Children and Adults Selectively Attribute Shared Cultural Knowledge to Speakers of the Same Language

Children's expectations about the stability of others' knowledge and preference states

It is a crucial ability to predict others' psychological states across time and contexts. Focusing on cultural inventions such as songs and stories, we contrasted children's attributions of stability with others' knowledge and preference states across time and space and whether these attributions change as a function of children's familiarity with the known/liked items. Children (91 4-year-olds and 97 6-year-olds) were introduced to characters who knew or liked a song, a story, a game and a dance that were either novel or familiar. Children were asked whether the characters would still know/like these when they move to another city or when they grow up to be an adult. Both age groups expected these attributes to be more durable in the moving scenario compared with the growing-up scenario, but this trend became more robust with age. Whereas overall children did not judge knowledge as more durable than preferences, children found knowledge to be more enduring with age. The 6-year-olds' stability attributions also increased when known/liked items were familiar. These results suggest that, across the preschool years, children become more nuanced in their predictions about the future forms of knowledge and preference states.

Shared social groups or shared experiences? The effect of shared knowledge on children's perspective-taking

Although the ability to consider others' visual perspectives to interpret ambiguous communication emerges during childhood, people sometimes fail to attend to their partner's perspective. Two studies investigated whether 4- to 6-year-olds show a "closeness-communication bias" in their consideration of a partner's perspective in a communication task. Participants played a game that required them to take their partner's visual perspective in order to interpret an ambiguous instruction. If children, like adults, perform worse when they overestimate the extent to which their perspective is aligned with that of a partner, then they should make more perspective-taking errors when interacting with a socially close partner compared with a more socially distant partner. In Study 1, social closeness was based on belonging to the same social group. In Study 2, social closeness was based on caregiving, a long-standing social relationship with a close kinship bond. Although social group membership did not affect children's consideration of their partner's perspective, children did make more perspective-taking errors when interacting with a close caregiver compared with a novel experimenter. These findings suggest that close personal relationships may be more likely to lead children to overestimate perspective alignment and hinder children's perspective-taking than shared social group membership, and they highlight important questions about the mechanisms underlying the effects of partner characteristics in perspective-taking tasks.

Interpersonal utility and children's social inferences from shared preferences

Similarity of behaviors or attributes is often used to infer social affiliation and prosociality. Does this reflect reasoning using a simple expectation of homophily, or more complex reasoning about shared utility? We addressed this question by examining the inferences children make from similar choices when this similarity does or does not cause competition over a zero-sum resource. Four- to six-year-olds (N = 204) saw two vignettes, each featuring three characters (a target plus two others) choosing between two types of resources. In all stories, each character expressed a preference: one 'other' chose the same resource as the target, while a second 'other' chose the different resource. In one condition there were enough resources for all the characters; in the other condition, one type of resource was limited, with only one available (inducing potential competition between the target and the similar-choice other). Children then judged which of the two 'other' characters was being nicer (prosocial judgment) and which of the two was more preferred by the target (affiliative inference). When resources were limited (vs. unlimited), children were less likely to select the similar other as being nice. Children's initial tendency to report that the target preferred the similar other was also eliminated in the limited resource scenario. These findings show that children's reasoning about similarity is not wholly based on homophily. Instead, by reasoning about shared utility - how each person values the goals of others - children engage in flexible inferences regarding whether others' similar preferences and behaviors have positive or negative social meaning.

EXPRESS: Representing Social Categories Based on Shared Cultural Knowledge in Adults

The study investigated whether adults rely on cues of shared cultural knowledge when forming social category representations. We used a modified version of the memory confusion paradigm, where participants are presented with photographs of people differing along social category distinctions while listening to utterances associated with the pictures. In the test phase, the task is to match the utterances to the photographs. When category representations are formed, more within-category than between-category errors are expected. Experiment 1 contrasted two cues in social category representations: race and shared cultural knowledge. In Experiment 2, categorisation based on shared cultural knowledge was tested without any competing cue. Experiment 3 replicated previous results about automatic race encoding when no competing social distinction was available. Experiment 4 contrasted gender with cultural category membership. The results indicate that people encode information about race, gender and cultural background; however, the latter two are more fundamental dimensions of social categorisation.

Two-Year-Old Children Expect Native, but Not Foreign Speakers to Use the Same Tool for the Same Purpose

Previous research has already demonstrated that even very young children are sensitive to language cues and learn differently from native and foreign speaker models. A possible explanation for this phenomenon suggests that spoken language is a sign of someone's cultural background and in this sense demonstrates the person's culture specific knowledge. The aim of the present study was to investigate what children think about native and foreign speakers' behavior in a domain that is typically regulated by cultural norms (tool usage), specifically whether they expect group members to act alike or not. In a violation of expectation paradigm, two-year-old toddlers first watched a video on which a native and a foreign speaker person used different tools for achieving the same goal. In the test phase a new native speaker model appeared and selected one of the previously seen tools for the same goal as it was used before. Results indicated that toddlers were surprised if the native speaker model had chosen the tool that had previously been used by the foreign speaker. In Experiment 2, the familiarization phase was exactly the same as in Experiment 1, but during the test phase, the model spoke a foreign language. Results, in this case, showed no significant differences between looking times. These experiments suggest that two-year-olds expect native (but not foreign) speakers to use the same tool for the same goals. As tool usage is a fundamental element of cultural knowledge, we propose that this pattern of results suggest that children expect native speakers to possess shared cultural knowledge at least in the domain of artifacts.

The social meaning of common knowledge across development

Common knowledge can be a potent sign of shared social attributes among people, but not all knowledge is socially meaningful to the same extent. For instance, compared to shared knowledge of cultural practices, knowledge of self-evident facts might be a poorer indicator of shared group membership among individuals. Two studies explored adults' and 6-to-9 years old children's social inferences based on what others know as well as their sensitivity to the distinctions in the diagnostic potential of different kinds of knowledge. Participants were presented with targets who were knowledgeable about familiar things that are either culture-specific (e.g., a traditional dance) or general (e.g., a self-evident fact), and asked to make inferences about their language and where they live. Adults and 8-year-olds privileged culture-specific knowledge over general knowledge when making both kinds of inferences about the targets, whereas 6-year-olds did not distinguish between the two knowledge types. Thus, what others know is socially meaningful from early in life, and across development, children become increasingly aware of the diagnostic potential of culture-specific knowledge when making social inferences about others. These findings suggest novel social implications of knowledge assessment.

(Un)common knowledge: Children use social relationships to determine who knows what

Socially savvy individuals track what they know and what other people likely know, and they use this information to navigate the social world. We examine whether children expect people to have shared knowledge based on their social relationships (e.g., expecting friends to know each other's secrets, expecting members of the same cultural group to share cultural knowledge) and we compare children's reasoning about shared knowledge to their reasoning about common knowledge (e.g., the wrongness of moral violations). In three studies, we told 4- to 9-year-olds (N = 227) about what a child knew and asked who else knew the information: The child's friend (Studies 1-3), the child's schoolmate (Study 1), another child from the same national group (Study 2), or the child's sibling (Study 3). In all three studies, older children reliably used relationships to infer what other people knew. Moreover, with age, children increasingly considered both the type of knowledge and an individual's social relationships when reporting who knew what. The results provide support for a 'Selective Inferences' hypothesis and suggest that children's early attention to social relationships facilitates an understanding of how knowledge transfers - an otherwise challenging cognitive process.