The source of the truth bias: Heuristic processing?

Electrophysiological correlates of (mis)judging social information

Social information can be used to optimize decision-making. However, the simultaneous presentation of multiple sources of advice can lead to a distinction bias in judging the validity of the information. While the involvement of event-related potential (ERP) components in social information processing has been studied, how they are modulated by (mis)judging an advisor's information validity remains unknown. In two experiments participants performed a decision-making task with highly accurate or inaccurate cues. Each experiment consisted of an initial, learning, and test phase. During the learning phase, three advice cues were simultaneously presented and the validity of them had to be assessed. The effect of different cue constellations on ERPs was investigated. In the subsequent test phase, the willingness to follow or oppose an advice cue was tested. Results demonstrated the distinction bias with participants over or underestimating the accuracy of the most uncertain cues. The P2 amplitude was significantly increased during cue presentation when advisors were in disagreement as compared to when all were in agreement, regardless of cue validity. Further, a larger P3 amplitude during outcome presentation was found when advisors were in disagreement and increased with more informative cues. As such, the most uncertain cues were related to the smallest P3 amplitude. The findings hint at the possible role of P3 in judging and learning the predictability of social cues. This study provides novel insights into the role of P2 and P3 components during the judgment of social information validity.

Verbal lie detection using Large Language Models

Human accuracy in detecting deception with intuitive judgments has been proven to not go above the chance level. Therefore, several automatized verbal lie detection techniques employing Machine Learning and Transformer models have been developed to reach higher levels of accuracy. This study is the first to explore the performance of a Large Language Model, FLAN-T5 (small and base sizes), in a lie-detection classification task in three English-language datasets encompassing personal opinions, autobiographical memories, and future intentions. After performing stylometric analysis to describe linguistic differences in the three datasets, we tested the small- and base-sized FLAN-T5 in three Scenarios using 10-fold cross-validation: one with train and test set coming from the same single dataset, one with train set coming from two datasets and the test set coming from the third remaining dataset, one with train and test set coming from all the three datasets. We reached state-of-the-art results in Scenarios 1 and 3, outperforming previous benchmarks. The results revealed also that model performance depended on model size, with larger models exhibiting higher performance. Furthermore, stylometric analysis was performed to carry out explainability analysis, finding that linguistic features associated with the Cognitive Load framework may influence the model's predictions.

Power and lie detection

Social power undermines focus on others and increases reliance on stereotype-consistent information. Thus, power may enhance focus on stereotypical cues to deception, thereby decreasing lie detection accuracy. In three studies, we tested whether having power affects lie detection accuracy. Participants (overall N = 502) were asked to identify truthful and lying candidates (N = 12) during mock job interviews. Study 1 was a field experiment involving employees who held managerial and non-managerial positions (N = 88). In the following laboratory experiments, we manipulated power and asked participants to imagine themselves as managers (Study 2, N = 214) or provided them with control over resources and the ability to reward others (Study 3, N = 200). In Studies 2 and 3, we additionally manipulated the method of lie detection (direct vs. indirect). In contrast to the original hypotheses, we found that power led to increased veracity assessment accuracy. Having power over others enhances the accuracy of one’s veracity assessment, although this increase is small and limited to lie detection (Study 1) or direct judgments (Studies 2 & 3). Together, power affects the processing of social information and what aspects of this information are taken into account.

The Electrocortical Signature of Successful and Unsuccessful Deception in a Face-to-Face Social Interaction

Deceptive behavior, and the evaluation of others' behavior as truthful or deceptive, are crucial aspects of human social interaction. We report a study investigating two participants in a social interaction, performing a deception task. The first participant, the "informant," made true or false autobiographical statements. The second participant, the "detective," then classified these statements as truth or lie. Behavioral data showed that detectives performed slightly above chance and were better at correctly identifying true as compared with deceptive statements. This presumably reflects the "truth bias": the finding that individuals are more likely to classify others' statements as truthful than as deceptive - even when informed that a lie is as likely to be told as the truth. Electroencephalography (EEG) was recorded from the informant. Event-related potential (ERP) analysis revealed a smaller contingent negative variation (CNV) preceding "convincing" statements (statements classified as true by the detective) compared to "unconvincing" statements (statements classified as lie by the detective) - irrespective of whether the statements were actually truthful or deceptive. This finding suggests a distinct electrocortical signature of "successful" compared to "unsuccessful" deceptive statements. One possible explanation is that the pronounced CNV indicates the individuals' higher "cognitive load" when processing unconvincing statements.

