1
|
Davis I, Carlson R, Dunham Y, Jara-Ettinger J. Identifying social partners through indirect prosociality: A computational account. Cognition 2023; 240:105580. [PMID: 37572564 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2023.105580] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/10/2023] [Revised: 07/24/2023] [Accepted: 07/25/2023] [Indexed: 08/14/2023]
Abstract
The ability to identify people who are prosocial, supportive, and mindful of others is critical for choosing social partners. While past work has emphasized the information value of direct social interactions (such as watching someone help or hinder others), social tendencies can also be inferred from indirect evidence, such as how an agent considers others when making personal choices. Here we present a computational model of this capacity, grounded in a Bayesian framework for action understanding. Across four experiments we show that this model captures how people infer social preferences based on how agents act when their choices indirectly impact others (Experiments 1a, 1b, & 1c), and how people infer what an agent knows about others from knowledge of that agent's social preferences (Experiment 2). Critically, people's patterns of inferences could not be explained by simpler alternatives. These findings illuminate how people can discern potential social partners from indirect evidence of their prosociality, thus deepening our understanding of partner detection, and social cognition more broadly.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Isaac Davis
- Department of Psychology, Yale University, United States of America.
| | - Ryan Carlson
- Department of Psychology, Yale University, United States of America
| | - Yarrow Dunham
- Department of Psychology, Yale University, United States of America; Wu Tsai Institute, Yale University, United States of America
| | - Julian Jara-Ettinger
- Department of Psychology, Yale University, United States of America; Wu Tsai Institute, Yale University, United States of America
| |
Collapse
|
2
|
Berryman K, Lazar SW, Hohwy J. Do contemplative practices make us more moral? Trends Cogn Sci 2023; 27:916-931. [PMID: 37574378 DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2023.07.005] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/28/2023] [Revised: 07/06/2023] [Accepted: 07/08/2023] [Indexed: 08/15/2023]
Abstract
Contemplative practices are a staple of modern life and have historically been intertwined with morality. However, do these practices in fact improve our morality? The answer remains unclear because the science of contemplative practices has focused on unidimensional aspects of morality, which do not align with the type of interdependent moral functioning these practices aspire to cultivate. Here, we appeal to a multifactor construct, which allows the assessment of outcomes from a contemplative intervention across multiple dimensions of moral cognition and behavior. This offers an open-minded and empirically rigorous investigation into the impact of contemplative practices on moral actions. Using this framework, we gain insight into the effect of mindfulness meditation on morality, which we show does indeed have positive influences, but also some negative influences, distributed across our moral functioning.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Kevin Berryman
- Monash Centre for Consciousness & Contemplative Studies, Monash University, Melbourne, VIC, Australia
| | - Sara W Lazar
- Massachusetts General Hospital, Boston, MA, USA; Harvard Medical School, Boston, MA, USA
| | - Jakob Hohwy
- Monash Centre for Consciousness & Contemplative Studies, Monash University, Melbourne, VIC, Australia.
