New perspectives for evaluating relative risks of African swine fever virus contamination in global feed ingredient supply chains

Unexpected thermal stability of two enveloped megaviruses, Emiliania huxleyi virus and African swine fever virus, as measured by viability PCR

BACKGROUND

The particle structure of Emiliania huxleyi virus (EhV), an algal infecting member of nucleocytoplasmic large DNA viruses (NCLDVs), contains an outer lipid membrane envelope similar to that found in animal viruses such as African swine fever virus (ASFV). Despite both being enveloped NCLDVs, EhV and ASFV are known for their stability outside their host environment.

METHOD

Here we report for the first time, the application of a viability qPCR (V-qPCR) method to describe the unprecedented and similar virion thermal stability of both EhV and ASFV. This result contradicts the cell culture-based assay method that suggests that virus "infectivity" is lost in a matter of seconds (for EhV) and minutes (for ASFV) at temperature greater than 50 °C. Confocal microscopy and analytical flow cytometry methods was used to validate the V-qPCR data for EhV.

RESULTS

We observed that both EhV and ASFV particles has unprecedented thermal tolerances. These two NCLDVs are exceptions to the rule that having an enveloped virion anatomy is a predicted weakness, as is often observed in enveloped RNA viruses (i.e., the viruses causing Porcine Reproductive and Respiratory Syndrome (PRRS), COVID-19, Ebola, or seasonal influenza). Using the V-qPCR method, we confirm that no PRRSV particles were detectable after 20 min of exposure to temperatures up to 100 °C. We also show that the EhV particles that remain after 50 °C 20 min exposure was in fact still infectious only after the three blind passages in bioassay experiments.

CONCLUSIONS

This study raises the possibility that ASFV is not always eliminated or contained after applying time and temperature inactivation treatments in current decontamination or biosecurity protocols. This observation has practical implications for industries involved in animal health and food security. Finally, we propose that EhV could be used as a surrogate for ASFV under certain circumstances.

Inactivation of African swine fever virus inoculated in liquid plasma by spray drying and storage for 14 days at 4°C or 20°C

African swine fever virus (ASFV) is a dsDNA virus that can cause high mortality in pigs of all ages. Spray-dried porcine plasma (SDPP) is a highly digestible ingredient used in feed because it benefits performance, gut function and immunity. The objectives were to test if the spray-drying (SD) conditions along with post-drying storage of product for 14 days can inactivate ASFV inoculated in liquid plasma. Fresh liquid porcine plasma was inoculated with ASFV (BA71V) to a final concentration of 105.18 ±0.08 TCID50/mL of liquid plasma. Triplicate 2-L samples of spiked plasma were SD in a lab drier set at an outlet temperature of 80°C or 71°C. The final dried samples were stored at 4°C or 20°C for 14 d. Liquid and SD samples were analyzed for ASFV infectivity in two mirror 24-well plaques containing VERO cells monolayers. Wells were inoculated with different dilutions of SDPP dissolved 1:9 in PBS. One plaque was immediately frozen at -80°C and the other was incubated at 37°C for 3 d. Each dilution was replicated 9 times. After incubation both plaques were analyzed for ASFV by qRT-PCR. Results indicated that the SD process inactivated between 3.2 to 4.2 Logs ASFV TCID50/mL and 2.53 to 2.75 Logs TCID50/mL when the outlet temperature were 80°C and 71°C respectively. All SD samples stored at 4°C or 20°C for 14 d were absent of infectious ASFV. The combination of SD and post drying storage at both temperatures for 14 d was able to inactive >5.18 ±0.08 Log10 of ASFV inoculated in liquid porcine plasma, demonstrating that the manufacturing process for SDPP can be considered safe regarding ASFV.

