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Millett P, Alexanian T, Brink KR, Carter SR, Diggans J, Palmer MJ, Ritterson R, Sandbrink JB, Wheeler NE. Beyond Biosecurity by Taxonomic Lists: Lessons, Challenges, and Opportunities. Health Secur 2023; 21:521-529. [PMID: 37856148 PMCID: PMC10733751 DOI: 10.1089/hs.2022.0109] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/20/2023] Open
Affiliation(s)
- Piers Millett
- Piers Millett, PhD, is Executive Director, International Biosecurity and Biosafety Initiative for Science, Washington, DC
| | - Tessa Alexanian
- Tessa Alexanian is Safety and Security Program Officer, iGEM Foundation, Paris, France
| | - Kathryn R. Brink
- Kathryn R. Brink, PhD, is a Postdoctoral Fellow, Center for International Security and Cooperation, at Stanford University, Stanford, CA
| | - Sarah R. Carter
- Sarah R. Carter, PhD, is Principal, Science Policy Consulting LLC, Arlington, VA
| | - James Diggans
- James Diggans, PhD, is Head of Biosecurity, Twist Bioscience, San Francisco, CA
| | - Megan J. Palmer
- Megan J. Palmer, PhD, is Executive Director of Bio Policy & Leadership Initiatives and an Adjunct Professor, Department of Bioengineering; at Stanford University, Stanford, CA
| | - Ryan Ritterson
- Ryan Ritterson, PhD, is Executive Vice President of Research, Gryphon Scientific LLC, Takoma Park, MD
| | - Jonas B. Sandbrink
- Jonas B. Sandbrink is a Doctoral Researcher, Nuffield Department of Medicine, University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom
| | - Nicole E. Wheeler
- Nicole E. Wheeler, PhD, is a Turing Fellow, Institute of Microbiology and Infection, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, United Kingdom
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Wells EW, Parker MT. Regulating Select Agent Chimeras: Defining the Problem(s) Through the Lens of SARS-CoV-1/SARS-CoV-2 Chimeric Viruses. Health Secur 2023; 21:392-406. [PMID: 37703547 DOI: 10.1089/hs.2023.0008] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 09/15/2023] Open
Abstract
In late 2021, the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) posted an interim final rule (86 FR 64075) to the federal register regulating the possession, use, and transfer of SARS-CoV-1/SARS-CoV-2 chimeric viruses. In doing so, the CDC provided the reasoning that viral chimeras combining the transmissibility of SARS-CoV-2 with the pathogenicity and lethality of SARS-CoV-1 pose a significant risk to public health and should thus be placed on the select agents and toxins list. However, 86 FR 64075 lacked clarity in its definitions and scope, some of which the CDC addressed in response to public comments in the final rule, 88 FR 13322, in early 2023. To evaluate these regulatory actions, we reviewed the existing select agent regulations to understand the landscape of chimeric virus regulation. Based on our findings, we first present clear definitions for the terms "chimeric virus," "viral chimera," and "virulence factor" and provide a list of SARS-CoV-1 virulence factors in an effort to aid researchers and federal rulemaking for these agents moving forward. We then provide suggestions for a combination of similarity and functional characteristic cutoffs that the government could use to enable researchers to distinguish between regulated and nonregulated chimeras. Finally, we discuss current select agent regulations and their overlaps with 86 FR 64075 and 88 FR 13322 and make suggestions for how to address chimera concerns within and/or without these regulations. Collectively, we believe that our findings fill important gaps in current federal regulations and provide forward-looking philosophical and practical analysis that can guide future decisionmaking.
