1
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Simon B, Ispolatov Y, Doebeli M. Fission as a source of variation for group selection. Evolution 2024; 78:1583-1593. [PMID: 38860610 DOI: 10.1093/evolut/qpae087] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/19/2023] [Revised: 05/13/2024] [Accepted: 06/04/2024] [Indexed: 06/12/2024]
Abstract
Without heritable variation natural selection cannot effect evolutionary change. In the case of group selection, there must be variation in the population of groups. Where does this variation come from? One source of variation is from the stochastic birth-death processes that occur within groups. This is where variation between groups comes from in most mathematical models of group selection. Here, we argue that another important source of variation between groups is fission, the (generally random) group-level reproduction where parent groups split into two or more offspring groups. We construct a simple model of the fissioning process with a parameter that controls how much variation is produced among the offspring groups. We then illustrate the effect of that parameter with some examples. In most models of group selection in the literature, no variation is produced during group reproduction events; that is, groups "clone" themselves when they reproduce. Fission is often a more biologically realistic method of group reproduction, and it can significantly increase the efficacy of group selection.
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Affiliation(s)
- Burton Simon
- Department of Mathematical and Statistical Sciences, University of Colorado Denver, Denver CO, United States
| | - Yaroslav Ispolatov
- Departamento de Física, Center for Interdisciplinary Research in Astrophysics and Space Science, Universidad de Santiago de Chile, Santiago, Chile
| | - Michael Doebeli
- Department of Zoology, University of British Columbia, Canada
- Department of Mathematics, University of British Columbia, Canada
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2
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Fontanari JF, Santos M. The dynamics of casual groups can keep free-riders at bay. Math Biosci 2024; 372:109188. [PMID: 38570010 DOI: 10.1016/j.mbs.2024.109188] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/28/2024] [Revised: 03/07/2024] [Accepted: 03/27/2024] [Indexed: 04/05/2024]
Abstract
Understanding the conditions for maintaining cooperation in groups of unrelated individuals despite the presence of non-cooperative members is a major research topic in contemporary biological, sociological, and economic theory. The N-person snowdrift game models the type of social dilemma where cooperative actions are costly, but there is a reward for performing them. We study this game in a scenario where players move between play groups following the casual group dynamics, where groups grow by recruiting isolates and shrink by losing individuals who then become isolates. This describes the size distribution of spontaneous human groups and also the formation of sleeping groups in monkeys. We consider three scenarios according to the probability of isolates joining a group. We find that for appropriate choices of the cost-benefit ratio of cooperation and the aggregation-disaggregation ratio in the formation of casual groups, free-riders can be completely eliminated from the population. If individuals are more attracted to large groups, we find that cooperators persist in the population even when the mean group size diverges. We also point out the remarkable similarity between the replicator equation approach to public goods games and the trait group formulation of structured demes.
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Affiliation(s)
- José F Fontanari
- Instituto de Física de São Carlos, Universidade de São Paulo, 13560-970 São Carlos, São Paulo, Brazil.
| | - Mauro Santos
- Departament de Genètica i de Microbiologia, Grup de Genòmica, Bioinformàtica i Biologia Evolutiva (GBBE), Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Spain; cE3c - Centre for Ecology, Evolution and Environmental Changes & CHANGE - Global Change and Sustainability Institute, Lisboa, Portugal.
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3
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Károlyi A, Scheuring I. Cooperation in public goods game does not require assortment and depends on population density. J Evol Biol 2024; 37:451-463. [PMID: 38459964 DOI: 10.1093/jeb/voae029] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/11/2023] [Revised: 03/01/2024] [Accepted: 03/06/2024] [Indexed: 03/11/2024]
Abstract
The threshold public goods game is one of the best-known models of non-linear public goods dilemmas. Cooperators and defectors typically coexist in this game when the population is assumed to follow the so-called structured deme model. In this article, we develop a dynamical model of a general N-player game in which there is no deme structure: Individuals interact with randomly chosen neighbours and selection occurs between randomly chosen pairs of individuals. We show that in the deterministic limit, the dynamics in this model leads to the same replicator dynamics as in the structured deme model, i.e., coexistence of cooperators and defectors is typical in threshold public goods game even when the population is completely well mixed. We extend the model to study the effect of density dependence and density fluctuation on the dynamics. We show analytically and numerically that decreasing population density increases the equilibrium frequency of cooperators till the fixation of this strategy, but below a critical density cooperators abruptly disappear from the population. Our numerical investigations show that weak density fluctuations enhance cooperation, while strong fluctuations suppress it.
