto Alegre, Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil
| | - Mendeli H Vainstein
- Instituto de Física, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, Caixa Postal 15051, CEP 91501-970, Porto Alegre, Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil
| | - Heitor C M Fernandes
- Instituto de Física, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, Caixa Postal 15051, CEP 91501-970, Porto Alegre, Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil
| | - Marco A Amaral
- Instituto de Humanidades, Artes e Ciências, Universidade Federal do Sul da Bahia, CEP 45638-000, Teixeira de Freitas, Bahia, Brazil
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2
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Song Z, Guo H, Jia D, Perc M, Li X, Wang Z. Reinforcement learning facilitates an optimal interaction intensity for cooperation. Neurocomputing 2022. [DOI: 10.1016/j.neucom.2022.09.109] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/26/2022]
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3
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McAvoy A, Kates-Harbeck J, Chatterjee K, Hilbe C. Evolutionary instability of selfish learning in repeated games. PNAS NEXUS 2022; 1:pgac141. [PMID: 36714856 PMCID: PMC9802390 DOI: 10.1093/pnasnexus/pgac141] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/06/2021] [Accepted: 07/22/2022] [Indexed: 02/01/2023]
Abstract
Across many domains of interaction, both natural and artificial, individuals use past experience to shape future behaviors. The results of such learning processes depend on what individuals wish to maximize. A natural objective is one's own success. However, when two such "selfish" learners interact with each other, the outcome can be detrimental to both, especially when there are conflicts of interest. Here, we explore how a learner can align incentives with a selfish opponent. Moreover, we consider the dynamics that arise when learning rules themselves are subject to evolutionary pressure. By combining extensive simulations and analytical techniques, we demonstrate that selfish learning is unstable in most classical two-player repeated games. If evolution operates on the level of long-run payoffs, selection instead favors learning rules that incorporate social (other-regarding) preferences. To further corroborate these results, we analyze data from a repeated prisoner's dilemma experiment. We find that selfish learning is insufficient to explain human behavior when there is a trade-off between payoff maximization and fairness.
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Affiliation(s)
| | | | | | - Christian Hilbe
- Max Planck Research Group: Dynamics of Social Behavior, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Plön, Germany
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4
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Liu J, Peng Y, Zhu P, Yu Y. The Polarization of the Coupling Strength of Interdependent Networks Stimulates Cooperation. ENTROPY (BASEL, SWITZERLAND) 2022; 24:694. [PMID: 35626577 PMCID: PMC9141804 DOI: 10.3390/e24050694] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/15/2022] [Revised: 04/27/2022] [Accepted: 05/09/2022] [Indexed: 11/16/2022]
Abstract
We introduce a mixed network coupling mechanism and study its effects on how cooperation evolves in interdependent networks. This mechanism allows some players (conservative-driven) to establish a fixed-strength coupling, while other players (radical-driven) adjust their coupling strength through the evolution of strategy. By means of numerical simulation, a hump-like relationship between the level of cooperation and conservative participant density is revealed. Interestingly, interspecies interactions stimulate polarization of the coupling strength of radical-driven players, promoting cooperation between two types of players. We thus demonstrate that a simple mixed network coupling mechanism substantially expands the scope of cooperation among structured populations.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jinzhuo Liu
- School of Software, Yunnan University, Kunming 650504, China
- School of Artificial Intelligence, Optics and Electronics (iOPEN), Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xi'an 710072, China
| | - Yunchen Peng
- School of Software, Yunnan University, Kunming 650504, China
| | - Peican Zhu
- School of Artificial Intelligence, Optics and Electronics (iOPEN), Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xi'an 710072, China
| | - Yong Yu
- School of Software, Yunnan University, Kunming 650504, China
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5
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Liang R, Wang Q, Zhang J, Zheng G, Ma L, Chen L. Dynamical reciprocity in interacting games: Numerical results and mechanism analysis. Phys Rev E 2022; 105:054302. [PMID: 35706290 DOI: 10.1103/physreve.105.054302] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/03/2021] [Accepted: 04/12/2022] [Indexed: 06/15/2023]
Abstract
We study the evolution of two mutually interacting pairwise games on different topologies. On two-dimensional square lattices, we reveal that the game-game interaction can promote the cooperation prevalence in all cases, and the cooperation-defection phase transitions even become absent and fairly high cooperation is expected when the interaction becomes very strong. A mean-field theory is developed that points out dynamical routes arising therein. Detailed analysis shows indeed that there are rich categories of interactions in either the individual or bulk scenario: invasion, neutral, and catalyzed types; their combination puts cooperators at a persistent advantage position, which boosts the cooperation. The robustness of the revealed reciprocity is strengthened by the studies of model variants, including the public goods game, asymmetrical or time-varying interactions, games of different types, games with timescale separation, different updating rules, etc. The structural complexities of the underlying population, such as Newman-Watts small world networks, Erdős-Rényi random networks, and Barabási-Albert networks, also do not alter the working of the dynamical reciprocity. In particular, as the number of games engaged increases, the cooperation level continuously improves in general. However, our analysis shows that the dynamical reciprocity works only in structured populations, otherwise the game-game interaction has no any impact on the cooperation at all. In brief, our work uncovers a cooperation mechanism in the structured populations, which indicates the great potential for human cooperation since concurrent issues are so often seen in the real world.
