Are automatic imitation and spatial compatibility mediated by different processes?

Comparing self-other distinction across motor, cognitive and affective domains

The self-other distinction (SOD) is a process by which humans disentangle self from other-related mental representations. This online study investigated two unresolved questions: (i) whether partially the same processes underpin SOD for motor, cognitive and affective representations, and (ii) whether SOD overlaps with domain-general cognitive control processes. Participants (N = 243) performed three SOD tasks (motor: automatic imitation inhibition (AIT); cognitive: visual perspective-taking (VPT); affective: emotional egocentricity bias (av-EEB) tasks) and two cognitive control tasks (Stroop and stop-signal reaction time (SSRT) tasks). Correlation analyses showed no associations among the motor, cognitive and affective SOD indexes. Similarly, distinct SOD clusters emerged in the hierarchical clustering dendrogram, indicating clear separations among SODs. However, the results of multidimensional scaling suggested a tendency towards two clusters, as evidenced by the proximity of AIT and VPT indexes in relation to EEB indexes. AIT spatial laterality and Stroop domain-general cognitive control confounded AIT and VPT indexes, albeit slightly differently depending on the analysis method used. SSRT showed neither associations with SODs nor with other domain-general indexes. These findings underscore the complexity of SOD processes and have notable implications for basic and applied research, e.g. in the domain of clinical disorders affected by deficiencies in SOD.

Spike-timing-dependent plasticity induction reveals dissociable supplementary- and premotor-motor pathways to automatic imitation

Humans tend to spontaneously imitate others' behavior, even when detrimental to the task at hand. The action observation network (AON) is consistently recruited during imitative tasks. However, whether automatic imitation is mediated by cortico-cortical projections from AON regions to the primary motor cortex (M1) remains speculative. Similarly, the potentially dissociable role of AON-to-M1 pathways involving the ventral premotor cortex (PMv) or supplementary motor area (SMA) in automatic imitation is unclear. Here, we used cortico-cortical paired associative stimulation (ccPAS) to enhance or hinder effective connectivity in PMv-to-M1 and SMA-to-M1 pathways via Hebbian spike-timing-dependent plasticity (STDP) to test their functional relevance to automatic and voluntary motor imitation. ccPAS affected behavior under competition between task rules and prepotent visuomotor associations underpinning automatic imitation. Critically, we found dissociable effects of manipulating the strength of the two pathways. While strengthening PMv-to-M1 projections enhanced automatic imitation, weakening them hindered it. On the other hand, strengthening SMA-to-M1 projections reduced automatic imitation but also reduced interference from task-irrelevant cues during voluntary imitation. Our study demonstrates that driving Hebbian STDP in AON-to-M1 projections induces opposite effects on automatic imitation that depend on the targeted pathway. Our results provide direct causal evidence of the functional role of PMv-to-M1 projections for automatic imitation, seemingly involved in spontaneously mirroring observed actions and facilitating the tendency to imitate them. Moreover, our findings support the notion that SMA exerts an opposite gating function, controlling M1 to prevent overt motor behavior when inadequate to the context.

Reaction Time "Mismatch Costs" Change with the Likelihood of Stimulus-Response Compatibility

Dyadic interactions require dynamic correspondence between one's own movements and those of the other agent. This mapping is largely viewed as imitative, with the behavioural hallmark being a reaction-time cost for mismatched actions. Yet the complex motor patterns humans enact together extend beyond direct-matching, varying adaptively between imitation, complementary movements, and counter-imitation. Optimal behaviour requires an agent to predict not only what is likely to be observed but also how that observed action will relate to their own motor planning. In 28 healthy adults, we examined imitation and counter-imitation in a task that varied the likelihood of stimulus-response congruence from highly predictable, to moderately predictable, to unpredictable. To gain mechanistic insights into the statistical learning of stimulus-response compatibility, we compared two computational models of behaviour: (1) a classic fixed learning-rate model (Rescorla-Wagner reinforcement [RW]) and (2) a hierarchical model of perceptual-behavioural processes in which the learning rate adapts to the inferred environmental volatility (hierarchical Gaussian filter [HGF]). Though more complex and hence penalized by model selection, the HGF provided a more likely model of the participants' behaviour. Matching motor responses were only primed (faster) in the most experimentally volatile context. This bias was reversed so that mismatched actions were primed when beliefs about volatility were lower. Inferential statistics indicated that matching responses were only primed in unpredictable contexts when stimuli-response congruence was at 50:50 chance. Outside of these unpredictable blocks the classic stimulus-response compatibility effect was reversed: Incongruent responses were faster than congruent ones. We show that hierarchical Bayesian learning of environmental statistics may underlie response priming during dyadic interactions.