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Affiliation(s)
- Adél Károlyi
- Department of Zoology, University of Veterinary Medicine, Budapest, Rottenbiller utca 50, Hungary
- University of Potsdam, Institute of Biochemistry and Biology, 14469 Potsdam, Germany
| | - István Scheuring
- HUN-REN, Centre for Ecological Research, Institute of Evolution, Budapest, Konkoly-Thege Miklós út 29-33, Hungary
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4
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Sheng A, Su Q, Wang L, Plotkin JB. Strategy evolution on higher-order networks. NATURE COMPUTATIONAL SCIENCE 2024; 4:274-284. [PMID: 38622347 DOI: 10.1038/s43588-024-00621-8] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/07/2023] [Accepted: 03/12/2024] [Indexed: 04/17/2024]
Abstract
Cooperation is key to prosperity in human societies. Population structure is well understood as a catalyst for cooperation, where research has focused on pairwise interactions. But cooperative behaviors are not simply dyadic, and they often involve coordinated behavior in larger groups. Here we develop a framework to study the evolution of behavioral strategies in higher-order population structures, which include pairwise and multi-way interactions. We provide an analytical treatment of when cooperation will be favored by higher-order interactions, accounting for arbitrary spatial heterogeneity and nonlinear rewards for cooperation in larger groups. Our results indicate that higher-order interactions can act to promote the evolution of cooperation across a broad range of networks, in public goods games. Higher-order interactions consistently provide an advantage for cooperation when interaction hyper-networks feature multiple conjoined communities. Our analysis provides a systematic account of how higher-order interactions modulate the evolution of prosocial traits.
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Affiliation(s)
- Anzhi Sheng
- Center for Systems and Control, College of Engineering, Peking University, Beijing, China
- Department of Biology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA
| | - Qi Su
- Department of Automation, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai, China.
- Key Laboratory of System Control and Information Processing, Ministry of Education of China, Shanghai, China.
- Shanghai Engineering Research Center of Intelligent Control and Management, Shanghai, China.
| | - Long Wang
- Center for Systems and Control, College of Engineering, Peking University, Beijing, China.
- Center for Multi-Agent Research, Institute for Artificial Intelligence, Peking University, Beijing, China.
| | - Joshua B Plotkin
- Department of Biology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA.
- Center for Mathematical Biology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA.
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5
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Priklopil T, Lehmann L. Metacommunities, fitness and gradual evolution. Theor Popul Biol 2021; 142:12-35. [PMID: 34530032 DOI: 10.1016/j.tpb.2021.09.002] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/15/2021] [Revised: 08/30/2021] [Accepted: 09/01/2021] [Indexed: 11/18/2022]
Abstract
We analyze the evolution of a multidimensional quantitative trait in a class-structured focal species interacting with other species in a wider metacommunity. The evolutionary dynamics in the focal species as well as the ecological dynamics of the whole metacommunity is described as a continuous-time process with birth, physiological development, dispersal, and death given as rates that can depend on the state of the whole metacommunity. This can accommodate complex local community and global metacommunity environmental feedbacks owing to inter- and intra-specific interactions, as well as local environmental stochastic fluctuations. For the focal species, we derive a fitness measure for a mutant allele affecting class-specific trait expression. Using classical results from geometric singular perturbation theory, we provide a detailed proof that if the effect of the mutation on phenotypic expression is small ("weak selection"), the large system of dynamical equations needed to describe selection on the mutant allele in the metacommunity can be reduced to a single ordinary differential equation on the arithmetic mean mutant allele frequency that is of constant sign. This invariance on allele frequency entails the mutant either dies out or will out-compete the ancestral resident (or wild) type. Moreover, the directional selection coefficient driving arithmetic mean allele frequency can be expressed as an inclusive fitness effect calculated from the resident metacommunity alone, and depends, as expected, on individual fitness differentials, relatedness, and reproductive values. This formalizes the Darwinian process of gradual evolution driven by random mutation and natural selection in spatially and physiologically class-structured metacommunities.
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Affiliation(s)
- Tadeas Priklopil
- Department of Ecology and Evolution, University of Lausanne, Lausanne, Switzerland.
| | - Laurent Lehmann
- Department of Ecology and Evolution, University of Lausanne, Lausanne, Switzerland
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6
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Johnson B, Altrock PM, Kimmel GJ. Two-dimensional adaptive dynamics of evolutionary public goods games: finite-size effects on fixation probability and branching time. ROYAL SOCIETY OPEN SCIENCE 2021; 8:210182. [PMID: 34084549 PMCID: PMC8150049 DOI: 10.1098/rsos.210182] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/02/2021] [Accepted: 04/28/2021] [Indexed: 06/12/2023]
Abstract
Public goods games (PGGs) describe situations in which individuals contribute to a good at a private cost, but others can free-ride by receiving a share of the public benefit at no cost. The game occurs within local neighbourhoods, which are subsets of the whole population. Free-riding and maximal production are two extremes of a continuous spectrum of traits. We study the adaptive dynamics of production and neighbourhood size. We allow the public good production and the neighbourhood size to coevolve and observe evolutionary branching. We explain how an initially monomorphic population undergoes evolutionary branching in two dimensions to become a dimorphic population characterized by extremes of the spectrum of trait values. We find that population size plays a crucial role in determining the final state of the population. Small populations may not branch or may be subject to extinction of a subpopulation after branching. In small populations, stochastic effects become important and we calculate the probability of subpopulation extinction. Our work elucidates the evolutionary origins of heterogeneity in local PGGs among individuals of two traits (production and neighbourhood size), and the effects of stochasticity in two-dimensional trait space, where novel effects emerge.