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Affiliation(s)
- Elizabeth W Wells
- Elizabeth W. Wells is a Student, Department of Biology, Georgetown College of Arts & Sciences, Georgetown University, Washington, DC
| | - Michael T Parker
- Michael T. Parker, PhD, is Assistant Dean, Georgetown College of Arts & Sciences, Georgetown University, Washington, DC
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Godbold GD, Hewitt FC, Kappell AD, Scholz MB, Agar SL, Treangen TJ, Ternus KL, Sandbrink JB, Koblentz GD. Improved understanding of biorisk for research involving microbial modification using annotated sequences of concern. Front Bioeng Biotechnol 2023; 11:1124100. [PMID: 37180048 PMCID: PMC10167326 DOI: 10.3389/fbioe.2023.1124100] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/14/2022] [Accepted: 04/11/2023] [Indexed: 05/15/2023] Open
Abstract
Regulation of research on microbes that cause disease in humans has historically been focused on taxonomic lists of 'bad bugs'. However, given our increased knowledge of these pathogens through inexpensive genome sequencing, 5 decades of research in microbial pathogenesis, and the burgeoning capacity of synthetic biologists, the limitations of this approach are apparent. With heightened scientific and public attention focused on biosafety and biosecurity, and an ongoing review by US authorities of dual-use research oversight, this article proposes the incorporation of sequences of concern (SoCs) into the biorisk management regime governing genetic engineering of pathogens. SoCs enable pathogenesis in all microbes infecting hosts that are 'of concern' to human civilization. Here we review the functions of SoCs (FunSoCs) and discuss how they might bring clarity to potentially problematic research outcomes involving infectious agents. We believe that annotation of SoCs with FunSoCs has the potential to improve the likelihood that dual use research of concern is recognized by both scientists and regulators before it occurs.
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Affiliation(s)
| | | | | | | | - Stacy L. Agar
- Signature Science, LLC, Charlottesville, VA, United States
| | - Todd J. Treangen
- Department of Computer Science, Rice University, Houston, TX, United States
| | | | - Jonas B. Sandbrink
- Nuffield Department of Medicine, University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom
| | - Gregory D. Koblentz
- Schar School of Policy and Government, George Mason University, Arlington, VA, United States
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Hoffmann SA, Diggans J, Densmore D, Dai J, Knight T, Leproust E, Boeke JD, Wheeler N, Cai Y. Safety by design: Biosafety and biosecurity in the age of synthetic genomics. iScience 2023; 26:106165. [PMID: 36895643 PMCID: PMC9988571 DOI: 10.1016/j.isci.2023.106165] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 6.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 02/11/2023] Open
Abstract
Technologies to profoundly engineer biology are becoming increasingly affordable, powerful, and accessible to a widening group of actors. While offering tremendous potential to fuel biological research and the bioeconomy, this development also increases the risk of inadvertent or deliberate creation and dissemination of pathogens. Effective regulatory and technological frameworks need to be developed and deployed to manage these emerging biosafety and biosecurity risks. Here, we review digital and biological approaches of a range of technology readiness levels suited to address these challenges. Digital sequence screening technologies already are used to control access to synthetic DNA of concern. We examine the current state of the art of sequence screening, challenges and future directions, and environmental surveillance for the presence of engineered organisms. As biosafety layer on the organism level, we discuss genetic biocontainment systems that can be used to created host organisms with an intrinsic barrier against unchecked environmental proliferation.
