Young Children's Reliance on Information From Inaccurate Informants

The cognitive underpinnings and early development of children's selective trust

Young children learn selectively from reliable over unreliable sources. However, the cognitive underpinnings of their selectivity (attentional biases or trait ascriptions) and its early ontogeny are unclear. Thus, across three studies (N = 139, monolingual German speakers, 67 female), selective-trust tasks were adapted to test both preschoolers (5-year-olds) and toddlers (24-month-olds), using eye-tracking and interactive measures. These data show that preschoolers' selectivity is not based on attentional biases, but on person-specific trait ascriptions. In contrast, toddlers showed no selective trust, even in the eye-tracking tasks. They succeeded, however, in eye-tracking tasks with the same word-learning demands, if no ascriptions of reliability were required. Thus, these findings suggest that preschoolers, but not toddlers, use trait-like ascriptions of reliability to guide their selective learning.

Younger, not older, children trust an inaccurate human informant more than an inaccurate robot informant

This study examined preschoolers' trust toward accurate and inaccurate robot informants versus human informants. Singaporean children aged 3-5 years (N = 120, 57 girls, mostly Asian; data collected from 2017 to 2018) viewed either a robot or a human adult label familiar objects either accurately or inaccurately. Children's trust was assessed by examining their subsequent willingness to accept novel object labels provided by the same informant. Regardless of age, children trusted accurate robots to a similar extent as accurate humans. However, while older children (dis)trusted inaccurate robots and humans comparably, younger children trusted inaccurate robots less than inaccurate humans. The results indicate a developmental change in children's reliance on informants' characteristics to decide whom to trust.

Self-motivated and directed learning across the lifespan

Self-motivated and directed learning is integral to knowledge base expansion for learners of all ages. Both motivational and cognitive processes drive self-motivated and directed lifelong learning, yet how these different processes operate together from childhood through adulthood is largely unknown. In this review, we discuss the role of personal motivators, such as beliefs in self-efficacy and personality traits in self-motivated and directed learning across the lifespan. We then consider the role of cognitive processes that contribute to knowledge base expansion in learners of all ages, specifically executive functions. We focus on working memory, inhibitory control, and task switching as potential determinants of lifelong learning. Finally, we integrate the two literatures, to discuss ways in which personal motivators may influence deployment of executive functions under self-motivated and directed conditions as a learner advances along a developmental trajectory. We also suggest ways to move the study of self-motivated and directed learning beyond observation and self-report measures thus affording experimental control. We aim to provide a more comprehensive understanding and novel insight to the mechanisms and processes of self-motivated and directed learning across the lifespan.

A Developmental Cognitive Architecture for Trust and Theory of Mind in Humanoid Robots

As artificial systems are starting to be widely deployed in real-world settings, it becomes critical to provide them with the ability to discriminate between different informants and to learn from reliable sources. Moreover, equipping an artificial agent to infer beliefs may improve the collaboration between humans and machines in several ways. In this article, we propose a hybrid cognitive architecture, called Thrive, with the purpose of unifying in a computational model recent discoveries regarding the underlying mechanism involved in trust. The model is based on biological observations that confirmed the role of the midbrain in trial-and-error learning, and on developmental studies that indicate how essential is a theory of mind in order to build empathetic trust. Thrive is build on top of an actor-critic framework that is used to stabilize the weights of two self-organizing maps. A Bayesian network embeds prior knowledge into an intrinsic environment, providing a measure of cost that is used to boostrap learning without an external reward signal. Following a developmental robotics approach, we embodied the model in the iCub humanoid robot and we replicated two psychological experiments. The results are in line with real data, and shed some light on the mechanisms involved in trust-based learning in children and robots.