Experimental evidence of consumer and physician detection and rejection of misleading prescription drug website content

BACKGROUND

Consumers and primary care physicians (PCPs) sometimes encounter deceptive promotional claims about prescription drugs. Whether consumers and PCPs can detect deceptive claims or whether those claims negatively affect medical decision making, however, remain important, unanswered research questions.

OBJECTIVES

This article explores (1) the ability of consumers and PCPs to identify deceptive prescription drug promotion at various levels of deception, (2) the influence of such tactics on obstructing risk recognition, and (3) whether perceived deception mediates relationships between exposure to deceptive tactics and various outcomes (including false-claim acceptance, attitudes, information-seeking intentions, and interest toward the promoted drug).

METHODS

Two experiments-1 with consumers (N = 366) and 1 with PCPs (N = 378)-were conducted to determine whether participant exposure to deceptive prescription drug website content corresponds to detection and acceptance (or rejection) of claims and tactics. In each experiment, the number of deceptive claims and tactics on a consumer- or PCP-targeted website for a fictitious chronic pain medication were varied, in a 1 × 3 (none, fewer, more) between-subjects design.

RESULTS

Among consumers, exposure to more deceptive claims or tactics did not increase suspicion about the veracity of the website (relative to fewer claims and tactics) and actually had a limited positive direct effect on false-claim acceptance and attitudes toward the drug. Among PCPs, a mediation effect existed such that exposure to more deceptive claims and tactics resulted in higher perceived website deceptiveness relative to those in the fewer deceptive claims condition, which, in turn, resulted in lower acceptance of deceptive claims and tactics, lower perceived drug effectiveness, more negative attitudes toward the drug, and lower interest and intentions.

CONCLUSION

These experiments demonstrate potential differences between consumers and PCPs as well as implications for consumer and PCP vulnerability to website deception.

Is justice blind or myopic? An examination of the effects of meta-cognitive myopia and truth bias on mock jurors and judges

Previous studies have shown that people are truth-biased in that they tend to believe the information they receive, even if it is clearly flagged as false. The truth bias has been recently proposed to be an instance of meta-cognitive myopia, that is, of a generalized human insensitivity towards the quality and correctness of the information available in the environment. In two studies we tested whether meta-cognitive myopia and the ensuing truth bias may operate in a courtroom setting. Based on a well-established paradigm in the truth-bias literature, we asked mock jurors (Study 1) and professional judges (Study 2) to read two crime reports containing aggravating or mitigating information that was explicitly flagged as false. Our findings suggest that jurors and judges are truth-biased, as their decisions and memory about the cases were affected by the false information. We discuss the implications of the potential operation of the truth bias in the courtroom, in the light of the literature on inadmissible and discredible evidence, and make some policy suggestions.

Factors affecting Observers' Accuracy when Assessing Credibility: The Effect of the Interaction between Media, Senders' Competence and Veracity

The present experiment examined how the interaction between senders' communicative competence, veracity and the medium through which judgments were made affected observers' accuracy. Stimuli were obtained from a previous study. Observers (N = 220) judged the truthfulness of statements provided by a good truth teller, a good liar, a bad truth teller, and a bad liar presented either via an audio-only, video-only, audio-video, or transcript format. Log-linear analyses showed that the data were best explained via the saturated model, therefore indicating that all the four variables interacted, G2(0) = 0, p = 1, Q2 = 1. Follow-up analyses showed that the good liar and bad liar were best evaluated via the transcript (z = 2.5) and the audio-only medium (z = 3.9), respectively. Both the good truth teller and the bad truth teller were best assessed through the audio-video medium (z = 2.1, good truth teller, z = 3.4, bad truth teller). Results indicated that all the factors interacted and played a joint role on observers' accuracy. Difficulties and suggestions for choosing the right medium are presented.