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Affiliation(s)
- Brian Johnson
- Department of Integrated Mathematical Oncology, H. Lee Moffit Cancer Center and Research Institute, Tampa, FL 33612, USA
| | - Philipp M. Altrock
- Department of Integrated Mathematical Oncology, H. Lee Moffit Cancer Center and Research Institute, Tampa, FL 33612, USA
| | - Gregory J. Kimmel
- Department of Integrated Mathematical Oncology, H. Lee Moffit Cancer Center and Research Institute, Tampa, FL 33612, USA
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7
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Henriques GJB, Osmond MM. Cooperation can promote rescue or lead to evolutionary suicide during environmental change. Evolution 2020; 74:1255-1273. [PMID: 32614158 DOI: 10.1111/evo.14028] [Citation(s) in RCA: 10] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/18/2019] [Revised: 02/05/2020] [Accepted: 05/23/2020] [Indexed: 12/20/2022]
Abstract
The adaptation of populations to changing conditions may be affected by interactions between individuals. For example, when cooperative interactions increase fecundity, they may allow populations to maintain high densities and thus keep track of moving environmental optima. Simultaneously, changes in population density alter the marginal benefits of cooperative investments, creating a feedback loop between population dynamics and the evolution of cooperation. Here we model how the evolution of cooperation interacts with adaptation to changing environments. We hypothesize that environmental change lowers population size and thus promotes the evolution of cooperation, and that this, in turn, helps the population keep up with the moving optimum. However, we find that the evolution of cooperation can have qualitatively different effects, depending on which fitness component is reduced by the costs of cooperation. If the costs decrease fecundity, cooperation indeed speeds adaptation by increasing population density; if, in contrast, the costs decrease viability, cooperation may instead slow adaptation by lowering the effective population size, leading to evolutionary suicide. Thus, cooperation can either promote or-counterintuitively-hinder adaptation to a changing environment. Finally, we show that our model can also be generalized to other social interactions by discussing the evolution of competition during environmental change.
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Affiliation(s)
- Gil J B Henriques
- Department of Zoology, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, V6T 1Z4, Canada
| | - Matthew M Osmond
- Center for Population Biology, University of California, Davis, Davis, California, 95616
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8
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Noh S, Christopher L, Strassmann JE, Queller DC. Wild Dictyostelium discoideum social amoebae show plastic responses to the presence of nonrelatives during multicellular development. Ecol Evol 2020; 10:1119-1134. [PMID: 32076502 PMCID: PMC7029077 DOI: 10.1002/ece3.5924] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/29/2019] [Revised: 10/30/2019] [Accepted: 11/18/2019] [Indexed: 11/11/2022] Open
Abstract
When multiple strains of microbes form social groups, such as the multicellular fruiting bodies of Dictyostelium discoideum, conflict can arise regarding cell fate. Both fixed and plastic differences among strains can contribute to cell fate, and plastic responses may be particularly important if social environments frequently change. We used RNA-sequencing and photographic time series analysis to detect possible conflict-induced plastic differences between wild D. discoideum aggregates formed by single strains compared with mixed pairs of strains (chimeras). We found one hundred and two differentially expressed genes that were enriched for biological processes including cytoskeleton organization and cyclic AMP response (up-regulated in chimeras), and DNA replication and cell cycle (down-regulated in chimeras). In addition, our data indicate that in reference to a time series of multicellular development in the laboratory strain AX4, chimeras may be slightly behind clonal aggregates in their development. Finally, phenotypic analysis supported slower splitting of aggregates and a nonsignificant trend for larger group sizes in chimeras. The transcriptomic comparison and phenotypic analyses support discoordination among aggregate group members due to social conflict. These results are consistent with previously observed factors that affect cell fate decision in D. discoideum and provide evidence for plasticity in cAMP signaling and phenotypic coordination during development in response to social conflict in D. discoideum and similar microbial social groups.
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Affiliation(s)
- Suegene Noh
- Department of BiologyColby CollegeWatervilleMEUSA
| | | | | | - David C. Queller
- Department of BiologyWashington University in St. LouisSt. LouisMOUSA
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9
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Abstract
Evolutionary game theory has been successful in describing phenomena from bacterial population dynamics to the evolution of social behaviour. However, it has typically focused on a single game describing the interactions between individuals. Organisms are simultaneously involved in many intraspecies and interspecies interactions. Therefore, there is a need to move from single games to multiple games. However, these interactions in nature involve many players. Shifting from 2-player games to multiple multiplayer games yield richer dynamics closer to natural settings. Such a complete picture of multiple game dynamics (MGD), where multiple players are involved, was lacking. For multiple multiplayer games—where each game could have an arbitrary finite number of players and strategies, we provide a replicator equation for MGD having many players and strategies. We show that if the individual games involved have more than two strategies, then the combined dynamics cannot be understood by looking only at individual games. Expected dynamics from single games is no longer valid, and trajectories can possess different limiting behaviour. In the case of finite populations, we formulate and calculate an essential and useful stochastic property, fixation probability. Our results highlight that studying a set of interactions defined by a single game can be misleading if we do not take the broader setting of the interactions into account. Through our results and analysis, we thus discuss and advocate the development of evolutionary game(s) theory, which will help us disentangle the complexity of multiple interactions.
