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Inglis TJJ. A systematic approach to microbial forensics. J Med Microbiol 2024; 73. [PMID: 38305344 DOI: 10.1099/jmm.0.001802] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 02/03/2024] Open
Abstract
The coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic accelerated developments in biotechnology that underpin infection science. These advances present an opportunity to refresh the microbial forensic toolkit. Integration of novel analytical techniques with established forensic methods will speed up acquisition of evidence and better support lines of enquiry. A critical part of any such investigation is demonstration of a robust causal relationship and attribution of responsibility for an incident. In the wider context of a formal investigation into agency, motivation and intent, the quick and efficient assembly of microbiological evidence sets the tone and tempo of the entire investigation. Integration of established and novel analytical techniques from infection science into a systematic approach to microbial forensics will therefore ensure that major perspectives are correctly used to frame and shape the evidence into a clear narrative, while recognizing that forensic hypothesis generation, testing and refinement comprise an iterative process. Development of multidisciplinary training exercises that use this approach will enable translation into practice and efficient implementation when the need arises.
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Affiliation(s)
- T J J Inglis
- Pathology and Laboratory Medicine, School of Medicine, University of Western Australia, Crawley, WA 6009, Australia
- PathWest Laboratory Medicine, QEII Medical Centre, Nedlands, WA 6009, Australia
- Western Australian Country Health Service, Perth, WA 6000, Australia
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Blatch-Jones AJ, Recio Saucedo A, Giddins B. The use and acceptability of preprints in health and social care settings: A scoping review. PLoS One 2023; 18:e0291627. [PMID: 37713422 PMCID: PMC10503772 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0291627] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/27/2023] [Accepted: 09/04/2023] [Indexed: 09/17/2023] Open
Abstract
BACKGROUND Preprints are open and accessible scientific manuscript or report that is shared publicly, through a preprint server, before being submitted to a journal. The value and importance of preprints has grown since its contribution during the public health emergency of the COVID-19 pandemic. Funders and publishers are establishing their position on the use of preprints, in grant applications and publishing models. However, the evidence supporting the use and acceptability of preprints varies across funders, publishers, and researchers. The scoping review explored the current evidence on the use and acceptability of preprints in health and social care settings by publishers, funders, and the research community throughout the research lifecycle. METHODS A scoping review was undertaken with no study or language limits. The search strategy was limited to the last five years (2017-2022) to capture changes influenced by COVID-19 (e.g., accelerated use and role of preprints in research). The review included international literature, including grey literature, and two databases were searched: Scopus and Web of Science (24 August 2022). RESULTS 379 titles and abstracts and 193 full text articles were assessed for eligibility. Ninety-eight articles met eligibility criteria and were included for full extraction. For barriers and challenges, 26 statements were grouped under four main themes (e.g., volume/growth of publications, quality assurance/trustworthiness, risks associated to credibility, and validation). For benefits and value, 34 statements were grouped under six themes (e.g., openness/transparency, increased visibility/credibility, open review process, open research, democratic process/systems, increased productivity/opportunities). CONCLUSIONS Preprints provide opportunities for rapid dissemination but there is a need for clear policies and guidance from journals, publishers, and funders. Cautionary measures are needed to maintain the quality and value of preprints, paying particular attention to how findings are translated to the public. More research is needed to address some of the uncertainties addressed in this review.
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Affiliation(s)
- Amanda Jane Blatch-Jones
- National Institute for Health and Care Research (NIHR) Coordinating Centre, School of Healthcare Enterprise and Innovation, University of Southampton, Southampton, Hampshire, United Kingdom
| | - Alejandra Recio Saucedo
- National Institute for Health and Care Research (NIHR) Coordinating Centre, School of Healthcare Enterprise and Innovation, University of Southampton, Southampton, Hampshire, United Kingdom
| | - Beth Giddins
- National Institute for Health and Care Research (NIHR) Coordinating Centre, School of Healthcare Enterprise and Innovation, University of Southampton, Southampton, Hampshire, United Kingdom
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Abstract
The term Gain-of-Function (GoF) describes the gain of new functions by organisms through genetic changes, which can naturally occur or by experimental genetic modifications. Gain-of-Function research on viruses is enhancing transmissibility, virus replication, virulence, host range, immune evasion or drug and vaccine resistance to get insights into the viral mechanisms, to create and analyze animal models, to accelerate drug and vaccine development and to improve pandemic preparedness. A subset is the GoF research of concern (GOFROC) on enhanced potentially pandemic pathogens (ePPPs) that could be harmful for humans. A related issue is the military use of research as dual-use research of concern (DURC). Influenza and coronaviruses are main research targets, because they cause pandemics by airborne infections. Two studies on avian influenza viruses initiated a global debate and a temporary GoF pause in the United States which ended with a new regulatory framework in 2017. In the European Union and China, GoF and DURC are mainly covered by the legislation for laboratory safety and genetically modified organisms. After the coronavirus outbreaks, the GoF research made significant advances, including analyses of modified MERS-like and SARS-like viruses and the creation of synthetic SARS-CoV-2 viruses as a platform to generate mutations. The GoF research on viruses will still play an important role in future, but the need to clarify the differences and overlaps between GoF research, GOFROC and DURC and the need for specialized oversight authorities are still debated.