| |
Collapse
|
3
|
Margoni F, Geipel J, Hadjichristidis C, Bakiaj R, Surian L. Age-Related Differences in Moral Judgment: The Role of Probability Judgments. Cogn Sci 2023; 47:e13345. [PMID: 37718470 DOI: 10.1111/cogs.13345] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/17/2022] [Revised: 07/25/2023] [Accepted: 09/06/2023] [Indexed: 09/19/2023]
Abstract
Research suggests that moral evaluations change during adulthood. Older adults (75+) tend to judge accidentally harmful acts more severely than younger adults do, and this age-related difference is in part due to the greater negligence older adults attribute to the accidental harmdoers. Across two studies (N = 254), we find support for this claim and report the novel discovery that older adults' increased attribution of negligence, in turn, is associated with a higher perceived likelihood that the accident would occur. We propose that, because older adults perceive accidents as more likely than younger adults do, they condemn the agents and their actions more and even infer that the agents' omission to exercise due care is intentional. These findings refine our understanding of the cognitive processes underpinning moral judgment in older adulthood and highlight the role of subjective probability judgments in negligence attribution.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Francesco Margoni
- Department of Psychology, University of Oslo
- Department of Social Studies, University of Stavanger
| | - Janet Geipel
- Department of Management, The University of Exeter
- Department of Psychology, The University of Chicago
| | - Constantinos Hadjichristidis
- Department of Economics and Management, University of Trento
- Centre for Decision Research, Leeds University Business School, University of Leeds
| | - Richard Bakiaj
- Department of Psychology and Cognitive Science, University of Trento
| | - Luca Surian
- Department of Psychology and Cognitive Science, University of Trento
| |
Collapse
|
4
|
Margoni F, Brown TR. Jurors use mental state information to assess breach in negligence cases. Cognition 2023; 236:105442. [PMID: 36996604 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2023.105442] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/03/2022] [Revised: 01/26/2023] [Accepted: 03/10/2023] [Indexed: 03/30/2023]
Abstract
To prove guilt, jurors in many countries must find that the criminal defendant acted with a particular mental state. However, this amateur form of mindreading is not supposed to occur in civil negligence trials. Instead, jurors should decide whether the defendant was negligent by looking only at his actions, and whether they were objectively reasonable under the circumstances. Even so, across four pre-registered studies (N = 782), we showed that mock jurors do not focus on actions alone. US mock jurors spontaneously rely on mental state information when evaluating negligence cases. In Study 1, jurors were given three negligence cases to judge, and were asked to evaluate whether a reasonably careful person would have foreseen the risk (foreseeability) and whether the defendant acted unreasonably (negligence). Across conditions, we also varied the extent and content of additional information about defendant's subjective mental state: jurors were provided with evidence that the defendant either thought the risk of a harm was high or was low, or were not provided with such information. Foreseeability and negligence scores increased when mock jurors were told the defendant thought there was a high risk, and negligence scores decreased when the defendant thought there was a low risk, compared to when no background mental state information was provided. In Study 2, we replicated these findings by using mild (as opposed to severe) harm cases. In Study 3, we tested an intervention aimed at reducing jurors' reliance on mental states, which consisted in raising jurors' awareness of potential hindsight bias in their evaluations. The intervention reduced mock juror reliance on mental states when assessing foreseeability when the defendant was described as knowing of a high risk, an effect replicated in Study 4. This research demonstrates that jurors rely on mental states to assess breach, regardless of what the legal doctrine says.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Francesco Margoni
- Department of Psychology, University of Oslo, Norway; Department of Social Studies, University of Stavanger, Norway.
| | - Teneille R Brown
- SJ Quinney College of Law, Center for Law and Biomedical Sciences, University Of Utah, United States of America.