Learning to Detect Deception from Evasive Answers and Inconsistencies across Repeated Interviews: A Study with Lay Respondents and Police Officers

Previous research has shown that inconsistencies across repeated interviews do not indicate deception because liars deliberately tend to repeat the same story. However, when a strategic interview approach that makes it difficult for liars to use the repeat strategy is used, both consistency and evasive answers differ significantly between truth tellers and liars, and statistical software (binary logistic regression analyses) can reach high classification rates (Masip et al., 2016b). Yet, if the interview procedure is to be used in applied settings the decision process will be made by humans, not statistical software. To address this issue, in the current study, 475 college students (Experiment 1) and 142 police officers (Experiment 2) were instructed to code and use consistency, evasive answers, or a combination or both before judging the veracity of Masip et al.'s (2016b) interview transcripts. Accuracy rates were high (60% to over 90%). Evasive answers yielded higher rates than consistency, and the combination of both these cues produced the highest accuracy rates in identifying both truthful and deceptive statements. Uninstructed participants performed fairly well (around 75% accuracy), apparently because they spontaneously used consistency and evasive answers. The pattern of results was the same among students, all officers, and veteran officers only, and shows that inconsistencies between interviews and evasive answers reveal deception when a strategic interview approach that hinders the repeat strategy is used.

Strategic Interviewing to Detect Deception: Cues to Deception across Repeated Interviews

Previous deception research on repeated interviews found that liars are not less consistent than truth tellers, presumably because liars use a “repeat strategy” to be consistent across interviews. The goal of this study was to design an interview procedure to overcome this strategy. Innocent participants (truth tellers) and guilty participants (liars) had to convince an interviewer that they had performed several innocent activities rather than committing a mock crime. The interview focused on the innocent activities (alibi), contained specific central and peripheral questions, and was repeated after 1 week without forewarning. Cognitive load was increased by asking participants to reply quickly. The liars’ answers in replying to both central and peripheral questions were significantly less accurate, less consistent, and more evasive than the truth tellers’ answers. Logistic regression analyses yielded classification rates ranging from around 70% (with consistency as the predictor variable), 85% (with evasive answers as the predictor variable), to over 90% (with an improved measure of consistency that incorporated evasive answers as the predictor variable, as well as with response accuracy as the predictor variable). These classification rates were higher than the interviewers’ accuracy rate (54%).

Can the Unconscious Boost Lie-Detection Accuracy?

Recently, a variety of methods have been used to show that unconscious processes can boost lie-detection accuracy. This article considers the latest developments in the context of research into unconscious cognition. Unconscious cognition has been under attack in recent years because the findings do not replicate, and when they do show reliably improved performance, they fail to exclude the possibility that conscious processing is at work. Here we show that work into unconscious lie detection suffers from the same weaknesses. Future research would benefit from taking a stronger theoretical stance and explicitly attempting to exclude conscious-processing accounts.

Detecting Deception within Small Groups: A Literature Review

Investigators often have multiple suspects to interview in order to determine whether they are guilty or innocent of a crime. Nevertheless, co-offending has been significantly neglected within the deception detection literature. The current review is the first of its kind to discuss co-offending and the importance of examining the detection of deception within groups. Groups of suspects can be interviewed separately (individual interviewing) or simultaneously (collective interviewing) and these differing interviewing styles are assessed throughout the review. The review emphasizes the differences between lone individuals and groups. It focuses on the theoretical implications of group deceit and the reasons why groups need to be understood in terms of investigative interviewing and deception detection if all types of crime-related incidents are to be recognized and dealt with appropriately. Group strategies, consistency within- and between-statements, joint memory, and group dynamics are referred to throughout the review and the importance of developing interview protocols specifically for groups is discussed. The review concludes by identifying the gaps in the literature and suggesting ideas for future research, highlighting that more research is required if we are to obtain a true understanding of the deception occurring within groups and how best to detect it.

A reverse order interview does not aid deception detection regarding intentions

Promising recent research suggests that more cognitively demanding interviews improve deception detection accuracy. Would these cognitively demanding techniques work in the same way when discriminating between true and false future intentions? In Experiment 1 participants planned to complete a task, but instead were intercepted and interviewed about their intentions. Participants lied or told the truth, and were subjected to high (reverse order) or low (sequential order) cognitive load interviews. Third-party observers watched these interviews and indicated whether they thought the person was lying or telling the truth. Subjecting participants to a reverse compared to sequential interview increased the misidentification rate and the appearance of cognitive load in truth tellers. People lying about false intentions were not better identified. In Experiment 2, a second set of third-party observers rated behavioral cues. Consistent with Experiment 1, truth tellers, but not liars, exhibited more behaviors associated with lying and fewer behaviors associated with truth telling in the reverse than sequential interview. Together these results suggest that certain cognitively demanding interviews may be less useful when interviewing to detect false intentions. Explaining a true intention while under higher cognitive demand places truth tellers at risk of being misclassified. There may be such a thing as too much cognitive load induced by certain techniques