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Affiliation(s)
- Rizhou Liang
- School of Physics and Information Technology, Shaanxi Normal University, Xi'an 710062, People's Republic of China
| | - Qinqin Wang
- School of Physics and Information Technology, Shaanxi Normal University, Xi'an 710062, People's Republic of China
| | - Jiqiang Zhang
- School of Physics and Electronic-Electrical Engineering, Ningxia University, Yinchuan 750021, People's Republic of China
- Beijing Advanced Innovation Center for Big Data and Brain Computing, Beihang University, Beijing 100191, People's Republic of China
| | - Guozhong Zheng
- School of Physics and Information Technology, Shaanxi Normal University, Xi'an 710062, People's Republic of China
| | - Lin Ma
- School of Physics and Information Technology, Shaanxi Normal University, Xi'an 710062, People's Republic of China
| | - Li Chen
- School of Physics and Information Technology, Shaanxi Normal University, Xi'an 710062, People's Republic of China
- Robert Koch-Institute, Nordufer 20, 13353 Berlin, Germany
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6
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Coordination and equilibrium selection in games: the role of local effects. Sci Rep 2022; 12:3373. [PMID: 35233046 PMCID: PMC8888577 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-022-07195-3] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/03/2021] [Accepted: 02/11/2022] [Indexed: 01/28/2023] Open
Abstract
We study the role of local effects and finite size effects in reaching coordination and in equilibrium selection in two-player coordination games. We investigate three update rules - the replicator dynamics (RD), the best response (BR), and the unconditional imitation (UI). For the pure coordination game with two equivalent strategies we find a transition from a disordered state to coordination for a critical value of connectivity. The transition is system-size-independent for the BR and RD update rules. For the IU it is system-size-dependent, but coordination can always be reached below the connectivity of a complete graph. We also consider the general coordination game which covers a range of games, such as the stag hunt. For these games there is a payoff-dominant strategy and a risk-dominant strategy with associated states of equilibrium coordination. We analyse equilibrium selection analytically and numerically. For the RD and BR update rules mean-field predictions agree with simulations and the risk-dominant strategy is evolutionary favoured independently of local effects. When players use the unconditional imitation, however, we observe coordination in the payoff-dominant strategy. Surprisingly, the selection of pay-off dominant equilibrium only occurs below a critical value of the network connectivity and disappears in complete graphs. As we show, it is a combination of local effects and update rule that allows for coordination on the payoff-dominant strategy.
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7
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Shi J, Liu J, Perc M, Deng Z, Wang Z. Neighborhood size effects on the evolution of cooperation under myopic dynamics. CHAOS (WOODBURY, N.Y.) 2021; 31:123113. [PMID: 34972342 DOI: 10.1063/5.0073632] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/01/2021] [Accepted: 11/23/2021] [Indexed: 06/14/2023]
Abstract
We study the evolution of cooperation in 2×2 social dilemma games in which players are located on a two-dimensional square lattice. During the evolution, each player modifies her strategy by means of myopic update dynamic to maximize her payoff while composing neighborhoods of different sizes, which are characterized by the corresponding radius, r. An investigation of the sublattice-ordered spatial structure for different values of r reveals that some patterns formed by cooperators and defectors can help the former to survive, even under untoward conditions. In contrast to individuals who resist the invasion of defectors by forming clusters due to network reciprocity, innovators spontaneously organize a socially divisive structure that provides strong support for the evolution of cooperation and advances better social systems.
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Affiliation(s)
- Juan Shi
- School of Automation, Northwestern Polytechnical University, Shaanxi 710072, China
| | - Jinzhuo Liu
- School of Software, Yunnan University, Kunming, Yunnan 650504, China
| | - Matjaž Perc
- Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics, University of Maribor, Koroška cesta 160, 2000 Maribor, Slovenia
| | - Zhenghong Deng
- School of Automation, Northwestern Polytechnical University, Shaanxi 710072, China
| | - Zhen Wang
- School of Artificial Intelligence, Optics and Electronics (iOPEN), Northwestern Polytechnical University, Shaanxi 710072, China
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8
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Takács K, Gross J, Testori M, Letina S, Kenny AR, Power EA, Wittek RPM. Networks of reliable reputations and cooperation: a review. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 2021; 376:20200297. [PMID: 34601917 PMCID: PMC8487750 DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2020.0297] [Citation(s) in RCA: 11] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/20/2022] Open
Abstract
Reputation has been shown to provide an informal solution to the problem of cooperation in human societies. After reviewing models that connect reputations and cooperation, we address how reputation results from information exchange embedded in a social network that changes endogenously itself. Theoretical studies highlight that network topologies have different effects on the extent of cooperation, since they can foster or hinder the flow of reputational information. Subsequently, we review models and empirical studies that intend to grasp the coevolution of reputations, cooperation and social networks. We identify open questions in the literature concerning how networks affect the accuracy of reputations, the honesty of shared information and the spread of reputational information. Certain network topologies may facilitate biased beliefs and intergroup competition or in-group identity formation that could lead to high cooperation within but conflicts between different subgroups of a network. Our review covers theoretical, experimental and field studies across various disciplines that target these questions and could explain how the dynamics of interactions and reputations help or prevent the establishment and sustainability of cooperation in small- and large-scale societies. This article is part of the theme issue ‘The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling’.
