How Children and Adults Represent God's Mind

The development and diversity of religious cognition and behavior: Protocol for Wave 1 data collection with children and parents by the Developing Belief Network

The Developing Belief Network is a consortium of researchers studying human development in diverse social-cultural settings, with a focus on the interplay between general cognitive development and culturally specific processes of socialization and cultural transmission in early and middle childhood. The current manuscript describes the study protocol for the network's first wave of data collection, which aims to explore the development and diversity of religious cognition and behavior. This work is guided by three key research questions: (1) How do children represent and reason about religious and supernatural agents? (2) How do children represent and reason about religion as an aspect of social identity? (3) How are religious and supernatural beliefs transmitted within and between generations? The protocol is designed to address these questions via a set of nine tasks for children between the ages of 4 and 10 years, a comprehensive survey completed by their parents/caregivers, and a task designed to elicit conversations between children and caregivers. This study is being conducted in 39 distinct cultural-religious groups (to date), spanning 17 countries and 13 languages. In this manuscript, we provide detailed descriptions of all elements of this study protocol, give a brief overview of the ways in which this protocol has been adapted for use in diverse religious communities, and present the final, English-language study materials for 6 of the 39 cultural-religious groups who are currently being recruited for this study: Protestant Americans, Catholic Americans, American members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, Jewish Americans, Muslim Americans, and religiously unaffiliated Americans.

Children attribute higher social status to people who have extraordinary capabilities

Throughout history, individuals believed to have extraordinary capabilities were generally highly ranked in their communities; this suggests a universal "extraordinary-dominant expectation" in human minds, which may play a key role in religious thought, even in modern societies. This study shows that 5-6-year-old children, who begin to understand real-world causalities regarding how the body and mind of human beings work, predict that individuals who exhibit extraordinary capabilities have higher social status in interactions with individuals who exhibit ordinary capabilities. In Experiment 1, we showed children two individuals achieving goals using either humanly possible or impossible methods, the latter involving simple forms of violation of intuitive psychology (knowing without seeing), physics (flying), or biology (fire breathing). The children clearly judged the latter as surprising and unusual. More importantly, the children predicted that individuals showing extraordinary capabilities will gain contested resources and play a dominant role in interactions with ordinary individuals, indicating a higher social status. Further investigations suggested that the children specifically linked extraordinary capacities to social status, as they did not attribute dominance to individuals who apply surprising/unusual but possible methods (Experiment 2), and that they did not indiscriminately attribute positive characteristics to extraordinary capabilities despite a strong extraordinary-dominant expectation being replicated (Experiment 3). These findings demonstrate that extraordinary-dominant expectations can be observed in childhood across different intuitive knowledge domains, helping understand the cognitive mechanisms of religious thought and the cognitive foundations of hierarchical social systems.

Autism and Religion

The disease burden of autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is a definitive public health challenge. The quality of life of children with ASD depends on how the cultural environment fits their special needs, including religious and spiritual factors. Does ASD predict low religiosity, and if not, what is the significance for clinical care? To answer this question, we reviewed the literature on the cognitive models of ASD and religious beliefs. We found that the cognitive models of ASD and religious beliefs substantially overlap, which is particularly important from a developmental psychological perspective. These models include Theory of Mind and intentionality, the "broken mirror" hypothesis, central coherence, and the intense world theory. We dispute the assumption that individuals with ASD are inherently less religious and spiritual than the neurotypical population. Religiosity is possibly expressed differently in ASD with unique spiritual experiences and beliefs ("gifted, visionary, and truth-seeker"). In some circumstances, a religious background can be helpful for both children with ASD and their caregivers. These circumstances should not be neglected, and clinicians are encouraged to consider patients' religious context, resources, and needs.

