Head Over the Heart or Heart Over the Head? Cognitive Experiential Self-Theory and Extralegal Heuristics in Juror Decision Making1

In the eye of the beholder: Decision-making of lawyers in cases of sexual harassment

OBJECTIVE

The purpose of the present study was to examine the effect of deliberative vs. intuitive thinking styles on forensic judgments of legal professionals. Two hypotheses were tested: (a) that low deliberative thinking would be related to judgmental biases (b) that lawyers would report a greater tendency and preference toward deliberative thinking in comparison to students and make more rational judgments.

METHOD

Ninety-one lawyers and 120 undergraduate students, who served as controls, were asked to read a criminal case depicting sexual harassment (SH) and judge victim and offender blame, whether the case constitutes SH, and the damage for the victim.

RESULTS

Deliberative thinking of lawyers was higher than students, and higher than their intuitive thinking style, supporting the more rational blame attributions of the former. In addition, higher deliberative thinking was related to a stronger perception of the event as SH. Nevertheless, all the participants were more inclined to perceive the case as SH when the victim was a woman instead of a man.

CONCLUSIONS

The results suggest that gender stereotypes and bias may persist despite high deliberative thinking and may even be manifested through deliberative thinking processes. Awareness of legal professionals of these biases as well as the development of more objective tools which will help make the judging process less subjective-will ensure more accurate assessment of victims, offenders, and cases.

Tell Me Who, and I’ll Tell You How Fair: A Model of Agent Bias in Justice Reasoning

A salient and underresearched aspect of un/fair treatment in organizations can be the source of justice, in terms of a specific justice agent. We propose a model of agent bias to describe how and when characteristics of the agent enacting justice are important to justice reasoning. The agent bias is defined as the effect on overall event justice perceptions of specific agent characteristics, over and above the effect via distributive, procedural, and interactional justice. For justice recipients to focus on agent characteristics rather than on the event being evaluated in terms of fairness is an unexplored bias in justice judgments. Agent warmth, competence, and past justice track record (entity justice) are identified as agent characteristics that influence justice judgments. Agent characteristics can influence overall event justice perceptions positively or negatively, depending on the ambiguity in terms of justice of the event and on its expectedness from a particular justice agent. Finally, we propose that agent bias is stronger when justice recipients use intuitive versus analytic information processing of event information. Our model of agent bias has important theoretical implications for theories of organizational justice and for other literatures, as well as important practical implications for organizations and managers.

Communicating Conservation Status: How Different Statistical Assessment Criteria Affect Perceptions of Extinction Risk

Although alternative forms of statistical and verbal information are routinely used to convey species' extinction risk to policymakers and the public, little is known about their effects on audience information processing and risk perceptions. To address this gap in literature, we report on an experiment that was designed to explore how perceptions of extinction risk differ as a function of five different assessment benchmarks (Criteria A-E) used by scientists to classify species within IUCN Red List risk levels (e.g., Critically Endangered, Vulnerable), as well as the role of key individual differences in these effects (e.g., rational and experiential thinking styles, environmental concern). Despite their normative equivalence within the IUCN classification system, results revealed divergent effects of specific assessment criteria: on average, describing extinction risk in terms of proportional population decline over time (Criterion A) and number of remaining individuals (Criterion D) evoked the highest level of perceived risk, whereas the single-event probability of a species becoming extinct (Criterion E) engendered the least perceived risk. Furthermore, participants scoring high in rationality (analytic thinking) were less prone to exhibit these biases compared to those low in rationality. Our findings suggest that despite their equivalence in the eyes of scientific experts, IUCN criteria are indeed capable of engendering different levels of risk perception among lay audiences, effects that carry direct and important implications for those tasked with communicating about conservation status to diverse publics.

People as Intuitive Retaliators

Two studies explore whether people intuitively approve or rather disapprove of a victim personally retaliating against an offender. Participants in Study 1 were introduced to the case of Ameneh Bahrami, an Iranian woman who had been blinded by a jealous suitor and who was given the opportunity to blind her perpetrator in return. Results show that participants who were instructed to complete a secondary task (cognitive load condition) reacted most positively to Ameneh Bahrami’s decision to retaliate. Participants in Study 2 read vignettes about fictitious offenses. Participants low in need for cognition approved more of the victim retaliating against the offender when they adopted an intuitive (vs. a reflective) mind-set. Together, these findings demonstrate that people intuitively approve of retaliation carried out by victims.

Playing Dice With Criminal Sentences: The Influence of Irrelevant Anchors on Experts’ Judicial Decision Making

Judicial sentencing decisions should be guided by facts, not by chance. The present research however demonstrates that the sentencing decisions of experienced legal professionals are influenced by irrelevant sentencing demands even if they are blatantly determined at random. Participating legal experts anchored their sentencing decisions on a given sentencing demand and assimilated toward it even if this demand came from an irrelevant source (Study 1), they were informed that this demand was randomly determined (Study 2), or they randomly determined this demand themselves by throwing dice (Study 3). Expertise and experience did not reduce this effect. This sentencing bias appears to be produced by a selective increase in the accessibility of arguments that are consistent with the random sentencing demand: The accessibility of incriminating arguments was higher if participants were confronted with a high rather than a low anchor (Study 4). Practical and theoretical implications of this research are discussed.

Heritability of Preferred Thinking Styles and a Genetic Link to Working Memory Capacity

Genetic and environmental contributions to preferences for rational and experiential thinking were examined in 100 pairs of monozygotic and 73 pairs of same-sex dizygotic Australian twins. Univariate analyses for experiential thinking and working memory capacity (WMC) revealed genetic effects accounted for 44% and 39% of the variability respectively, with non-shared environmental effects accounting for the balance. For rational thinking, the univariate models produced ambiguous results about the relative roles of heritability and shared environment, but a subsequent Cholesky analysis suggested genetic effects accounted for 34%, with the balance, 66%, explained by the non-shared environment. The Cholesky analysis revealed that shared genetic effects accounted for 60%, and non-shared environment accounted for 40% of the relationship between preference for rational thinking and WMC.

