On the Importance of a Rich Embodiment in the Grounding of Concepts: Perspectives From Embodied Cognitive Science and Computational Linguistics

A test of indirect grounding of abstract concepts using multimodal distributional semantics

How are abstract concepts grounded in perceptual experiences for shaping human conceptual knowledge? Recent studies on abstract concepts emphasizing the role of language have argued that abstract concepts are grounded indirectly in perceptual experiences and language (or words) functions as a bridge between abstract concepts and perceptual experiences. However, this “indirect grounding” view remains largely speculative and has hardly been supported directly by empirical evidence. In this paper, therefore, we test the indirect grounding view by means of multimodal distributional semantics, in which the meaning of a word (i.e., a concept) is represented as the combination of textual and visual vectors. The newly devised multimodal distributional semantic model incorporates the indirect grounding view by computing the visual vector of an abstract word through the visual vectors of concrete words semantically related to that abstract word. An evaluation experiment is conducted in which conceptual representation is predicted from multimodal vectors using a multilayer feed-forward neural network. The analysis of prediction performance demonstrates that the indirect grounding model achieves significantly better performance in predicting human conceptual representation of abstract words than other models that mimic competing views on abstract concepts, especially than the direct grounding model in which the visual vectors of abstract words are computed directly from the images of abstract concepts. This result lends some plausibility to the indirect grounding view as a cognitive mechanism of grounding abstract concepts.

The Inhibition Effect of Affordances in Action Picture Naming: An ERP Study

How quickly are different kinds of conceptual knowledge activated in action picture naming? Using a masked priming paradigm, we manipulated the prime category type (artificial vs. natural), prime action type (precision, power, vs. neutral grip), and target action type (precision vs. power grip) in action picture naming, while electrophysiological signals were measured concurrently. Naming latencies showed an inhibition effect in the congruent action type condition compared with the neutral condition. ERP results showed that artificial and natural category primes induced smaller waveforms in precision or power action primes than neutral primes in the time window of 100-200 msec. Time-frequency results consistently presented a power desynchronization of the mu rhythm in the time window of 0-210 msec with precision action type artificial objects compared with neutral primes, which localized at the supplementary motor, precentral and postcentral areas in the left hemisphere. These findings suggest an inhibitory effect of affordances arising at conceptual preparation in action picture naming and provide evidence for embodied cognition.

Exploring What Is Encoded in Distributional Word Vectors: A Neurobiologically Motivated Analysis

The pervasive use of distributional semantic models or word embeddings for both cognitive modeling and practical application is because of their remarkable ability to represent the meanings of words. However, relatively little effort has been made to explore what types of information are encoded in distributional word vectors. Knowing the internal knowledge embedded in word vectors is important for cognitive modeling using distributional semantic models. Therefore, in this paper, we attempt to identify the knowledge encoded in word vectors by conducting a computational experiment using Binder et al.'s (2016) featural conceptual representations based on neurobiologically motivated attributes. In an experiment, these conceptual vectors are predicted from text-based word vectors using a neural network and linear transformation, and prediction performance is compared among various types of information. The analysis demonstrates that abstract information is generally predicted more accurately by word vectors than perceptual and spatiotemporal information, and specifically, the prediction accuracy of cognitive and social information is higher. Emotional information is also found to be successfully predicted for abstract words. These results indicate that language can be a major source of knowledge about abstract attributes, and they support the recent view that emphasizes the importance of language for abstract concepts. Furthermore, we show that word vectors can capture some types of perceptual and spatiotemporal information about concrete concepts and some relevant word categories. This suggests that language statistics can encode more perceptual knowledge than often expected.

Symbol Grounding Without Direct Experience: Do Words Inherit Sensorimotor Activation From Purely Linguistic Context?

Theories of embodied cognition assume that concepts are grounded in non-linguistic, sensorimotor experience. In support of this assumption, previous studies have shown that upwards response movements are faster than downwards movements after participants have been presented with words whose referents are typically located in the upper vertical space (and vice versa for downwards responses). This is taken as evidence that processing these words reactivates sensorimotor experiential traces. This congruency effect was also found for novel words, after participants learned these words as labels for novel objects that they encountered either in their upper or lower visual field. While this indicates that direct experience with a word's referent is sufficient to evoke said congruency effects, the present study investigates whether this direct experience is also a necessary condition. To this end, we conducted five experiments in which participants learned novel words from purely linguistic input: Novel words were presented in pairs with real up- or down-words (Experiment 1); they were presented in natural sentences where they replaced these real words (Experiment 2); they were presented as new labels for these real words (Experiment 3); and they were presented as labels for novel combined concepts based on these real words (Experiment 4 and 5). In all five experiments, we did not find any congruency effects elicited by the novel words; however, participants were always able to make correct explicit judgements about the vertical dimension associated to the novel words. These results suggest that direct experience is necessary for reactivating experiential traces, but this reactivation is not a necessary condition for understanding (in the sense of storing and accessing) the corresponding aspects of word meaning.

What's on the Inside Counts: A Grounded Account of Concept Acquisition and Development

Understanding the factors which affect the age of acquisition (AoA) of words and concepts is fundamental to understanding cognitive development more broadly. Traditionally, studies of AoA have taken two approaches, either exploring the effect of linguistic variables such as input frequency (e.g., Naigles and Hoff-Ginsberg, 1998) or the semantics of the underlying concept, such as concreteness or imageability (e.g., Bird et al., 2001). Embodied theories of cognition, meanwhile, assume that concepts, even relatively abstract ones, can be grounded in the embodied experience. While the focus of such discussions has been mainly on grounding in external modalities, more recently some have argued for the importance of interoceptive features, or grounding in complex modalities such as social interaction. In this paper, we argue for the integration and extension of these two strands of research. We demonstrate that the psycholinguistic factors traditionally considered to determine AoA are far from sufficient to account for the variability observed in AoA data. Given this gap, we propose groundability as a new conceptual tool that can measure the degree to which concepts are grounded both in external and, critically, internal modalities. We then present a mechanistic theory of conceptual representation that can account for groundability in addition to the existing variables argued to influence concept acquisition in both the developmental and embodied cognition literatures, and discuss its implications for future work in concept and cognitive development.