Toward an integrated neuroscience of morality: the contribution of neuroeconomics to moral cognition

Foreign and Regional Languages Make You Less Deontological

Previous studies have shown that foreign languages can change people's responses to moral dilemmas, making them more likely to choose harm (e.g., to kill one individual in order to save a few lives). Regional languages have also been shown to make sacrificial choices more likely. Regional languages are typically acquired early and used routinely among family and acquaintances, thus differing from foreign languages that are typically acquired later and used rather sporadically. Using a process dissociation procedure, we show in the present study that regional and foreign languages weaken the contribution of the deontological view in similar ways. Furthermore, the effects of both languages were modulated by proficiency, so that less proficient bilinguals showed a stronger decrease of the deontological tendency. These similarities suggest that the effects induced by both languages stem from what these languages have in common. Both languages are not experienced in contexts critical in forging moral views (e.g., public institutions, media, schools). We propose that the effects of foreign and regional languages stem from the lack of experience in such contexts.

A neurocomputational account of the link between social perception and social action

People selectively help others based on perceptions of their merit or need. Here, we develop a neurocomputational account of how these social perceptions translate into social choice. Using a novel fMRI social perception task, we show that both merit and need perceptions recruited the brain's social inference network. A behavioral computational model identified two non-exclusive mechanisms underlying variance in social perceptions: a consistent tendency to perceive others as meritorious/needy (bias) and a propensity to sample and integrate normative evidence distinguishing high from low merit/need in other people (sensitivity). Variance in people's merit (but not need) bias and sensitivity independently predicted distinct aspects of altruism in a social choice task completed months later. An individual's merit bias predicted context-independent variance in people's overall other-regard during altruistic choice, biasing people towards prosocial actions. An individual's merit sensitivity predicted context-sensitive discrimination in generosity towards high and low merit recipients by influencing other-regard and self-regard during altruistic decision-making. This context-sensitive perception-action link was associated with activation in the right temporoparietal junction. Together, these findings point towards stable, biologically based individual differences in perceptual processes related to abstract social concepts like merit, and suggest that these differences may have important behavioral implications for an individual's tendency toward favoritism or discrimination in social settings.

Moral judgements of fairness-related actions are flexibly updated to account for contextual information

In everyday life we are constantly updating our moral judgements as we learn new information. However, this judgement updating process has not been systematically studied. We investigated how people update their moral judgements of fairness-related actions of others after receiving contextual information regarding the deservingness of the action recipient. Participants (N = 313) observed a virtual ‘Decision-maker’ share a portion of $10 with a virtual ‘Receiver’. Participants were aware that the Decision-maker made these choices knowing the Receiver’s previous offer to another person. Participants first made a context-absent judgement of the Decision-maker’s offer to the Receiver, and then a subsequent context-present judgement of the same offer after learning the Receiver’s previous offer. This sequence was repeated for varying dollar values of Decision-makers’ and Receivers’ offers. Patterns of judgements varied across individuals and were interpretable in relation to moral norms. Most participants flexibly switched from relying on context-independent norms (generosity, equality) to related, context-dependent norms (relative generosity, indirect reciprocity) as they integrated contextual information. Judgement of low offers varied across individuals, with a substantial minority of participants withholding their context-absent judgements of selfishness, and another minority that was lenient towards selfishness across both judgements. Our paradigm provides a novel framework for investigating how moral judgements evolve in real time as people learn more information about a given situation.

At the heart of morality lies neuro-visceral integration: lower cardiac vagal tone predicts utilitarian moral judgment

To not harm others is widely considered the most basic element of human morality. The aversion to harm others can be either rooted in the outcomes of an action (utilitarianism) or reactions to the action itself (deontology). We speculated that the human moral judgments rely on the integration of neural computations of harm and visceral reactions. The present research examined whether utilitarian or deontological aspects of moral judgment are associated with cardiac vagal tone, a physiological proxy for neuro-visceral integration. We investigated the relationship between cardiac vagal tone and moral judgment by using a mix of moral dilemmas, mathematical modeling and psychophysiological measures. An index of bipolar deontology-utilitarianism was correlated with resting heart rate variability (HRV)-an index of cardiac vagal tone-such that more utilitarian judgments were associated with lower HRV. Follow-up analyses using process dissociation, which independently quantifies utilitarian and deontological moral inclinations, provided further evidence that utilitarian (but not deontological) judgments were associated with lower HRV. Our results suggest that the functional integration of neural and visceral systems during moral judgments can restrict outcome-based, utilitarian moral preferences. Implications for theories of moral judgment are discussed.

Moral cognition in schizophrenia

INTRODUCTION

Disordered moral behaviour and understanding of moral rules were described early in the literature on schizophrenia; however, moral cognition has received scant attention in spite of a large literature focused on social cognitive impairments and violent behaviour in schizophrenia.

METHODS

We conducted a narrative synthesis of the literature on violence, moral judgement and schizophrenia.

RESULTS

Initial empirical research into moral cognition in schizophrenia did not fully account for the basic- and social-cognitive deficits now known to characterise schizophrenia. Importantly, research into moral cognition in autism and psychopathy, disorders in part characterised by social cognitive impairments indicates subtle patterns of difference to the moral cognition of control participants. Recent neuroeconomic studies of moral cognition in schizophrenia have indicated that individuals with schizophrenia display subtle dysfunction in their fairness-related behaviours, but not in their propensity to engage in altruistic punishment.

CONCLUSIONS

Further research has the potential to broaden our understanding of what is intact and what is impaired in moral cognition in schizophrenia and also to inform our theories of the structures subserving moral judgement in the general population. Furthermore, a more thorough understanding of moral cognitive impairments in schizophrenia may have implications for both legal process and psychosocial rehabilitation.

Action, Outcome, and Value

Dual-system approaches to psychology explain the fundamental properties of human judgment, decision making, and behavior across diverse domains. Yet, the appropriate characterization of each system is a source of debate. For instance, a large body of research on moral psychology makes use of the contrast between “emotional” and “rational/cognitive” processes, yet even the chief proponents of this division recognize its shortcomings. Largely independently, research in the computational neurosciences has identified a broad division between two algorithms for learning and choice derived from formal models of reinforcement learning. One assigns value to actions intrinsically based on past experience, while another derives representations of value from an internally represented causal model of the world. This division between action- and outcome-based value representation provides an ideal framework for a dual-system theory in the moral domain.