Modeling Morality in 3-D: Decision-Making, Judgment, and Inference

Ethical choice reversals

Understanding the systematic ways that human decision making departs from normative principles has been important in the development of cognitive theory across multiple decision domains. We focus here on whether such seemingly "irrational" decisions occur in ethical decisions that impose difficult tradeoffs between the welfare and interests of different individuals or groups. Across three sets of experiments and in multiple decision scenarios, we provide clear evidence that contextual choice reversals arise in multiples types of ethical choice settings, in just the way that they do in other domains ranging from economic gambles to perceptual judgments (Trueblood et al., 2013; Wedell, 1991). Specifically, we find within-participant evidence for attraction effects in which choices between two options systematically vary as a function of features of a third dominated and unchosen option-a prima facie violation of rational choice axioms that demand consistency. Unlike economic gambles and most domains in which such effects have been studied, many of our ethical scenarios involve features that are not presented numerically, and features for which there is no clear majority-endorsed ranking. We provide empirical evidence and a novel modeling analysis based on individual differences of feature rankings within attributes to show that such individual variations partly explains observed variation in the attraction effects. We conclude by discussing how recent computational analyses of attraction effects may provide a basis for understanding how the observed patterns of choices reflect boundedly rational decision processes.

Embodied sequential sampling models and dynamic neural fields for decision-making: Why hesitate between two when a continuum is the answer

As two alternative options in a forced choice task are separated by design, two classes of computational models of decision-making have thrived independently in the literature for nearly five decades. While sequential sampling models (SSM) focus on response times and keypresses in binary decisions in experimental paradigms, dynamic neural fields (DNF) focus on continuous sensorimotor dimensions and tasks found in perception and robotics. Recent attempts have been made to address limitations in their application to other domains, but strong similarities and compatibility between prominent models from both classes were hardly considered. This article is an attempt at bridging the gap between these classes of models, and simultaneously between disciplines and paradigms relying on binary or continuous responses. A unifying formulation of representative SSM and DNF equations is proposed, varying the number of units which interact and compete to reach a decision. The embodiment of decisions is also considered by coupling cognitive and sensorimotor processes, enabling the model to generate decision trajectories at trial level. The resulting mechanistic model is therefore able to target different paradigms (forced choices or continuous response scales) and measures (final responses or dynamics). The validity of the model is assessed statistically by fitting empirical distributions obtained from human participants in moral decision-making mouse-tracking tasks, for which both dichotomous and nuanced responses are meaningful. Comparing equations at the theoretical level, and model parametrizations at the empirical level, the implications for psychological decision-making processes, as well as the fundamental assumptions and limitations of models and paradigms are discussed.

Predictive cues elicit a liminal confirmation bias in the moral evaluation of real-world images

Previous research suggested that predictive cues enhance the preference and reduce the response time for congruent targets during bivalent food evaluation, indicating a confirmation bias. Less is known about how prior processing affects subjective moral evaluation. Here, we used three different types of predictive cues to elicit directional vs. non-predictive prior processing and then asked the participants to perform moral evaluations on a continuous scale from -10 ("very immoral") to +10 ("very moral") with a diverse set of real-world images. Our experimental image database balanced the morality of image content and the volatility of the ratings based on the means and standard deviations in a preliminary study. Ratings, response times, and gaze positions were measured to examine the effects of predictive cues on the moral evaluation of real-world images. We found that the moral ratings were in line with the expectations induced by the cues. Compared to the non-predictive condition, the moral evaluation in the directional conditions was more polarized. For neutral images, the predictive cues tilted the evaluations to positive vs. negative, indicating a decisive liminal influence. High-volatility images were impacted more than low-volatility images in ratings as well as response times. Furthermore, the gaze positions during the interval between the predictive cue and the image showed a spatial displacement in line with the cue instruction, indicating a response bias. Together, the results show that predictive cues elicit a liminal confirmation bias in moral image evaluation, much in the same way as in bivalent food evaluation.

