Analogical Comparison Promotes Theory-of-Mind Development

The role of speech-language pathologists in supporting theory of mind through literacy-based activities

PURPOSE

This tutorial discusses the importance of speech-language pathologists (SLPs) supporting individuals with language disorders in their understanding of others' cognitive and affective states (theory of mind, ToM), with a special consideration given to applying these suggestions with individuals who are neurodivergent.

METHOD

I motivate this tutorial by first reviewing the literature related to ToM and language abilities for various populations of individuals with language difficulties, highlighting the need for explicitly targeting the language-related skills that are thought to underlie ToM for individuals with language disorders. I next present concrete examples of how to support ToM through literacy-based activities. I follow this discussion with a short description of how these activities may be applied with individuals who are neurodivergent through concrete examples, such as how inclusion of neurodivergent characters in storybooks can aid in educating children about understanding others' perspectives. It further emphasizes the importance of discussing various types of mental and emotional states for individuals who share as well as differ in their neurotypes.

CONCLUSIONS

Language skills are an integral part of ToM abilities. SLPs play an important role in supporting clients' academic, literacy, and social outcomes and can support important perspective-taking skills through associated language/communication skills. The various skills that fall under the umbrella term 'theory of mind' can be appropriately incorporated into intervention and literacy-based tasks in a way that respects differences in neurotype while still building important language and communication skills for clients.

An Analogical Model of Pretense

We argue that pretense can be viewed as analogical projection: a structural comparison between the pretend scenario and its real-world counterpart that leads to inferences about the pretend scenario. For example, in pretending to make a phone call with a banana, a number pad might be projected on the banana's surface. We model two empirical studies of early childhood pretense, and show how successful pretense requires making and accepting such inferences, while failed pretense can be traced to failure of such projection. Other models of pretense, both theoretical and computational, and their relationships to our model, are discussed.