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Affiliation(s)
- Károly Takács
- The Institute for Analytical Sociology, Linköping University, 601 74 Norrköping, Sweden.,Computational Social Science-Research Center for Educational and Network Studies (CSS-RECENS), Centre for Social Sciences, Tóth Kálmán u. 4., 1097 Budapest, Hungary
| | - Jörg Gross
- Institute of Psychology, Leiden University, Wassenaarseweg 52, 2333 AK, Leiden, The Netherlands
| | - Martina Testori
- Organization Sciences, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, De Boelelaan 1105, 1081 HV Amsterdam, The Netherlands
| | - Srebrenka Letina
- The Institute for Analytical Sociology, Linköping University, 601 74 Norrköping, Sweden.,Institute of Health and Wellbeing, MRC/CSO Social and Public Health Sciences Unit, University of Glasgow, Berkeley Square, 99 Berkeley Street, Glasgow G3 7HR, UK
| | - Adam R Kenny
- Institute of Cognitive and Evolutionary Anthropology, University of Oxford, 64 Banbury Road, Oxford OX2 6PN, UK.,Calleva Research Centre for Evolution and Human Sciences, Magdalen College, High Street, Oxford OX1 4AU, UK
| | - Eleanor A Power
- Department of Methodology, The London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, UK
| | - Rafael P M Wittek
- Department of Sociology, University of Groningen, Grote Rozenstraat 31, 9712 TG Groningen, The Netherlands
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9
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Modeling pluralism and self-regulation explains the emergence of cooperation in networked societies. Sci Rep 2021; 11:19226. [PMID: 34584146 PMCID: PMC8479068 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-021-98524-5] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/06/2021] [Accepted: 09/02/2021] [Indexed: 11/20/2022] Open
Abstract
Understanding the dynamics of cooperative behavior of individuals in complex societies represents a fundamental research question which puzzles scientists working in heterogeneous fields. Many studies have been developed using the unitary agent assumption, which embeds the idea that when making decisions, individuals share the same socio-cultural parameters. In this paper, we propose the ECHO-EGN model, based on Evolutionary Game Theory, which relaxes this strong assumption by considering the heterogeneity of three fundamental socio-cultural aspects ruling the behavior of groups of people: the propensity to be more cooperative with members of the same group (Endogamic cooperation), the propensity to cooperate with the public domain (Civicness) and the propensity to prefer connections with members of the same group (Homophily). The ECHO-EGN model is shown to have high performance in describing real world behavior of interacting individuals living in complex environments. Extensive numerical experiments allowing the comparison of real data and model simulations confirmed that the introduction of the above mechanisms enhances the realism in the modelling of cooperation dynamics. Additionally, theoretical findings allow us to conclude that endogamic cooperation may limit significantly the emergence of cooperation.
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10
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Arefin MR, Tanimoto J. Imitation and aspiration dynamics bring different evolutionary outcomes in feedback-evolving games. Proc Math Phys Eng Sci 2021. [DOI: 10.1098/rspa.2021.0240] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/12/2022] Open
Abstract
Feedback-evolving games characterize the interplay between the evolution of strategies and environments. Rich dynamics have been derived for such games under the premise of the replicator equation, which unveils persistent oscillations between cooperation and defection. Besides replicator dynamics, here we have employed aspiration dynamics, in which individuals, instead of comparing payoffs with opposite strategies, assess their payoffs by self-evaluation to update strategies. We start with a brief review of feedback-evolving games with replicator dynamics and then comprehensively discuss such games with aspiration dynamics. Interestingly, the tenacious cycles, as perceived in replicator dynamics, cannot be observed in aspiration dynamics. Our analysis reveals that a parameter
θ
—which depicts the strength of cooperation in enhancing the environment—plays a pivotal role in comprehending the dynamics. In particular, with the symmetric aspiration level, if replete and depleted states, respectively, experience Prisoner's Dilemma and Trivial games, the rich environment is achievable only when
θ
> 1. The case
θ
< 1 never allows us to reach the replete state, even with a higher cooperation level. Furthermore, if cooperators aspire less than defectors, then the enhanced state can be achieved with a relatively lower
θ
value compared with the opposite scenario because too much expectation from cooperation can be less beneficial.
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Affiliation(s)
- Md. Rajib Arefin
- Interdisciplinary Graduate School of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University, Kasuga-koen, Kasuga-shi, Fukuoka 816-8580, Japan
- Department of Mathematics, University of Dhaka, Dhaka 1000, Bangladesh
| | - Jun Tanimoto
- Interdisciplinary Graduate School of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University, Kasuga-koen, Kasuga-shi, Fukuoka 816-8580, Japan
- Faculty of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University, Kasuga-koen, Kasuga-shi, Fukuoka 816-8580, Japan
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11
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Amaral MA, Oliveira MMD, Javarone MA. An epidemiological model with voluntary quarantine strategies governed by evolutionary game dynamics. CHAOS, SOLITONS, AND FRACTALS 2021; 143:110616. [PMID: 33867699 PMCID: PMC8044925 DOI: 10.1016/j.chaos.2020.110616] [Citation(s) in RCA: 14] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/14/2020] [Revised: 10/19/2020] [Accepted: 12/23/2020] [Indexed: 05/05/2023]
Abstract
During pandemic events, strategies such as social distancing can be fundamental to reduce simultaneous infections and mitigate the disease spreading, which is very relevant to the risk of a healthcare system collapse. Although these strategies can be recommended, or even imposed, their actual implementation may depend on the population perception of the risks associated with a potential infection. The current COVID-19 crisis, for instance, is showing that some individuals are much more prone than others to remain isolated. To better understand these dynamics, we propose an epidemiological SIR model that uses evolutionary game theory for combining in a single process social strategies, individual risk perception, and viral spreading. In particular, we consider a disease spreading through a population, whose agents can choose between self-isolation and a lifestyle careless of any epidemic risk. The strategy adoption is individual and depends on the perceived disease risk compared to the quarantine cost. The game payoff governs the strategy adoption, while the epidemic process governs the agent's health state. At the same time, the infection rate depends on the agent's strategy while the perceived disease risk depends on the fraction of infected agents. Our results show recurrent infection waves, which are usually seen in previous historic epidemic scenarios with voluntary quarantine. In particular, such waves re-occur as the population reduces disease awareness. Notably, the risk perception is found to be fundamental for controlling the magnitude of the infection peak, while the final infection size is mainly dictated by the infection rates. Low awareness leads to a single and strong infection peak, while a greater disease risk leads to shorter, although more frequent, peaks. The proposed model spontaneously captures relevant aspects of a pandemic event, highlighting the fundamental role of social strategies.