A neurocomputational account of the link between social perception and social action

People selectively help others based on perceptions of their merit or need. Here, we develop a neurocomputational account of how these social perceptions translate into social choice. Using a novel fMRI social perception task, we show that both merit and need perceptions recruited the brain's social inference network. A behavioral computational model identified two non-exclusive mechanisms underlying variance in social perceptions: a consistent tendency to perceive others as meritorious/needy (bias) and a propensity to sample and integrate normative evidence distinguishing high from low merit/need in other people (sensitivity). Variance in people's merit (but not need) bias and sensitivity independently predicted distinct aspects of altruism in a social choice task completed months later. An individual's merit bias predicted context-independent variance in people's overall other-regard during altruistic choice, biasing people towards prosocial actions. An individual's merit sensitivity predicted context-sensitive discrimination in generosity towards high and low merit recipients by influencing other-regard and self-regard during altruistic decision-making. This context-sensitive perception-action link was associated with activation in the right temporoparietal junction. Together, these findings point towards stable, biologically based individual differences in perceptual processes related to abstract social concepts like merit, and suggest that these differences may have important behavioral implications for an individual's tendency toward favoritism or discrimination in social settings.

Computational Social Psychology

Social psychologists attempt to explain how we interact by appealing to basic principles of how we think. To make good on this ambition, they are increasingly relying on an interconnected set of formal tools that model inference, attribution, value-guided decision making, and multi-agent interactions. By reviewing progress in each of these areas and highlighting the connections between them, we can better appreciate the structure of social thought and behavior, while also coming to understand when, why, and how formal tools can be useful for social psychologists.

Empathic concern induction modulates behavioral ratings and neural responses to harm-related moral judgment: An event-related potentials study

Although empathic concern is critical in harm-related moral judgment, the temporal dynamics underlying the impact of empathic concern on moral judgment remain unclear. This study used event-related potentials (ERPs) to investigate how empathic concern induction shaped the way individuals perceive harmful/helpful behaviors. Behavioral results showed that participants assigned more blame to harmful behaviors in the empathic concern priming condition compared to those in the control condition. ERP results showed that helpful behaviors elicited larger N1 than did harmful behaviors. Additionally, harmful behaviors in the empathic concern priming condition elicited more negative N2 than did harmful behaviors in the control condition. Moreover, harmful behaviors elicited larger late positive potential (LPP) than did helpful behaviors in the control condition. These findings suggest that (1) empathic concern induction might increase moral sensitivity about harm-related norms; (2) participants independent of the empathic concern manipulation can distinguish between harmful behaviors and helpful behaviors similarly, as indicated by the early ERP component (N1); (3) empathic concern especially influences the intermediate (N2) and later (LPP) ERP components.

Mindfulness training reduces slippery slope effects in moral decision-making and moral judgment

Extant research has demonstrated the positive intrapersonal effects of mindfulness training. However, the cognitive mechanisms underlying the effects of mindfulness training on interpersonal processes are less clear. Here, we combined a randomized control mindfulness training design with computational approach to moral decision-making and moral judgments. Participants were randomly assigned to a Training group (N = 32) who received an 8-week mindfulness training or a Control group (N = 26) who waited for the same period of time. Before and after the 8-week period, participants completed a moral decision-making task, where they made tradeoff between money for themselves and unpleasant electric shocks to another person, and a moral judgment task, where they evaluated the blameworthiness of someone else's choices in the same moral decision-making task. Trait mindfulness, as measured by the Five-Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire, significantly increased from the pre- to post-training session for the Training group, but not the Control group, demonstrating the effectiveness of the mindfulness manipulation. For the Control group, participants' moral preference in both the decision-making task and the judgment task declined over time, exhibiting a "slippery slope" effect. In contrast, for the Training group, mindfulness training prevented moral preferences from declining. Computational modeling revealed that mindfulness training specifically reduced the increase in the weights of money over time in both the decision-making and judgment tasks, thereby curbing the "slippery slope" effects. These findings provide a cognitive account of the prosocial effects of mindfulness training on moral decision-making and moral judgments.