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Affiliation(s)
- Vandana Revathi Venkateswaran
- Research Group for Theoretical Models of Eco-evolutionary Dynamics, Department of Evolutionary Theory, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology , August Thienemann Strasse 2, 24306 Plön , Germany
| | - Chaitanya S Gokhale
- Research Group for Theoretical Models of Eco-evolutionary Dynamics, Department of Evolutionary Theory, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology , August Thienemann Strasse 2, 24306 Plön , Germany
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10
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Pereda M, Capraro V, Sánchez A. Group size effects and critical mass in public goods games. Sci Rep 2019; 9:5503. [PMID: 30940892 PMCID: PMC6445079 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-019-41988-3] [Citation(s) in RCA: 15] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/13/2018] [Accepted: 03/14/2019] [Indexed: 11/25/2022] Open
Abstract
Understanding whether the size of the interacting group has an effect on cooperative behavior has been a major topic of debate since the seminal works on cooperation in the 1960s. Half a century later, scholars have yet to reach a consensus, with some arguing that cooperation is harder in larger groups, while others that cooperation is easier in larger groups, and yet others that cooperation attains its maximum in intermediate size groups. Here we add to this field of work by reporting a two-treatment empirical study where subjects play a Public Goods Game with a Critical Mass, such that the return for full cooperation increases linearly for early contributions and then stabilizes after a critical mass is reached (the two treatments differ only on the critical mass). We choose this game for two reasons: it has been argued that it approximates real-life social dilemmas; previous work suggests that, in this case, group size might have an inverted-U effect on cooperation, where the pick of cooperation is reached around the critical mass. Our main innovation with respect to previous experiments is that we implement a within-subject design, such that the same subject plays in groups of different size (from 5 to 40 subjects). Groups are formed at random at every round and there is no feedback. This allows us to explore if and how subjects change their choice as a function of the size of the group. We report three main results, which partially contrast what has been suggested by previous work: in our setting (i) the critical mass has no effect on cooperation; (ii) group size has a positive effect on cooperation; (iii) the most chosen option (played by about 50% of the subjects) is All Defection, followed by All Cooperation (about 10% of the subjects), whereas the rest have a slight trend to switch preferentially from defection to cooperation as the group size increases.
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Affiliation(s)
- María Pereda
- Universidad Politécnica de Madrid, Departamento Ingeniería de Organización, Administración de empresas y Estadística, Madrid, Spain
- Unidad Mixta Interdisciplinar de Comportamiento y Complejidad Social (UMICC S), UC3M-UV-UZ, Leganés, Madrid, Spain
| | - Valerio Capraro
- Economics Department, Middlesex University London, Business School, The Burroughs, London, NW4 4BT, United Kingdom.
| | - Angel Sánchez
- Unidad Mixta Interdisciplinar de Comportamiento y Complejidad Social (UMICC S), UC3M-UV-UZ, Leganés, Madrid, Spain
- Grupo Interdisciplinar de Sistemas Complejos, Departamento de Matemáticas, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, 28911, Leganés, Madrid, Spain
- Institute for Biocomputation and Physics of Complex Systems (BIFI), University of Zaragoza, 50018, Zaragoza, Spain
- Institute UC3M-BS for Financial Big Data (IBiDat), Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, 28903, Getafe, Madrid, Spain
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11
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Duong MH, Tran HM, Han TA. On the distribution of the number of internal equilibria in random evolutionary games. J Math Biol 2019; 78:331-371. [PMID: 30069646 PMCID: PMC6437138 DOI: 10.1007/s00285-018-1276-0] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/08/2018] [Revised: 07/12/2018] [Indexed: 11/02/2022]
Abstract
The analysis of equilibrium points is of great importance in evolutionary game theory with numerous practical ramifications in ecology, population genetics, social sciences, economics and computer science. In contrast to previous analytical approaches which primarily focus on computing the expected number of internal equilibria, in this paper we study the distribution of the number of internal equilibria in a multi-player two-strategy random evolutionary game. We derive for the first time a closed formula for the probability that the game has a certain number of internal equilibria, for both normal and uniform distributions of the game payoff entries. In addition, using Descartes' rule of signs and combinatorial methods, we provide several universal upper and lower bound estimates for this probability, which are independent of the underlying payoff distribution. We also compare our analytical results with those obtained from extensive numerical simulations. Many results of this paper are applicable to a wider class of random polynomials that are not necessarily from evolutionary games.
