Asymmetry within social groups: division of labour and intergroup competition

Evolution of cooperation in a two-species system with a common resource pool

Understanding the evolution of cooperation is a major question in Evolutionary Biology. Here, we extend a previously proposed mathematical model in Evolutionary Game Theory that investigated how resource use by a single species composed of cooperators and defectors may lead to its maintenance or extinction. We include another species in the model, so as to investigate how different intra and interspecific interactions of cooperative or competitive nature among individuals that share the same essential resource may drive the survival and evolution of the species. Several outcomes emerge from the model, depending on the configuration of the payoff matrix, the individual contribution to the resource pool, the competition intensity between species, and the initial conditions of the system dynamics. Observed results include scenarios in which species thrive due to the action of cooperators, but also scenarios in which both species collapse due to lack of cooperation and, consequently, of resources. In particular, a high initial availability of resources may be the determinant factor to the survival of both species. Interestingly, cooperation may be more favored when individuals have less incentive to cooperate with others, and the survival of their populations may depend crucially on their competitive capacities.

Feedback loops in the major evolutionary transition to eusociality: the status and potential of theoretical approaches

In this review, we adopt a step-wise framework for the evolution a major evolutionary transition in light of eusocial insects. By focusing on the sequence of (1) group formation, (2) alignment of genetic interests, and finally (3) group integration to higher-level functioning, we highlight that these steps occasionally interact with each other through feedback. We summarize models that capture such feedback and identify cases where there is room for the development of between-step relationships. We suggest that life history traits may serve as a conduit for analyzing feedback between suites of correlated traits. Our review reveals that there are many relationships both within and between the above steps that await formal modeling.

The Heider balance and the looking-glass self: modelling dynamics of social relations

We consider the dynamics of interpersonal relations which leads to balanced states in a fully connected network. Here this approach is applied to directed networks with asymmetric relations, and it is generalized to include self-evaluation of actors, according to the 'looking-glass self' theory. A new index of self-acceptance is proposed: the relation of an actor to him/herself is positive, if the majority of his/her positive relations to others are reciprocated. Sets of stable configurations of relations are obtained under the dynamics, where the self-evaluation of some actors is negative. Within each set all configurations have the same structure.

Inter-group cooperation in humans and other animals

Social interactions are often characterized by cooperation within groups and conflict or competition between groups. In certain circumstances, however, cooperation can arise between social groups. Here, we examine the circumstances under which inter-group cooperation is expected to emerge and present examples with particular focus on groups in two well-studied but dissimilar taxa: humans and ants. Drivers for the evolution of inter-group cooperation include overarching threats from predators, competitors or adverse conditions, and group-level resource asymmetries. Resources can differ between groups in both quantity and type. Where the difference is in type, inequalities can lead to specialization and division of labour between groups, a phenomenon characteristic of human societies, but rarely seen in other animals. The ability to identify members of one's own group is essential for social coherence; we consider the proximate roles of identity effects in shaping inter-group cooperation and allowing membership of multiple groups. Finally, we identify numerous valuable avenues for future research that will improve our understanding of the processes shaping inter-group cooperation.

Synthesizing perspectives on the evolution of cooperation within and between species

Cooperation is widespread both within and between species, but are intraspecific and interspecific cooperation fundamentally similar or qualitatively different phenomena? This review evaluates this question, necessary for a general understanding of the evolution of cooperation. First, we outline three advantages of cooperation relative to noncooperation (acquisition of otherwise inaccessible goods and services, more efficient acquisition of resources, and buffering against variability), and predict when individuals should cooperate with a conspecific versus a heterospecific partner to obtain these advantages. Second, we highlight five axes along which heterospecific and conspecific partners may differ: relatedness and fitness feedbacks, competition and resource use, resource-generation abilities, relative evolutionary rates, and asymmetric strategy sets and outside options. Along all of these axes, certain asymmetries between partners are more common in, but not exclusive to, cooperation between species, especially complementary resource use and production. We conclude that cooperation within and between species share many fundamental qualities, and that differences between the two systems are explained by the various asymmetries between partners. Consideration of the parallels between intra- and interspecific cooperation facilitates application of well-studied topics in one system to the other, such as direct benefits within species and kin-selected cooperation between species, generating promising directions for future research.

Women Tend to Defect in a Social Dilemma Game in Southwest China

Cooperation theories assume that interacting individuals can change their strategies under different expected payoffs, depending on their social status or social situations. When looking at sex differences in cooperation, the existing studies have found that the genders cooperate at similar frequencies. However, the majority of the data originate within Western human societies. In this paper, we explore whether there are gender differences in cooperation in China. An Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game with a punishment option was used to gather data about Southwest Chinese subjects in a culture in which men have a hierarchical advantage over women. Results indicate that men invested into partners significantly more than women did (34% ♂ vs. 24% ♀) while women, in turn, were more likely to defect (65% ♀ vs. 50% ♂). In this region, women have customarily held less economic power and they are used to obtain a payoff typically lower than men. We suggest that the women’s willingness to invest in cooperation has decreased throughout evolutionary time, providing us with an illustration of a culturally-driven shift towards a disparity in gender cooperation interests.