| |
Collapse
|
5
|
Margoni F, Cho I, Gutchess A. Intent-Based Moral Judgment in Old Age. J Gerontol B Psychol Sci Soc Sci 2023; 78:1136-1141. [PMID: 35973063 PMCID: PMC10292836 DOI: 10.1093/geronb/gbac114] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/28/2022] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
OBJECTIVES Recent studies support the idea of an intent-to-outcome shift in moral judgments with age. We further assessed whether a reduced reliance on intentions is associated with aging in a preregistered study with 73 younger (20-41 years) and 79 older (70-84 years) adults, group-matched on education level. METHOD Participants were presented with a set of moral cases to evaluate, created by varying orthogonally the valence (neutral, negative) of the information regarding the agent's intentions and the action's outcomes. RESULTS The two age groups did not differ in the extent they relied on intentions in moral judgment. DISCUSSION These results suggest that an intent-to-outcome shift might not be found in all aging populations, challenging prevailing theories suggesting that aging is necessarily associated with a reduced reliance on intentions.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
| | - Isu Cho
- Department of Psychology, Brandeis University, Waltham, MA, USA
| | - Angela Gutchess
- Department of Psychology, Brandeis University, Waltham, MA, USA
| |
Collapse
|
6
|
Nobes G, Panagiotaki G, Martin JW. Moral luck and the roles of outcome and negligence in moral judgments. JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 2023. [DOI: 10.1016/j.jesp.2023.104456] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 02/12/2023]
|
7
|
Kneer M, Skoczeń I. Outcome effects, moral luck and the hindsight bias. Cognition 2023; 232:105258. [PMID: 36516666 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2022.105258] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/15/2021] [Revised: 08/03/2022] [Accepted: 08/16/2022] [Indexed: 12/14/2022]
Abstract
In a series of ten preregistered experiments (N = 2043), we investigate the effect of outcome valence on judgments of probability, negligence, and culpability - a phenomenon sometimes labelled moral (and legal) luck. We found that harmful outcomes, when contrasted with neutral outcomes, lead to an increased perceived probability of harm ex post, and consequently, to a greater attribution of negligence and culpability. Rather than simply postulating hindsight bias (as is common), we employ a variety of empirical means to demonstrate that the outcome-driven asymmetry across perceived probabilities constitutes a systematic cognitive distortion. We then explore three distinct strategies to alleviate the hindsight bias and its downstream effects on mens rea and culpability ascriptions. Not all strategies are successful, but some prove very promising. They should, we argue, be considered in criminal jurisprudence, where distortions due to the hindsight bias are likely considerable and deeply disconcerting.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Markus Kneer
- Department of Philosophy, University of Zurich, 8008 Zurich, Switzerland.
| | - Izabela Skoczeń
- Department of Philosophy, University of Zurich, 8008 Zurich, Switzerland; Faculty of Law and Administration, Jagiellonian Centre for Law, Language and Philosophy, Jagiellonian University, Kraków, Poland
| |
Collapse
|
8
|
Engelmann N, Waldmann MR. How causal structure, causal strength, and foreseeability affect moral judgments. Cognition 2022; 226:105167. [DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2022.105167] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/04/2022] [Revised: 04/17/2022] [Accepted: 05/10/2022] [Indexed: 11/24/2022]
|
9
|
Schwartz F, Djeriouat H, Trémolière B. EXPRESS: Judging accidental harm: reasoning style modulates the weight of intention and harm severity. Q J Exp Psychol (Hove) 2022; 75:2366-2381. [PMID: 35285342 DOI: 10.1177/17470218221089964] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/17/2022]
Abstract
When judging a perpetrator who harmed someone accidentally, humans rely on distinct information pertaining to the perpetrator and victim. The present study investigates how reasoning style modulates the contribution of the victim's harm and the perpetrator's intention to third-party judgment of accidental harm. In two pre-registered online experiments, we simultaneously manipulated harm severity and the perpetrator's intention. Participants completed reasoning measures as well as a moral judgment task consisting of short narratives which depicted the interaction between a perpetrator and a victim. In experiment 1, we manipulated the perpetrator's intent to harm (accidental vs. intentional harm) and the victim's harm (mild vs. severe harm). In experiment 2, we aimed to manipulate intent in accidental harm scenarios exclusively, using positive or neutral intents and manipulating harm severity (mild vs. severe harm). As expected, intent and harm severity moderated participants' moral judgment of acceptability, punishment and blame. Most importantly, in both experiments, the perpetrator's intent not only interacted with outcome severity but also polarized moral judgments in participants with a more deliberative reasoning style. While moral judgments of more intuitive reasoners were less sensitive to intent, more deliberative reasoners were more forgiving of accidental harm, especially following mild harm. These findings extend previous studies by showing that reasoning style interacts with intent and harm severity to shape moral judgment of accidents.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Flora Schwartz
- UNIV. NIMES, F-30021 Nîmes Cedex 1, France 52858.,University of Toulouse, CLLE-Lab, France
| | | | | |
Collapse
|