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Affiliation(s)
- Manh Hong Duong
- School of Mathematics, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, B15 2TT UK
| | - Hoang Minh Tran
- Data Analytics Department, Esmart Systems, 1783 Halden, Norway
| | - The Anh Han
- School of Computing, Media & the Arts, Teesside University, Middlesbrough, TS1 3BX UK
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12
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13
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Kurokawa S. Unified and simple understanding for the evolution of conditional cooperators. Math Biosci 2016; 282:16-20. [PMID: 27693301 DOI: 10.1016/j.mbs.2016.09.012] [Citation(s) in RCA: 12] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/10/2016] [Revised: 09/17/2016] [Accepted: 09/20/2016] [Indexed: 02/05/2023]
Abstract
Cooperation is a mysterious phenomenon which is observed in this world. The potential explanation is a repeated interaction. Cooperation is established if individuals meet the same opponent repeatedly and cooperate conditionally. Previous studies have analyzed the following four as characters of conditional cooperators mainly. (i) niceness (i.e., when a conditional cooperator meets an opponent in the first place, he (she) cooperates or defects), (ii) optimism (when a conditional cooperator meets an opponent in the past, but he (she) did not get access to information about the opponent's behavior in the previous round, he (she) cooperates or defects), (iii) generosity (even when a conditional cooperator knows that an opponent defected in the previous round, he (she) cooperates or defects) and (iv) retaliation (a conditional cooperator cooperates with a cooperator with a higher probability than with a defector). Previous works deal with these four characters mainly. However, these four characters basically have been regarded as distinct topics and unified understanding has not been done fully. Here we, by studying the iterated prisoner's dilemma game (in particular, additive games) and using evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) analysis, find that when retaliation is large, the condition under which conditional cooperators are stable against the invasion by an unconditional defector is loose, while none of "niceness", "optimism", and "generosity" makes impact on the condition under which conditional cooperators are stable against an invasion by an unconditional defector. Furthermore, we show that we can understand "niceness", "optimism", and "generosity" uniformly by using one parameter indicating "cooperative", and when the conditional cooperators have large "retaliation" enough to resist an invasion by an unconditional defector, natural selection favors more "cooperative" conditional cooperators to invade the resident conditional cooperative strategy. Moreover, we show that these results are robust even when taking the existence of mistakes in behavior into consideration.
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Affiliation(s)
- Shun Kurokawa
- Graduate School of Agriculture, Kyoto University, Oiwake-cho, Kitashirakawa, Sakyo-ku, Kyoto 606-8502, Japan; Institute of Zoology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Datun Road, Chaoyang, Beijing 100101, PR China.
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14
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Kurokawa S. Payoff non-linearity sways the effect of mistakes on the evolution of reciprocity. Math Biosci 2016; 279:63-70. [DOI: 10.1016/j.mbs.2016.07.004] [Citation(s) in RCA: 8] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/25/2016] [Revised: 07/04/2016] [Accepted: 07/10/2016] [Indexed: 11/25/2022]
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15
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Kurokawa S. Imperfect information facilitates the evolution of reciprocity. Math Biosci 2016; 276:114-20. [DOI: 10.1016/j.mbs.2016.03.011] [Citation(s) in RCA: 14] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/21/2016] [Revised: 03/04/2016] [Accepted: 03/31/2016] [Indexed: 11/29/2022]
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16
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17
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Gavrilets S. Collective action problem in heterogeneous groups. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 2015; 370:20150016. [PMID: 26503689 PMCID: PMC4633852 DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2015.0016] [Citation(s) in RCA: 80] [Impact Index Per Article: 8.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 08/21/2015] [Indexed: 11/12/2022] Open
Abstract
I review the theoretical and experimental literature on the collective action problem in groups whose members differ in various characteristics affecting individual costs, benefits and preferences in collective actions. I focus on evolutionary models that predict how individual efforts and fitnesses, group efforts and the amount of produced collective goods depend on the group's size and heterogeneity, as well as on the benefit and cost functions and parameters. I consider collective actions that aim to overcome the challenges from nature or win competition with neighbouring groups of co-specifics. I show that the largest contributors towards production of collective goods will typically be group members with the highest stake in it or for whom the effort is least costly, or those who have the largest capability or initial endowment. Under some conditions, such group members end up with smaller net pay-offs than the rest of the group. That is, they effectively behave as altruists. With weak nonlinearity in benefit and cost functions, the group effort typically decreases with group size and increases with within-group heterogeneity. With strong nonlinearity in benefit and cost functions, these patterns are reversed. I discuss the implications of theoretical results for animal behaviour, human origins and psychology.
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Affiliation(s)
- Sergey Gavrilets
- Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN 37996, USA Department of Mathematics, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN 37996, USA National Institute for Mathematical and Biological Synthesis, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN 37996, USA
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18
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Garcia T, Doulcier G, De Monte S. The evolution of adhesiveness as a social adaptation. eLife 2015; 4:e08595. [PMID: 26613415 PMCID: PMC4775229 DOI: 10.7554/elife.08595] [Citation(s) in RCA: 32] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/07/2015] [Accepted: 11/26/2015] [Indexed: 12/31/2022] Open
Abstract
Cellular adhesion is a key ingredient to sustain collective functions of microbial aggregates. Here, we investigate the evolutionary origins of adhesion and the emergence of groups of genealogically unrelated cells with a game-theoretical model. The considered adhesiveness trait is costly, continuous and affects both group formation and group-derived benefits. The formalism of adaptive dynamics reveals two evolutionary stable strategies, at each extreme on the axis of adhesiveness. We show that cohesive groups can evolve by small mutational steps, provided the population is already endowed with a minimum adhesiveness level. Assortment between more adhesive types, and in particular differential propensities to leave a fraction of individuals ungrouped at the end of the aggregation process, can compensate for the cost of increased adhesiveness. We also discuss the change in the social nature of more adhesive mutations along evolutionary trajectories, and find that altruism arises before directly beneficial behavior, despite being the most challenging form of cooperation.