A computational account of how individuals resolve the dilemma of dirty money

Money can be tainted when it is associated with direct or indirect harm to others. Deciding whether to accept "dirty money" poses a dilemma because money can be used to help others, but accepting dirty money has moral costs. How people resolve the dilemma of dirty money remains unknown. One theory casts the dilemma as a valuation conflict that can be resolved by integrating the costs and benefits of accepting dirty money. Here, we use behavioral experiments and computational modeling to test the valuation conflict account and unveil the cognitive computations employed when deciding whether to accept or reject morally tainted cash. In Study 1, British participants decided whether to accept "dirty" money obtained by inflicting electric shocks on another person (versus "clean" money obtained by shocking oneself). Computational models showed that the source of the money (dirty versus clean) impacted decisions by shifting the relative valuation of the money's positive and negative attributes, rather than imposing a uniform bias on decision-making. Studies 2 and 3 replicate this finding and show that participants were more willing to accept dirty money when the money was directed towards a good cause, and observers judged such decisions to be more praiseworthy than accepting dirty money for one's own profit. Our findings suggest that dirty money can be psychologically "laundered" through charitable activities and have implications for understanding and preventing the social norms that can justify corrupt behavior.

How Imagination and Memory Shape the Moral Mind

Interdisciplinary research has proposed a multifaceted view of human cognition and morality, establishing that inputs from multiple cognitive and affective processes guide moral decisions. However, extant work on moral cognition has largely overlooked the contributions of episodic representation. The ability to remember or imagine a specific moment in time plays a broadly influential role in cognition and behavior. Yet, existing research has only begun exploring the influence of episodic representation on moral cognition. Here, we evaluate the theoretical connections between episodic representation and moral cognition, review emerging empirical work revealing how episodic representation affects moral decision-making, and conclude by highlighting gaps in the literature and open questions. We argue that a comprehensive model of moral cognition will require including the episodic memory system, further delineating its direct influence on moral thought, and better understanding its interactions with other mental processes to fundamentally shape our sense of right and wrong.

The Effects of Intent, Outcome, and Causality on Moral Judgments and Decision Processes

Over the past decade, moral judgments and their underlying decision processes have more frequently been considered from a dynamic and multi-factorial perspective rather than a binary approach (e.g., dual-system processes). The agent's intent and his or her causal role in the outcome-as well as the outcome importance-are key psychological factors that influence moral decisions, especially judgments of punishment. The current research aimed to study the influence of intent, outcome, and causality variations on moral decisions, and to identify their interaction during the decision process by embedding the moral scenarios within an adapted mouse-tracking paradigm. Findings of the preregistered study (final n = 80) revealed main effects for intent, outcome, and causality on judgments of punishment, and an interaction between the effects of intent and causality. We furthermore explored the dynamics of these effects during the decision process via the analysis of mouse trajectories in the course of time. It allowed detecting when these factors intervened during the trial time course. The present findings thus both replicate and extend previous research on moral judgment, and evidence that, despite some ongoing challenges, mouse-tracking represents a promising tool to investigate moral decision-making.

Stronger Prejudices Are Associated With Decreased Model-Based Control

Background: Prejudices against minorities can be understood as habitually negative evaluations that are kept in spite of evidence to the contrary. Therefore, individuals with strong prejudices might be dominated by habitual or "automatic" reactions at the expense of more controlled reactions. Computational theories suggest individual differences in the balance between habitual/model-free and deliberative/model-based decision-making. Methods: 127 subjects performed the two Step task and completed the blatant and subtle prejudice scale. Results: By using analyses of choices and reaction times in combination with computational modeling, subjects with stronger blatant prejudices showed a shift away from model-based control. There was no association between these decision-making processes and subtle prejudices. Conclusion: These results support the idea that blatant prejudices toward minorities are related to a relative dominance of habitual decision-making. This finding has important implications for developing interventions that target to change prejudices across societies.