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Affiliation(s)
- Marco A Amaral
- Instituto de Artes, Humanidades e Ciẽncias, Universidade Federal do Sul da Bahia, Teixeira de Freitas-BA, 45996-108 Brazil
| | - Marcelo M de Oliveira
- Departamento de Física e Matemática, CAP, Universidade Federal de São João del Rei, Ouro Branco-MG, 36420-000 Brazil
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12
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Arefin MR, Tanimoto J. Evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas under the coexistence of aspiration and imitation mechanisms. Phys Rev E 2020; 102:032120. [PMID: 33075988 DOI: 10.1103/physreve.102.032120] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/10/2020] [Accepted: 08/24/2020] [Indexed: 05/09/2023]
Abstract
Imitation and aspiration update rules are frequently observed in human and animal populations. While the imitation process entails payoff comparisons with surroundings, the aspiration process refers to self-evaluation. This work explores the evolution of cooperation in dyadic games under the coexistence of these two dynamics in an infinitely large well-mixed population. Two situations have been explored: (i) individuals adopt either an imitation or aspiration update rule with a certain probability, and (ii) the entire population is divided into two groups where one group only uses imitative rules and the other obeys aspiration updating alone. Both premises have been modeled by taking an infinite approximation of the finite population. In particular, the second mixing principle follows an additive property: the outcome of the whole population is the weighted average of outcomes from imitators and aspiration-driven individuals. Our work progressively investigates several variants of aspiration dynamics under strong selection, encompassing symmetric, asymmetric, and adaptive aspirations, which then coalesce with imitative dynamics. We also demonstrate which of the update rules performs better, under different social dilemmas, by allowing the evolution of the preference of update rules besides strategies. Aspiration dynamics always outperform imitation dynamics in the prisoner's dilemma, however, in the chicken and stag-hunt games the predominance of either update rule depends on the level of aspirations as well as on the extent of greed and fear present in the system. Finally, we examine the coevolution of strategies, aspirations, and update rules which leads to a binary state of obeying either imitation or aspiration dynamics. In such a circumstance, when aspiration dynamics prevail over imitation dynamics, cooperators and defectors coexist to an equal extent.
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Affiliation(s)
- Md Rajib Arefin
- Interdisciplinary Graduate School of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University, Kasuga-koen, Kasuga-shi, Fukuoka 816-8580, Japan
- Department of Mathematics, University of Dhaka, Dhaka 1000, Bangladesh
| | - Jun Tanimoto
- Interdisciplinary Graduate School of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University, Kasuga-koen, Kasuga-shi, Fukuoka 816-8580, Japan
- Faculty of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University, Kasuga-koen, Kasuga-shi, Fukuoka 816-8580, Japan
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13
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Abstract
Trust and trustworthiness form the basis for continued social and economic interactions, and they are also fundamental for cooperation, fairness, honesty, and indeed for many other forms of prosocial and moral behaviour. However, trust entails risks, and building a trustworthy reputation requires effort. So how did trust and trustworthiness evolve, and under which conditions do they thrive? To find answers, we operationalize trust and trustworthiness using the trust game with the trustor's investment and the trustee's return of the investment as the two key parameters. We study this game on different networks, including the complete network, random and scale-free networks, and in the well-mixed limit. We show that in all but one case, the network structure has little effect on the evolution of trust and trustworthiness. Specifically, for well-mixed populations, lattices, random and scale-free networks, we find that trust never evolves, while trustworthiness evolves with some probability depending on the game parameters and the updating dynamics. Only for the scale-free network with degree non-normalized dynamics, we find parameter values for which trust evolves but trustworthiness does not, as well as values for which both trust and trustworthiness evolve. We conclude with a discussion about mechanisms that could lead to the evolution of trust and outline directions for future work.
