The cost-effectiveness of using results-based financing to reduce maternal and perinatal mortality in Malawi

Exploring the roles of players in strategic purchasing for healthcare in Africa-a scoping review

Following the World Health Organization (WHO) guidance on strategic purchasing in 2000, low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) are trying to shift from passive purchasing (using fixed budgets) to strategic purchasing of healthcare which ties reimbursement to outcomes. However, there is limited evidence on strategic purchasing in Africa. We conducted a scoping literature review aimed at summarizing the roles played by governments, purchasers and providers in relation to citizens/population in strategic purchasing in Africa. The review searched for scientific journal articles that contained data on strategic purchasing collected from Africa. The literature search identified 957 articles of which 80 matched the inclusion criteria and were included in the review. The study revealed that in some countries strategic purchasing has been used as a tool for healthcare reforms or for strengthening systems that were not functional under fixed budgets. However, there was some evidence of a lack of government commitment in taking leading roles and funding strategic purchasing. Further, in some countries the laws need to be revised to accommodate new arrangements that were not part of fixed budgets. The review also established that there were some obstacles within the public health systems that deterred purchasers from promoting efficiency among providers and that prevented providers from having full autonomy in decision making. As African countries strive to shift from passive to strategic purchasing of healthcare, there is need for full government commitment on strategic purchasing. There is need to further revise appropriate legal frameworks to support strategic purchasing, conduct assessments of the healthcare systems before designing strategic purchasing schemes and to sensitize the providers and citizens on their roles and entitlements respectively.

How much does it cost to combine supply-side and demand-side RBF approaches in a single intervention? Full cost analysis of the Results Based Financing for Maternal and Newborn Health Initiative in Malawi

OBJECTIVE

To estimate the economic cost associated with implementing the Results Based Financing for Maternal and Newborn Health (RBF4MNH) Initiative in Malawi. No specific hypotheses were formulated ex-ante.

SETTING

Primary and secondary delivery facilities in rural Malawi.

PARTICIPANTS

Not applicable. The study relied almost exclusively on secondary financial data.

INTERVENTION

The RBF4MNH Initiative was a results-based financing (RBF) intervention including both a demand and a supply-side component.

PRIMARY AND SECONDARY OUTCOME MEASURES

Cost per potential and for actual beneficiaries.

RESULTS

The overall economic cost of the Initiative during 2011-2016 amounted to €12 786 924, equivalent to €24.17 per pregnant woman residing in the intervention districts. The supply side activity cluster absorbed over 40% of all resources, half of which were spent on infrastructure upgrading and equipment supply, and 10% on incentives. Costs for the demand side activity cluster and for verification were equivalent to 14% and 6%, respectively of the Initiative overall cost.

CONCLUSION

Carefully tracing resource consumption across all activities, our study suggests that the full economic cost of implementing RBF interventions may be higher than what was previously reported in published cost-effectiveness studies. More research is urgently needed to carefully trace the costs of implementing RBF and similar health financing innovations, in order to inform decision-making in low-income and middle-income countries around scaling up RBF approaches.

The effects of performance-based financing on neonatal health outcomes in Burundi, Lesotho, Senegal, Zambia and Zimbabwe

Maternal and newborn care has been a primary focus of performance-based financing (PBF) projects, which have been piloted or implemented in 21 countries in sub-Saharan Africa since 2007. Several evaluations of PBF have demonstrated improvements to facility delivery or quality of care. However, no studies have measured the impact of PBF programmes directly on neonatal health outcomes in Africa, nor compared PBF programmes against another. We assess the impact of PBF on early neonatal health outcomes and associated health care utilization and quality in Burundi, Lesotho, Senegal, Zambia and Zimbabwe. We pooled Demographic and Health Surveys and Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys and apply difference-in-differences analysis to estimate the effect of PBF projects supported by the World Bank on early neonatal mortality and low birthweight. We also assessed the effect of PBF on intermediate outputs that are frequently explicitly incentivized in PBF projects, including facility delivery and antenatal care utilization and quality, and caesarean section. Finally, we examined the impact among births to poor or high-risk women. We found no statistically significant impact of PBF on neonatal health outcomes, health care utilization or quality in a pooled sample. PBF was also not associated with better health outcomes in each country individually, though in some countries and among poor women PBF improved facility delivery, antenatal care utilization or antenatal care quality. There was no improvement on the health outcomes among poor or high-risk women in the five countries. PBF had no impact on early neonatal health outcomes in the five African countries studied and had limited and variable effects on the utilization and quality of neonatal health care. These findings suggest that there is a need for both a deeper assessment of PBF and for other strategies to make meaningful improvements to neonatal health outcomes.

Paying for performance to improve the delivery of health interventions in low- and middle-income countries

BACKGROUND

There is growing interest in paying for performance (P4P) as a means to align the incentives of healthcare providers with public health goals. Rigorous evidence on the effectiveness of these strategies in improving health care and health in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) is lacking; this is an update of the 2012 review on this topic.