Imitation or Polarity Correspondence? Behavioural and Neurophysiological Evidence for the Confounding Influence of Orthogonal Spatial Compatibility on Measures of Automatic Imitation

During social interactions, humans tend to imitate one another involuntarily. To investigate the neurocognitive mechanisms driving this tendency, researchers often employ stimulus-response compatibility (SRC) tasks to assess the influence that action observation has on action execution. This is referred to as automatic imitation (AI). The stimuli used frequently in SRC procedures to elicit AI often confound action-related with other nonsocial influences on behaviour; however, in response to the rotated hand-action stimuli employed increasingly, AI partly reflects unspecific up-right/down-left biases in stimulus-response mapping. Despite an emerging awareness of this confounding orthogonal spatial-compatibility effect, psychological and neuroscientific research into social behaviour continues to employ these stimuli to investigate AI. To increase recognition of this methodological issue, the present study measured the systematic influence of orthogonal spatial effects on behavioural and neurophysiological measures of AI acquired with rotated hand-action stimuli in SRC tasks. In Experiment 1, behavioural data from a large sample revealed that complex orthogonal spatial effects exert an influence on AI over and above any topographical similarity between observed and executed actions. Experiment 2 reproduced this finding in a more systematic, within-subject design, and high-density electroencephalography revealed that electrocortical expressions of AI elicited also are modulated by orthogonal spatial compatibility. Finally, source localisations identified a collection of cortical areas sensitive to this spatial confound, including nodes of the multiple-demand and semantic-control networks. These results indicate that AI measured on SRC procedures with the rotated hand stimuli used commonly might reflect neurocognitive mechanisms associated with spatial associations rather than imitative tendencies.

Functional Specificity and Sex Differences in the Neural Circuits Supporting the Inhibition of Automatic Imitation

Humans show an involuntary tendency to copy other people's actions. Although automatic imitation builds rapport and affiliation between individuals, we do not copy actions indiscriminately. Instead, copying behaviors are guided by a selection mechanism, which inhibits some actions and prioritizes others. To date, the neural underpinnings of the inhibition of automatic imitation and differences between the sexes in imitation control are not well understood. Previous studies involved small sample sizes and low statistical power, which produced mixed findings regarding the involvement of domain-general and domain-specific neural architectures. Here, we used data from Experiment 1 ( N = 28) to perform a power analysis to determine the sample size required for Experiment 2 ( N = 50; 80% power). Using independent functional localizers and an analysis pipeline that bolsters sensitivity, during imitation control we show clear engagement of the multiple-demand network (domain-general), but no sensitivity in the theory-of-mind network (domain-specific). Weaker effects were observed with regard to sex differences, suggesting that there are more similarities than differences between the sexes in terms of the neural systems engaged during imitation control. In summary, neurocognitive models of imitation require revision to reflect that the inhibition of imitation relies to a greater extent on a domain-general selection system rather than a domain-specific system that supports social cognition.

Orthogonal-compatibility effects confound automatic imitation: implications for measuring self-other distinction

Accurate distinction between self and other representations is fundamental to a range of social cognitive capacities, and understanding individual differences in this ability is an important aim for psychological research. This demands accurate measures of self-other distinction (SOD). The present study examined an experimental paradigm employed frequently to measure SOD in the action domain; specifically, we evaluated the rotated finger-action stimuli used increasingly to measure automatic imitation (AI). To assess the suitability of these stimuli, we compared AI elicited by different action stimuli to the performance on a perspective-taking task believed to measure SOD in the perception domain. In two separate experiments we reveal three important findings: firstly, we demonstrate a strong confounding influence of orthogonal-compatibility effects on AI elicited by certain rotated stimuli. Second, we demonstrate the potential for this confounding influence to mask important relationships between AI and other measures of SOD; we observed a relationship between AI and perspective-taking performance only when the former was measured in isolation of orthogonality compatibility. Thirdly, we observed a relationship between these two performance measures only in a sub-group of individuals exhibiting a pure form of AI. Furthermore, this relationship revealed a self-bias in SOD-reduced AI was associated with increased egocentric misattributions in perspective taking. Together, our findings identify an important methodological consideration for measures of AI and extend previous research by showing an egocentric style of SOD across action and perception domains.