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Affiliation(s)
- Aanjaneya Kumar
- Department of Physics, Indian Institute of Science Education and Research, Dr. Homi Bhabha Road, Pune 411008, India
| | - Valerio Capraro
- Department of Economics, Middlesex University, The Burroughs, London NW4 4BT, UK
| | - Matjaž Perc
- Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics, University of Maribor, Koroška cesta 160, 2000 Maribor, Slovenia.,Department of Medical Research, China Medical University Hospital, China Medical University, Taichung 404, Taiwan.,Complexity Science Hub Vienna, Josefstädterstraße 39, 1080 Vienna, Austria
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14
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Arefin MR, Masaki T, Tanimoto J. Vaccinating behaviour guided by imitation and aspiration. Proc Math Phys Eng Sci 2020. [DOI: 10.1098/rspa.2020.0327] [Citation(s) in RCA: 8] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/19/2022] Open
Abstract
Vaccinating decisions can be influenced by imitation as well as self-evaluation or aspiration. This work analyses vaccinating behaviours by coupling both imitation and aspiration update rules, adopting an existing set-up of the mean-field vaccination game. We incorporate the imitation mechanism with several variants of the aspiration protocol, encompassing constant and adaptive aspirations. Equations of the combined dynamics have been derived by grouping the population according to (i) vaccinating strategies and (ii) healthy and infected status within each strategy. If aspiration levels are fixed but differentiated by vaccinating strategies, then vaccinators aspiring less than non-vaccinators are found to ameliorate the vaccination coverage, thereby yielding a less infectious state. The adaptive aspirations maintain a positive correlation with the vaccine efficacy while keeping the opposite relation with vaccination cost. When vaccinating strategies, aspirations and update rules are allowed to evolve synchronously, then either the imitation or aspiration process takes over the entire population. If aspiration rules prevail, then vaccinees and non-vaccinees coexist equally (according to (i)) or vaccine uptake follows a non-monotonic trend with the efficacy (according to (ii)). The imitative rule performs better when vaccination is less expensive or cheap, while aspiration updating safeguards the tenacity of vaccinees despite vaccination being expensive.
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Affiliation(s)
- Md. Rajib Arefin
- Interdisciplinary Graduate School of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University, Kasuga-koen, Kasuga-shi, Fukuoka 816-8580, Japan
- Department of Mathematics, University of Dhaka, Dhaka 1000, Bangladesh
| | - Tanaka Masaki
- Interdisciplinary Graduate School of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University, Kasuga-koen, Kasuga-shi, Fukuoka 816-8580, Japan
| | - Jun Tanimoto
- Interdisciplinary Graduate School of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University, Kasuga-koen, Kasuga-shi, Fukuoka 816-8580, Japan
- Faculty of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University, Kasuga-koen, Kasuga-shi, Fukuoka 816-8580, Japan
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15
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Amaral MA, Javarone MA. Strategy equilibrium in dilemma games with off-diagonal payoff perturbations. Phys Rev E 2020; 101:062309. [PMID: 32688499 DOI: 10.1103/physreve.101.062309] [Citation(s) in RCA: 8] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/01/2020] [Accepted: 06/03/2020] [Indexed: 06/11/2023]
Abstract
We analyze the strategy equilibrium of dilemma games considering a payoff matrix affected by small and random perturbations on the off-diagonal. Notably, a recent work [Proc. R. Soc. A 476, 20200116 (2020)1364-502110.1098/rspa.2020.0116] reported that while cooperation is sustained by perturbations acting on the main diagonal, a less clear scenario emerges when perturbations act on the off-diagonal. Thus, the second case represents the core of this investigation, aimed at completing the description of the effects that payoff perturbations have on the dynamics of evolutionary games. Our results, achieved by analyzing the proposed model under a variety of configurations as different update rules, suggest that off-diagonal perturbations actually constitute a nontrivial form of noise. In particular, the most interesting effects are detected near the phase transition, as perturbations tend to move the strategy distribution towards nonordered states of equilibrium, supporting cooperation when defection is pervading the population, and supporting defection in the opposite case. To conclude, we identified a form of noise that, under controlled conditions, could be used to enhance cooperation and greatly delay its extinction.
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Affiliation(s)
- Marco A Amaral
- Instituto de Humanidades, Artes e Ciências, Universidade Federal do Sul da Bahia-BA, 45996-108, Brazil
| | - Marco A Javarone
- Department of Mathematics, University College London, London WC1E 6BT, United Kingdom
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16
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Amaral MA, Javarone MA. Heterogeneity in evolutionary games: an analysis of the risk perception. Proc Math Phys Eng Sci 2020; 476:20200116. [PMID: 32523420 DOI: 10.1098/rspa.2020.0116] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/21/2020] [Accepted: 03/24/2020] [Indexed: 11/12/2022] Open
Abstract
In this study, we analyse the relationship between heterogeneity and cooperation. Previous investigations suggest that this relation is non-trivial, as some authors found that heterogeneity sustains cooperation, while others obtained different results. Among the possible forms of heterogeneity, we focus on the individual perception of risks and rewards related to a generic event, which can appear in a number of social and biological systems. The modelling approach is based on the framework of evolutionary game theory. To represent this kind of heterogeneity, we implement small and local perturbations on the pay-off matrix of simple two-strategy games, such as the Prisoner's Dilemma. So, while usually the pay-off is considered to be a global and time-invariant structure, i.e. it is the same for all individuals of a population at any time, in our model its value is continuously affected by small variations, in both time and space (i.e. position on a lattice). We found that such perturbations can be beneficial or detrimental to cooperation, depending on their setting. Notably, cooperation is strongly supported when perturbations act on the main diagonal of the pay-off matrix, whereas when they act on the off-diagonal the resulting effect is more difficult to quantify. To conclude, the proposed model shows a rich spectrum of possible equilibria, whose interpretation might offer insights and enrich the description of several systems.
