Can Neuroscience Contribute to Practical Ethics? A Critical Review and Discussion of the Methodological and Translational Challenges of the Neuroscience of Ethics

Why Moral Bioenhancement Cannot Reliably Produce Virtue

Moral bioenhancement presents the possibility of enhancing morally desirable emotions and dispositions. While some scholars have proposed that moral bioenhancement can produce virtue, we argue that within a virtue ethics framework moral bioenhancement cannot reliably produce virtue. Moreover, on a virtue ethics framework, the pursuit of moral bioenhancement carries moral risks. To make this argument, we consider three aspects of virtue-its motivational, rational, and behavioral components. In order to be virtuous, we argue, a person must (i) take pleasure in doing the right thing and have the correct motivational attitudes; (ii) reason correctly about what is called for in a particular ethical dilemma; and (iii) intentionally and continuously practice and cultivate virtues. These dimensions of morality-in short: precisely those emphasized in a virtue ethics framework-cannot be consistently or reliably met using existing moral bioenhancement technology.

The ubiquity of the fallacy of composition in cognitive enhancement and in education

Research into cognitive enhancement is highly controversial, and arguments for and against it have failed to identify the logical fallacy underlying this debate: the fallacy of composition. The fallacy of composition is a lesser-known fallacy of ambiguity, but it has been explored and applied extensively to other fields, including economics. The fallacy of composition, which occurs when the characteristics of the parts of the whole are incorrectly extended to apply to the whole itself, and the conclusion is false, should be addressed in the debate on cognitive enhancement and within education. Within cognitive enhancement, the premise that individual distinct cognitive processes can be enhanced by cognitive enhancers leads to the conclusion that they must enhance cognition overall, and this idea is pervasive in the literature. If the goal of cognitive enhancement is to enhance cognition or learning, and not merely individual cognitive processes, then this is a clear example of the fallacy of composition. The ambiguity of "cognitive," "cognition," and "enhancement" only perpetuates this fallacy and creates more confusion surrounding the purposes and goals of enhancement. Identifying this fallacy does not threaten the existing body of research; however, it provides a novel framework to explore new avenues for research, education, and enhancement, particularly through education reform initiatives. Education enhances and facilitates learning, and improvements to education could be considered cognitive enhancements. Furthermore, the same fallacy is ubiquitous in education; educators commit it by "teaching to the test" and prioritizing memorization over generalizable skills such as critical thinking and problem solving. We will explore these new avenues for research and highlight principles of learning success from other disciplines to create a clearer understanding of the means and ends of cognitive enhancement. Recognizing the pervasiveness of composition fallacy in cognitive enhancement and education will lead to greater clarity of normative positions and insights into student learning that steer away from fallacious reasoning.

Opportunities, risks and challenges in global mental health and population neuroscience: a case of Sino-German cooperation

Large scale prospective cohorts have now been established across several countries, and continents, and among the aims include an assessment of the developmental trajectory of mental disorders. This level of international cooperation helps transfer research findings to new social contexts as well as enabling an assessment of which findings can be replicated, and which interventions are most effective, in different social and cultural settings. However, data sharing across different regional and national health care systems requires a careful consideration of different standards in ethical research, data protection and patient care, including respect for patients' rights, in cooperating jurisdictions. In our review, we discuss ethical, legal and practical challenges associated with such cooperation with a focus on research participants, specifically patient recruitment, by considering the instance of China and Germany. Our broader aim is to promote international cooperation by identifying key challenges that arise in international cooperation, and to facilitate an exchange in relation to legal and practical approaches.

Toward a rational and ethical sociotechnical system of autonomous vehicles: A novel application of multi-criteria decision analysis

The impacts of autonomous vehicles (AV) are widely anticipated to be socially, economically, and ethically significant. A reliable assessment of the harms and benefits of their large-scale deployment requires a multi-disciplinary approach. To that end, we employed Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis to make such an assessment. We obtained opinions from 19 disciplinary experts to assess the significance of 13 potential harms and eight potential benefits that might arise under four deployments schemes. Specifically, we considered: (1) the status quo, i.e., no AVs are deployed; (2) unfettered assimilation, i.e., no regulatory control would be exercised and commercial entities would "push" the development and deployment; (3) regulated introduction, i.e., regulatory control would be applied and either private individuals or commercial fleet operators could own the AVs; and (4) fleets only, i.e., regulatory control would be applied and only commercial fleet operators could own the AVs. Our results suggest that two of these scenarios, (3) and (4), namely regulated privately-owned introduction or fleet ownership or autonomous vehicles would be less likely to cause harm than either the status quo or the unfettered options.

Superethics Instead of Superintelligence: Know Thyself, and Apply Science Accordingly

The human species is combining an increased understanding of our cognitive machinery with the development of a technology that can profoundly influence our lives and our ways of living together. Our sciences enable us to see our strengths and weaknesses, and build technology accordingly. What would future historians think of our current attempts to build increasingly smart systems, the purposes for which we employ them, the almost unstoppable goldrush toward ever more commercially relevant implementations, and the risk of superintelligence? We need a more profound reflection on what our science shows us about ourselves, what our technology allows us to do with that, and what, apparently, we aim to do with those insights and applications. As the smartest species on the planet, we don't need more intelligence. Since we appear to possess an underdeveloped capacity to act ethically and empathically, we rather require the kind of technology that enables us to act more consistently upon ethical principles. The problem is not to formulate ethical rules, it's to put them into practice. Cognitive neuroscience and AI provide the knowledge and the tools to develop the moral crutches we so clearly require. Why aren't we building them? We don't need superintelligence, we need superethics.

Two Problematic Foundations of Neuroethics and Pragmatist Reconstructions

Common understandings of neuroethics, that is, of its distinctive nature, are premised on two distinct sets of claims: (1) neuroscience can change views about the nature of ethics itself and neuroethics is dedicated to reaping such an understanding of ethics, and (2) neuroscience poses challenges distinct from other areas of medicine and science and neuroethics tackles those issues. Critiques have rightfully challenged both claims, stressing how the first may lead to problematic forms of reductionism whereas the second relies on debatable assumptions about the nature of bioethics specialization and development. Informed by philosophical pragmatism and our experience in neuroethics, we argue that these claims are ill founded and should give way to pragmatist reconstructions; namely, that neuroscience, much like other areas of empirical research on morality, can provide useful information about the nature of morally problematic situations, but does not need to promise radical and sweeping changes to ethics based on neuroscientism. Furthermore, the rationale for the development of neuroethics as a specialized field need not to be premised on the distinctive nature of the issues it tackles or of neurotechnologies. Rather, it can espouse an understanding of neuroethics as both a scholarly and a practical endeavor dedicated to resolving a series of problematic situations raised by neurological and psychiatric conditions.