Reply to "The 1977 H1N1 Influenza Virus Reemergence Demonstrated Gain-of-Function Hazards"

Virology-The next fifty years

Virology has made enormous advances in the last 50 years but has never faced such scrutiny as it does today. Herein, we outline some of the major advances made in virology during this period, particularly in light of the COVID-19 pandemic, and suggest some areas that may be of research importance in the next 50 years. We focus on several linked themes: cataloging the genomic and phenotypic diversity of the virosphere; understanding disease emergence; future directions in viral disease therapies, vaccines, and interventions; host-virus interactions; the role of viruses in chronic diseases; and viruses as tools for cell biology. We highlight the challenges that virology will face moving forward-not just the scientific and technical but also the social and political. Although there are inherent limitations in trying to outline the virology of the future, we hope this article will help inspire the next generation of virologists.

The Silver Lining in Gain-of-Function Experiments with Pathogens of Pandemic Potential

Half a decade after the contentious "gain-of-function" (GOF) debate of 2012 that followed experimentation showing that highly pathogenic avian influenza virus could become mammalian transmissible, it is possible to reflect on the arguments for and against this type of research. In this essay we argue that GOF-type experiments have already produced important information not available from any other source while also providing information on pathogenesis and the requirements for optimizing strains for vaccine production. We analyze the moral arguments against GOF and find them less compelling for a variety of reasons ranging from the uncertainty of risk-benefit analysis to the reduced likelihood of accidents given the enhanced biosafety and biosecurity protocols currently in place. In our view the most important consequence of the GOF debate is that it brought renewed attention to biosafety protocols and ushered innovation in answering the relevant biological questions with greater safety. We conclude that GOF experiments should go forward provided that necessary biosafety and biosecurity conditions are in place.