What are the relations of thinking about groups and theory of mind?

What is mindreading?

Theory of mind, also known as mindreading, refers to our ability to attribute mental states to agents in order to make sense of and interact with other agents. Recently, theorists in this literature have advanced a broad conception of mindreading. In particular, psychologists and philosophers have examined how we attribute knowledge, intention, mentalistically loaded stereotypes, and personality traits to others. Moreover, the diversity of our goals in a social interaction-precision, efficiency, self/in-group protection-generates diversity in the mindreading processes we employ. Finally, the products of mindreading are varied, as well. We produce different sorts of mindreading explanations depending on our epistemic goals and the situational context. In this article, I piece together these different strands of research to present a broad conception of mindreading that is complex, messy, and interesting. This article is categorized under: Philosophy > Knowledge and Belief Philosophy > Psychological Capacities.

Young Children Are More Likely to Spontaneously Attribute Mental States to Members of Their Own Group

We investigated whether young children were more likely to spontaneously attribute mental states to members of their own social group than to members of an out-group. We asked 5- and 6-year-old children to describe the actions of interacting geometric shapes and manipulated whether the children believed these shapes represented their own group or another group. Children of both ages spontaneously used mental-state words more often in their description of in-group members compared with out-group members. Furthermore, 6-year-olds produced a greater diversity of mental-state terms when talking about their own social group. These effects held across two different social categories (based on gender and geographic location). This research has important implications for understanding a broad range of social phenomena, including dehumanization, intergroup bias, and theory of mind.

Children's responses to social atypicality among group members - advantages of a contextualized social developmental account

Abrams, Rutland, Palmer, Ferrell, and Pelletier (2014) showed that better second-order mental state understanding facilitates 6-7-year-olds' ability to link a partially disloyal child's atypicality to inclusive or exclusive reactions by in-group or outgroup members. This finding is interpreted in terms of predictions from the developmental subjective group dynamics model. We respond to thoughtful commentaries by Rhodes and Chalik, Patterson, and Rakoczy. Children face a significant developmental challenge in becoming able to recognize and interpret social atypicality in intergroup contexts. Researching that ability to contextualize judgements raises new questions about the nature of peer inclusion and exclusion, about children's social cognition, and about the way that social cognitive development and social experience combine. Rather than individual-focused cognition taking priority over category-based cognition, we argue the two become more systematically integrated during development. We note that loyalty is but one example of typicality, and we also consider the role of more advanced perspective taking among older children, and the role of multiple classification skill among younger children, as well as potential implications for intervention to reduce peer victimization and prejudice.