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Abstract
The risk of accidental or deliberate misuse of biological research is increasing as biotechnology advances. As open science becomes widespread, we must consider its impact on those risks and develop solutions that ensure security while facilitating scientific progress. Here, we examine the interaction between open science practices and biosecurity and biosafety to identify risks and opportunities for risk mitigation. Increasing the availability of computational tools, datasets, and protocols could increase risks from research with misuse potential. For instance, in the context of viral engineering, open code, data, and materials may increase the risk of release of enhanced pathogens. For this dangerous subset of research, both open science and biosecurity goals may be achieved by using access-controlled repositories or application programming interfaces. While preprints accelerate dissemination of findings, their increased use could challenge strategies for risk mitigation at the publication stage. This highlights the importance of oversight earlier in the research lifecycle. Preregistration of research, a practice promoted by the open science community, provides an opportunity for achieving biosecurity risk assessment at the conception of research. Open science and biosecurity experts have an important role to play in enabling responsible research with maximal societal benefit.
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Affiliation(s)
- James Andrew Smith
- Botnar Research Centre and Centre for Statistics in Medicine, Nuffield Department of Orthopaedics, Rheumatology and Musculoskeletal Sciences, University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom
- National Institute for Health Research Oxford Biomedical Research Centre, John Radcliffe Hospital, Oxford, United Kingdom
| | - Jonas B. Sandbrink
- Nuffield Department of Medicine, University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom
- Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom
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Isaac CR. Establishing an incentive-based multi-stakeholder approach to Dual Use DNA screening. Biochem Cell Biol 2022; 100:268-273. [PMID: 35290750 DOI: 10.1139/bcb-2021-0504] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/22/2022] Open
Abstract
Fast, accessible, and high-quality DNA is fundamental to advancement in the life sciences that will drive forward fields like agriculture, energy, and medicine. Despite their importance in accelerating global progress, bioscience research and biotechnologies can also be misused, endangering humans, animals, and the environment. The ability to accidentally or deliberately endow or enhance pathogenicity of biological systems is of particular concern. Access to DNA sequences with a clear potential for Dual Use should be limited to responsible and identifiable groups with legitimate uses. Yet, none of the 195 countries party to the International Health Regulations have national laws that mandate this type of screening. Many DNA providers voluntarily screen orders and absorb increased costs, but this practice is not universally adopted for a variety of reasons. This article explores the incentives and regulatory structures that can bring the screening coverage of DNA orders towards 100%, which may include: expedited orders for approved customers, better tools and technology for more efficient screening, funding requirements that grantees use screened DNA, and early education in biosecurity aimed at researchers and students. Ultimately, an incentive-based multi-stakeholder approach to DNA screening can benefit researchers, industry, and global health security.