Biosecurity and Mitigation Strategies to Control Swine Viruses in Feed Ingredients and Complete Feeds

No system nor standardized analytical procedures at commercial laboratories exist to facilitate and accurately measure potential viable virus contamination in feed ingredients and complete feeds globally. As a result, there is high uncertainty of the extent of swine virus contamination in global feed supply chains. Many knowledge gaps need to be addressed to improve our ability to prevent virus contamination and transmission in swine feed. This review summarizes the current state of knowledge involving: (1) the need for biosecurity protocols to identify production, processing, storage, and transportation conditions that may cause virus contamination of feed ingredients and complete feed; (2) challenges of measuring virus inactivation; (3) virus survival in feed ingredients during transportation and storage; (4) minimum infectious doses; (5) differences between using a food safety objective versus a performance objective as potential approaches for risk assessment in swine feed; (6) swine virus inactivation from thermal and irradiation processes, and chemical mitigants in feed ingredients and complete feed; (7) efficacy of virus decontamination strategies in feed mills; (8) benefits of functional ingredients, nutrients, and commercial feed additives in pig diets during a viral health challenge; and (9) considerations for improved risk assessment models of virus contamination in feed supply chains.

Survival of a surrogate African swine fever virus-like algal virus in feed matrices using a 23-day commercial United States truck transport model

African swine fever virus (ASFV) is a member of the nucleocytoplasmic large DNA viruses (NCLDVs) and is stable in a variety of environments, including animal feed ingredients as shown in previous laboratory experiments and simulations. Emiliania huxleyi virus (EhV) is another member of the NCLDVs, which has a restricted host range limited to a species of marine algae called Emiliania huxleyi. This algal NCLDV has many similar morphological and physical characteristics to ASFV thereby making it a safe surrogate, with results that are applicable to ASFV and suitable for use in real-world experiments. Here we inoculated conventional soybean meal (SBMC), organic soybean meal (SBMO), and swine complete feed (CF) matrices with EhV strain 86 (EhV-86) at a concentration of 6.6 × 107 virus g-1, and then transported these samples in the trailer of a commercial transport vehicle for 23 days across 10,183 km covering 29 states in various regions of the United States. Upon return, samples were evaluated for virus presence and viability using a previously validated viability qPCR (V-qPCR) method. Results showed that EhV-86 was detected in all matrices and no degradation in EhV-86 viability was observed after the 23-day transportation event. Additionally, sampling sensitivity (we recorded unexpected increases, as high as 49% in one matrix, when virus was recovered at the end of the sampling period) rather than virus degradation best explains the variation of virus quantity observed after the 23-day transport simulation. These results demonstrate for the first time that ASFV-like NCLDVs can retain viability in swine feed matrices during long-term transport across the continental United States.

Research progress on the proteins involved in African swine fever virus infection and replication

African swine fever (ASF) is an acute, hemorrhagic and highly contagious infectious disease caused by African swine fever virus (ASFV), which infects domestic pigs or wild boars. It is characterized by short course of disease, high fever and hemorrhagic lesions, with mortality of up to 100% from acute infection. Up to now, the lack of commercial vaccines and effective drugs has seriously threatened the healthy economic development of the global pig industry. ASFV is a double-stranded DNA virus and genome varies between about 170-194 kb, which encodes 150-200 viral proteins, including 68 structural proteins and more than 100 non-structural proteins. In recent years, although the research on structure and function of ASFV-encoded proteins has been deepened, the structure and infection process of ASFV are still not clear. This review summarizes the main process of ASFV infection, replication and functions of related viral proteins to provide scientific basis and theoretical basis for ASFV research and vaccine development.

