An ironic reductio for a 'pro-life' argument: Hurlbut's proposal for stem cell research

Practical pursuit in stem cell biology: Innovation, translation, and incomplete theorization

This paper aims to contribute to the study of practical pursuit-worthiness in science by engaging with a case in therapeutic stem cell biology. Induced pluripotent stem cell (iPSC) research emerged from research in developmental biology and the molecular biology of cell fate conversion. It took on practical significance when proposed as an alternative to therapeutic stem cell research that used human embryonic stem cells. The supposed ability of iPSC research to tackle ethical and regulatory constraints on research at the beginning of the twentieth century was a central part of the heuristic assessment of iPSC. However, the development and transfer of knowledge from experimental and theoretical biology to preclinical pursuit conflicted with the framing of biomedical innovation in public policy. The framing of innovation operated as part of the heuristic assessment of the pursuit-worthiness of iPSCs in the United States and was characterized by attempts to underdetermine conflicting ethical and socio-economic values - to seek innovations that are "incompletely theorized" in the sense that they purportedly allow stakeholders to refrain from engagement with the divisive values that created impediments to research in stem cell biology. When conflict arose with the epistemic standards in preclinical pursuit required to ensure the safety and efficacy of biomedical innovations, it resulted in the critical appraisal of the values used to rationalize policies for the distribution of federal resources for biomedical research. The case demonstrates how non-epistemic values impinge on standards of assessment in translational science, how background assumptions about innovation can drive practical pursuit, and how conflicting values and goals in research creates an important context for the appraisal of emerging science, technology and policy.

Moral uncertainty in bioethical argumentation: a new understanding of the pro-life view on early human embryos

In this article, I present a new interpretation of the pro-life view on the status of early human embryos. In my understanding, this position is based not on presumptions about the ontological status of embryos and their developmental capabilities but on the specific criteria of rational decisions under uncertainty and on a cautious response to the ambiguous status of embryos. This view, which uses the decision theory model of moral reasoning, promises to reconcile the uncertainty about the ontological status of embryos with the certainty about normative obligations. I will demonstrate that my interpretation of the pro-life view, although seeming to be stronger than the standard one, has limited scope and cannot be used to limit destructive research on human embryos.

The human embryo: ethical and legal aspects

This paper analyses the status of the embryo in Canadian law. First, a brief overview of some ethical issues raised by research with embryos, focusing on the moral status of the embryo, is presented. A survey of the regulatory framework applicable to embryo research in Canada follows, so as to delineate the legal status of the embryo in Canada and its ethical underpinnings. A summary of applicable regulation in Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States is also undertaken, illustrating the lack of consensus on this issue in Western countries. Finally, recent developments in stem cell research are considered, focusing on current alternatives to embryo destruction.