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Affiliation(s)
- Marco A Amaral
- Instituto de Humanidades, Artes e Ciências, Universidade Federal do Sul da Bahia, Teixeira de Freitas, Bahia 45988, Brazil
| | - Marco A Javarone
- Department of Mathematics, University College London, London, UK
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17
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Cooperation on Interdependent Networks by Means of Migration and Stochastic Imitation. ENTROPY 2020; 22:e22040485. [PMID: 33286258 PMCID: PMC7516967 DOI: 10.3390/e22040485] [Citation(s) in RCA: 34] [Impact Index Per Article: 8.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/19/2020] [Revised: 04/12/2020] [Accepted: 04/21/2020] [Indexed: 11/17/2022]
Abstract
Evolutionary game theory in the realm of network science appeals to a lot of research communities, as it constitutes a popular theoretical framework for studying the evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas. Recent research has shown that cooperation is markedly more resistant in interdependent networks, where traditional network reciprocity can be further enhanced due to various forms of interdependence between different network layers. However, the role of mobility in interdependent networks is yet to gain its well-deserved attention. Here we consider an interdependent network model, where individuals in each layer follow different evolutionary games, and where each player is considered as a mobile agent that can move locally inside its own layer to improve its fitness. Probabilistically, we also consider an imitation possibility from a neighbor on the other layer. We show that, by considering migration and stochastic imitation, further fascinating gateways to cooperation on interdependent networks can be observed. Notably, cooperation can be promoted on both layers, even if cooperation without interdependence would be improbable on one of the layers due to adverse conditions. Our results provide a rationale for engineering better social systems at the interface of networks and human decision making under testing dilemmas.
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18
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Arefin MR, Masaki T, Kabir KMA, Tanimoto J. Interplay between cost and effectiveness in influenza vaccine uptake: a vaccination game approach. Proc Math Phys Eng Sci 2019; 475:20190608. [PMID: 31892839 PMCID: PMC6936611 DOI: 10.1098/rspa.2019.0608] [Citation(s) in RCA: 36] [Impact Index Per Article: 7.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/16/2019] [Accepted: 11/11/2019] [Indexed: 12/17/2022] Open
Abstract
Pre-emptive vaccination is regarded as one of the most protective measures to control influenza outbreak. There are mainly two types of influenza viruses-influenza A and B with several subtypes-that are commonly found to circulate among humans. The traditional trivalent (TIV) flu vaccine targets two strains of influenza A and one strain of influenza B. The quadrivalent (QIV) vaccine targets one extra B virus strain that ensures better protection against influenza; however, the use of QIV vaccine can be costly, hence impose an extra financial burden to society. This scenario might create a dilemma in choosing vaccine types at the individual level. This article endeavours to explain such a dilemma through the framework of a vaccination game, where individuals can opt for one of the three options: choose either of QIV or TIV vaccine or none. Our approach presumes a mean-field framework of a vaccination game in an infinite and well-mixed population, entangling the disease spreading process of influenza with the coevolution of two types of vaccination decision-making processes taking place before an epidemic season. We conduct a series of numerical simulations as an attempt to illustrate different scenarios. The framework has been validated by the so-called multi-agent simulation (MAS) approach.
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Affiliation(s)
- Md. Rajib Arefin
- Interdisciplinary Graduate School of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University, Kasuga-koen, Kasuga-shi, Fukuoka 816-8580, Japan
- Department of Mathematics, University of Dhaka, Dhaka-1000, Bangladesh
| | - Tanaka Masaki
- Interdisciplinary Graduate School of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University, Kasuga-koen, Kasuga-shi, Fukuoka 816-8580, Japan
| | - K. M. Ariful Kabir
- Interdisciplinary Graduate School of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University, Kasuga-koen, Kasuga-shi, Fukuoka 816-8580, Japan
- Department of Mathematics, Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology, Dhaka, Bangladesh
| | - Jun Tanimoto
- Interdisciplinary Graduate School of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University, Kasuga-koen, Kasuga-shi, Fukuoka 816-8580, Japan
- Faculty of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University, Kasuga-koen, Kasuga-shi, Fukuoka 816-8580, Japan
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19
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Seasonal payoff variations and the evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas. Sci Rep 2019; 9:12575. [PMID: 31467364 PMCID: PMC6715707 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-019-49075-3] [Citation(s) in RCA: 31] [Impact Index Per Article: 6.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/19/2019] [Accepted: 08/19/2019] [Indexed: 11/14/2022] Open
Abstract
Varying environmental conditions affect relations between interacting individuals in social dilemmas, thus affecting also the evolution of cooperation. Oftentimes these environmental variations are seasonal and can therefore be mathematically described as periodic changes. Accordingly, we here study how periodic shifts between different manifestations of social dilemmas affect cooperation. We observe a non-trivial interplay between the inherent spatiotemporal dynamics that characterizes the spreading of cooperation in a particular social dilemma type and the frequency of payoff changes. In particular, we show that periodic changes between two available games with global ordering best be fast, while periodic changes between global and local ordering games best be slow for cooperation to thrive. We also show that the frequency of periodic changes between two local ordering social dilemmas is irrelevant, because then the process is fast and simply the average cooperation level of the two is returned. The structure of the interaction network plays an important role too in that lattices promote local ordering, whilst random graphs hinder the formation of compact cooperative clusters. Conversely, for local ordering the regular structure of the interaction network is only marginally relevant as role-separating checkerboard patterns do not rely on long-range order.
