Comparing Types of Financial Incentives to Promote Walking: An Experimental Test

Evaluation of the Effectiveness of Behavioral Economic Incentive Programs for Goal Achievement on Healthy Diet, Weight Control and Physical Activity: A Systematic Review and Network Meta-analysis

BACKGROUND

Healthy diet, weight control and physical activity to reduce obesity can be motivated by financial incentives (FI). Behavioral-economic approaches may improve the incentivization effectiveness. This study compares and ranks the effectiveness of standard and behavioral incentivization for healthy diet, weight control, and physical activity promotion.

PURPOSE

To investigate whether behavioral-economic insights improve incentivization effectiveness.

METHODS

A systematic search of Medline and Scopus was performed from database inception to December 2020. Study characteristics, program designs, and risk ratio (RR) were extracted. A two-stage network meta-analysis pooled and ranked intervention effects.

RESULTS

There were 35 eligible RCTs. For diet-weight control, standard FI, deposit contract (deposit), lottery-based incentive (lottery), and standard-FI + lottery increased goal achievement compared to no-FI but only deposit was statistically significant with pooled RRs and 95% confidence intervals (CI) of 1.21 (0.94, 1.56), 1.79 (1.04, 3.05), 1.45 (0.99, 2.13), and 1.73 (0.83, 3.63). For physical activity, standard-FI, deposit, and lottery significantly increased goal achievement compared to no-FI, with pooled RRs of 1.38 (1.13, 1.68), 1.63 (1.24, 2.14) and 1.43 (1.14, 1.80), respectively. In a follow-up period for physical activity, only deposit significantly increased goal achievement compared to no-FI, with pooled RRs of 1.39 (1.11, 1.73).

CONCLUSION

Deposit, followed by lottery, were best for motivating healthy diet, weight control and physical activity at program end. Post-intervention, deposit then standard-FI were best for motivating physical activity. Behavioral insights can improve incentivization effectiveness, although lottery-based approaches may offer only short-term benefit regarding physical activity. However, the imprecise intervention effects were major concerns.

Put your money where your feet are: The real-world effects of StepBet gamified deposit contracts for physical activity

Background

Gamification and deposit contracts (a financial incentive in which participants pledge their own money) can enhance effectiveness of mobile behavior change interventions. However, to assess their potential for improving population health, research should investigate implementation of gamified deposit contracts outside the research setting. Therefore, we analyzed data from StepBet, a smartphone application originally developed by WayBetter, Inc.

Objective

To perform a naturalistic evaluation of StepBet gamified deposit contracts, for whom they work best, and under which conditions they are most effective to help increase physical activity.

Methods

WayBetter provided data of StepBet participants that participated in a stepcount challenge between 2015 and 2020 (N = 72,974). StepBet challenges were offered on the StepBet smartphone application. The modal challenge consisted of a $40 deposit made prior to a 6-week challenge period during which participants needed to reach daily and weekly step goals in order to regain their deposit. Participants who met their goals also received additional earnings which were paid out from the money lost by those who failed their challenge. Challenge step goals were tailored on a 90-day historic step count retrieval that was also used as the baseline comparison for this study. Primary outcomes were increase in step count (continuous) and challenge success (dichotomous).

Results

Overall, average daily step counts increased by 31.2 % (2423 steps, SD = 3462) from 7774 steps (SD = 3112) at baseline to 10,197 steps (SD = 4162) during the challenge. The average challenge success rate was 73 %. Those who succeeded in their challenge (n = 53,281) increased their step count by 44.0 % (3465 steps, SD = 3013), while those who failed their challenge (n = 19,693) decreased their step count by -5.3 % (-398 steps, SD = 3013). Challenges started as a New Year's resolution were slightly more successful (77.7 %) than those started during the rest of the year (72.6 %).

Discussion

In a real-world setting, and among a large and diverse sample, participating in a gamified deposit contract challenge was associated with a large increase in step counts. A majority of challenges were successful and succeeding in a challenge was associated with a large and clinically relevant increase in step counts. Based on these findings, we recommend implementing gamified deposit contracts for physical activity where possible. An interesting avenue for future research is to explore possible setback effects among people who fail a challenge, and how setbacks can be mitigated.

Pre-registration

Open Science Framework (doi:10.17605/OSF.IO/D237C).

Loss-Framed Adaptive Microcontingency Management for Preventing Prolonged Sedentariness: Development and Feasibility Study

BACKGROUND

A growing body of evidence shows that financial incentives can effectively reinforce individuals' positive behavior change and improve compliance with health intervention programs. A critical factor in the design of incentive-based interventions is to set a proper incentive magnitude. However, it is highly challenging to determine such magnitudes as the effects of incentive magnitude depend on personal attitudes and contexts.

OBJECTIVE

This study aimed to illustrate loss-framed adaptive microcontingency management (L-AMCM) and the lessons learned from a feasibility study. L-AMCM discourages an individual's adverse health behaviors by deducting particular expenses from a regularly assigned budget, where expenses are adaptively estimated based on the individual's previous responses to varying expenses and contexts.

METHODS

We developed a mobile health intervention app for preventing prolonged sedentary lifestyles. This app delivered a behavioral mission (ie, suggesting taking an active break for a while) with an incentive bid when 50 minutes of uninterrupted sedentary behavior happened. Participants were assigned to either the fixed (ie, deducting the monotonous expense for each mission failure) or adaptive (ie, deducting varying expenses estimated by the L-AMCM for each mission failure) incentive group. The intervention lasted 3 weeks.