What we would (but shouldn't) do for those we love: Universalism versus partiality in responding to others' moral transgressions

Recent work indicates that people are more likely to protect a close (vs. distant) other who commits a crime. But do people think it is morally right to treat close others differently? On the one hand, universalist moral principles dictate that people should be treated equally. On the other hand, close relationships are the source of special moral obligations, which may lead people to believe they ought to preferentially protect close others. Here we attempt to adjudicate between these competing considerations by examining what people think they would and should do when a close (vs. distant) other behaves immorally. Across four experiments (N = 2002), we show that people believe they morally should protect close others more than distant others. However, we also document a striking discrepancy: participants reported that they would protect close others far more than they should protect them. These findings demonstrate that people believe close relationships influence what they morally ought to do-but also that moral decisions about close others may be a context in which people are particularly likely to fail to do what they think is morally right.

Preserved intention understanding during moral judgments in schizophrenia

INTRODUCTION

Although there is convincing evidence for socio-cognitive impairments in schizophrenia spectrum disorder (SSD), little evidence is found for deficient moral cognition. We investigated whether patients with SSD showed altered moral judgments in a story task where the protagonist either had a neutral or malicious intention towards another person. This paradigm examined whether SSD relates to altered moral cognition in general or specifically to impaired integration of prior information (such as beliefs) in moral judgments.

METHODS

23 patients and 32 healthy controls read vignettes created in a 2 x 2 design. The protagonist in each story either had a neutral or negative intention towards another person which, as a result, either died (negative outcome) or did not die (neutral outcome). Participants rated the moral permissibility of the protagonist's action. Standard null hypothesis significance testing and equivalent Bayes analyses are reported.

RESULTS

Schizophrenia patients did not differ significantly in permissibility ratings from healthy controls. This finding was supported by the Bayes analyses which favoured the null hypothesis. Task performance was not related to symptom severity or medication.

CONCLUSIONS

The current findings do not support the notion that moral judgments are deficient in schizophrenia. Furthermore, the current study shows that patients do not have observable difficulties in integrating the protagonist's belief in the rating of the moral permissibility of the action-outcome.

Three stages of perceiving consecutively moral behaviors: Neurophysiological effect of agent and valence on the moral judgments

The present study investigates how agents and the moral valence of the acts affect moral judgments when two consecutively behaviors are perceived, with each describing morally salient behaviors done by the same or different agent(s). Participants had to rate the likableness/pleasantness of the agents/behaviors. Behavioral results indicated that rating the likableness of the agent was mainly depended on the morally diagnostic character of the agent while rating the pleasantness of the behaviors was mainly depended on the moral valence of the behaviors per se. ERP results showed: 1) larger N1 was found in response to the agent consistently acting immorally, indicating an early detection of social threatening information. 2) Compared with agents who consistently act morally which provided no norm- or expectation-violation information, other conditions induced larger N400, indicating greater cognitive effort was recruited when the present moral information violated the participants' prior knowledge to the agent. 3) Increased LPP was found in response to the agent consistently acting morally (vs. moral behaviors acted by different agents), representing that people may allocate more attention to positive information during this stage. We suggest that this three-stage scheme is a common model when people encounter consecutive moral events.

A Generalizable Multivariate Brain Pattern for Interpersonal Guilt

Feeling guilty when we have wronged another is a crucial aspect of prosociality, but its neurobiological bases are elusive. Although multivariate patterns of brain activity show promise for developing brain measures linked to specific emotions, it is less clear whether brain activity can be trained to detect more complex social emotional states such as guilt. Here, we identified a distributed guilt-related brain signature (GRBS) across two independent neuroimaging datasets that used interpersonal interactions to evoke guilt. This signature discriminated conditions associated with interpersonal guilt from closely matched control conditions in a cross-validated training sample (N = 24; Chinese population) and in an independent test sample (N = 19; Swiss population). However, it did not respond to observed or experienced pain, or recalled guilt. Moreover, the GRBS only exhibited weak spatial similarity with other brain signatures of social-affective processes, further indicating the specificity of the brain state it represents. These findings provide a step toward developing biological markers of social emotions, which could serve as important tools to investigate guilt-related brain processes in both healthy and clinical populations.

Editors' Introduction: Computational Approaches to Social Cognition

What place should formal or computational methods occupy in social psychology? We consider this question in historical perspective, survey the current state of the field, introduce the several new contributions to this special issue, and reflect on the future.