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20
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Wang X, Gu C, Zhao J, Quan J. Evolutionary game dynamics of combining the imitation and aspiration-driven update rules. Phys Rev E 2019; 100:022411. [PMID: 31574646 DOI: 10.1103/physreve.100.022411] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/14/2019] [Indexed: 06/10/2023]
Abstract
So far, most studies on evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations have concentrated on a single update rule. However, given the impacts of the environment and individual cognition, individuals may use different update rules to change their current strategies. In light of this, the current paper reports on a study that constructed a mixed stochastic evolutionary game dynamic by combining the imitation and aspiration-driven update processes. The target was to clarify the influences of the aspiration-driven process on the evolution of the level of cooperation by considering the behavior of a population in which individuals have two strategies available: cooperation and defection. Through a numerical analysis of unstructured populations and simulation analyses of structured populations and of the random-matching model, the following results were found. First, the mean fraction of cooperators varied alongside the probability with which the individual adopted the aspiration-driven update rule. In the Prisoner's Dilemma and coexistence games, the aspiration-driven update process promoted cooperation in the well-mixed population but inhibited it in structured ones and the random-matching model; however, in the coordination game, the aspiration-driven update process was seen to exert the opposite effect on cooperation by inhibiting the latter in a homogeneously mixed population but promoting it in structured ones and in the random-matching model. Second, the mean fraction of cooperators changed with the aspiration level in the differently structured populations and random-matching model, and there appeared a phase transition point. Third, the evolutionary characteristics of the mean fraction of cooperators maintained robustness in the differently structured populations and random-matching model. These results extend evolutionary game theory.
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Affiliation(s)
- Xianjia Wang
- Economics and Management School, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China
- Institute of Systems Engineering, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China
| | - Cuiling Gu
- Institute of Systems Engineering, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China
| | - Jinhua Zhao
- Economics and Management School, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China
| | - Ji Quan
- School of Management, Wuhan University of Technology, Wuhan 430070, China
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21
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Takesue H. Roles of mutation rate and co-existence of multiple strategy updating rules in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games. ACTA ACUST UNITED AC 2019. [DOI: 10.1209/0295-5075/126/58001] [Citation(s) in RCA: 15] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/20/2022]
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22
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Fang Y, Benko TP, Perc M, Xu H, Tan Q. Synergistic third-party rewarding and punishment in the public goods game. Proc Math Phys Eng Sci 2019; 475:20190349. [PMID: 31423104 PMCID: PMC6694311 DOI: 10.1098/rspa.2019.0349] [Citation(s) in RCA: 31] [Impact Index Per Article: 6.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/04/2019] [Accepted: 06/18/2019] [Indexed: 11/12/2022] Open
Abstract
We study the evolution of cooperation in the spatial public goods game in the presence of third-party rewarding and punishment. The third party executes public intervention, punishing groups where cooperation is weak and rewarding groups where cooperation is strong. We consider four different scenarios to determine what works best for cooperation, in particular, neither rewarding nor punishment, only rewarding, only punishment or both rewarding and punishment. We observe strong synergistic effects when rewarding and punishment are simultaneously applied, which are absent if neither of the two incentives or just each individual incentive is applied by the third party. We find that public cooperation can be sustained at comparatively low third-party costs under adverse conditions, which is impossible if just positive or negative incentives are applied. We also examine the impact of defection tolerance and application frequency, showing that the higher the tolerance and the frequency of rewarding and punishment, the more cooperation thrives. Phase diagrams and characteristic spatial distributions of strategies are presented to corroborate these results, which will hopefully prove useful for more efficient public policies in support of cooperation in social dilemmas.
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Affiliation(s)
- Yinhai Fang
- College of Economics and Management, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing 211100, People's Republic of China
| | - Tina P. Benko
- Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics, University of Maribor, Koroška cesta 160, 2000 Maribor, Slovenia
| | - Matjaž Perc
- Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics, University of Maribor, Koroška cesta 160, 2000 Maribor, Slovenia
- Complexity Science Hub Vienna, Josefstädterstraße 39, 1080 Vienna, Austria
| | - Haiyan Xu
- College of Economics and Management, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing 211100, People's Republic of China
| | - Qingmei Tan
- College of Economics and Management, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing 211100, People's Republic of China
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Fang Y, Benko TP, Perc M, Xu H. Dissimilarity-driven behavior and cooperation in the spatial public goods game. Sci Rep 2019; 9:7655. [PMID: 31113984 PMCID: PMC6529404 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-019-44184-5] [Citation(s) in RCA: 17] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/13/2019] [Accepted: 05/09/2019] [Indexed: 11/08/2022] Open
Abstract
In this paper, we explore the impact of four different types of dissimilarity-driven behavior on the evolution of cooperation in the spatial public goods game. While it is commonly assumed that individuals adapt their strategy by imitating one of their more successful neighbors, in reality only very few will be awarded the highest payoffs. Many have equity or equality preferences, and they have to make do with an average or even with a low payoff. To account for this, we divide the population into two categories. One consists of payoff-driven players, while the other consists of dissimilarity-driven players. The later imitate the minority strategy in their group based on four different dissimilarity-driven behaviors. The rule that most effectively promotes cooperation, and this regardless of the multiplication factor of the public goods game, is when individuals adopt the minority strategy only when their payoff is better than that of their neighbors. If the dissimilarity-driven players adopt the minority strategy regardless of the payoffs of others, or if their payoff is the same, the population typically evolves towards a neutral state where cooperators and defectors are equally common. This may be beneficial when the multiplication factor is low, when defectors would otherwise dominate. However, if the dissimilarity-driven players adopt the minority strategy only when their payoff is worse than that of their neighbors, then cooperation is not promoted at all in comparison to the baseline case in the absence of dissimilarity-driven behavior. We explore the pattern formation behind these results, and we discuss their wider implications for the better understanding of cooperative behavior in social groups.