Rethinking the uncertainty of African swine fever virus contamination in feed ingredients and risk of introduction into the United States

Economically relevant pathogens, such as African swine fever virus (ASFV), have been shown to survive when experimentally inoculated in some feed ingredients under the environmental conditions in transoceanic transport models. However, these models did not characterize the likelihood of virus survival under various time and temperature processes that feed ingredients undergo before they are added to swine diets. Here, we developed a quantitative risk assessment model to estimate the probability that one or more corn or soybean meal ocean vessels (25,000 tonnes) contaminated with ASFV would be imported into the United States annually. This final probability estimate was conditionally based on five likelihoods: the probability of initial ASFV contamination (p0), ASFV inactivation during processing (p1) and transport (p2), recontamination (pR), and ASFV inactivation while awaiting customs clearance at United States entry (p3). The probability of ASFV inactivation was modelled using corn and soybean (extruded or solvent extracted) processing conditions (times and temperatures), D-values (time to reduce 90% or 1-log) estimated from studies of ASFV thermal inactivation in pork serum (p1), and survival in feed ingredients during transoceanic transport (p2 and p3). 'What-if' scenarios using deterministic values for p0 and pR (1%, 10%, 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100%) were used to explore their impact on risk. The model estimated complete inactivation of ASFV after extrusion or solvent extraction processes regardless of the initial ASFV contamination probability assumed. The value of recontamination (ranging from 1% to 75%) was highly influential on the risk of one ASFV-contaminated soybean meal vessel entering the United States. Median risk estimates ranged from 0.064% [0.006%-0.60%; 95% probability interval (PI)], assuming a pR of 1.0%, up to 4.67% (0.45%-36.50% 95% PI) assuming a pR of 75.0%. This means that at least one vessel with ASFV-contaminated soybean meal would be imported once every 1563-21 years, respectively. When all raw corn was assumed to be contaminated (p0 = 100%), and no recontamination was assumed to occur (pR = 0%), the median probability of one vessel with ASFV-contaminated corn entering the United States was 2.02% (0.28%-9.43% 95% PI) or once every 50 years. Values of recontamination between 1% and 75% did not substantially change the risk of corn. Days of transport, virus survival during transport (D-value), and number of vessels shipped were the parameters most influential for increased likelihood of a vessel with ASFV-contaminated soybean meal or corn entering the United States. The model helped to identify knowledge gaps that are most influential on output values and serves as a framework that could be updated and parameterized as new scientific information becomes available. We propose that the quantitative risk assessment model developed in this study can be used as a framework for estimating the risk of ASFV entry into the United States and other ASFV-free countries through other types of imported feed ingredients that may potentially become contaminated. Ultimately, this model can be used to develop risk mitigation strategies and critical control points for inactivating ASFV during feed ingredient processing, storage, and transport, and contribute to the design and implementation of biosecurity measures to prevent the introduction of ASFV into the United States and other ASFV-free countries.

Can we effectively manage parasites, prions, and pathogens in the global feed industry to achieve One Health?

Prions and certain endoparasites, bacteria, and viruses are internationally recognized as types of disease-causing biological agents that can be transmitted from contaminated feed to animals. Historically, foodborne biological hazards such as prions (transmissible spongiform encephalopathy), endoparasites (Trichinella spiralis, Toxoplasma gondii), and pathogenic bacteria (Salmonella spp., Listeria monocytogenes, Escherichia coli O157, Clostridium spp., and Campylobacter spp.) were major food safety concerns from feeding uncooked or improperly heated animal-derived food waste and by-products. However, implementation of validated thermal processing conditions along with verifiable quality control procedures has been effective in enabling safe use of these feed materials in animal diets. More recently, the occurrence of global Porcine Epidemic Diarrhea Virus and African Swine Fever Virus epidemics, dependence on international feed ingredient supply chains, and the discovery that these viruses can survive in some feed ingredient matrices under environmental conditions of trans-oceanic shipments has created an urgent need to develop and implement rigorous biosecurity protocols that prevent and control animal viruses in feed ingredients. Implementation of verifiable risk-based preventive controls, traceability systems from origin to destination, and effective mitigation procedures is essential to minimize these food security, safety, and sustainability threats. Creating a new biosafety and biosecurity framework will enable convergence of the diverging One Health components involving low environmental impact and functional feed ingredients that are perceived as having elevated biosafety risks when used in animal feeds.