The neurophilosophy of epileptic experiences

Dissociation in patients with epilepsy and functional seizures: A narrative review of the literature

Dissociation is a "disruption of the usually integrated functions of consciousness, memory, identity or perception of the environment" according to DSM-5.  It is commonly seen in psychiatric disorders including primary dissociative disorders, post-traumatic stress disorder, depression, and panic disorder. Dissociative phenomena are also described in the context of substance intoxication, sleep deprivation and medical illnesses including traumatic brain injury, migraines, and epilepsy. Patients with epilepsy have higher rates of dissociative experiences as measured on the Dissociative Experiences Scale compared to healthy controls. Ictal symptoms, especially in focal epilepsy of temporal lobe origin, may include dissociative-like experiences such as déjà vu/jamais vu, depersonalization, derealization and what has been described as a "dreamy state".  These descriptions are common in the setting of seizures that originate from mesial temporal lobe epilepsy and may involve the amygdala and hippocampus. Other ictal dissociative phenomena include autoscopy and out of body experiences, which are thought to be due to disruptions in networks responsible for the integration of one's own body and extra-personal space and involve the temporoparietal junction and posterior insula. In this narrative review, we will summarize the updated literature on dissociative experiences in epilepsy, as well as dissociative experiences in functional seizures. Using a case example, we will review the differential diagnosis of dissociative symptoms. We will also review neurobiological underpinnings of dissociative symptoms across different diagnostic entities and discuss how ictal symptoms may shed light on the neurobiology of complex mental processes including the subjective nature of consciousness and self-identity.

Epileptic qualia and self-awareness: a third dimension for consciousness

Over the last few decades, there has been increasing awareness among epileptologists about the need to refine our understanding and assessment of ictal consciousness, focusing on both subjective and behavioral aspects of seizures. Specifically, there have been suggestions that both the internal and external milieux - the former related to the phenomenal qualia of experience, the latter related to behavior - must be taken into account for a better understanding of altered states of consciousness in epilepsy. It has been proposed that clinical and experimental data from patients experiencing alterations of consciousness during epileptic seizures could be better understood within a bidimensional model, in which any manifestation of conscious experience can be plotted according to the level and contents of consciousness. The 'level' axis measures the degree of alertness/arousal, whereas the 'contents' axis measures the vividness of specific experiential phenomena reported by the patient. We argue that certain seizure types might require more rigorous conceptual models for their characterization, and we highlight the potential usefulness of a more refined framework which includes a further dimension related to the 'self', in addition to those of 'level' and 'contents'. This model could be visualized in a three-dimensional space to allow fine-grained distinctions between epileptic seizures.

What makes a simple partial seizure complex?

The assessment of ictal consciousness has been the landmark criterion for the differentiation between simple and complex partial seizures over the last three decades. After review of the historical development of the concept of "complex partial seizure," the difficulties surrounding the simple versus complex dichotomy are addressed from theoretical, phenomenological, and neurophysiological standpoints. With respect to consciousness, careful analysis of ictal semiology shows that both the general level of vigilance and the specific contents of the conscious state can be selectively involved during partial seizures. Moreover, recent neuroimaging findings, coupled with classic electrophysiological studies, suggest that the neural substrate of ictal alterations of consciousness is twofold: focal hyperactivity in the limbic structures generates the complex psychic phenomena responsible for the altered contents of consciousness, and secondary disruption of the network involving the thalamus and the frontoparietal association cortices affects the level of awareness. These data, along with the localization information they provide, should be taken into account in the formulation of new criteria for the classification of seizures with focal onset.