OBJECTIVES

To assess the effects of paying for performance on the provision of health care and health outcomes in low- and middle-income countries.

SEARCH METHODS

We searched CENTRAL, MEDLINE, Embase, and 10 other databases between April and June 2018. We also searched two trial registries, websites, online resources of international agencies, organizations and universities, and contacted experts in the field. Studies identified from rerunning searches in 2020 are under 'Studies awaiting classification.'

SELECTION CRITERIA

We included randomized or non-randomized trials, controlled before-after studies, or interrupted time series studies conducted in LMICs (as defined by the World Bank in 2018). P4P refers to the transfer of money or material goods conditional on taking a measurable action or achieving a predetermined performance target. To be included, a study had to report at least one of the following outcomes: patient health outcomes, changes in targeted measures of provider performance (such as the delivery of healthcare services), unintended effects, or changes in resource use.

DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

We extracted data as per original review protocol and narratively synthesised findings. We used standard methodological procedures expected by Cochrane. Given diversity and variability in intervention types, patient populations, analyses and outcome reporting, we deemed meta-analysis inappropriate. We noted the range of effects associated with P4P against each outcome of interest. Based on intervention descriptions provided in documents, we classified design schemes and explored variation in effect by scheme design.

MAIN RESULTS

We included 59 studies: controlled before-after studies (19), non-randomized (16) or cluster randomized trials (14);  and interrupted time-series studies (9). One study included both an interrupted time series and a controlled before-after study. Studies focused on a wide range of P4P interventions, including target payments and payment for outputs as modified by quality (or quality and equity assessments). Only one study assessed results-based aid. Many schemes were funded by national governments (23 studies) with the World Bank funding most externally funded schemes (11 studies). Targeted services varied; however, most interventions focused on reproductive, maternal and child health indicators. Participants were predominantly located in public or in a mix of public, non-governmental and faith-based facilities (54 studies). P4P was assessed predominantly at health facility level, though districts and other levels were also involved. Most studies assessed the effects of P4P against a status quo control (49 studies); however, some studies assessed effects against comparator interventions (predominantly enhanced financing intended to match P4P funds (17 studies)). Four studies reported intervention effects against both comparator and status quo. Controlled before-after studies were at higher risk of bias than other study designs. However, some randomised trials were also downgraded due to risk of bias. The interrupted time-series studies provided insufficient information on other concurrent changes in the study context. P4P compared to a status quo control For health services that are specifically targeted, P4P may slightly improve health outcomes (low certainty evidence), but few studies assessed this. P4P may also improve service quality overall (low certainty evidence); and probably increases the availability of health workers, medicines and well-functioning infrastructure and equipment (moderate certainty evidence). P4P may have mixed effects on the delivery and use of services (low certainty evidence) and may have few or no distorting unintended effects on outcomes that were not targeted (low-certainty evidence), but few studies assessed these. For secondary outcomes, P4P may make little or no difference to provider absenteeism, motivation or satisfaction (low certainty evidence); but may improve patient satisfaction and acceptability (low certainty evidence); and may positively affect facility managerial autonomy (low certainty evidence). P4P probably makes little to no difference to management quality or facility governance (low certainty evidence). Impacts on equity were mixed (low certainty evidence). For health services that are untargeted, P4P probably improves some health outcomes (moderate certainty evidence); may improve the delivery, use and quality of some health services but may make little or no difference to others (low certainty evidence); and may have few or no distorting unintended effects (low certainty evidence). The effects of P4P on the availability of medicines and other resources are uncertain (very low certainty evidence). P4P compared to other strategies For health outcomes and services that are specifically targeted, P4P may make little or no difference to health outcomes (low certainty evidence), but few studies assessed this. P4P may improve service quality (low certainty evidence); and may have mixed effects on the delivery and use of health services and on the availability of equipment and medicines (low certainty evidence). For health outcomes and services that are untargeted, P4P may make little or no difference to health outcomes and to the delivery and use of health services (low certainty evidence). The effects of P4P on service quality, resource availability and unintended effects are uncertain (very low certainty evidence). Findings of subgroup analyses Results-based aid, and schemes using payment per output adjusted for service quality, appeared to yield the greatest positive effects on outcomes. However, only one study evaluated results-based aid, so the effects may be spurious. Overall, schemes adjusting both for quality of service and rewarding equitable delivery of services appeared to perform best in relation to service utilization outcomes.

AUTHORS' CONCLUSIONS

The evidence base on the impacts of P4P schemes has grown considerably, with study quality gradually increasing. P4P schemes may have mixed effects on outcomes of interest, and there is high heterogeneity in the types of schemes implemented and evaluations conducted. P4P is not a uniform intervention, but rather a range of approaches. Its effects depend on the interaction of several variables, including the design of the intervention (e.g., who receives payments ), the amount of additional funding,  ancillary components (such as technical support) and contextual factors (including organizational context).