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Affiliation(s)
- Christopher R Isaac
- Nuclear Threat Initiative, 580269, Global Biological Policy and Programs, Washington, District of Columbia, United States;
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Mackelprang R, Adamala KP, Aurand ER, Diggans JC, Ellington AD, Evans SW, Fortman JLC, Hillson NJ, Hinman AW, Isaacs FJ, Medford JI, Mamaghani S, Moon TS, Palmer MJ, Peccoud J, Vitalis EA, Hook-Barnard I, Friedman DC. Making Security Viral: Shifting Engineering Biology Culture and Publishing. ACS Synth Biol 2022; 11:522-527. [PMID: 35176864 DOI: 10.1021/acssynbio.1c00324] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/29/2022]
Abstract
The ability to construct, synthesize, and edit genes and genomes at scale and with speed enables, in synergy with other tools of engineering biology, breakthrough applications with far-reaching implications for society. As SARS-CoV-2 spread around the world in early spring of 2020, researchers rapidly mobilized, using these tools in the development of diagnostics, therapeutics, and vaccines for COVID-19. The sharing of knowledge was crucial to making rapid progress. Several publications described the use of reverse genetics for the de novo construction of SARS-CoV-2 in the laboratory, one in the form of a protocol. Given the demonstrable harm caused by the virus, the unequal distribution of mitigating vaccines and therapeutics, their unknown efficacy against variants, and the interest in this research by laboratories unaccustomed to working with highly transmissible pandemic pathogens, there are risks associated with such publications, particularly as protocols. We describe considerations and offer suggestions for enhancing security in the publication of synthetic biology research and techniques. We recommend: (1) that protocol manuscripts for the de novo synthesis of certain pathogenic viruses undergo a mandatory safety and security review; (2) that if published, such papers include descriptions of the discussions or review processes that occurred regarding security considerations in the main text; and (3) the development of a governance framework for the inclusion of basic security screening during the publication process of engineering biology/synthetic biology manuscripts to build and support a safe and secure research enterprise that is able to maximize its positive impacts and minimize any negative outcomes.
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Affiliation(s)
- Rebecca Mackelprang
- Engineering Biology Research Consortium, 5885 Hollis Street, Emeryville, California 94608, United States
| | - Katarzyna P. Adamala
- Department of Genetics, Cell Biology and Development, University of Minnesota, 420 Washington Avenue SE, Minneapolis, Minnesota 55455, United States
| | - Emily R. Aurand
- Engineering Biology Research Consortium, 5885 Hollis Street, Emeryville, California 94608, United States
| | - James C. Diggans
- Twist Bioscience, 681 Gateway Boulevard, South San Francisco, California 94080, United States
| | - Andrew D. Ellington
- Center for Systems and Synthetic Biology, University of Texas at Austin, 100 E 24th Street, Austin, Texas 78712, United States
| | - Samuel Weiss Evans
- Harvard Kennedy School, Program on Science, Technology & Society, 79 JFK Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139, United States
| | - J. L. Clem Fortman
- Engineering Biology Research Consortium, 5885 Hollis Street, Emeryville, California 94608, United States
| | - Nathan J. Hillson
- Biological Systems & Engineering Division, Berkeley National Lab, 1 Cyclotron Road, Berkeley, California 94720, United States
- DOE Agile BioFoundry, 1 Cyclotron Road, Berkeley, California 94720, United States
- DOE Joint Genome Institute,1 Cyclotron Road, Berkeley, California 94720, United States
- DOE Joint BioEnergy Institute, 1 Cyclotron Road, Berkeley, California 94720, United States
| | - Albert W. Hinman
- Engineering Biology Research Consortium, 5885 Hollis Street, Emeryville, California 94608, United States
| | - Farren J. Isaacs
- Department of Molecular, Cellular & Developmental Biology, Department of Biomedical Engineering, Systems Biology Institute, Yale University, 266 Whitney Avenue, KBT 802, P.O. Box 208103, New Haven, Connecticut 06520, United States
| | - June I. Medford
- Department of Biology, Colorado State University, 1878 Campus Delivery, Fort Collins, Colorado 90523-1878, United States
| | - Shadi Mamaghani
- AAAS Science and Technology Policy Fellowship, 1200 NW New York Avenue, Washington, D.C., 20005, United States
| | - Tae Seok Moon
- Department of Energy, Environmental and Chemical Engineering, Washington University in St. Louis, One Brookings Drive Box 1180, St. Louis, Missouri 63130, United States
- Division of Biology and Biomedical Sciences, Washington University in St. Louis, One Brookings Drive Box 1180, St. Louis, Missouri 63130, United States
| | - Megan J. Palmer
- Department of Bioengineering, Stanford University, 443 Via Ortega, Stanford, California 94305, United States
- Center for International Security and Cooperation, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University, 616 Serra Street C100, Stanford, California 94305, United States
| | - Jean Peccoud
- Department of Chemical & Biological Engineering, Colorado State University, 1370 Campus Delivery, Fort Collins, Colorado 80523-1370, United States
| | | | - India Hook-Barnard
- Engineering Biology Research Consortium, 5885 Hollis Street, Emeryville, California 94608, United States
| | - Douglas C. Friedman
- Engineering Biology Research Consortium, 5885 Hollis Street, Emeryville, California 94608, United States
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