On explaining and understanding cognitive behaviour

Cerebral Organoid Research Ethics and Pinning the Tail on the Donkey

The risk of creating cerebral organoids/assembloids conscious enough to suffer is a recurrent concern in organoid research ethics. On one hand, we should, apparently, avoid discovering how to distinguish between organoids that it would be permissible (non-conscious) and impermissible (conscious) to use in research, since if successful we would create organoids that suffer. On the other, if we do not, the risk persists that research might inadvertently continue to cause organoids to suffer. Moreover, since modeling some brain disorders may require inducing stress in organoids, it is unclear how to eliminate the risk, if we want to develop effective therapies. We are committed to harm avoidance but hamstrung by a presumption that we should avoid research that might tell us clearly when suffering occurs. How can we negotiate this challenge and maximize the therapeutic benefits of cerebral organoid research? The author interrogates the challenge, suggesting a tentative way forward.

What Do We Owe to Novel Synthetic Beings and How Can We Be Sure?

Embodiment is typically given insufficient weight in debates concerning the moral status of Novel Synthetic Beings (NSBs) such as sentient or sapient Artificial Intelligences (AIs). Discussion usually turns on whether AIs are conscious or self-aware, but this does not exhaust what is morally relevant. Since moral agency encompasses what a being wants to do, the means by which it enacts choices in the world is a feature of such agency. In determining the moral status of NSBs and our obligations to them, therefore, we must consider how their corporeality shapes their options, preferences, values, and is constitutive of their moral universe. Analysing AI embodiment and the coupling between cognition and world, the paper shows why determination of moral status is only sensible in terms of the whole being, rather than mental sophistication alone, and why failure to do this leads to an impoverished account of our obligations to such NSBs.

The Transition from Animal to Linguistic Communication

Darwin's theory predicts that linguistic behavior gradually evolved out of animal forms of communication (signaling). However, this prediction is confronted by the conceptual problem that there is an essential difference between signaling and linguistic behavior: using words is a normative practice. It is argued that we can resolve this problem if we (1) note that language evolution is the outcome of an evolutionary transition, and (2) observe that the use of words evolves during ontogenesis out of babbling. It is discussed that language evolved as the result of an expansion of the vocalizing powers of our ancestors. This involved an increase in the volitional control of our speech apparatus (leading to the ability to produce new combinations of vowels and consonants), but also the evolution of socially guided learning. It resulted in unique human abilities, namely doing things with words and later reasoning and giving reasons.

Behavior, neuropsychology and fMRI

Cognitive neuroscientists in the late 20th century began the task of identifying the part(s) of the brain concerned with normal behavior as manifest in the psychological capacities as affective powers, reasoning, behaving purposively and the pursuit of goals, following introduction of the 'functional magnetic resonance imaging' (fMRI) method for identifying brain activity. For this research program to be successful two questions require satisfactory answers. First, as the fMRI method can currently only be used on stationary subjects, to what extent can neuropsychological tests applicable to such stationary subjects be correlated with normal behavior. Second, to what extent can correlations between the various neuropsychological tests on the one hand, and sites of brain activity determined with fMRI on the other, be regarded as established. The extent to which these questions have yet received satisfactory answers is reviewed, and suggestions made both for improving correlations of neuropsychological tests with behavior as well as with the results of fMRI-based observations.