When emotionality trumps reason: a study of individual processing style and juror bias

"Cognitive Experiential Self Theory" (CEST) postulates that information-processing proceeds through two pathways, a rational one and an experiential one. The former is characterized by an emphasis on analysis, fact, and logical argument, whereas the latter is characterized by emotional and personal experience. We examined whether individuals influenced by the experiential system (E-processors) are more susceptible to extralegal biases (e.g. defendant attractiveness) than those influenced by the rational system (R-processors). Participants reviewed a criminal trial transcript and defendant profile and determined verdict, sentencing, and extralegal susceptibility. Although E-processors and R-processors convicted attractive defendants at similar rates, E-processors were more likely to convict less attractive defendants. Whereas R-processors did not sentence attractive and less attractive defendants differently, E-processors gave more lenient sentences to attractive defendants and harsher sentences to less attractive defendants. E-processors were also more likely to report that extralegal factors would change their verdicts. Further, the degree to which emotionality trumped rationality within an individual, as measured by a novel scoring method, linearly correlated with harsher sentences and extralegal influence. In sum, the results support an "unattractive harshness" effect during guilt determination, an attraction leniency effect during sentencing and increased susceptibility to extralegal factors within E-processors. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Determining dangerousness in sexually violent predator evaluations: cognitive-experiential self-theory and juror judgments of expert testimony

Past research examining the effects of expert testimony on the future dangerousness of a defendant in death penalty sentencing found that jurors are more influenced by less scientific clinical expert testimony and tend to devalue scientific actuarial testimony. This study was designed to determine whether these findings extend to civil commitment trials for sexual offenders and to test a theoretical rationale for this effect. In addition, we investigated the influence of a recently developed innovation in risk assessment procedures, Guided Professional Judgment (GPJ) instruments. Consistent with a cognitive-experiential self-theory based explanation, mock jurors motivated to process information in an experiential condition were more influenced by clinical testimony, while mock jurors in a rational mode were more influenced by actuarial testimony. Participants responded to clinical and GPJ testimony in a similar manner. However, participants' gender exerted important interactive effects on dangerousness decisions, with male jurors showing the predicted effect while females did not. The policy implications of these findings are discussed.

Law and emotion: a proposed taxonomy of an emerging field

Scholars from diverse fields have begun to study the intersection of emotion and law. The notion that reason and emotion are cleanly separable--and that law rightly privileges and admits only of the former--is deeply engrained. Law and emotion scholarship proceeds instead from the belief that the legal relevance of emotion is both significant and deserving of (and amenable to) close scrutiny. It is organized around six approaches, each of which is defined and discussed: emotion-centered, emotional phenomenon, emotion theory, legal doctrine, theory of law; and legal actor. Drawing on the analytic value of the proposed taxonomy, any exploration of law and emotion should strive to identify which emotion(s) it takes as its focus; distinguish implicated emotion-driven phenomena; explore relevant and competing theories of the emotions; limit itself to a particular type of legal doctrine; expose underlying theories of law; and make clear which legal actors are implicated. Directions for future research are discussed and cross-disciplinary collaboration encouraged.

Attributions of Guilt and Punishment as Functions of Physical Attractiveness and Smiling

The authors found an interaction between sex of participant and sex of defendant in the leniency bias toward a smiling defendant. Differences occurred for male participants when levying punishment for a smiling male defendant vs. a smiling female defendant and for a smiling male defendant vs. a nonsmiling male defendant, whereas differences did not occur for female participants. The authors found moderating effects of physical attractiveness and smiling between guilt and punishment. The only significant positive relationship between guilt and punishment occurred for the defendant whom participants rated low in physical attractiveness and who was not smiling. When guilty, the smiling and unattractive defendant received less punishment than did the smiling and attractive defendant. The authors discussed complex relationships between physical attractiveness, smiling, guilt, and punishment.

The effects of judicial admonitions on hearsay evidence

Using a simulated civil case, this experiment investigated whether mock jurors: (a) are able to disregard hearsay evidence when admonished to do so, (b) experience psychological reactance and "backfire effects" in proportion to the strength of judicial admonition instructing them to disregard hearsay evidence, and (c) are able to recognize and disregard hearsay evidence without judicial instructions. Results indicate that jurors were unable to disregard inadmissible hearsay testimony in some legal decisions regardless of whether there were judicial instructions to do so. Jurors exhibited backfire effects paying more attention to inadmissible hearsay evidence when they were strongly instructed to disregard it. More specifically, juror backfire effects were evident in both their confidence in their liability verdicts and in their punitive damage awards. The legal and policy implications of these findings are discussed.

The effects of rational and experiential information processing of expert testimony in death penalty cases

Past research examining the effects of actuarial and clinical expert testimony on defendants' dangerousness in Texas death penalty sentencing has found that jurors are more influenced by less scientific pure clinical expert testimony and less influenced by more scientific actuarial expert testimony (Krauss & Lee, 2003; Krauss & Sales, 2001). By applying cognitive-experiential self-theory (CEST) to juror decision-making, the present study was undertaken in an attempt to offer a theoretical rationale for these findings. Based on past CEST research, 163 mock jurors were either directed into a rational mode or experiential mode of processing. Consistent with CEST and inconsistent with previous research using the same stimulus materials, results demonstrate that jurors in a rational mode of processing more heavily weighted actuarial expert testimony in their dangerousness assessments, while those jurors in the experiential condition were more influenced by clinical expert testimony. The policy implications of these findings are discussed.