Evaluating performance-based financing in low-income and middle-income countries: the need to look beyond average effect

How personnel diversity and affective bonds affect performance-based financing: a moderator analysis of a difference-in-difference estimator

To spur improvement in health-care service quality and quantity, performance-based financing (PBF) is an increasingly common policy tool, especially in low- and middle-income countries. This study examines how personnel diversity and affective bonds in primary care clinics affect their ability to improve care quality in PBF arrangements. Leveraging data from a large-scale matched PBF intervention in Tajikistan including 208 primary care clinics, we examined how measures of personnel diversity (position and tenure variety) and affective bonds (mutual support and group pride) were associated with changes in the level and variability of clinical knowledge (diagnostic accuracy of 878 clinical vignettes) and care processes (completion of checklist items in 2485 instances of direct observations). We interacted the explanatory variables with exposure to PBF in cluster-robust, linear regressions to assess how these explanatory variables moderated the PBF treatment's association with clinical knowledge and care process improvements. Providers and facilities with higher group pride exhibited higher care process improvement (greater checklist item completion and lower variability of items completed). Personnel diversity and mutual support showed little significant associations with the outcomes. Organizational features of clinics exposed to PBF may help explain variation in outcomes and warrant further research and intervention in practice to identify and test opportunities to leverage them. Group pride may strengthen clinics' ability to improve care quality in PBF arrangements. Improving health-care facilities' pride may be an affordable and effective way to enhance health-care organization adaptation.

Reviewing the evidence on health financing for effective coverage: do financial incentives work?

The widening gap between improving healthcare coverage rates and stagnating health outcomes across low-income and middle-income countries highlights the need for investments in quality of care, in addition to access. New research, presented in a World Bank report, examines one type of relevant policy reform: performance-based financing (PBF), which is a package reform that always includes performance pay to front-line health workers and often also provides facility autonomy, transparency and community engagement. A large body of rigorous studies and new analysis show that in under-resourced, centralised health systems, PBF can result in gains to service utilisation, but only has limited impacts on quality. Even the relative benefits of PBF on service utilisation are less clear when compared with (1) direct facility financing which provides front-line facilities with operating budgets and provider autonomy, but not performance pay and (2) demand-side financial support for health services (ie, conditional cash transfers and vouchers). Thus, the central component of PBF—the performance pay—appears to add little value over flexible payment systems and provider autonomy. The analysis shows that this lack of impact is unsurprising because most of the constraints to improving quality do not lie with the health worker in these settings. While PBF was conceived as a complex package ‘blueprint’, we review the evidence to conclude that only some elements seem to make sense. To improve quality of care, health financing should pivot from performance pay while retaining the elements of direct facility financing, autonomy, transparency and community engagement.

Facility and Community Results-Based Financing to Improve Maternal and Child Nutrition and Health in The Gambia

In 2013, the Government of The Gambia implemented a novel results-based financing (RBF) intervention designed to improve maternal and child nutrition and health through a combination of community, facility and individual incentives. In a mixed-methods study, we used a randomized 2 × 2 study design to measure these interventions' impact on the uptake of priority maternal health services, hygiene and sanitation. Conditional cash transfers to individuals were bundled with facility results-based payments. Community groups received incentive payments conditional on completion of locally-designed health projects. Randomization occurred separately at health facility and community levels. Our model pools baseline, midline and endline exposure data to identify evidence of the interventions' impact in isolation or combination. Multivariable linear regression models were estimated. A qualitative study was embedded, with data thematically analyzed. We analyzed 5,927 household surveys: 1,939 baseline, 1,951 midline, and 2,037 endline. On average, community group interventions increased skilled deliveries by 11 percentage points, while the facility interventions package increased them by seven percentage points. No impact was found, either in the community group or facility intervention package arms on early ANC. The community group intervention led to 49, 43 and 48 percentage point increases in handwashing stations, soaps at station and water at station, respectively. No impact was found on improved sanitation facilities. The qualitative data help understand factors underlying these changes. No interaction was found between the community and facility interventions. Where demand-side barriers predominate and community governance structures exist, community group RBF interventions may be more effective than facility designs.

Performance-based incentives and community health workers' outputs, a systematic review

OBJECTIVE

To review the evidence on the impact on measurable outcomes of performance-based incentives for community health workers (CHWs) in low- and middle-income countries.

METHODS

We conducted a systematic review of intervention studies published before November 2020 that evaluated the impact of financial and non-financial performance-based incentives for CHWs. Outcomes included patient health indicators; quality, utilization or delivery of health-care services; and CHW motivation or satisfaction. We assessed risk of bias for all included studies using the Cochrane tool. We based our narrative synthesis on a framework for measuring the performance of CHW programmes, comprising inputs, processes, performance outputs and health outcomes.

FINDINGS

Two reviewers screened 2811 records; we included 12 studies, 11 of which were randomized controlled trials and one a non-randomized trial. We found that non-financial, publicly displayed recognition of CHWs' efforts was effective in improved service delivery outcomes. While large financial incentives were more effective than small ones in bringing about improved performance, they often resulted in the reallocation of effort away from other, non-incentivized tasks. We found no studies that tested a combined package of financial and non-financial incentives. The rationale for the design of performance-based incentives or explanation of how incentives interacted with contextual factors were rarely reported.

CONCLUSION

Financial performance-based incentives alone can improve CHW service delivery outcomes, but at the risk of unincentivized tasks being neglected. As calls to professionalize CHW programmes gain momentum, research that explores the interactions among different forms of incentives, context and sustainability is needed.

Can Results-Based Financing improve health outcomes in resource poor settings? Evidence from Zimbabwe

Result Based Financing (RBF) has been implemented in health systems across low and middle-income countries (LMICs), with the objective of improving population health. Most evaluations of RBF schemes have focused on average programme effects for incentivised services. There is limited evidence on the potential effect of RBF on health outcomes, as well as on the heterogeneous effects across socio-economic groups and time periods. This study analyses the effect of Zimbabwe's national RBF scheme on neonatal, infant and under five mortality, using Demographic and Health Survey data from 2005, 2010 and 2015. We use a difference in differences design, which exploits the staggered roll-out of the scheme across 60 districts. We examine average programme effects and perform sub-group analyses to assess differences between socio-economic groups. We find that RBF reduced under-five mortality by two percentage points overall, but that this decrease was only significant for children of mothers with above median wealth (2.7 percentage points) and education (2.1 percentage points). RBF increased institutional delivery by seven percentage points – with a statistically significant effect for poorer socio-economic groups and least educated. We also find that RBF reduced c-section rates by three percentage points. We find no detectable effect of RBF on other incentivised services. When considering programme effects over time, we find that effects were only observed during the second phase of the programme (March 2012) with the exception of c-sections, which only reduced in the longer term. Further research is needed to examine whether these findings can be generalised to other settings.

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Zimbabwe's national Results Based Financing scheme decreased under-five mortality.

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Among higher wealth and education groups.

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RBF increased institutional deliveries in the poorest and least educated groups and reduced the rate of c-section.

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There were no programme effects on other incentivised services.

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The RBF programme effects generally appear to be stronger earlier in the implementation process.