Epistemic injustices in clinical communication: the example of narrative elicitation in person-centred care

Examining the knowledge work of person-centred care: Towards epistemic reciprocity

OBJECTIVE

It is increasingly recognised that when healthcare staff fails to give adequate credence to patients' illness-related knowledge work, this epistemic injustice undermines person-centred care. Therefore, we set out to examine the experiences of people with long-term conditions with knowledge work in healthcare settings to identify changes needed to strengthen person-centred primary care.

METHODS

We designed a qualitative study and recruited people with long-term conditions in the UK. We conducted individual interviews (analysed using interpretive phenomenological analysis) and focus groups (analysed using thematic analysis), then integrated findings from both methods through an approach focused on their complementarity.

RESULTS

Participants described how successful person-centred consultations were characterised by a negotiation between patient and doctor and moments of broad exploration, reflexive listening, and reciprocal enquiry, which allowed for epistemic reciprocity.

CONCLUSIONS

Epistemic reciprocity is a core component of person-centred clinical consultations, fostering the co-creation of new knowledge of patient experience and need through the interactive knowledge work of patient and doctor.

PRACTICE IMPLICATIONS

Medical education could benefit from initiatives that develop knowledge use and integration skills across primary care professionals. Accommodating for patient's and doctor's knowledge work during clinical practice requires redesigning the consultation process, including timing, headspace, pre-consultation, and post-consultation work.

“Always opening and never closing”: How dialogical therapists understand and create reflective conversations in network meetings

Tom Andersen’s reflecting team process, which allowed families to witness and respond to the talk of professionals during therapy sessions, has been described as revolutionary in the field of family therapy. Reflecting teams are prominent in a number of family therapy approaches, more recently in narrative and dialogical therapies. This way of working is considered more a philosophy than a technique, and has been received positively by both therapists and service users. This paper describes how dialogical therapists conceptualise the reflective process, how they work to engage families in reflective dialogues and how this supports change. We conducted semi-structured, reflective interviews with 12 dialogical therapists with between 2 and 20 years of experience. Interpretative Phenomenological analysis of transcribed interviews identified varying conceptualisations of the reflecting process and descriptions of therapist actions that support reflective talk among network members. We adopted a dialogical approach to interpretation of this data. In this sense, we did not aim to condense accounts into consensus but instead to describe variations and new ways of understanding dialogical reflecting team practices. Four themes were identified: Lived experience as expertise; Listening to the self and hearing others; Relational responsiveness and fostering connection; and Opening space for something new. We applied these themes to psychotherapy process literature both within family therapy literature and more broadly to understand more about how reflecting teams promote helpful and healing conversations in practice.

Epistemic solidarity in medicine and healthcare

In this article, I apply the concept of solidarity to collective knowledge practices in healthcare. Generally, solidarity acknowledges that people are dependent on each other in many respects, and it captures those support practices that people engage in out of concern for others in whom they recognise a relevant similarity. Drawing on the rich literature on solidarity in bioethics and beyond, this article specifically discusses the role that epistemic solidarity can play in healthcare. It thus focuses, in particular, on solidarity’s relationship with justice and injustice. In this regard, it is argued (1) that justice and solidarity are two equally important and complementary values that should both be considered in healthcare practices and institutions and (2) that solidarity often arises in unjust situations and can be a means to bring about justice. I transfer these ‘general’ insights about solidarity to knowledge practices in healthcare and link them to the discussion about epistemic injustices in healthcare and how to overcome them. I argue that epistemic solidarity can play an important role in overcoming epistemic injustices as well as—and independently from its contribution to justice—in knowledge production in medicine more generally. To demonstrate how epistemic solidarity can add to our understanding of collective knowledge practices, I discuss two examples: patients sharing their medical data for research purposes and healthcare professionals’ engagement with patients to better understand their afflictions.

Using Ricoeur's notions on narrative interpretation as a resource in supporting person-centredness in health and social care

This article suggests a shift in focus from stories as verbal accounts to narrative interpretation of the every day as a resource for achieving person‐centred health and social care. The aim is to explore Ricoeur's notion of narrative and action, as expressed in his arguments on a threefold mimesis process, using this as a grounding for the use of narration to achieve person‐centredness in health and social care practice. This focus emerged from discussions on this matter at the IPONS conference in Gothenburg, 2021. Based on philosophical resources from Ricoeur's notions of narrative and action developed in his arguments on a threefold mimesis process, we propose a wider use of stories in health and social care practices. We suggest expanding from only focusing on verbal accounts to focusing on narrative as a human way to interpret and make sense of everyday life and circumstances and to communicate possible meanings. We discuss how such complementary focus can be a resource in getting patients involved and collaborating in their health and social care and thereby help develop person‐centred practices.

Developing new ways to listen: the value of narrative approaches in empirical (bio)ethics

The use of qualitative research in empirical bioethics is becoming increasingly popular, but its implementation comes with several challenges, such as difficulties in aligning moral epistemology and methods. In this paper, we describe some problems that empirical bioethics researchers may face; these problems are related to a tension between the different poles on the spectrum of scientific paradigms, namely a positivist and interpretive stance. We explore the ideas of narrative construction, ‘genres’ in medicine and dominant discourses in relation to empirical research. We also reflect on the loss of depth and context that may occur with thematic or content analyses of interviews, and discuss the need for transparency about methodologies in empirical bioethics. Drawing on insights from narrative approaches in the social sciences and the clinical-educational discipline of Narrative Medicine, we further clarify these problems and suggest a narrative approach to qualitative interviewing in empirical bioethics that enables researchers to ‘listen (and read) in new ways’. We then show how this approach was applied in the first author’s research project about euthanasia decision-making. In addition, we stress the important ethical task of scrutinizing methodologies and meta-ethical standpoints, as they inevitably impact empirical outcomes and corresponding ethical judgments. Finally, we raise the question whether a ‘diagnostic’, rather than a ‘problem-solving’, mindset could and should be foregrounded in empirical ethics, albeit without losing a commitment to ethics’ normative task, and suggest further avenues for theorizing about listening and epistemic (in)justice in relation to empirical (bio)ethics.