Embodying the avatar of an omnipotent agent modulates the perception of one's own abilities and enhances feelings of invulnerability

Immersive virtual reality can give people the illusion of owning artificial bodies (i.e., avatars) and controlling their actions. Tellingly, people appear to adhere to the newly embodied entities not just on the basis of physical traits but also behaving accordingly with the hallmarks of the represented characters. In two studies we pushed the limits of this process by testing if one's own sense of power could be affected by embodying the anthropomorphic representation of the Christian God, that is considered an omnipotent entity. A human Muscled and a Normotype avatar were used as controls. Results showed that participants embodying the God-avatar: (i) reacted to a threatening event compromising their physical safety by exhibiting a lower skin conductance response and heart rate deceleration compared to the Normotype-control avatar (Study 1); (ii) estimated they had more physical abilities compared to both the Normotype-control and the Muscled-control avatars (Study 2). Taken together, our findings suggest that embodying an omnipotent agent may exert an influence on people's perception of their own limits and capabilities, nourishing feelings of physical invulnerability and strength. Our study indicates that effectively embodying virtual role models may boost achievements and have translational implications in the field of empowerment.

Being Watched by God Versus a Third Person: Which Agent Lowers the Perceived Likelihood of Immoral Behaviors?

With three experimental studies using data from young adults living in a highly religious context, namely Turkey (N = 483), the current research examines how being watched by a third person versus God affects the perceived likelihood ratings of harmful versus impure immoral behaviors. We hypothesized that respondents would expect others to more strongly refrain from acting immorally when they believed they were being watched by God compared to a third person, and that this effect would be more pronounced for impure compared to harmful moral transgressions. The God condition was perceived as more effective than the third-person surveillance condition when immoral behaviors were harmful. However, for severe impure transgressions, neither surveillance condition was perceived as effective. We discuss our findings in light of contemporary morality research, outline the role of possible cultural and individual-level boundary conditions, and highlight the scientific and practical contributions of our research to the field.

Visual image of God/gods during early childhood

This study examined whether Japanese children have a different visual image of God/gods than children from Western countries, who have an image of an old White man. Study 1 comprised 183, 4-7-year-old Japanese children (93 girls), who had to choose a face that looked like God/gods from among pictures of faces that differed on age (e.g., young Asian man vs. old Asian man), race (e.g., White woman vs. Black woman vs. Asian woman), or gender (e.g., Asian man vs. Asian woman). Children's responses were relatively biased toward old or White faces, but only boys were weakly biased toward male faces. Study 2 confirmed that children did not have a strong gender bias. Japanese children conceptualise God/gods as old or White.

Correspondence in parents' and children's concepts of god: Investigating the role of parental values, religious practices and executive functioning

This study examined the extent to which children's concepts of God correspond with their parents' concepts of God. It also examined how parent‐context factors and children's executive functioning relate to parent–child conceptual similarity. Parent–child dyads from varied religious and racial backgrounds participated. Dyads had the greatest conceptual similarity concerning God's mind‐dependent functions. Though correspondence between parents and children was lowest concerning God's body‐dependent functions, dyads were more similar about those functions when parents engaged in more frequent religious practices with their child and thought God was important. Children's concepts of God were unrelated to religious practices, and parent–child conceptual similarity was unrelated to children's age and executive functioning. Simply put, variation among parents' anthropomorphic concepts of God drove variation in parent–child conceptual similarity. Overall, these findings suggest that embodied concepts of God may be most sensitive to cultural input and that socialization practices provide greater insight into parents' anthropomorphic concepts.

Introduction to Special Issue: Diverse Disciplinary Approaches to the Study of Adolescent Religious and Spiritual Development

This editorial introduces the special issue on Diverse Disciplinary Approaches to the Study of Adolescent Religious and Spiritual Development. First, a case is made for the importance of the special issue, focusing on the utility of diverse approaches in providing a richer understanding of the phenomena of interest. Second, a summary is given of the six target pieces in the special issue. These target articles were written by scholars from six disciplines doing work relevant to adolescent religious and spiritual development: developmental psychology, sociology, cultural psychology, social and personality psychology, cognitive psychology, and developmental neuroscience. It is hoped that this special issue strengthens the quality of scholarship in this research area, encourages interdisciplinary work, and enriches our understanding of adolescent religious and spiritual development.

