Generalized Communicative Suspicion (GCS) Among Police Officers: Accounting for the Investigator Bias Effect1

Is It the Judge, the Sender, or Just the Individual Message? Disentangling Person and Message Effects on Variation in Lie-Detection Judgments

Research suggests that people differ more in their ability to lie than in their ability to detect lies. However, because studies have not treated senders and messages as separate entities, it is unclear whether some senders are generally more transparent than others or whether individual messages differ in their transparency of veracity regardless of senders. Variance attributable to judges, senders, and messages was estimated simultaneously using multiple messages from each sender (totaling more than 45,000 judgments). The claim that the accuracy of a veracity judgment depends on the sender was not supported. Messages differed in their detectability (21% explained variance), but senders did not. Message veracity accounted for most message variation (16.8% of the total variance), but other idiosyncratic message characteristics also contributed significantly. Consistent with the notion that a (mis)match between sender demeanor and veracity determines accuracy, lie and truth detectability differed individually within senders. Judges primarily determined variance in lie-versus-truth classifications (12%) and in confidence (46%) but played no role regarding judgment accuracy (< 0.01%). This work has substantial implications for the design and direction of future research and underscores the importance of separating senders and messages when developing theories and testing derived hypotheses.

Power and lie detection

Social power undermines focus on others and increases reliance on stereotype-consistent information. Thus, power may enhance focus on stereotypical cues to deception, thereby decreasing lie detection accuracy. In three studies, we tested whether having power affects lie detection accuracy. Participants (overall N = 502) were asked to identify truthful and lying candidates (N = 12) during mock job interviews. Study 1 was a field experiment involving employees who held managerial and non-managerial positions (N = 88). In the following laboratory experiments, we manipulated power and asked participants to imagine themselves as managers (Study 2, N = 214) or provided them with control over resources and the ability to reward others (Study 3, N = 200). In Studies 2 and 3, we additionally manipulated the method of lie detection (direct vs. indirect). In contrast to the original hypotheses, we found that power led to increased veracity assessment accuracy. Having power over others enhances the accuracy of one’s veracity assessment, although this increase is small and limited to lie detection (Study 1) or direct judgments (Studies 2 & 3). Together, power affects the processing of social information and what aspects of this information are taken into account.

Cumulative Disadvantage: A Psychological Framework for Understanding How Innocence Can Lead to Confession, Wrongful Conviction, and Beyond

False confessions are a contributing factor in almost 30% of DNA exonerations in the United States. Similar problems have been documented all over the world. We present a novel framework to highlight the processes through which innocent people, once misidentified as suspects, experience cumulative disadvantages that culminate in pernicious consequences. The cumulative-disadvantage framework details how the innocent suspect's naivete and the interrogator's presumption of guilt trigger a process that can lead to false confession, the aftereffects of which spread to corrupt evidence gathering, bias forensic analysis, and virtually ensure wrongful convictions at trial or through pressured false guilty pleas. The framework integrates nascent research underscoring the enduring effects of the accumulated disadvantages postconviction and even after exoneration. We synthesize findings from psychological science, corroborating naturalistic evidence, and relevant legal precedents to explain how an innocent suspect's disadvantages can accumulate through the actions of law enforcement, forensic examiners, prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges, juries, and appeals courts. We conclude with prescribed research directions that can lead to empirically driven reforms to address the gestalt of the multistage process.

Learning to Detect Deception from Evasive Answers and Inconsistencies across Repeated Interviews: A Study with Lay Respondents and Police Officers

Previous research has shown that inconsistencies across repeated interviews do not indicate deception because liars deliberately tend to repeat the same story. However, when a strategic interview approach that makes it difficult for liars to use the repeat strategy is used, both consistency and evasive answers differ significantly between truth tellers and liars, and statistical software (binary logistic regression analyses) can reach high classification rates (Masip et al., 2016b). Yet, if the interview procedure is to be used in applied settings the decision process will be made by humans, not statistical software. To address this issue, in the current study, 475 college students (Experiment 1) and 142 police officers (Experiment 2) were instructed to code and use consistency, evasive answers, or a combination or both before judging the veracity of Masip et al.'s (2016b) interview transcripts. Accuracy rates were high (60% to over 90%). Evasive answers yielded higher rates than consistency, and the combination of both these cues produced the highest accuracy rates in identifying both truthful and deceptive statements. Uninstructed participants performed fairly well (around 75% accuracy), apparently because they spontaneously used consistency and evasive answers. The pattern of results was the same among students, all officers, and veteran officers only, and shows that inconsistencies between interviews and evasive answers reveal deception when a strategic interview approach that hinders the repeat strategy is used.