Behavioral Advantages of the First-Person Perspective Model for Imitation

Visuomotor information may be better conveyed through a first-person perspective than through a third-person perspective. However, few reports have shown a clear behavioral advantage of the first-person perspective because of the confounding factor of spatial stimulus-response compatibility. Most imitation studies have utilized visuospatial imitation tasks in which participants use the same body part as that used by the model, identified by its spatial position (i.e., the response action is predefined). In such studies, visuomotor information conveyed by the model does not appear to facilitate imitative behavior. We hypothesized that the use of the first-person perspective would facilitate more efficient imitative behavior than a third-person perspective when participants are asked to choose and reproduce an action identical to that of the model rather than to select the same body part; this task requires the analysis of both visual and motor information from the model rather than a simple assessment of spatial information. To test this hypothesis, we asked 15 participants to observe a model from two perspectives (first-person and third-person) with left or right hand laterality and to lift their index finger with an identical movement type (extension or flexion) as quickly as possible. Response latencies were shorter and fewer errors were made in trials using the first-person perspective than in those using the third-person perspective, regardless of whether the model used the right or left hand. These findings suggest that visuomotor information from the first-person perspective, without confounding effects of spatial information, facilitates efficient imitative behavior.

Distinct neural processes are engaged in the modulation of mimicry by social group-membership and emotional expressions

People often spontaneously engage in copying each other's postures and mannerisms, a phenomenon referred to as behavioral mimicry. Social psychology experiments indicate that mimicry denotes an implicit affiliative signal flexibly regulated in response to social requirements. Yet, the mediating processes and neural underpinnings of such regulation are largely unexplored. The present functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study examined mimicry regulation by combining an automatic imitation task with facial stimuli, varied on two social-affective dimensions: emotional expression (angry vs happy) and ethnic group membership (in- vs out-group). Behavioral data revealed increased mimicry when happy and when out-group faces were shown. Imaging results revealed that mimicry regulation in response to happy faces was associated with increased activation in the right temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), right dorsal premotor cortex (dPMC), and right superior parietal lobule (SPL). Mimicry regulation in response to out-group faces was related to increased activation in the left ventral premotor cortex (vPMC) and inferior parietal lobule (IPL), bilateral anterior insula, and mid-cingulate cortex (MCC). We suggest that mimicry in response to happy and to out-group faces is driven by distinct affiliative goals, and that mimicry regulation to attain these goals is mediated by distinct neuro-cognitive processes. Higher mimicry in response to happy faces seems to denote reciprocation of an affiliative signal. Higher mimicry in response to out-group faces, reflects an appeasement attempt towards an interaction partner perceived as threatening (an interpretation supported by implicit measures showing that out-group members are more strongly associated with threat). Our findings show that subtle social cues can result in the implicit regulation of mimicry. This regulation serves to achieve distinct affiliative goals, is mediated by different regulatory processes, and relies on distinct parts of an overarching network of task-related brain areas. Our findings shed new light on the neural mechanisms underlying the interplay between implicit action control and social cognition.

Doing the opposite to what another person is doing

The three studies presented here aim to contribute to a better understanding of the role of the coordinate system of a person's body and of the environment in spatial organization underlying the recognition and production of gestures. The paper introduces a new approach by investigating what people consider to be opposite gestures in addition to identical gestures. It also suggests a new point of view setting the issue in the framework of egocentric versus allocentric spatial encoding as compared to the anatomical versus non-anatomical matching which is usually adopted in the literature. The results showed that the role of the allocentric system as a key player was much more evident when participants were asked to "do the opposite" as compared to when they imitated which indicates that the two tasks really are different from each other. Response times were also quicker when people "did the opposite" indicating that this is an immediate response and not the result of "reversing an imitation". These findings suggest that the issue of how the oppositional structure of space impacts on human perception and the performance of gestures has probably been underestimated in an area of research which traditionally focuses exclusively on imitation.