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Affiliation(s)
- Thomas Garcia
- Institut d'écologie et des sciences de l'environnement, Université Pierre et Marie Curie, Paris, France
| | - Guilhem Doulcier
- Institut de Biologie de l’École Normale Supérieure, École Normale Supérieure, PSL Research University, Paris, France
| | - Silvia De Monte
- Institut de Biologie de l’École Normale Supérieure, École Normale Supérieure, PSL Research University, Paris, France
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Peña J, Nöldeke G. Variability in group size and the evolution of collective action. J Theor Biol 2015; 389:72-82. [PMID: 26551151 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2015.10.023] [Citation(s) in RCA: 17] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/25/2015] [Revised: 10/07/2015] [Accepted: 10/10/2015] [Indexed: 11/27/2022]
Abstract
Models of the evolution of collective action typically assume that interactions occur in groups of identical size. In contrast, social interactions between animals occur in groups of widely dispersed size. This paper models collective action problems as two-strategy multiplayer games and studies the effect of variability in group size on the evolution of cooperative behavior under the replicator dynamics. The analysis identifies elementary conditions on the payoff structure of the game implying that the evolution of cooperative behavior is promoted or inhibited when the group size experienced by a focal player is more or less variable. Similar but more stringent conditions are applicable when the confounding effect of size-biased sampling, which causes the group-size distribution experienced by a focal player to differ from the statistical distribution of group sizes, is taken into account.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jorge Peña
- Department of Evolutionary Theory, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, 24306 Plön, Germany.
| | - Georg Nöldeke
- Faculty of Business and Economics, University of Basel, 4002 Basel, Switzerland.
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20
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Pichugin Y, Gokhale CS, Garcia J, Traulsen A, Rainey PB. Modes of migration and multilevel selection in evolutionary multiplayer games. J Theor Biol 2015; 387:144-53. [PMID: 26456203 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2015.09.027] [Citation(s) in RCA: 11] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/14/2015] [Revised: 09/23/2015] [Accepted: 09/28/2015] [Indexed: 11/18/2022]
Abstract
The evolution of cooperation in group-structured populations has received much attention, but little is known about the effects of different modes of migration of individuals between groups. Here, we have incorporated four different modes of migration that differ in the degree of coordination among the individuals. For each mode of migration, we identify the set of multiplayer games in which the cooperative strategy has higher fixation probability than defection. The comparison shows that the set of games under which cooperation may evolve generally expands depending upon the degree of coordination among the migrating individuals. Weak altruism can evolve under all modes of individual migration, provided that the benefit to cost ratio is high enough. Strong altruism, however, evolves only if the mode of migration involves coordination of individual actions. Depending upon the migration frequency and degree of coordination among individuals, conditions that allow selection to work at the level of groups can be established.
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Affiliation(s)
- Yuriy Pichugin
- New Zealand Institute For Advanced Study, Massey University at Albany, Private Bag 102904, North Shore Mail Centre, Auckland 0745, New Zealand.
| | - Chaitanya S Gokhale
- New Zealand Institute For Advanced Study, Massey University at Albany, Private Bag 102904, North Shore Mail Centre, Auckland 0745, New Zealand
| | - Julián Garcia
- Faculty of Information Technology, Monash University, Wellington Road, Clayton, VIC 3800, Australia
| | - Arne Traulsen
- Max-Planck-Institute for Evolutionary Biology, August-Thienemann-Straße 2, 24306 Plön, Germany
| | - Paul B Rainey
- New Zealand Institute For Advanced Study, Massey University at Albany, Private Bag 102904, North Shore Mail Centre, Auckland 0745, New Zealand; Max-Planck-Institute for Evolutionary Biology, August-Thienemann-Straße 2, 24306 Plön, Germany
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21
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Peña J, Nöldeke G, Lehmann L. Evolutionary dynamics of collective action in spatially structured populations. J Theor Biol 2015; 382:122-36. [PMID: 26151588 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2015.06.039] [Citation(s) in RCA: 47] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/24/2015] [Revised: 06/22/2015] [Accepted: 06/24/2015] [Indexed: 01/09/2023]
Abstract
Many models proposed to study the evolution of collective action rely on a formalism that represents social interactions as n-player games between individuals adopting discrete actions such as cooperate and defect. Despite the importance of spatial structure in biological collective action, the analysis of n-player games games in spatially structured populations has so far proved elusive. We address this problem by considering mixed strategies and by integrating discrete-action n-player games into the direct fitness approach of social evolution theory. This allows to conveniently identify convergence stable strategies and to capture the effect of population structure by a single structure coefficient, namely, the pairwise (scaled) relatedness among interacting individuals. As an application, we use our mathematical framework to investigate collective action problems associated with the provision of three different kinds of collective goods, paradigmatic of a vast array of helping traits in nature: "public goods" (both providers and shirkers can use the good, e.g., alarm calls), "club goods" (only providers can use the good, e.g., participation in collective hunting), and "charity goods" (only shirkers can use the good, e.g., altruistic sacrifice). We show that relatedness promotes the evolution of collective action in different ways depending on the kind of collective good and its economies of scale. Our findings highlight the importance of explicitly accounting for relatedness, the kind of collective good, and the economies of scale in theoretical and empirical studies of the evolution of collective action.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jorge Peña
- Department of Evolutionary Theory, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, August-Thienemann-Str. 2, 24306 Plön, Germany.
