Some Theoretical Considerations on Attitude, Arousal and Affect during Cognitive Dissonance

Vicarious Dissonance: Pre-Registered Meta-Analysis

The vicarious cognitive dissonance process predicts that observing an inconsistent act by a member of the ingroup causes uncomfortable arousal in the observer, inducing a motivation to reduce this discomfort. This meta-analysis examined the effect of vicarious cognitive dissonance based on 24 studies (N = 16,769). Our results indicated a small effect for the vicarious cognitive dissonance (g = 0.41 [0.27, 0.54], p <.001) with important variability between the outcomes. Our moderator analysis was limited by the low number of included studies. Publication bias analyses indicate a small true effect size (e.g., 3PSM: g = 0.22, p = .042), that was inflated by small sample sizes (R-index = 14.6%). We discussed theoretical issues concerning the psychological processes underlying vicarious cognitive dissonance, and methodological questions concerning operationalization. We proposed ways of improving the design and procedure to ensure that the effects found in the literature exist and are replicable.

The advice less taken: The consequences of receiving unexpected advice

Although new information technologies and social networks make a wide variety of opinions and advice easily accessible, one can never be sure to get support on a focal judgment task. Nevertheless, participants in traditional advice taking studies are by default informed in advance about the opportunity to revise their judgment in the light of advice. The expectation of advice, however, may affect the weight assigned to it. The present research therefore investigates whether the advice taking process depends on the expectation of advice in the judge-advisor system (JAS). Five preregistered experiments (total N = 2019) compared low and high levels of advice expectation. While there was no evidence for expectation effects in three experiments with block-wise structure, we obtained support for a positive influence of advice expectation on advice weighting in two experiments implementing sequential advice taking. The paradigmatic disclosure of the full procedure to participants thus constitutes an important boundary condition for the ecological study of advice taking behavior. The results suggest that the conventional JAS procedure fails to capture a class of judgment processes where advice is unexpected and therefore weighted less.

Exploring Cognitive Dissonance on a Ski Mountaineering Traverse: A Personal Narrative of an Expedition to ISHINCA (5530 m) in PERU

Through a personal narrative account, this paper explores the nature of the author’s cognitive dissonance experienced during a traverse of a high-altitude ski mountaineering objective (Nevado Ishinca 5530 m) in Peru’s Cordillera Blanca. The author experienced psychological discomfort in the ascent and a role of self in determining a continued commitment with the ski mountaineering challenge. Distraction, trivialization, act rationalization and finally attitude change were all used in attempt to reduce negative levels of cognitive dissonance. The lack of consonant cognitions to support abandoning the climb, the notion of free choice, the role of self-concept and self-esteem values motivated continued commitment until the negative levels of arousal subsided. Through a challenging mountaineering experience, I developed a greater self-awareness of the role of commitment to an objective which could be applied to other life events and experiences.

The principle of consistency and the cause and function of behaviour

At all levels of information processing in the brain, neural and cognitive structures tend towards a state of consistency. When two or more simultaneously active cognitive structures are logically inconsistent, arousal is increased, which activates processes with the expected consequence of increasing consistency and decreasing arousal. Increased arousal is experienced as aversive, while the expected or actual decrease in arousal as a result of increased consistency is experienced as rewarding. Modes of resolution of inconsistency can be divided into purely cognitive solutions, such as changing an attitude or an associated motor plan, and behavioural solutions, such as exploration, aggression, fear, and feeding. Models and theories consistent with the principle of consistency are numerous, have a long and continuing history, and come from many different scientific fields, such as social psychology, perception, neurocognition, learning, motor control, system control, ethology, and stress. The present paper presents a brief overview of relevant information from these fields of research, while focusing mainly on the implications of the principle of consistency for the understanding of the cause and function of behaviour. Based on this overview, it is proposed that all behaviour involving cognitive processing is caused by the activation of inconsistent cognitions and functions to increase perceived consistency.