Mirror neurons: Tests and testability

Commentators have tended to focus on the conceptual framework of our article, the contrast between genetic and associative accounts of mirror neurons, and to challenge it with additional possibilities rather than empirical data. This makes the empirically focused comments especially valuable. The mirror neuron debate is replete with ideas; what it needs now are system-level theories and careful experiments – tests and testability.

The controlled imitation task: a new paradigm for studying self-other control

In the automatic imitation task (AIT) participants make a cued response during simultaneous exposure to a congruent or incongruent action made by another agent. Participants are slower to make the cued response on incongruent trials, which is thought to reflect conflict between the motor representation activated by the cue and the motor representation activated by the observed action. On incongruent trials, good performance requires the capacity to suppress the imitative action, in favor of producing the cued response. Here, we introduce a new experimental paradigm that complements the AIT, and is therefore a useful task for studying the control of self and other activated representations. In what we term the "Controlled Imitation Task (CIT)", participants are cued to make an action, but on 50% of trials, within 100 ms of this cue, an on-screen hand makes a congruent or incongruent action. If the onscreen hand moves, the participant must suppress the cued response, and instead imitate the observed action as quickly and accurately as possible. In direct contrast to the AIT, the CIT requires suppression of a self-activated motor representation, and prioritization of an imitative response. In experiment 1, we report a robust pattern of interference effects in the CIT, such that participants are slower to make the imitative response on incongruent compared to congruent trials. In experiment 2, we replicate this effect while including a non-imitative spatial-cue control condition to show that the effect is particularly robust for imitative response tendencies per se. Owing to the essentially opposite control requirements of the CIT versus the AIT (i.e., suppression of self-activated motor representations instead of suppression of other-activated motor representations), we propose that this new task is a potentially informative complementary paradigm to the AIT that can be used in studies of self-other control processes.

It Takes Two to Imitate

Imitation is assumed to serve crucial functions in social interaction, such as empathy and learning, yet these functions apply only to the imitating observer. In the two experiments reported here, we revealed a distinct function of imitation for the action model: Anticipation of being imitated facilitates the production of overt motor actions. Specifically, anticipated motor responses of social counterparts serve as mental cues for the model to retrieve corresponding motor commands to orchestrate his or her own actions.

In praise of a model but not its conclusions: commentary on Cooper, Catmur, and Heyes (2012)

Cooper et al. (this issue) develop an interactive activation model of spatial and imitative compatibilities that simulates the key results from Catmur and Heyes (2011) and thus conclude that both compatibilities are mediated by the same processes since their single model can predict all the results. Although the model is impressive, the conclusions are premature because they are based on an incomplete review of the relevant literature and because the model includes some questionable assumptions. Moreover, a competing model (Scheutz & Bertenthal, 2012) is introduced that suggests the two compatibilities are not mediated by the same processes. We propose that more research is necessary before concluding that spatial and imitative compatibilities are mediated by the same processes.

Associative (not Hebbian) learning and the mirror neuron system

The associative sequence learning (ASL) hypothesis suggests that sensorimotor experience plays an inductive role in the development of the mirror neuron system, and that it can play this crucial role because its effects are mediated by learning that is sensitive to both contingency and contiguity. The Hebbian hypothesis proposes that sensorimotor experience plays a facilitative role, and that its effects are mediated by learning that is sensitive only to contiguity. We tested the associative and Hebbian accounts by computational modelling of automatic imitation data indicating that MNS responsivity is reduced more by contingent and signalled than by non-contingent sensorimotor training (Cook et al. [7]). Supporting the associative account, we found that the reduction in automatic imitation could be reproduced by an existing interactive activation model of imitative compatibility when augmented with Rescorla-Wagner learning, but not with Hebbian or quasi-Hebbian learning. The work argues for an associative, but against a Hebbian, account of the effect of sensorimotor training on automatic imitation. We argue, by extension, that associative learning is potentially sufficient for MNS development.