| | - Georg Nöldeke
- Faculty of Business and Economics, University of Basel, Peter Merian-Weg 6, 4002 Basel, Switzerland.
| | - Laurent Lehmann
- Department of Ecology and Evolution, University of Lausanne, Le Biophore, 1015 Lausanne, Switzerland.
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22
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Network Modularity is essential for evolution of cooperation under uncertainty. Sci Rep 2015; 5:9340. [PMID: 25849737 PMCID: PMC4388161 DOI: 10.1038/srep09340] [Citation(s) in RCA: 33] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/02/2014] [Accepted: 02/25/2015] [Indexed: 11/15/2022] Open
Abstract
Cooperative behavior, which pervades nature, can be significantly enhanced when agents interact in a structured rather than random way; however, the key structural factors that affect cooperation are not well understood. Moreover, the role structure plays with cooperation has largely been studied through observing overall cooperation rather than the underlying components that together shape cooperative behavior. In this paper we address these two problems by first applying evolutionary games to a wide range of networks, where agents play the Prisoner's Dilemma with a three-component stochastic strategy, and then analyzing agent-based simulation results using principal component analysis. With these methods we study the evolution of trust, reciprocity and forgiveness as a function of several structural parameters. This work demonstrates that community structure, represented by network modularity, among all the tested structural parameters, has the most significant impact on the emergence of cooperative behavior, with forgiveness showing the largest sensitivity to community structure. We also show that increased community structure reduces the dispersion of trust and forgiveness, thereby reducing the network-level uncertainties for these two components; graph transitivity and degree also significantly influence the evolutionary dynamics of the population and the diversity of strategies at equilibrium.
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23
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Marshall JAR. Generalizations of Hamilton's rule applied to non-additive public goods games with random group size. Front Ecol Evol 2014. [DOI: 10.3389/fevo.2014.00040] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
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Peña J, Lehmann L, Nöldeke G. Gains from switching and evolutionary stability in multi-player matrix games. J Theor Biol 2014; 346:23-33. [DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2013.12.016] [Citation(s) in RCA: 38] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/04/2013] [Revised: 12/12/2013] [Accepted: 12/16/2013] [Indexed: 10/25/2022]
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25
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Van Cleve J, Lehmann L. Stochastic stability and the evolution of coordination in spatially structured populations. Theor Popul Biol 2013; 89:75-87. [DOI: 10.1016/j.tpb.2013.08.006] [Citation(s) in RCA: 17] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/14/2013] [Revised: 08/08/2013] [Accepted: 08/16/2013] [Indexed: 10/26/2022]
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26
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Vásárhelyi Z, Scheuring I. Invasion of cooperators in lattice populations: linear and non-linear public good games. Biosystems 2013; 113:81-90. [PMID: 23727301 DOI: 10.1016/j.biosystems.2013.05.003] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/08/2013] [Revised: 04/30/2013] [Accepted: 05/13/2013] [Indexed: 11/27/2022]
Abstract
A generalized version of the N-person volunteer's dilemma (NVD) Game has been suggested recently for illustrating the problem of N-person social dilemmas. Using standard replicator dynamics it can be shown that coexistence of cooperators and defectors is typical in this model. However, the question of how a rare mutant cooperator could invade a population of defectors is still open. Here we examined the dynamics of individual based stochastic models of the NVD. We analyze the dynamics in well-mixed and viscous populations. We show in both cases that coexistence between cooperators and defectors is possible; moreover, spatial aggregation of types in viscous populations can easily lead to pure cooperation. Furthermore we analyze the invasion of cooperators in populations consisting predominantly of defectors. In accordance with analytical results, in deterministic systems, we found the invasion of cooperators successful in the well-mixed case only if their initial concentration was higher than a critical threshold, defined by the replicator dynamics of the NVD. In the viscous case, however, not the initial concentration but the initial number determines the success of invasion. We show that even a single mutant cooperator can invade with a high probability, because the local density of aggregated cooperators exceeds the threshold defined by the game. Comparing the results to models using different benefit functions (linear or sigmoid), we show that the role of the benefit function is much more important in the well-mixed than in the viscous case.
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Affiliation(s)
- Zsóka Vásárhelyi
- Department of Plant Systematics, Ecology and Theoretical Biology, Eötvös Loránd University, Pázmány Péter sétány, 1/c, Budapest H-1117, Hungary.