Concepts of God and Germs: Social Mechanisms and Cognitive Heuristics

Previous research has shown that the more individuals view observable entities as animate, the more those entities are associated with having psychological and physiological experiences. This study examined the relationship between children's animistic and anthropomorphic reasoning for concepts of unobservable scientific (i.e., germ) and religious (i.e., God) entities. This study further explored how children's conceptions vary according to the social learning opportunities (i.e., discourse, rituals) parents reportedly create. Parent-child dyads with young children from diverse ethnic and religious backgrounds participated. Three central findings emerged. First, children readily associated God with psychobiological characteristics but did not do so to the same extent for germs. Second, children applied more psychobiological properties to both entity types when they believed that the entity was animate. Third, engaging in rituals and discourse with parents was indirectly related to children's concepts of God but not related to their concepts of germs. Overall, this study presented support for a connection between children's animistic and anthropomorphic reasoning for unobservable entities, and an indirect effect of cultural input on this reasoning. The implications of these findings will be discussed.

Cognitive Pathways to Belief in Karma and Belief in God

Supernatural beliefs are ubiquitous around the world, and mounting evidence indicates that these beliefs partly rely on intuitive, cross-culturally recurrent cognitive processes. Specifically, past research has focused on humans' intuitive tendency to perceive minds as part of the cognitive foundations of belief in a personified God-an agentic, morally concerned supernatural entity. However, much less is known about belief in karma-another culturally widespread but ostensibly non-agentic supernatural entity reflecting ethical causation across reincarnations. In two studies and four high-powered samples, including mostly Christian Canadians and mostly Hindu Indians (Study 1, N = 2,006) and mostly Christian Americans and Singaporean Buddhists (Study 2, N = 1,752), we provide the first systematic empirical investigation of the cognitive intuitions underlying various forms of belief in karma. We used path analyses to (a) replicate tests of the previously documented cognitive predictors of belief in God, (b) test whether this same network of variables predicts belief in karma, and (c) examine the relative contributions of cognitive and cultural variables to both sets of beliefs. We found that cognitive tendencies toward intuitive thinking, mentalizing, dualism, and teleological thinking predicted a variety of beliefs about karma-including morally laden, non-agentic, and agentic conceptualizations-above and beyond the variability explained by cultural learning about karma across cultures. These results provide further evidence for an independent role for both culture and cognition in supporting diverse types of supernatural beliefs in distinct cultural contexts.

The Minds of God(s) and Humans: Differences in Mind Perception in Fiji and North America

Previous research suggests that how people conceive of minds depends on the culture in which they live, both in determining how they interact with other human minds and how they infer the unseen minds of gods. We use exploratory factor analysis to compare how people from different societies with distinct models of human minds and different religious traditions perceive the minds of humans and gods. In two North American samples (American adults, N = 186; Canadian students, N = 202), we replicated a previously found two-factor agency/experience structure for both human and divine minds, but in Fijian samples (Indigenous iTaukei Fijians, N = 77; Fijians of Indian descent, N = 214; total N = 679) we found a three-factor structure, with the additional containing items related to social relationships. Further, Fijians' responses revealed a different three-factor structure for human minds and gods' minds. We used these factors as dimensions in the conception of minds to predict (a) expectations about human and divine tendencies towards punishment and reward; and (b) conception of gods as more embodied (an extension of experience) or more able to know people's thoughts (an extension of agency). We found variation in how these factors predict conceptions of agents across groups, indicating further theory is needed to explain how culturally generated concepts of mind lead to other sorts of social inferences. We conclude that mind perception is shaped by culturally defined social expectations and recommend further work in different cultural contexts to examine the interplay between culture and social cognition.