CONFIANÇA SELETIVA EM CRIANÇAS PRÉ-ESCOLARES: UMA REVISÃO SISTEMÁTICA

Embora o campo de estudos sobre confiança seletiva tenha ganhado destaque nos últimos anos, essa linha de pesquisa não é ainda suficientemente divulgada no Brasil. A presente revisão sistemática teve como objetivo avaliar a produção científica sobre confiança seletiva em crianças pré-escolares, bem como sobre possíveis variáveis que influenciam os julgamentos de confiança. A busca foi realizada nas bases de dados PSYCINFO, Scielo Brasil, PEPSIC e LILACS, utilizando-se as palavras-chave selective trust, epistemic trust e seus correspondentes em português ‘confiança seletiva’ e ‘confiança epistêmica’. De um total de 103 trabalhos, foram analisados 45 artigos empíricos, publicados entre 2008 e 2018, seguindo o protocolo PRISMA. Contrariando uma crença predominante em muitas culturas de que as crianças acreditam em tudo o que ouvem, elas não são consumidoras ingênuas de informação. Discutem-se os efeitos de variáveis individuais e contextuais sobre os julgamentos de confiança seletiva que apontam para direções futuras promissoras de pesquisa.

The role of intergroup biases in children's endorsement of information about novel individuals

A great body of evidence suggests that children are remarkably selective in accepting information from different sources. Yet, very few studies have focused on children's learning about the attributes of others. In three experiments, we examined how 6- and 7-year-olds' ingroup and outgroup biases about novel target individuals and their biases to follow ingroup informants interact in social learning contexts. Overall, children exhibited a positivity bias, accepting positive testimony about ingroup and outgroup targets, but this bias was significantly higher for ingroup targets. Furthermore, whereas children accepted the positive testimony about ingroup targets regardless of the informant's group membership, children selectively relied on ingroup informants when endorsing information about outgroup targets. These results suggest that children's existing biases interact with their acquisition of knowledge in complex ways and shape their social evaluations. These findings may have important implications for developing strategies to prevent negative biases against outgroup individuals among children.

How children use accuracy information to infer informant intentions and to make reward decisions

The ability to assess the value of the information one receives and the intentions of the source of that information can be used to establish cooperative relationships and to identify cooperative partners. Across two experiments, 4- to 8-year-old children (N = 204) received a note with correct, incorrect, or no information that affected their efforts on a search task. Children were told that all informants had played the game before and knew the location of the hidden reward. In the no information condition, children were told that the informant needed to leave before finishing the note and, thus, was not intentionally uninformative. Children rated the note with correct information as more helpful than the note with no information; incorrect information was rated least helpful. When asked about the informant's intentions, children attributed positive intentions when the information was correct and when they received unhelpful information but knew the informant was not intentionally uninformative. Children attributed less positive intentions to the informant when they received incorrect information. When given the chance to reward the informant, children rewarded the informant who provided correct information and no information equally; the informant who provided incorrect information received fewer rewards. Combined, these results suggest that young children assume that informants have positive intentions even when they provide no useful information. However, when the information provided is clearly inaccurate, children infer more negative intentions and reward those informants at lower rates. These results suggest that children tend to reward informants more based on their presumed intentions, placing less weight on the value of the information they provide.

Willingness to revise own testimony: 3- and 4-year-olds' selective trust in unexpected testimony from accurate and inaccurate informants

Prior work has shown that young children trust single accurate and inaccurate individuals to a similar extent in their endorsement of novel information. However, it remains unknown to what extent children trust a credible or noncredible individual when given information that is pitted against their own beliefs. The current study examined whether children, when given unexpected testimony that contradicted their initial beliefs but was not completely unbelievable, would selectively revise their beliefs depending on the informant's past history of accuracy. The participants (3- and 4-year-olds; N = 100) were familiarized with an informant who labeled a series of common objects either accurately or inaccurately. Following that, all children saw a picture of an ambiguous hybrid artifact that consisted of features of two typical common artifacts and were asked to identify the hybrid object with their own label. Subsequently, children watched the previously accurate or inaccurate informant give the same hybrid object a different but plausible label. Children expressed a greater tendency to override their initial judgments and endorse the unexpected testimony from a previously accurate informant than from someone who had consistently made naming errors. The findings provide novel understandings of the circumstances under which 3- and 4-year-old preschoolers may or may not rely on the informant's prior reliability in their selective learning.