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Perc M, Gómez-Gardeñes J, Szolnoki A, Floría LM, Moreno Y. Evolutionary dynamics of group interactions on structured populations: a review. J R Soc Interface 2013; 10:20120997. [PMID: 23303223 PMCID: PMC3565747 DOI: 10.1098/rsif.2012.0997] [Citation(s) in RCA: 370] [Impact Index Per Article: 33.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/04/2012] [Accepted: 12/12/2012] [Indexed: 11/12/2022] Open
Abstract
Interactions among living organisms, from bacteria colonies to human societies, are inherently more complex than interactions among particles and non-living matter. Group interactions are a particularly important and widespread class, representative of which is the public goods game. In addition, methods of statistical physics have proved valuable for studying pattern formation, equilibrium selection and self-organization in evolutionary games. Here, we review recent advances in the study of evolutionary dynamics of group interactions on top of structured populations, including lattices, complex networks and coevolutionary models. We also compare these results with those obtained on well-mixed populations. The review particularly highlights that the study of the dynamics of group interactions, like several other important equilibrium and non-equilibrium dynamical processes in biological, economical and social sciences, benefits from the synergy between statistical physics, network science and evolutionary game theory.
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Affiliation(s)
- Matjaz Perc
- University of Maribor, Koroška cesta 160, 2000 Maribor, Slovenia.
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Gokhale CS, Traulsen A. Mutualism and evolutionary multiplayer games: revisiting the Red King. Proc Biol Sci 2012; 279:4611-6. [PMID: 22977149 DOI: 10.1098/rspb.2012.1697] [Citation(s) in RCA: 25] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 01/04/2023] Open
Abstract
Coevolution of two species is typically thought to favour the evolution of faster evolutionary rates helping a species keep ahead in the Red Queen race, where 'it takes all the running you can do to stay where you are'. In contrast, if species are in a mutualistic relationship, it was proposed that the Red King effect may act, where it can be beneficial to evolve slower than the mutualistic species. The Red King hypothesis proposes that the species which evolves slower can gain a larger share of the benefits. However, the interactions between the two species may involve multiple individuals. To analyse such a situation, we resort to evolutionary multiplayer games. Even in situations where evolving slower is beneficial in a two-player setting, faster evolution may be favoured in a multiplayer setting. The underlying features of multiplayer games can be crucial for the distribution of benefits. They also suggest a link between the evolution of the rate of evolution and group size.
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Affiliation(s)
- Chaitanya S Gokhale
- Research Group for Evolutionary Theory, Max-Planck-Institute for Evolutionary Biology, August-Thienemann-Straße 2, 24306 Plön, Germany.
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Peña J, Rochat Y. Bipartite graphs as models of population structures in evolutionary multiplayer games. PLoS One 2012; 7:e44514. [PMID: 22970237 PMCID: PMC3438187 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0044514] [Citation(s) in RCA: 23] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/10/2012] [Accepted: 08/08/2012] [Indexed: 12/03/2022] Open
Abstract
By combining evolutionary game theory and graph theory, “games on graphs” study the evolutionary dynamics of frequency-dependent selection in population structures modeled as geographical or social networks. Networks are usually represented by means of unipartite graphs, and social interactions by two-person games such as the famous prisoner’s dilemma. Unipartite graphs have also been used for modeling interactions going beyond pairwise interactions. In this paper, we argue that bipartite graphs are a better alternative to unipartite graphs for describing population structures in evolutionary multiplayer games. To illustrate this point, we make use of bipartite graphs to investigate, by means of computer simulations, the evolution of cooperation under the conventional and the distributed N-person prisoner’s dilemma. We show that several implicit assumptions arising from the standard approach based on unipartite graphs (such as the definition of replacement neighborhoods, the intertwining of individual and group diversity, and the large overlap of interaction neighborhoods) can have a large impact on the resulting evolutionary dynamics. Our work provides a clear example of the importance of construction procedures in games on graphs, of the suitability of bigraphs and hypergraphs for computational modeling, and of the importance of concepts from social network analysis such as centrality, centralization and bipartite clustering for the understanding of dynamical processes occurring on networked population structures.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jorge Peña
- Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Institute of Applied Mathematics, University of Lausanne, Lausanne, Switzerland.
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30
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Abstract
In spite of its intrinsic evolutionary instability, altruistic behavior in social groups is widespread in nature, spanning from organisms endowed with complex cognitive abilities to microbial populations. In this study, we show that if social individuals have an enhanced tendency to form groups and fitness increases with group cohesion, sociality can evolve and be maintained in the absence of actively assortative mechanisms such as kin recognition or nepotism toward other carriers of the social gene. When explicitly taken into account in a game-theoretical framework, the process of group formation qualitatively changes the evolutionary dynamics with respect to games played in groups of constant size and equal grouping tendencies. The evolutionary consequences of the rules underpinning the group size distribution are discussed for a simple model of microbial aggregation by differential attachment, indicating a way to the evolution of sociality bereft of peer recognition.
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Affiliation(s)
- Thomas Garcia
- École Normale Supérieure, Unité Mixte de Recherche 7625, Écologie et Évolution, 46 rue d'Ulm, 75005 Paris, France.
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