The Embodied God: Core Intuitions About Person Physicality Coexist and Interfere With Acquired Christian Beliefs About God, the Holy Spirit, and Jesus

Why are disembodied extraordinary beings like gods and spirits prevalent in past and present theologies? Under the intuitive Cartesian dualism hypothesis, this is because it is natural to conceptualize of minds as separate from bodies; under the counterintuitiveness hypothesis, this is because beliefs in minds without bodies are unnatural-such beliefs violate core knowledge intuitions about person physicality and consequently have a social transmission advantage. We report on a critical test of these contrasting hypotheses. Prior research found that among adult Christian religious adherents, intuitions about person psychology coexist and interfere with theological conceptualizations of God (e.g., infallibility). Here, we use a sentence verification paradigm where participants are asked to evaluate as true or false statements on which core knowledge intuitions about person physicality and psychology and Christian theology about God are inconsistent (true on one and false on the other) versus consistent (both true or both false). We find, as predicted by the counterintuitiveness hypothesis but not the Cartesian dualism hypothesis, that Christian religious adherents show worse performance (lower accuracy and slower response time) on statements where Christian theological doctrines about God's physicality (e.g., incorporeality, omnipresence) conflict with intuitions about person physicality. We find these effects for other extraordinary beings in Christianity-the Holy Spirit and Jesus-but not for an ordinary being (priest). We conclude that it is unintuitive to conceptualize extraordinary beings as disembodied, and that this, rather than inherent Cartesian dualism, may explain the prevalence of beliefs in such beings.

Theories of God: Explanatory coherence in religious cognition

Representations of God in art, literature, and discourse range from the highly anthropomorphic to the highly abstract. The present study explored whether people who endorse anthropomorphic God concepts hold different religious beliefs and engage in different religious practices than those who endorse abstract concepts. Adults of various religious affiliations (n = 275) completed a questionnaire that probed their beliefs about God, angels, Satan, Heaven, Hell, cosmogenesis, anthropogenesis, human suffering, and human misdeeds, as well as their experiences regarding prayer, worship, and religious development. Responses to the questionnaire were analyzed by how strongly participants anthropomorphized God in a property-attribution task. Overall, the more participants anthropomorphized God, the more concretely they interpreted religious ideas, importing their understanding of human affairs into their understanding of divine affairs. These findings suggest not only that individuals vary greatly in how they interpret the same religious ideas but also that those interpretations cohere along a concrete-to-abstract dimension, anchored on the concrete side by our everyday notions of people.

Dimensional Structure of and Variation in Anthropomorphic Concepts of God

When considering other persons, the human mind draws from folk theories of biology, physics, and psychology. Studies have examined the extent to which people utilize these folk theories in inferring whether or not God has human-like biological, physical, and psychological constraints. However, few studies have examined the way in which these folk attributions relate to each other, the extent to which attributions within a domain are consistent, or whether cultural factors influence human-like attributions within and across domains. The present study assessed 341 individuals’ attributions of anthropomorphic properties to God in three domains (psychological, biological, and physical), their religious beliefs, and their engagement in religious practices. Three Confirmatory Factor Analyses tested hypothetical models of the underlying structure of an anthropomorphic concept of God. The best fitting model was the “Hierarchical Dimensions Concept,” the analyses indicated one overall dimension of anthropomorphism with three sub-domains. Additionally, participants’ religiosity was negatively related to attributing human-like psychological properties to God, suggesting that the more people engage with their religion, the less they think about God as having a ‘human-like’ mind. Religiosity was positively related to individual consistency scores in the biological domain. In other words, greater religiosity was related to less consistent answers about God’s biological properties. As a result, the findings of the current study also suggest that individuals do not just vary between each other in how much they anthropomorphize God, but additionally, variation exists in the type of anthropomorphic reasoning used within an individual person’s concept of God.