RESULTS

We recruited 41 participants (n=15, 37% women; fixed incentive group: n=20, 49% of participants; adaptive incentive group: n=21, 51% of participants) whose mean age was 24.0 (SD 3.8; range 19-34) years. Mission success rates did not show statistically significant differences by group (P=.54; fixed incentive group mean 0.66, SD 0.24; adaptive incentive group mean 0.61, SD 0.22). The follow-up analysis of the adaptive incentive group revealed that the influence of incentive magnitudes on mission success was not statistically significant (P=.18; odds ratio 0.98, 95% CI 0.95-1.01). On the basis of the qualitative interviews, such results were possibly because the participants had sufficient intrinsic motivation and less sensitivity to incentive magnitudes.

CONCLUSIONS

Although our L-AMCM did not significantly affect users' mission success rate, this study configures a pioneering work toward adaptively estimating incentives by considering user behaviors and contexts through leveraging mobile sensing and machine learning. We hope that this study inspires researchers to develop incentive-based interventions.

Investigating Rewards and Deposit Contract Financial Incentives for Physical Activity Behavior Change Using a Smartphone App: Randomized Controlled Trial

BACKGROUND

Financial incentive interventions for improving physical activity have proven to be effective but costly. Deposit contracts (in which participants pledge their own money) could be an affordable alternative. In addition, deposit contracts may have superior effects by exploiting the power of loss aversion. Previous research has often operationalized deposit contracts through loss framing a financial reward (without requiring a deposit) to mimic the feelings of loss involved in a deposit contract.

OBJECTIVE

This study aimed to disentangle the effects of incurring actual losses (through self-funding a deposit contract) and loss framing. We investigated whether incentive conditions are more effective than a no-incentive control condition, whether deposit contracts have a lower uptake than financial rewards, whether deposit contracts are more effective than financial rewards, and whether loss frames are more effective than gain frames.

METHODS

Healthy participants (N=126) with an average age of 22.7 (SD 2.84) years participated in a 20-day physical activity intervention. They downloaded a smartphone app that provided them with a personalized physical activity goal and either required a €10 (at the time of writing: €1=US $0.98) deposit up front (which could be lost) or provided €10 as a reward, contingent on performance. Daily feedback on incentive earnings was provided and framed as either a loss or gain. We used a 2 (incentive type: deposit or reward) × 2 (feedback frame: gain or loss) between-subjects factorial design with a no-incentive control condition. Our primary outcome was the number of days participants achieved their goals. The uptake of the intervention was a secondary outcome.

RESULTS

Overall, financial incentive conditions (mean 13.10, SD 6.33 days goal achieved) had higher effectiveness than the control condition (mean 8.00, SD 5.65 days goal achieved; P=.002; ηp2=0.147). Deposit contracts had lower uptake (29/47, 62%) than rewards (50/50, 100%; P<.001; Cramer V=0.492). Furthermore, 2-way analysis of covariance showed that deposit contracts (mean 14.88, SD 6.40 days goal achieved) were not significantly more effective than rewards (mean 12.13, SD 6.17 days goal achieved; P=.17). Unexpectedly, loss frames (mean 10.50, SD 6.22 days goal achieved) were significantly less effective than gain frames (mean 14.67, SD 5.95 days goal achieved; P=.007; ηp2=0.155).

CONCLUSIONS

Financial incentives help increase physical activity, but deposit contracts were not more effective than rewards. Although self-funded deposit contracts can be offered at low cost, low uptake is an important obstacle to large-scale implementation. Unexpectedly, loss framing was less effective than gain framing. Therefore, we urge further research on their boundary conditions before using loss-framed incentives in practice. Because of limited statistical power regarding some research questions, the results of this study should be interpreted with caution, and future work should be done to confirm these findings.

TRIAL REGISTRATION

Open Science Framework Registries osf.io/34ygt; https://osf.io/34ygt.

Technology-based versus in-person deposit contract treatments for promoting physical activity

Deposit contracts involve participants depositing their own money and earning it back contingent on behavior change. Deposit contracts are empirically supported treatments for promoting health behavior, but they have a history of poor uptake. We compared the effectiveness and acceptability of technology-based versus in-person deposit contracts for promoting physical activity with 12 individuals. Participants' daily step counts were monitored using Fitbits across 6 weeks, and treatment preferences were assessed at the end of the study. The 2 types of treatments were equally effective in increasing physical activity, but the technology-based deposit contracts were preferred by most participants. Most participants also reported that their preference was related to convenience. Technology-based implementation may be one way to improve deposit contract uptake, while maintaining similar effectiveness compared to in-person procedures.

Parts greater than their sum: randomized controlled trial testing partitioned incentives to increase cancer screening

Promoting healthy behavior is a challenge for public health officials, especially in the context of asking patients to participate in preventive cancer screenings. Small financial incentives are sometimes used, but there is a little scientific basis to support a compelling description of the best-practice implementation of such incentives. We present a simple behavioral strategy based on mental accounting from prospect theory that maximizes the impact of incentives with no additional cost. We show how the partition of one incentive into two smaller incentives of equivalent total amount produces substantial behavioral changes, demonstrated in the context of colorectal cancer screening. In a randomized controlled trial, eligible patients aged 50-74 (n = 1652 patients) were allocated to receive either one €10 incentive (upon completion of screening) or two €5 incentives (at the beginning and at the end of screening). We show that cancer screening rates were dramatically increased by partitioning the financial incentive (61.1%), compared with a single installment at the end (41.4%). These results support the hedonic editing hypothesis from prospect theory, and underline the importance of implementing theoretically grounded healthcare interventions. Our results suggest that, when patient incentives are feasible, healthcare procedures should be framed as multistage events with smaller incentives offered at multiple points in time.