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Duman I, Ehmann IS, Gonsalves AR, Gültekin Z, Van den Berckt J, van Leeuwen C. The No-Report Paradigm: A Revolution in Consciousness Research? Front Hum Neurosci 2022; 16:861517. [PMID: 35634201 PMCID: PMC9130851 DOI: 10.3389/fnhum.2022.861517] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/24/2022] [Accepted: 04/11/2022] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
In the cognitive neuroscience of consciousness, participants have commonly been instructed to report their conscious content. This, it was claimed, risks confounding the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) with their preconditions, i.e., allocation of attention, and consequences, i.e., metacognitive reflection. Recently, the field has therefore been shifting towards no-report paradigms. No-report paradigms draw their validity from a direct comparison with no-report conditions. We analyze several examples of such comparisons and identify alternative interpretations of their results and/or methodological issues in all cases. These go beyond the previous criticism that just removing the report is insufficient, because it does not prevent metacognitive reflection. The conscious mind is fickle. Without having much to do, it will turn inward and switch, or timeshare, between the stimuli on display and daydreaming or mind-wandering. Thus, rather than the NCC, no-report paradigms might be addressing the neural correlates of conscious disengagement. This observation reaffirms the conclusion that no-report paradigms are no less problematic than report paradigms.
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Affiliation(s)
- Irem Duman
- Brain and Cognition, Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences, KU Leuven, Leuven, Belgium
| | - Isabell Sophia Ehmann
- Brain and Cognition, Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences, KU Leuven, Leuven, Belgium
| | - Alicia Ronnie Gonsalves
- Brain and Cognition, Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences, KU Leuven, Leuven, Belgium
| | - Zeynep Gültekin
- Brain and Cognition, Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences, KU Leuven, Leuven, Belgium
| | - Jonathan Van den Berckt
- Brain and Cognition, Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences, KU Leuven, Leuven, Belgium
| | - Cees van Leeuwen
- Brain and Cognition, Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences, KU Leuven, Leuven, Belgium
- Cognitive and Developmental Psychology, Faculty of Social Sciences, TU Kaiserslautern, Kaiserslautern, Germany
- *Correspondence: Cees van Leeuwen
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Grünbaum T, Christensen MS. Measures of agency. Neurosci Conscious 2020; 2020:niaa019. [PMID: 32793394 PMCID: PMC7416314 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niaa019] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/05/2020] [Revised: 03/17/2020] [Accepted: 06/09/2020] [Indexed: 12/05/2022] Open
Abstract
The sense of agency is typically defined as the experience of controlling one’s own actions, and through them, changes in the external environment. It is often assumed that this experience is a single, unified construct that can be experimentally manipulated and measured in a variety of ways. In this article, we challenge this assumption. We argue that we should acknowledge four possible agency-related psychological constructs. Having a clear grasp of the possible constructs is important since experimental procedures are only able to target some but not all the possible constructs. The unacknowledged misalignment of the possible constructs of a sense of agency and the experimental procedures is a major theoretical and methodological obstacle to studying the sense of agency. Only if we recognize the nature of this obstacle will we be able to design the experimental paradigms that would enable us to study the responsible computational mechanisms.
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Affiliation(s)
- Thor Grünbaum
- Section for Philosophy, University of Copenhagen, Karen Blixens Plads 8, DK - 2300 Copenhagen S, Denmark
| | - Mark Schram Christensen
- Department of Neuroscience, Christensen Lab - Cognitive Motor Neuroscience, University of Copenhagen, Panum Institute, Blegdamsvej 3B, DK - 2200, Copenhagen N, 33.3.52, Denmark
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Kello CT. Editor's Introduction and Review: Coordination and Context in Cognitive Science. Top Cogn Sci 2017; 10:6-17. [PMID: 29115065 DOI: 10.1111/tops.12302] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/05/2016] [Revised: 06/14/2017] [Accepted: 08/04/2017] [Indexed: 11/28/2022]
Abstract
The role of coordination in cognitive science has been on the rise in recent years, in terms of coordination among neurons, coordination among sensory and motor systems, and coordination among individuals. Research has shown that coordination patterns corresponding to cognitive activities depend on the various contexts in which the underlying interactions are situated. The present issue of Topics in Cognitive Science centers on studies of coordination that address the role of context in shaping or interpreting dynamical patterns of human behavior. This introductory article reviews some of the prior literature leading up to current and future research on coordination and context in cognitive science.
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