The faces of God in America: Revealing religious diversity across people and politics

Literature and art have long depicted God as a stern and elderly white man, but do people actually see Him this way? We use reverse correlation to understand how a representative sample of American Christians visualize the face of God, which we argue is indicative of how believers think about God’s mind. In contrast to historical depictions, Americans generally see God as young, Caucasian, and loving, but perceptions vary by believers’ political ideology and physical appearance. Liberals see God as relatively more feminine, more African American, and more loving than conservatives, who see God as older, more intelligent, and more powerful. All participants see God as similar to themselves on attractiveness, age, and, to a lesser extent, race. These differences are consistent with past research showing that people’s views of God are shaped by their group-based motivations and cognitive biases. Our results also speak to the broad scope of religious differences: even people of the same nationality and the same faith appear to think differently about God’s appearance.

Mind perception of God in Japanese children

There is a theoretical debate regarding whether children represent God with reference to a human. Most previous studies have assessed this issue focusing on knowledge/omniscience in western children. This study used a theoretical framework characterising mental capacities in terms of motivational/emotional (experience) and cognitive (agency) mental capacities and tested whether Japanese children discriminated between God, a human, a baby and an invisible agent according to these capacities. Three- to 6-year-old children were asked about the experience and agency of the agents. The results revealed that children discriminated God from a human in terms of mental capacities including experience and agency in 3-year-old children. On the other hand, 4- to 6-year-old children, but not 3-year-old children, discriminated a human from a baby and an invisible person. The results suggest that the Japanese children's representations of God differed from their representation of a human during preschool years.

Representational coexistence in the God concept: Core knowledge intuitions of God as a person are not revised by Christian theology despite lifelong experience

Previous research has shown that in the minds of young adult religious adherents, acquired theology about the extraordinary characteristics of God (e.g., omniscience) coexists with, rather than replaces, an initial concept of God formed by co-option of the person concept. We tested the hypothesis that representational coexistence holds even after extensive experience with Christian theology, as indexed by age. Christian religious adherents ranging in age from 18 to 87 years were asked to evaluate as true or false statements on which core knowledge intuitions about persons and Christian theology about God were consistent (both true or both false) or inconsistent (true on one and false on the other). Results showed, across adulthood, more theological errors in evaluating inconsistent versus consistent statements. Older adults also exhibited slower response times to inconsistent versus consistent statements. These findings show that despite extensive experience, indeed a lifetime of experience for some participants, the Christian theological God concept does not separate from the initial person concept from which it is formed. In fact, behavioral signatures of representational coexistence were not attenuated by experience. We discuss the broader implications of these findings to the acquisition of evolutionarily new concepts.

My mind, your mind, and God's mind: How children and adults conceive of different agents' moral beliefs

Extending prior research on belief attributions, we investigated the extent to which 5- to 8-year-olds and adults distinguish their beliefs and other humans' beliefs from God's beliefs. In Study 1, children reported that all agents held the same beliefs, whereas adults drew greater distinctions among agents. For example, adults reported that God was less likely than humans to view behaviors as morally acceptable. Study 2 additionally investigated attributions of beliefs about controversial behaviours (e.g., telling prosocial lies) and belief stability. These data replicated the main results from Study 1 and additionally revealed that adults (but not children) reported that God was less likely than any other agent to think that controversial behaviours were morally acceptable. Furthermore, across ages, participants reported that another person's beliefs were more likely to change than either God's beliefs or their own beliefs. We discuss implications for theories regarding belief attributions and for religious and moral cognition. Statement of contribution What is already known on this subject Preschoolers can attribute different beliefs to different humans Children and adults attribute greater cognitive capacities to God than to humans What the present study adds Children attribute the same moral beliefs to God and humans Adults distinguish among different agents' minds when attributing moral beliefs Developmental differences are less pronounced in judgements of belief stability.

