Money Is Material

All inequality is not equal: children correct inequalities using resource value

Fairness concerns guide children's judgments about how to share resources with others. However, it is unclear from past research if children take extant inequalities or the value of resources involved in an inequality into account when sharing with others; these questions are the focus of the current studies. In all experiments, children saw an inequality between two recipients—one had two more resources than another. What varied between conditions was the value of the resources that the child could subsequently distribute. When the resources were equal in value to those involved in the original inequality, children corrected the previous inequality by giving two resources to the child with fewer resources (Experiment 1). However, as the value of the resources increased relative to those initially shared by the experimenter, children were more likely to distribute the two high value resources equally between the two recipients, presumably to minimize the overall inequality in value (Experiments 1 and 2). We found that children specifically use value, not just size, when trying to equalize outcomes (Experiment 3) and further found that children focus on the relative rather than absolute value of the resources they share—when the experimenter had unequally distributed the same high value resource that the child would later share, children corrected the previous inequality by giving two high value resources to the person who had received fewer high value resources. These results illustrate that children attempt to correct past inequalities and try to maintain equality not just in the count of resources but also by using the value of resources.

Fast and automatic activation of an abstract representation of money in the human ventral visual pathway

Money, when used as an incentive, activates the same neural circuits as rewards associated with physiological needs. However, unlike physiological rewards, monetary stimuli are cultural artifacts: how are monetary stimuli identified in the first place? How and when does the brain identify a valid coin, i.e. a disc of metal that is, by social agreement, endowed with monetary properties? We took advantage of the changes in the Euro area in 2002 to compare neural responses to valid coins (Euros, Australian Dollars) with neural responses to invalid coins that have lost all monetary properties (French Francs, Finnish Marks). We show in magneto-encephalographic recordings, that the ventral visual pathway automatically distinguishes between valid and invalid coins, within only ∼150 ms. This automatic categorization operates as well on coins subjects were familiar with as on unfamiliar coins. No difference between neural responses to scrambled controls could be detected. These results could suggest the existence of a generic, all-purpose neural representation of money that is independent of experience. This finding is reminiscent of a central assumption in economics, money fungibility, or the fact that a unit of money is substitutable to another. From a neural point of view, our findings may indicate that the ventral visual pathway, a system previously thought to analyze visual features such as shape or color and to be influenced by daily experience, could also able to use conceptual attributes such as monetary validity to categorize familiar as well as unfamiliar visual objects. The symbolic abilities of the posterior fusiform region suggested here could constitute an efficient neural substrate to deal with culturally defined symbols, independently of experience, which probably fostered money's cultural emergence and success.

Medium of exchange matters: what's fair for goods is unfair for money

Organized groups face a fundamental problem of how to distribute resources fairly. We found people view it as less fair to distribute resources equally when the allocated resource invokes the market by being a medium of exchange than when the allocated resource is a good that holds value in use. These differences in fairness can be attributed to being a medium of exchange, and not to other essential properties of money (i.e., being a unit of account or a store of value). These findings suggest that egalitarian outcomes have a greater likelihood of being accepted as fair when the resources being distributed take the form of in-kind goods rather than of cash transfers.

Does Autonomic Arousal Distinguish Good and Bad Decisions?

The somatic marker hypothesis (SMH) proposes that physiological feedback to the brain influences cognitive appraisal and human decisions, however, the strength of evidence in support of the SMH is equivocal. We examined the validity of the SMH by measuring physiological arousal in a population of healthy individuals playing the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT), which is a computerized card game designed to assess real-life decisions. We also examined the influence of reinforcer type on IGT performance and physiological reactivity. Skin conductance level (SCL) reactivity was measured in 41 participants performing the IGT using either facsimile or real money. Participants were categorized as normal (i.e., nonimpaired) or impaired on the basis of their IGT performance, and differences in performance and physiological reactivity between groups were examined. No differences in SCL were found between normal and impaired groups. However, greater SCL rises were borderline significant when anticipating choices from bad decks compared with good decks, and a significantly greater SCL rise followed a reward from a bad deck. The effect of reinforcer type also revealed marginally greater performance when using facsimile money. This was corroborated physiologically by Deck × Reinforcer Type interactions, showing a marginally significant tendency for a greater SCL rise when anticipating a choice from a bad deck using facsimile but not real money, and a significantly greater SCL rise following a reward from a bad deck when using facsimile but not real money. Findings constrain the SMH, suggesting that autonomic activity may discriminate between good and bad decks (i.e., good vs. bad decision-making) by reflecting the magnitude of gains and losses, but is independent of long-term consequences and does not discriminate between overall good and bad performance (i.e., normal vs. impaired decision-makers).