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Affiliation(s)
- Stefan A Hoffmann
- Manchester Institute of Biotechnology, University of Manchester, 131 Princess Street, Manchester M1 7DN, UK
| | - James Diggans
- Twist Bioscience, 681 Gateway Boulevard, South San Francisco, CA 9408, USA
| | - Douglas Densmore
- Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Boston University, 610 Commonwealth Avenue, Boston, MA 02215, USA
| | - Junbiao Dai
- CAS Key Laboratory of Quantitative Engineering Biology, Guangdong Provincial Key Laboratory of Synthetic Genomics and Shenzhen Key Laboratory of Synthetic Genomics, Shenzhen Institute of Synthetic Biology, Shenzhen Institute of Advanced Technology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Shenzhen, China
| | - Tom Knight
- Ginkgo Bioworks, 27 Drydock Avenue, Boston, MA 02210, USA
| | - Emily Leproust
- Twist Bioscience, 681 Gateway Boulevard, South San Francisco, CA 9408, USA
| | - Jef D Boeke
- Institute for Systems Genetics, and Department of Biochemistry & Molecular Pharmacology, NYU Langone Health, 435 East 30th Street, New York, NY 10016, USA.,Department of Biomedical Engineering, NYU Tandon School of Engineering, Brooklyn, NY 11201, USA
| | - Nicole Wheeler
- Institute of Microbiology and Infection, University of Birmingham, Edgbaston, Birmingham B15 2TT, UK
| | - Yizhi Cai
- Manchester Institute of Biotechnology, University of Manchester, 131 Princess Street, Manchester M1 7DN, UK
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Analysis of bronchoalveolar lavage fluid metatranscriptomes among patients with COVID-19 disease. Sci Rep 2022; 12:21125. [PMID: 36476670 PMCID: PMC9729217 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-022-25463-0] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/09/2022] [Accepted: 11/30/2022] [Indexed: 12/13/2022] Open
Abstract
To better understand the potential relationship between COVID-19 disease and hologenome microbial community dynamics and functional profiles, we conducted a multivariate taxonomic and functional microbiome comparison of publicly available human bronchoalveolar lavage fluid (BALF) metatranscriptome samples amongst COVID-19 (n = 32), community acquired pneumonia (CAP) (n = 25), and uninfected samples (n = 29). We then performed a stratified analysis based on mortality amongst the COVID-19 cohort with known outcomes of deceased (n = 10) versus survived (n = 15). Our overarching hypothesis was that there are detectable and functionally significant relationships between BALF microbial metatranscriptomes and the severity of COVID-19 disease onset and progression. We observed 34 functionally discriminant gene ontology (GO) terms in COVID-19 disease compared to the CAP and uninfected cohorts, and 21 GO terms functionally discriminant to COVID-19 mortality (q < 0.05). GO terms enriched in the COVID-19 disease cohort included hydrolase activity, and significant GO terms under the parental terms of biological regulation, viral process, and interspecies interaction between organisms. Notable GO terms associated with COVID-19 mortality included nucleobase-containing compound biosynthetic process, organonitrogen compound catabolic process, pyrimidine-containing compound biosynthetic process, and DNA recombination, RNA binding, magnesium and zinc ion binding, oxidoreductase activity, and endopeptidase activity. A Dirichlet multinomial mixtures clustering analysis resulted in a best model fit using three distinct clusters that were significantly associated with COVID-19 disease and mortality. We additionally observed discriminant taxonomic differences associated with COVID-19 disease and mortality in the genus Sphingomonas, belonging to the Sphingomonadacae family, Variovorax, belonging to the Comamonadaceae family, and in the class Bacteroidia, belonging to the order Bacteroidales. To our knowledge, this is the first study to evaluate significant differences in taxonomic and functional signatures between BALF metatranscriptomes from COVID-19, CAP, and uninfected cohorts, as well as associating these taxa and microbial gene functions with COVID-19 mortality. Collectively, while this data does not speak to causality nor directionality of the association, it does demonstrate a significant relationship between the human microbiome and COVID-19. The results from this study have rendered testable hypotheses that warrant further investigation to better understand the causality and directionality of host-microbiome-pathogen interactions.