Strong, but Wrong: Lay People's and Police Officers' Beliefs about Verbal and Nonverbal Cues to Deception

The present study investigated the beliefs of students and police officers about cues to deception. A total of 95 police officers and 104 undergraduate students filled out a questionnaire addressing beliefs about cues to deception. Twenty-eight verbal cues were included in the questionnaire, all extracted from verbal credibility assessment tools (i.e., CBCA, RM, and SCAN). We investigated to what extent beliefs about nonverbal and verbal cues of deception differed between lay people (students) and police officers, and whether these beliefs were in agreement with objective cues known from research. Both students and police officers believed the usual stereotypical, but non-diagnostic (nonverbal) cues such as gaze aversion and increased movement to be indicative of deception. Yet, participants were less inclined to overestimate the relationship between verbal cues and deception and their beliefs fitted better with what we know from research. The implications of these findings for practice are discussed.

Increasing skepticism toward potential liars: effects of existential threat on veracity judgments and the moderating role of honesty norm activation

With the present research, we investigated effects of existential threat on veracity judgments. According to several meta-analyses, people judge potentially deceptive messages of other people as true rather than as false (so-called truth bias). This judgmental bias has been shown to depend on how people weigh the error of judging a true message as a lie (error 1) and the error of judging a lie as a true message (error 2). The weight of these errors has been further shown to be affected by situational variables. Given that research on terror management theory has found evidence that mortality salience (MS) increases the sensitivity toward the compliance of cultural norms, especially when they are of focal attention, we assumed that when the honesty norm is activated, MS affects judgmental error weighing and, consequently, judgmental biases. Specifically, activating the norm of honesty should decrease the weight of error 1 (the error of judging a true message as a lie) and increase the weight of error 2 (the error of judging a lie as a true message) when mortality is salient. In a first study, we found initial evidence for this assumption. Furthermore, the change in error weighing should reduce the truth bias, automatically resulting in better detection accuracy of actual lies and worse accuracy of actual true statements. In two further studies, we manipulated MS and honesty norm activation before participants judged several videos containing actual truths or lies. Results revealed evidence for our prediction. Moreover, in Study 3, the truth bias was increased after MS when group solidarity was previously emphasized.

Heuristic versus systematic processing of information in detecting deception: questioning the truth bias

Research on nonverbal detection of deception has normally been conducted by asking observers to judge the veracity of a number of videotaped communications. These video clips have typically been very short. Observers have a tendency to judge most of these statements as truthful. An experiment was conducted in which 52 participants (44 women, 8 men; M age = 22.2 yr., SD = 2.2) who were taking a psychology and law course were requested to make judgments of credibility at different points of the senders' statements. A strong truth bias was apparent when judgments were made at the beginning of the statements, suggesting that when exposed to brief communications, the observers make heuristic judgments. Over time, a decrease in the truth bias and an increase in overall accuracy were found, suggesting that later judgments were increasingly based on systematic information processing. These results suggest that the truth bias that has been found in previous deception research may be a result of having used very brief and uninformative behavioral samples as stimuli.

"I'd know a false confession if I saw one": a comparative study of college students and police investigators

College students and police investigators watched or listened to 10 prison inmates confessing to crimes. Half the confessions were true accounts; half were false--concocted for the study. Consistent with much recent research, students were generally more accurate than police, and accuracy rates were higher among those presented with audiotaped than videotaped confessions. In addition, investigators were significantly more confident in their judgments and also prone to judge confessors guilty. To determine if police accuracy would increase if this guilty response bias were neutralized, participants in a second experiment were specifically informed that half the confessions were true and half were false. This manipulation eliminated the investigator response bias, but it did not increase accuracy or lower confidence. These findings are discussed for what they imply about the post-interrogation risks to innocent suspects who confess.