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Affiliation(s)
- Yinhai Fang
- College of Economics and Management, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing, 211106, China
- Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics, University of Maribor, Koroška cesta 160, SI-2000, Maribor, Slovenia
| | - Tina P Benko
- Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics, University of Maribor, Koroška cesta 160, SI-2000, Maribor, Slovenia
| | - Matjaž Perc
- Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics, University of Maribor, Koroška cesta 160, SI-2000, Maribor, Slovenia.
- CAMTP - Center for Applied Mathematics and Theoretical Physics, University of Maribor, Mladinska 3, SI-2000, Maribor, Slovenia.
- Complexity Science Hub Vienna, Josefstädterstraße 39, A-1080, Vienna, Austria.
| | - Haiyan Xu
- College of Economics and Management, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing, 211106, China.
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24
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Direct reciprocity and model-predictive rationality explain network reciprocity over social ties. Sci Rep 2019; 9:5367. [PMID: 30931975 PMCID: PMC6443768 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-019-41547-w] [Citation(s) in RCA: 11] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/21/2018] [Accepted: 02/28/2019] [Indexed: 11/16/2022] Open
Abstract
Since M. A. Nowak & R. May’s (1992) influential paper, limiting each agent’s interactions to a few neighbors in a network of contacts has been proposed as the simplest mechanism to support the evolution of cooperation in biological and socio-economic systems. The network allows cooperative agents to self-assort into clusters, within which they reciprocate cooperation. This (induced) network reciprocity has been observed in several theoreticalmodels and shown to predict the fixation of cooperation under a simple rule: the benefit produced by an act of cooperation must outweigh the cost of cooperating with all neighbors. However, the experimental evidence among humans is controversial: though the rule seems to be confirmed, the underlying modeling assumptions are not. Specifically, models assume that agents update their strategies by imitating better performing neighbors, even though imitation lacks rationality when interactions are far from all-to-all. Indeed, imitation did not emerge in experiments. What did emerge is that humans are conditioned by their own mood and that, when in a cooperative mood, they reciprocate cooperation. To help resolve the controversy, we design a model in which we rationally confront the two main behaviors emerging from experiments—reciprocal cooperation and unconditional defection—in a networked prisoner’s dilemma. Rationality is introduced by means of a predictive rule for strategy update and is bounded by the assumed model society. We show that both reciprocity and a multi-step predictive horizon are necessary to stabilize cooperation, and sufficient for its fixation, provided the game benefit-to-cost ratio is larger than a measure of network connectivity. We hence rediscover the rule of network reciprocity, underpinned however by a different evolutionary mechanism.
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Xu H, Tian C, Fan S, Li J. Information flows in the market: An evolutionary game approach. CHAOS (WOODBURY, N.Y.) 2019; 29:023126. [PMID: 30823723 DOI: 10.1063/1.5084070] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/03/2018] [Accepted: 01/29/2019] [Indexed: 06/09/2023]
Abstract
Information influences the decisions that investors make in the markets. Whether this information is true or false can be quantified and distinguished by markets. To study how information propagates through markets, we propose an information flow game based on an evolutionary game approach. In reality, investors transmit profits or losses when they transmit information, because there are values associated with information in the market. In the information flow game, information is represented by its value. Investors in the game can choose to be sharers or silencers. Sharers share their information with their neighbors according to a sharing rate α, which is a key quantity in the model. In the evolutionary process, we show that more sharers emerge when the market is full of rumors, especially as the sharing rate increases. Higher values of the sharing rate reduce the standard deviation of the information value in such markets, whereas the opposite occurs in markets that largely consist of true information. The reactions of the investors are asymmetric, which indicates that investors are more sensitive to losses than to profits. Furthermore, as the network becomes more random, a higher sharing rate becomes more beneficial for the stability of the emergence of sharers if information is generally false, whereas a lower sharing rate is helpful for the stability of the emergence of sharers if information is generally true.
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Affiliation(s)
- Hedong Xu
- Institute of Finance, Jinan University, Guangzhou 510632, China
| | - Cunzhi Tian
- Institute of Finance, Jinan University, Guangzhou 510632, China
| | - Suohai Fan
- School of Information Science and Technology, Jinan University, Guangzhou 510632, China
| | - Jiajia Li
- China Merchants Bank Guangzhou Branch, Guangzhou 510632, China
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26
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Szolnoki A, Chen X. Reciprocity-based cooperative phalanx maintained by overconfident players. Phys Rev E 2018; 98:022309. [PMID: 30253608 DOI: 10.1103/physreve.98.022309] [Citation(s) in RCA: 16] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/05/2018] [Indexed: 11/07/2022]
Abstract
According to the evolutionary game theory principle, a strategy representing a higher payoff can spread among competitors. But there are cases when a player consistently overestimates or underestimates her own payoff, which undermines proper comparison. Interestingly, both underconfident and overconfident individuals are capable of elevating the cooperation level significantly. While former players stimulate a local coordination of strategies, the presence of overconfident individuals enhances the spatial reciprocity mechanism. In both cases the propagations of competing strategies are influenced in a biased way resulting in a cooperation supporting environment. These effects are strongly related to the nonlinear character of invasion probabilities which is a common and frequently observed feature of microscopic dynamics.
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Affiliation(s)
- Attila Szolnoki
- Institute of Technical Physics and Materials Science, Centre for Energy Research, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, P.O. Box 49, H-1525 Budapest, Hungary
| | - Xiaojie Chen
- School of Mathematical Sciences, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 611731, China
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