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Gemler BT, Mukherjee C, Howland CA, Huk D, Shank Z, Harbo LJ, Tabbaa OP, Bartling CM. Function-based classification of hazardous biological sequences: Demonstration of a new paradigm for biohazard assessments. Front Bioeng Biotechnol 2022; 10:979497. [PMID: 36277394 PMCID: PMC9585941 DOI: 10.3389/fbioe.2022.979497] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/27/2022] [Accepted: 08/31/2022] [Indexed: 12/04/2022] Open
Abstract
Bioengineering applies analytical and engineering principles to identify functional biological building blocks for biotechnology applications. While these building blocks are leveraged to improve the human condition, the lack of simplistic, machine-readable definition of biohazards at the function level is creating a gap for biosafety practices. More specifically, traditional safety practices focus on the biohazards of known pathogens at the organism-level and may not accurately consider novel biodesigns with engineered functionalities at the genetic component-level. This gap is motivating the need for a paradigm shift from organism-centric procedures to function-centric biohazard identification and classification practices. To address this challenge, we present a novel methodology for classifying biohazards at the individual sequence level, which we then compiled to distinguish the biohazardous property of pathogenicity at the whole genome level. Our methodology is rooted in compilation of hazardous functions, defined as a set of sequences and associated metadata that describe coarse-level functions associated with pathogens (e.g., adherence, immune subversion). We demonstrate that the resulting database can be used to develop hazardous “fingerprints” based on the functional metadata categories. We verified that these hazardous functions are found at higher levels in pathogens compared to non-pathogens, and hierarchical clustering of the fingerprints can distinguish between these two groups. The methodology presented here defines the hazardous functions associated with bioengineering functional building blocks at the sequence level, which provide a foundational framework for classifying biological hazards at the organism level, thus leading to the improvement and standardization of current biosecurity and biosafety practices.
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Balaji A, Kille B, Kappell AD, Godbold GD, Diep M, Elworth RAL, Qian Z, Albin D, Nasko DJ, Shah N, Pop M, Segarra S, Ternus KL, Treangen TJ. SeqScreen: accurate and sensitive functional screening of pathogenic sequences via ensemble learning. Genome Biol 2022; 23:133. [PMID: 35725628 PMCID: PMC9208262 DOI: 10.1186/s13059-022-02695-x] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/29/2021] [Accepted: 05/25/2022] [Indexed: 11/10/2022] Open
Abstract
The COVID-19 pandemic has emphasized the importance of accurate detection of known and emerging pathogens. However, robust characterization of pathogenic sequences remains an open challenge. To address this need we developed SeqScreen, which accurately characterizes short nucleotide sequences using taxonomic and functional labels and a customized set of curated Functions of Sequences of Concern (FunSoCs) specific to microbial pathogenesis. We show our ensemble machine learning model can label protein-coding sequences with FunSoCs with high recall and precision. SeqScreen is a step towards a novel paradigm of functionally informed synthetic DNA screening and pathogen characterization, available for download at www.gitlab.com/treangenlab/seqscreen .
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Affiliation(s)
- Advait Balaji
- Department of Computer Science, Rice University, Houston, TX, USA
| | - Bryce Kille
- Department of Computer Science, Rice University, Houston, TX, USA
| | - Anthony D Kappell
- Signature Science, LLC, 8329 North Mopac Expressway, Austin, TX, USA
| | - Gene D Godbold
- Signature Science, LLC, 1670 Discovery Drive, Charlottesville, VA, USA
| | - Madeline Diep
- Fraunhofer USA Center Mid-Atlantic CMA, Riverdale, MD, USA
| | - R A Leo Elworth
- Department of Computer Science, Rice University, Houston, TX, USA
| | - Zhiqin Qian
- Department of Computer Science, Rice University, Houston, TX, USA
| | - Dreycey Albin
- Department of Computer Science, Rice University, Houston, TX, USA
| | - Daniel J Nasko
- Department of Computer Science, University of Maryland, College Park, MD, USA
| | - Nidhi Shah
- Department of Computer Science, University of Maryland, College Park, MD, USA
| | - Mihai Pop
- Department of Computer Science, University of Maryland, College Park, MD, USA
| | - Santiago Segarra
- Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Rice University, Houston, TX, USA
| | - Krista L Ternus
- Signature Science, LLC, 8329 North Mopac Expressway, Austin, TX, USA.
| | - Todd J Treangen
- Department of Computer Science, Rice University, Houston, TX, USA.
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