Are Animals Stuck in Time or Are They Chronesthetic Creatures?

Reflections on the spoon test

In this paper, we shall use Tulving's seminal empirical and theoretical research including the 'Spoon Test' to explore memory and mental time travel and its origins and role in planning for the future. We will review the comparative research on future planning and episodic foresight in pre-verbal children and non-verbal animals to explore how this may be manifest as wordless thoughts.

Ways of thinking: from crows to children and back again

This article reviews some of the recent work on the remarkable cognitive capacities of food-caching corvids. The focus will be on their ability to think about other minds and other times, and tool-using tests of physical problem solving. Research on developmental cognition suggests that young children do not pass similar tests until they are at least four years of age in the case of the social cognition experiments, and eight years of age in the case of the tasks that tap into physical cognition. This developmental trajectory seems surprising. Intuitively, one might have thought that the social and planning tasks required more complex forms of cognitive process, namely Mental Time Travel and Theory of Mind. Perhaps the fact that children pass these tasks earlier than the physical problem-solving tasks is a reflection of cultural influences. Future research will hope to identify these cognitive milestones by starting to develop tasks that might go some way towards understanding the mechanisms underlying these abilities in both children and corvids, to explore similarities and differences in their ways of thinking.

The value of foresight: how prospection affects decision-making

Traditional theories of decision-making assume that utilities are based on the intrinsic value of outcomes; in turn, these values depend on associations between expected outcomes and the current motivational state of the decision-maker. This view disregards the fact that humans (and possibly other animals) have prospection abilities, which permit anticipating future mental processes and motivational and emotional states. For instance, we can evaluate future outcomes in light of the motivational state we expect to have when the outcome is collected, not (only) when we make a decision. Consequently, we can plan for the future and choose to store food to be consumed when we expect to be hungry, not immediately. Furthermore, similarly to any expected outcome, we can assign a value to our anticipated mental processes and emotions. It has been reported that (in some circumstances) human subjects prefer to receive an unavoidable punishment immediately, probably because they are anticipating the dread associated with the time spent waiting for the punishment. This article offers a formal framework to guide neuroeconomic research on how prospection affects decision-making. The model has two characteristics. First, it uses model-based Bayesian inference to describe anticipation of cognitive and motivational processes. Second, the utility-maximization process considers these anticipations in two ways: to evaluate outcomes (e.g., the pleasure of eating a pie is evaluated differently at the beginning of a dinner, when one is hungry, and at the end of the dinner, when one is satiated), and as outcomes having a value themselves (e.g., the case of dread as a cost of waiting for punishment). By explicitly accounting for the relationship between prospection and value, our model provides a framework to reconcile the utility-maximization approach with psychological phenomena such as planning for the future and dread.

Evolution of cognition

Renewed interest in the field of comparative cognition over the past 30 years has led to a renaissance in our thinking of how cognition evolved. Here, we review historical and comparative approaches to the study of psychological evolution, focusing on cognitive differences based on evolutionary divergence, but also cognitive similarities based on evolutionary convergence. Both approaches have contributed to major theories of cognitive evolution in humans and non-human animals. As a result, not only have we furthered our understanding of the evolution of the human mind and its unique attributes, but we have also identified complex cognitive capacities in a few large-brained species, evolved from solving social and ecological challenges requiring a flexible mind. WIREs Cogni Sci 2011 2 621-633 DOI: 10.1002/wcs.144 For further resources related to this article, please visit the WIREs website.