Cognitive Foundations of Learning from Testimony

Humans acquire much of their knowledge from the testimony of other people. An understanding of the way that information can be conveyed via gesture and vocalization is present in infancy. Thus, infants seek information from well-informed interlocutors, supply information to the ignorant, and make sense of communicative acts that they observe from a third-party perspective. This basic understanding is refined in the course of development. As they age, children's reasoning about testimony increasingly reflects an ability not just to detect imperfect or inaccurate claims but also to assess what inferences may or may not be drawn about informants given their particular situation. Children also attend to the broader characteristics of particular informants-their group membership, personality characteristics, and agreement or disagreement with other potential informants. When presented with unexpected or counterintuitive testimony, children are prone to set aside their own prior convictions, but they may sometimes defer to informants for inherently social reasons.

Is God just a big person? Children's conceptions of God across cultures and religious traditions

The present research examines the influence of intuitive cognitive domain and religion on the God concepts of children growing up in religious traditions that present God in ways varying from abstract to concrete. In Study 1, we compared children from a Latter-Day Saints (LDS) background with those from mainstream Christian (MC) backgrounds in the United States. In contrast to MC theology that holds that God is all-knowing, all-powerful, and disembodied, LDS theology depicts God as embodied. In Study 1, 3- to 7-year-olds from LDS and MC backgrounds were asked about supernatural mental and immaterial attributes of God, a ghost, a dad, and a bug. In Study 2, children ages 3-7 from Muslim and Catholic backgrounds in Indonesia were presented with a variant of Study 1. Taken together, the two studies examine the God concepts of children raised in three different religious traditions with God concepts that range from highly abstract to concrete. Overall, we find that the youngest children, regardless of religion, distinguish God from humans and hold similar ideas of God, attributing more supernatural psychological than physical properties. Older children's conceptions of God are more in line with the theological notions of their traditions. The results suggest that children are not simply anthropomorphic in their God concepts, but early on understand supernatural agents as having special mental properties and they continue to learn about differences between agents, influenced by their religious traditions. Statement of contribution What is already known on this subject Research on children's God concepts has established that children begin to distinguish the mind of God from that of humans by around age 4-5. The main debate in the field is whether children start out thinking about God in anthropomorphic terms or whether they start out with an undifferentiated idea of agents' minds as all having access to knowledge. Research on children's understanding of immortality has demonstrated that around the same age that children begin differentiating God's mind from human minds, they also differentiate between the two in terms of life-cycle attributes, attributing immortality to God, but not to humans. What does this study add? The present research contributes to the field by examining the God concepts of children from different religious backgrounds. These religious backgrounds have theologies with God concepts that range from physically concrete (Latter-Day Saints or Mormonism) to highly abstract (Islam). We also include Christian samples for comparison. The present research examines children's attributions to different supernatural agents including God, but also a ghost and an angel. The present studies look at children's attribution of not only supernatural mental attributions, but also the supernatural physical attributions of immateriality and omnipresence that have been understudied.

Core Intuitions About Persons Coexist and Interfere With Acquired Christian Beliefs About God

This study tested the hypothesis that in the minds of adult religious adherents, acquired beliefs about the extraordinary characteristics of God coexist with, rather than replace, an initial representation of God formed by co-option of the evolved person concept. In three experiments, Christian religious adherents were asked to evaluate a series of statements for which core intuitions about persons and acquired Christian beliefs about God were consistent (i.e., true according to both [e.g., "God has beliefs that are true"] or false according to both [e.g., "All beliefs God has are false"]) or inconsistent (i.e., true on intuition but false theologically [e.g., "God has beliefs that are false"] or false on intuition but true theologically [e.g., "All beliefs God has are true"]). Participants were less accurate and slower to respond to inconsistent versus consistent statements, suggesting that the core intuitions both coexisted alongside and interfered with the acquired beliefs (Experiments 1 and 2). In Experiment 2 when responding under time pressure participants were disproportionately more likely to make errors on inconsistent versus consistent statements than when responding with no time pressure, suggesting that the resolution of interference requires cognitive resources the functioning of which decreases under cognitive load. In Experiment 3 a plausible alternative interpretation of these findings was ruled out by demonstrating that the response accuracy and time differences on consistent versus inconsistent statements occur for God-a supernatural religious entity-but not for a natural religious entity (a priest).